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Abstract 
In the last two decades especially, the scale, depth and intensity of competitive changes in the financial 
services marketplace have progressed to new heights. Financialisation, as it has become known, is 
creating new opportunities and constraints for nations, businesses and 'people', as the circuits of 
production have become more closely bound up with the innovative dynamics and institutions of the 
capital market. In an attempt to define, measure and explain the financialisation of the economy, this 
thesis draws upon a unique theoretical framework to explore the transformations in private pension 
provision. Using the work of Karl Polanyi as our guide, and particularly of those ideas found in his 
seminal book The Great Transformation, we posit that financialisation has gone through two different 
stages that we call disembedding and re-embedding. To articulate this proposition and to examine it 
beyond conventional economic accounts, we draw upon a wide variety of cultural (political) economic 
scholars, such as Veblen, Foucault, Bourdieu, Giddens, Callon and Thrift, whose ideas collectively help 
us to understand the cultural processes, strategies, conflicts, interactions and performances underpinning 
the ongoing evolution of financialisation in society. Applying this framework, we find that the collective 
pensions that were once part of a unified post-war political economy have come under threat from the 
new idea that welfare should be linked to the vagaries and anonymous circuits of the stock market. 
Disembedding has taken its form through the financialisation of pension provision, encouraging an 
explicit change from collective welfare to individual responsibility. While the individual has become 
precariously embedded as a financial consumer inside commercial market relations, it is doubtful whether 
this model is sustainable and practical as a means of delivering social inclusion and political enrichment. 
Department of Politics 
University of Newcastle upon Tvne 
School of Geography, Politics and SociologTv 
NEI 7R U 
UK 
NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
206 53520 2 
Dedicated to Mum, Dad, Clare, Marc, Tabby, Mairead, Franky and Striker 
2 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
Philosopher 
My point is already clear: this ascetic priest, this apparent enemy of life, this man of negation - 
yes, even he counts among the very great forces which conserve and affirm life ... 
What is the 
reason for this sickliness? For man is more sick, more uncertain, more mutable, less defined than 
any other animal, there is no doubt about that - he is the sick animal: why is that? Certainly, he 
has also been more daring, innovative, and defiant and has challenged fate more than all the 
other animals put together: he, the great experimenter with himself, the unsatisfied, unsated one 
who struggles with animal, nature, and the gods for ultimate mastery - he, the one who remains 
undefeated, eternally orientated towards the future, who can find no respite from his own 
compelling energy, so that the spur of the future mercilessly digs into the skin of every present - 
how should such a courageous and well-endowed animal not also be the most endangered, the 
most chronically and deeply sick of all the sick animals?... Man has had enough - there are, often 
enough, whole epidemics of this satiety; but, like everything else, even this disgust, this fatigue, 
this frustration with himself emerges so powerfully in him that it is immediately transformed into 
another chain. The No which he says to life brings, as if by magic, an abundance of tender Yeses 
to light; even when this master of destruction, of self-destruction wounds himself - it is the 
wound itself which afterwards compels him to live... 
On the Genealogy of Morals (1887/1998: 100) 
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Samir Amin 
Academic and writer 
... 
by dint of its completely generalised nature, embracing each and every segment of the world 
system, fmancialisation has acquired an unprecedented dimension. What future is taking place 
behind the smoke screen that it puts up? What new system of accumulation is putting itself, or 
not putting itself, into place? We are here in a field where all - or nearly all - hypotheses are 
possible, where all scenarios are imaginable; such is the uncertainty of the future and so fragile 
are our fragments of knowledge concerning the recomposition of the world. The future of 
globalisation remains a great unknown. 
The Challenge of Globalisation (1996: 250) 
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Adam Tickell 
Academic and Writer 
Ultimately, the future of pensions is about the political and economic decisions that our societies 
make... 
Pensions and Politics (2003: 1383) 
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IX. PREFACE 
The motivation for this work was to understand `financialisation', a relatively new 
concept in the nomenclature of academia, which has now become the workhorse and the 
meeting place for many intersecting disciplines (see figure one Annex B). I intended to 
focus on the political economy of financialisation, to go beyond the state-market 
dichotomy and to see politics and governance in the marketplace. What began as a 
politics of financialisation evolved into something else, something that required less 
rules and more epistemological freedom, more creative freedom, which inevitably led to 
the acquisition of naive bottlenecks. Like trying to force a melon down a pea shoot, 
conceptualising financialisation became a creative problem, because the question of 
politics moved towards questions of culture - questions of meaning; representation; 
repetition, performativity and reflexivity. This whole project has been a journey of 
moving `towards' such questions and never quite reaching their final destination, 
because in many ways it is futile, if not adolescent, to try and monopolise them, because 
they are fictitious, they exist in our heads and in a reality that is constantly changing and 
altering their social forms and significance. This is perhaps another reason why we 
move `towards' a Cultural International Political Economy of Financialisation. 
How to think about this thesis: imagine Michel Aglietta (1979: 1998), the 
regulation theorist, the heterodox analyst of the political economy, whom is interested in 
the systemic connections of production and consumption at the micro, meso and macro 
levels - the circuits of value creation that connect individuals, governments and 
institutions into topologies of interaction, output and governance. Now imagine Michel 
Foucault (1966/2002: 1969), the philosopher of history, who turns our world upside 
down and looks at the propagators of our world, not people, but knowledge - or 
discourse, that shapes history through the medium and effect of its own meta-narrative, 
structuring social relations and bodily power without any physical presence what so 
ever. Discourse is not homogenous, it comes in many forms e. g. science, language or 
even `economics'; and so the world that Aglietta describes is the world that Foucault 
deconstructs. Now finally, imagine Karl Polanyi (1944), the historian, who reminds us 
of the need for historical understanding and narrative, who looks at the economy as a 
socially instituted and path-dependent process. In these three scholars, we have the 
study of norms, the constitution of norms and the transformation of norms. It is between 
these three scholars that we attempt to situate this work. 
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The argument: financialisation has gone through a stage and process of 
disembedding and re-embedding. Anthony Giddens first coined the concept of 
disembedding, which referred to `the `lifting out' of social relations from local contexts 
of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space' (Giddens, 
1990: 21). Giddens's main point was that disembedding bracketed `time-space by 
coupling instantaneity and deferral, presence and absence' (ibid.: 25). While Giddens 
argues that disembedding is inextricably woven into the reflexive and cumulative nature 
of modernity, it is proposed in this thesis that financialisation is a discursive example of 
disembedding, with its roots in late-modernity and the Klondike revival of global 
finance in post-war economic times. We needn't think of financialisation and its 
qualitative nature as an inevitable process or something that is unquestionably 
`progressive', because even the solutions internal to its evolution aspire from 
fundamental economic assumptions about the good life that privilege individualism over 
non-competitive ways of life, which may for example - as an alternative, emphasise 
such things as community, deference and universal social values that we can all agree 
upon - or at least pursue. The undemocratic nature of financialisation - and its 
consequences for society, is the main point here and is something that we must address 
if we are to reconstruct a new politics founded on virtues, as opposed to individualised, 
fickle, fad-like interests. But to set off on this journey, we must not undermine our 
opponent, because like a `soft cage', financialisation is coercive and seductive; it 
belongs to the historical evolution of the world-system, particularly of modern times, 
and it compels institutions and people to transform and rationalise their operations and 
behaviour in such a way as to increase the dominance of finance, as power becomes 
expressed through the medium of the culturally mundane economic society. In this case, 
the post-war institutions, conventions and expectations of embedded liberalism, a 
concept infamously coined by John G. Ruggie (1983), have been `lifted out' of their 
historical context and interaction, and restructured to `fit' the urgencies arising from 
within financialisation itself. 
As an observatory note, just think of the many changes in welfare for a while. 
Since the late l9`h century, social movements in Europe urged governments and 
institutions, and companies, to create benevolent institutions of welfare, not just for the 
few, but for the many. In the United Kingdom, this call for social justice was 
consolidated and delivered by Sir William Beveridge in 1942 with the publication of 
Social Insurance and Allied Services; otherwise known as the Beveridge report - where 
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it called for the provision of unemployment insurance, pensions and medical care etc., in 
order to create a minimum standard of living `below which no one should be allowed to 
fall'. This set the post-war paradigm of collective social insurance and traditional 
responsibility on its way. Out of this momentum in history, great institutions were 
formed, creating incentives between the employee and employer e. g. final salary 
pensions; between state and citizen e. g. national insurance and health; between public 
and private sector. What's more is that the young were responsible, implicitly, for the 
old - they certainly were not a burden - and the private sector was not necessarily at 
odds or in tension with the public sector, or the benefits internal to such institutions, 
because the private sector contributed towards the public sphere from across the fence; 
it was laden in community relations within a post-war political economy of tripartite 
relations i. e. labour, capital and state. This is not to say, at all, that this period was 
utopia or that it was free from ambivalence, because this would not be true. But, for a 
while, the post-war economy did rest upon a common vision of progress, of wealth 
creation, where society was respected as an independent, yet mutual partner in the re- 
stabilisation of the economy, and not, as we increasingly observe today, as an 
indistinguishable variable of commercial life. 
Ironically, the same generations that benefited from the post-war political 
economy were seemingly seduced by the new frontier of global finance; its institutions 
and pledges; promises and opportunities; to the extent that we can now talk of 
financialisation as the privatisation of positive liberty. The collective pensions that were 
once part of a unified post-war political economy have come under threat from the new 
idea that welfare should be linked to the vagaries and anonymous circuits of the stock 
market. Disembedding has taken its form through the financialisation of pension 
provision, encouraging an explicit change from collective welfare to individual 
responsibility. And so disembedding, the removal of traditional social relations and 
institutions relates more to the ideas of Karl Polanyi, though Giddens assists in our 
initial understanding, because disembedding is the prerequisite and the effect of 
conditions arising from financialisation that are both path-dependent and reflexive. 
But as Marx and Engels argued long ago, `all that is solid melts into air, all that 
is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real 
conditions of life, and his relations with his kind' (Marx and Engels, 1888/2002: 223). It 
is proposed in the same light as Karl Polanyi that financialisation is also a process of re- 
embedding, where the individual becomes part of the self-regulatory institutions of the 
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free-market society. But unlike Polanyi, it is not necessarily the case that re-embedding 
is a positive or certain transition i. e. a double movement does not necessarily follow. 
Though there are a number of possibilities. Firstly, the individual may have learned 
through his errors in trusting the experts of global finance, and so there could be room 
for social accountability from the bottom up; though, it is doubtful given the freedoms 
and provisions that finance affords younger generations and people less well off that we 
will be able to reign in or re-direct value production in ways that restore the linkages 
between society, community and tradition. In this sense, patterns of re-embedding may 
also legitimate the very circuits of value production that we see as outside of us and 
outside of our capacity to transform their kind. 
In other words, patterns of re-embedding may take many unforeseen twists and 
turns revitalising or resolving the residues of crisis left over by disembedding. Or, this 
secondary stage could be the opportunity for an alternative vision. The post-war 
movement demonstrated this superbly. Had John Maynard Keynes not delivered his 
ideas on the post-war international monetary mechanism, we might not be talking of 
embedded liberalism `at all'. Ultimately, the pattern of change is `down to us' as people 
to explore politics and its many surface outcomes and structural inequalities as part of a 
deeper, more underlying, less visible pattern of conversations, episodes, routines, 
perceptions, practices, symbols, semiotics, words and pictures - that connect and 
initialise action as cultural manifestations of economic life. If we are to handle change 
for the better, we must understand how it happens, why and what for. The famous 
International Relations theorist Susan Strange once asked, `qui Bono', and 
unfortunately, through this academic movement towards `cultural economy', we might 
not like the answer we're looking for, because like most things in life - the problem is 
usually located inside ourselves. To change the economy, we must change our culture - 
and thus, we must transform ourselves. 
Finally, this project is therefore not primarily about the study of pensions. It is 
about looking at financialisation through pensions. This is an important distinction 
because while the field of pensions is an articulate and complex discipline, especially to 
some, it is also highly ineffable to grasp without a microscopic lens that can make sense 
of its historical and cultural economic significance. This thesis is divided into two main 
parts. Part I is about understanding financialisation not only as a material process where 
the graphs literally show finance expanding in every department, but as a process that is 
historically distinct and peculiar to our modern era -a process that requires a unique 
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framework of understanding that goes beyond conventional neoliberal methodology and 
methods to explore the initiation and reflexive effect of action from unique standing 
points. As we delve deeper into the question of financialisation, we should become 
keenly aware that this concept has many constitutive dimensions that are as much 
political as they are cultural. And so Part I allows us to journey into Part II, where we 
apply our Cultural IPE approach to Financialisation by exploring the transformation of 
private pension provision. It should be noted that we focus on `private' pensions, rather 
than strictly state pensions, because while we inevitably touch upon the latter in our 
analysis, this focus allows us to observe the qualitative changes that have occurred in 
the vicissitudes of private pension changes. In this novel approach, we explore the 
macro catalysts of change and the ahistorical re-writing of economic history (Chapter 
5); the bottom-up circuits of commonplace saving (Chapter 6); the contingent and 
fortuitous nature of financial knowledge and `expert-systems' informing macro 
transformations (Chapter 7); and lastly (Chapter 8), the reflexive macro consequences of 
this for the stabilisation of a new private pension policy. Essentially, the case-studies 
should be seen as slices of history that build up a cumulative picture of financialisation 
as both stage and process. 
Where we end is on the question of our social future and particularly - of what 
re-embedding means for economic society as our cultural present unfolds, but also how, 
if possible, we can begin to think of credible alternatives to financialisation, where 
social accountability is an implicit and in-built by-product of performing connections in 
the economy, as opposed to an explicit system of democratic surveillance that can only 
react politically inside a cultural economy that it remains inseparable to. This is perhaps 
the most promising aspect of `cultural economy'. Given its potential to link micro, meso 
and macro relations across human, non-human and sensory variables, we have the 
methodological ability to deliver more sensitive policies based on a much richer 
comprehension of economic life. Unlike economics or some aspects of economic 
history, going down the cultural root means bringing together this vast disciplinary 
space to achieve a much more intensive understanding of socio-economic life in 
particular contexts. In contrast to post-modernism, we can thus aspire to channel 
economic power for the good based on an empirical understanding of its pitfalls and 
failings - and especially, to understand how they are created and how they can be 
adapted to foster and maintain what is one of humanity's greatest achievement yet - the 
Enlightenment. 
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Chapter One 
Life outside the Cave 
Introduction 
Thomas Hobbes long ago complained that life was `nasty, poor, solitary, brutish, and 
short' and required an absolute sovereign state, the infamous `Leviathan' to protect its 
citizens and to enforce law and order in return for their rational obedience (see Bronner, 
2004: Jacob, 2001). Today, life could be described as `pernicious, inegalitarian, 
individualised, ambivalent and long'. The deliverance of parsimony in Hobbes' vignette 
denotes the confidence in its uncontested realism and even probably the assumed 
support for its solution in the form of the state. The modem-day description is less 
striking and confident. It is entirely contestable. The world today is more civilized and 
prosperous, but its frustrated lacks are more defying in an age of heightened 
expectations. The modem-day description assumes a reality complicated by its less 
visible discrepancies, injustices and inequalities, but it would presuppose that those 
realities somehow work together to propound present conditions that may not resolve 
themselves easily. There is another comparison. In Hobbes' day, it was the lack of a 
legitimate social structure that allowed anarchy and `self-imposed non-age to reign' 
(Kant, 1784/2001). The hopes and possibilities of Liberal Enlightenment were positive, 
wide and varied (see Bronner, 2004). Today, the converse is true. It is perhaps the 
dominant philosophy, structure and `cultural international political economy' of modern 
day society that has become all imposing and limiting of the range and possibilities of 
political action. Broadly speaking, the scope of the political and its effectiveness in the 
global economy has been narrowed and it has become a significant question to ask how 
this narrowing has taken shape and why, what propels it and what are its consequences? 
If anything, there is an inkling that the solution or tonic to this lies not in the state, but in 
the cultural economy of society. A fresh democratic consciousness and culture of 
collective accountability is needed that contains a level of systemic awareness and 
empathy that is open and sensitive to alternative ideas of what should constitute the 
good life for all and a willingness to debate and pursue such ideas at the national and 
global level. 
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Economy, Culture and Politics 
In Plato's most famous allegory, prisoners were tied down facing a wall inside the 
depths of a cave (Plato, 1955: 255). Upon the cave wall that they faced, they saw 
moving shadows, which became the object of the prisoners' discussions. Outside the 
cave and far from the prisoners' imaginations, people moved between the entrance of 
the cave and a burning fire. To the prisoners, the reality that they experienced and talked 
about was truth, but it concealed a `hidden' reality that confounded and contradicted 
their notion of freedom and truth. Unlike the prisoners in the cave, `we' stand in the 
open air - inside economic reality, a world smothered in darkness, despite the twinkling 
of the economic stars that we ponder; their cycles, dips and crashes; their flashing 
inventiveness; their boldness and wealth to the skies that divides the vastness of space, 
which engulfs the bright lights with blackness that can only distract us from the 
pleasures of our gaze. While we focus on the stars, we remain trapped in the darkness 
with only meagre light upon which to understand the relations, recklessness and plights 
of human contact. What remains hidden to us is our truth, our basis point, but this 
conceals an `unhiddeness'. As Martin Heidegger' argued, `the Greeks understood what 
we call the true, as the unhidden, as what is no longer hidden, as what is without 
hiddenness and, as it were, been robbed of its hiddenness. For the Greeks, therefore, the 
true is something which no longer possesses something else, namely hiddenness, and is 
freed from this' (Heidegger, 1988/2002: 7). 
The darkness is also our light; hiddenness has become what we can see and it 
has become commonplace to describe this given perception, this unequivocal reality as 
economic globalisation. Martin Wolf, the eminent financial journalist of our times and a 
protagonist of liberal economic freedoms, describes the stars before us; 
Globalisation is defined in what follows as integration of economic activities, via markets. The 
driving forces are technological and policy changes - falling costs of transport and 
communications and greater reliance on market forces. The economic globalisation discussed 
here has cultural, social and political consequences (and preconditions). But those consequences 
and preconditions are neither part of its definition nor a focus of our attention' (Wolf, 2004: 19, 
my emphasis). 
As an economist and aesthetic priest of globalising modernity, Martin Wolf provides 
our light, but he controls our darkness. It is because these consequences and 
preconditions are not part of any comprehensive definition of economics that the 
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epistemological consequences of this knowledge, while socialised, remains depoliticised 
and hidden from view. As Wolf narrates to those in the darkness the advantages of the 
twinkling stars, he attempts not to understand why we remain in the darkness, for he 
focuses our attention to an appreciation of the light. For `if we want a better world, we 
need not a different economics, but a better politics' (ibid.: 12). By describing our 
hiddenness, Martin Wolf conceals our unhiddeness, he conceals the causes of the 
darkness, by attributing it to the darkness; an area of insecurity, folly, confusion and 
disaster; areas of complexity, culture, society and politics that provide, it would seem, 
ruination to the economy and the final prospect of peace. From Wolf's perspective, it is 
the darkness that spoils the light. More light is needed in conditions of darkness. But 
where does this come from when the lights have gone out - when the light has become 
finite, when the light has reached its limit? The `fault dear Brutus is not in the stars, but 
in ourselves'. We need not a different politics, but a better international cultural 
political economy. 
Martin Wolf (2004) fails to see the relationship between liberalism and the 
economic ideas that have shaped contemporary society towards three political extremes: 
political and social passivity; social ambivalence with the consequences of (global) 
economic management; and political and religious extremism, both in method and 
principle, against the ethical casualness and hypocrisies of Western market society. As 
Wolf argues, 
A liberal society is endemically restless and, for those who treasure the unchanging and the 
traditional, consequently insecure, however wealthy it may become. It does not merely 
accommodate novelty, but welcomes it. The merchant makes profits by seizing an unperceived 
opportunity for gain, thereby changing the economic world. The intellectual makes a reputation 
by arguing something new, thereby changing the beliefs of the world. Traditional hierarchies, 
deference, ways of life and beliefs are all subject to the solvent action of liberty. Liberalism 
means perpetual and unsettling change. Most of its enemies have, at bottom, hated it for that 
reason (Wolf, 2004: 25, my emphasis). 
Who would rightfully deny the Enlightenment principle of progress as `an attack on the 
illusion of finality: closure, certainty, and utopia' (Bronner, 2004: 18). But who would 
rightfully defend perpetual change as the ultimate expression of freedom, if the 
`lightness and fluidity of the increasingly mobile, slippery, shifty, evasive and fugitive 
power' (Bauman, 2000: 14) of private-led change de-limited the space of public 
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accountability and contestation, in ontological as well as practical terms, and therefore 
our ability to re-invigorate the Enlightenment challenge of `transforming the invisible 
into the visible, the ineffable into the discursive, and the unknown into the known 
(Bronner, 2004: 19). 
Martin Wolf s conception of the liberal society provokes a series of questions: 
should we question change in a liberal society, or should we let it be? If we question 
change, does this naturally mean that we are giving into fear of what it might bring, 
better the devil you know springs to mind - and if we let change be, are we not 
assuming, in some small sense, that things will continue just as they are? Writing over 
sixty years ago, Karl Polanyi (1944) challenged the same liberal beliefs now supported 
by Martin Wolf, with his own sentiment that an inert scepticism towards economic 
change, far from being anti-liberal, was indeed a practicable and sensitive measure of 
liberal checks and balances. As Polanyi argued, 
The rate of change is often of no less importance than the direction of change itself; but while the 
latter frequently does not depend upon our volition, it is the rate at which we allow change to 
take place which may well depend upon us. A belief in spontaneous progress must make us blind 
to the role of government in economic life (Polanyi, 1944: 37). 
If we read into Polanyi's insights correctly, the systemic chaos of economic order as it 
unfolds in its random complexity, continually demands our response based on our 
present state of knowledge, the consequences of which are inherently unknowable and 
uncertain, and which no doubt carry a momentum of their own. By controlling the rate, 
we thereby have the reigns of its direction, in some small measure, because we can 
reflect upon what is useful to us and what is not, what we are ready for and what we are 
not. Without controlling the rate, we acquiesce in the changes that force us to adapt 
without question or debate, and so history is allowed to roll over us like a wave, as if we 
could only prepare for its affects `accurately' until the very last minute. With this 
Polanyian insight, we may not be able to prevent the waves of history from occurring, 
but we can control how and in what way they can affect us if only we improved our long 
term vision. In other words, it is not the rate of change that is essentially dogmatic, it is 
our unwillingness or inability to understand and control its nature that is. With this in 
mind, we may ask, what causes our blindness? Is it our blindness that causes our belief, 
or our belief that causes our blindness? 
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Marx and Engels famously argued long ago that `life is not determined by 
consciousness, but consciousness by life' (Marx and Engels, 1846/1970: 47). Are we so 
bogged down by the superficial priorities of life, that we cannot see the complex reasons 
for their existence? As a general insight into this, a religious woman visiting England 
from West Africa profoundly stated that the people in `England live by the clock. But 
we keep the time'2. This appeared to suggest that the nature of clock time, in those 
countries most influenced by `advanced' economic change, has narrowed the priorities 
and sensitivities of human life to economically motivated demands and opportunities, 
down to our scheduling of leisure and work time, even down to the laughter prompts on 
TV comedies, all of which heightens our cyclical sense of self-importance and mastery, 
our position and relation to others in the economic hierarchy, our uncontrollable 
narcissism and discomfort with the contradictory impulses of ego, if not the compulsion 
to resolve the lacks that this creates, sometimes through economic mediums that we 
cannot escape. Whereas, with a pinch of salt of course, those most distant to this kind of 
economic life contain in themselves a sense of completion, subordination to the 
serendipity and fortuity of nature, where time and the self is regulated, not by an 
instrument of economic self-sufficiency, but through bonds to nature and to people, that 
are intuitive, routine, loyal, enduring, and which are grounded in tradition and cultural 
continuities of belonging. 
Taking Marx and Engels at their word, we must admit however, that there is an 
odd contradiction between our economic world and the theoretical world of the 
economy. In our economic world, freedom centres around the clock. Culturally 
speaking, `time is money', `time waits for no man', `another day, another dollar', are all 
references, or `euphemisms', that conceal our own ironic surrendering to the imminence 
of clock time, in creating freedom (leisure) through wealth. And yet, orthodox 
economics, the spectacles for our world, indulges in its own tautological frameworks. 
For example, demand and supply, the Hicksian IS-LM model and the world of rational 
expectations, all have one thing in common: they have no concept of time. Economics is 
time-less and thereby rules out all those messy, random factors of reality that are not 
important to the cleanly parsimony of time-less explanation. In this Western centred 
time-less theory of life, individuals rule themselves through the expectations imposed by 
clock time, whereas those most distant to this compulsion, it would seem, are governed 
through otherness. 
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These are simple, modest observations, but they draw us closer to an 
understanding of cultural political economy and what this concept means. For example, 
it would seem that we are not altogether governed or encouraged to self-govern by 
reality in its essence, but through our own spectacles of knowledge. Let us remember 
here what Fredric Jameson, the eminent cultural theorist, said of our contemporary times 
more than twenty years ago, 
I believe that the emergence of postmodernism is closely related to the emergence of this new 
moment of late, consumer multinational capitalism. I believe also that its formal features in many 
ways express the deeper logic of that particular system... namely the disappearance of a sense of 
history, the way in which our entire contemporary social system has little by little began to lose 
the capacity to retain its own past, has begun to live in a perpetual present and in a perpetual 
change that obliterates tradition of the kind which all early social formations have had in one 
way or another to preserve (Jameson, 1985: 125). 
For one thing it is interesting to find an economist and a cultural theorist who agree on 
something, albeit from different perspectives, that there is an apparent congruence 
between our experience of `unsettling change' and the `perpetual present'. But is the 
point not that they agree, but that their ideas mirror one another? For it would seem that 
the economic perspective of liberalism mirrors the cultural observation of the economy. 
Or, to put this another way, the emergence of the post-modem economy reflects the 
modem project of liberal economism. In political terms, however, Jameson's conception 
of the `perpetual present' seems to be a concerning symptom of perpetual change, 
because it suggests that our memory of history - collective, intellectual and individual, 
is being subject to a process of dilution by our focus on what is ahead - and by its very 
nature, what is ahead shapes how we see the past, to the extent that all change is novel 
and unique and has no reference or comparison in history. Without historical 
comparison or understanding, we clasp on to change without any certainty of its 
direction, as if history and change transcended our being, because the future is how we 
administrate and prepare for it, not how we shape and build it. We therefore have to ask, 
is the modem life of the liberal economy, also by its very nature, the realisation of the 
post-modem in it physical form? 
Let us remind ourselves, briefly, what the life of the post-modem means? For 
Anthony Giddens, post-modemity takes us away from the institutions of modernity 
`towards a new and distinct type of social order' (1990: 46). In one very important 
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sense, it suggests that we have awoken from the broken promises of the indisputable, 
`one-dimensional' (cf. Marcuse, 1964/2002) and teleological force of modem historical 
progress, because we have finally acknowledged our fait as autonomous agents in a 
world of structure that is within us and not beyond us. But as Bauman stated, `post- 
modem men and women' have `exchanged a portion of their possibilities of security for 
a portion of happiness' and the `freedom of pleasure-seeking' (Bauman, 1997: 3). As a 
result, we are now presented with opportunities and dangers (Beck, 1994: Giddens, 
1990: 1994) that are `multidimensional' in scope and ever-expansive in spectrum; that 
are in continual and fleeting transformation; where we are forced to place trust in our 
own conscious understanding of knowledge to determine private and public security 
matters to determine our fait (Beck, 1992: 1999), as the mastery of modem science 
undercuts the embedded certainties of industrial society, revealing uncertain personal 
and collective risks that can only, it is assumed, provoke what must be made globally 
transparent and accountable (Beck, 1999: 1-47). This either rests on a cognitive 
conception of reflexivity, a Beckian `I am I', devoid of the aesthetic environment and its 
strategies (see Lash, 1994), or else, it feeds into a post-structural myth itself. Here, the 
agent can never escape the bounds of knowledge/power and so the method and practice 
of continual escape is virtuous and necessary as long as the last thread of Liberal 
Enlightenment retains its strength. But do these approaches also not encourage the 
simulacra between liberalism and post-modernism rejected above? 
For some, there is no escaping the contradictions of Enlightenment and so we 
should accept the `post-modem condition of fractured perspectives and groundless 
practices as a historical fate' (Gray, 1995: 146). This might lead to the positive 
conclusion that we can revert to a modus vivendi of competing perspectives -a retreat to 
idealism no matter how sensible its pursuit, because it far too easily abandons `the 
challenge' of re-claiming the Enlightenment from Coxian `problem-solvers' (see Cox, 
2002) whom already believe it has reached its full potential. If we are to reach any 
solution, realistically, society must be convinced through a battle of wits, and so we 
must avoid the temptation to collapse and confuse the methodology of post-structuralism 
with an ontology of the post-modem. For it is the case that the method of escape al a 
Sartre (1943/2003) may not always guarantee its expectation in reality, especially 
within an epochal theory that has no prescriptive control over its direction or 
consequence, or any physical assurance that its tendency is grounded satisfactorily in 
institutions of historical comparison. Without this separation, the post-modern notion of 
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freedom and progress, the cause of alterity, lasts only as long as the liberal tendency to 
commercialise its post-structural voice. 
Martin Wolf and his colleagues believe that they still carry the torch of the 
Enlightenment project and attack post-modernists and other `anti-liberals' for their 
repudiation of economic globalisation. But their modernisation project is no longer 
linked, as Habermas would argue (1985b: 1-23), to the `completion of modernity', 
because the aesthetic priests of our time believe that the limits of Enlightenment have 
been achieved through the final flouring of (neo)liberalism. As the famous International 
Relations theorist Robert Cox (2002) reminds us, to give up the challenge of 
Enlightenment is to end what is political about modernity (cf. Bronner, 2004). This 
echoes in Habermas' notion that the Enlightenment is dead (see Habermas, 1985a), but 
the consequences live on, which is why from Cox's point of view at least, the world has 
been washed over by a wave of post-modem liberalism - an ironic game of logistics. 
Decision-making is now the realm of bureaucrats and lobbyists and is fragmented into 
innumerable confrontations between specific interest groups. Politics has become a game of 
management, in which there are no conflicts of values, only adjustments of interests. Politics in 
this sense of choice by political subjects among different social projects is disappearing. The 
death of politics is the death of the citizen, which is the death of democracy. What for Fukuyama 
seemed the apotheosis of the West, for this author is the end of the dream of active citizenship 
that the European Enlightenment inspired - the end is post-modem non-politics (Cox, 2002: 
141). 
Robert Cox is not alone in his thinking. Zygmunt Bauman (2000) too believes that we 
have reached a stage of high modernity that he describes as `liquid modernity'. Nothing 
much changes in a world driven by a plethora of global commercial interests, where 
time has conquered space, where individuals and companies all compete and hope for 
solutions that either resolve certain lacks or advance what already exists, so that politics 
becomes the expression and output of individual interests, consumerism and life-style 
choices, as opposed to a set of collective values and ideals that strive for social 
alternatives and betterment through systemic reflection. But perhaps, we haven't gotten 
there yet. Perhaps this post-modern feeling, this apparent slow death of politics is about 
to take a cultural turn, which could either be responsible for this kind of politics or the 
source of new powers of social politicisation. Here we must mark out the historical and 
political position or assumption directing this thesis. 
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Historically speaking, we appear to be in an `in-between' stage of global 
political economy that we could call global limbo economy. Since the Enlightenment, it 
is evident that the twin forces of socialisation and nationalisation have moved in tandem 
creating a phase of embedding that we could tentatively call nationalising modernity. 
The deliquescence of this period has also witnessed a period of what we call in this 
thesis as disembedding (cf. Bauman, 2000). For some, the cause of this is the `risk 
society' (Bech, 1992: 1994: 1999), for others it is `de-traditionalisation' (Giddens, 1994) 
or `liquid modernity' (Bauman, 2000), but what is clear is that our national structures 
are limiting of the range of the political, especially as capital has taken on the 
imagination of the transnational i. e. global connections of financial and techno- 
consumerism (cf. Sennet, 2006). In other words, we are in a period of `political limbo' 
between nationalising modernity and globalising modernity, where there is transnational 
market governance without government (cf. Amin, 1996: Hewson and Sinclair, 1999). 
This one foot in one era (disembedding) and one foot in the next (re-embedding) seems 
in many ways part of the problem and what's more is that this problem appears to be 
contained, stabilised, repeated and subsidised by the expansion of the global financial 
economy that we believe was meant for us. 
In Dante Alighieri's epic masterpiece - the Devine Comedy, Limbo was a place 
of self-administered punishment for the wise old pagans of reason, who were `neither 
rebels against God nor faithful to him' (Musa, 1971: 27-28). Just like Dante's Limbo, 
contemporary political decision-making is informed by logic and reason, but it would 
seem that something is missing, something like faith, not in God per se, but in a 
common social framework that can unite and protect people through institutions and 
cultures that stave off the relentless pressures and competitive urges of our 
unconstrained technological future. Today however, we remain trapped due mainly to 
our own surrendering to a transnational economy that asks questions we dare not to 
oppose or struggle against. As Dante recounts Virgil's regret of the pagan souls stuck in 
Limbo, `for this defect, and for no other guilt, we are lost. In this alone we suffer: cut off 
from hope, we live on in desire' (Musa, 1971: 28). 
Financial Crisis: in Retrospect and Prospect 
In many respects, the rise of the global financial economy is presented to us, especially 
by economists as a novel extension of the market economy, something that has evolved 
out of economic exchange, technology and the necessity to make the allocation of 
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capital more efficient, transparent, competitive and risk-averse. Defending the rise of the 
global market economy, Martin Wolf talking head for the Financial Times, proposes 
that `the arrival of an economy dominated by sophisticated markets with secure property 
rights, long-term investment and constant innovation has brought about a revolution in 
human life' (2004: 57). In many respects, the global sophistication of the financial 
economy and its re-organisation of human life on a planetary scale is something that 
cannot be doubted. But the notion that human history has not witnessed this before and 
that economic globalisation can restore peace and prosperity in the world by excluding 
political, social and cultural `preconditions' and `consequences' is seriously misled (cf. 
Wolf, 2004: 19). 
For those who have attempted to examine the birth and evolution of the capitalist 
economy from a `world-systems' perspective (e. g. Arrighi, 2003), periods of financial 
expansion - the kind that we are experiencing today, including sophisticated practices of 
lending, intermediation, innovation, calculation and commodification, have triumphed at 
different stages throughout world history (Arrighi, 1994). According to the findings of 
this literature, the global economy as we know it has evolved out of a succession of 
central capitalist regimes beginning with the Republic of Genoa in the 16th century, 
passing on to the United Provinces in the 18th century, through to the United Kingdom 
in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and then finally to the United States in the 20th and 
21St centuries (Arrighi and Silver, 2001: 264: Langley, 2002). We will go into much 
more detail as we progress, but generally speaking, the quantitative and qualitative 
dominance of financial capital has tended to expand and retract at different stages in the 
evolution of world-capitalism (Arrighi, 1994). All four capitalist regimes have been 
witness to the ascendancy of financial capital - economically and politically, but only 
three have so far experienced the conditions of its involution. 
What is fascinating about this historical analysis is not only the suggestion that 
human history has experienced extended financial markets before, but the prediction that 
our contemporary experience and perception of the financial economy is less 
economically, socially and politically stable as an `advanced' form of human betterment 
than what we might think (Arrighi and Silver, 2001: 274). In fact, world-systems' 
historicity forecasts the dissolution of the global financial economy as we know it - and 
specifically, the Anglo-American centres, institutions and practices of accumulation that 
constitute its globalising hegemony. For economists such as Martin Wolf, it is possible 
to tame and control the global financial beast through more economic understanding of 
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its institutional make-up and deleterious tendencies (Wolf, 2004). But for those with an 
understanding of history over the course of the longue duree3, this maybe like throwing 
pebbles into a river to control a momentum of force built up long before. 
The puzzle of course is that there is not even the slightest hint that the end is in 
sight for the global financial economy, despite many apocalyptic claims and concerns to 
the contrary (e. g. Arrighi and Silver, 2001: Warburton, 2000). What is truly 
unimaginable for the contemporary generation of googlers and garners is a global 
financial crisis on the same scale as the Great Crash of 1929 and its intertwinement with 
the Great Depression (1929-31) that stood in its wake. Today, financial crisis has 
become a soft sell, a headline - that seemingly provokes the ethical or effected hearts of 
the few, while titillating the disinterested heads of the many. For those who witnessed 
the Great Crash and lived through the Great Depression, financial crisis sharpened 
reality into a more primitive set of human instincts and social needs, not just for the few, 
but for the many. Writing in 1930, John Maynard Keynes wrote, 
The world has been slow to realize that we are living this year in the shadow of one of the 
greatest economic catastrophes of modem history. But now that the man in the street has become 
aware of what is happening, he, not knowing the why and wherefore, is as full to-day of what 
may prove excessive fears as, previously, when the trouble was first coming on, he was lacking 
in what would have been a reasonable anxiety. He begins to doubt the future. Is he now 
awakening from a pleasant dream to face the darkness of facts? Or dropping off into a nightmare 
which will pass away? (Keynes, 1963: 135). 
The `nightmare' began famously on `Black Thursday' October 24`h 1929 when the New 
York Stock Exchange teetered on the brink of collapse. On `the blackest of Black 
Tuesdays' five days later, a `tidal wave of sell orders inundated the market. Neither men 
nor machines could keep up' (Fraser, 2005: 371). On the same day that Winston 
Churchill apparently visited the exchange `expecting pandemonium' and `taken aback 
by the slow motion decorum that prevailed instead' (Fraser, 2005: 370), the exchange 
had traded 16,400,000 shares in one day, `a record that stood for almost forty years' 
(Kindleberger: 1973: 118). 
One significant aspect of the crash that still has enormous relevance today was 
the way in which the implosion of one financial centre created a series of cumulative 
and systemic financial failings throughout the world. Within two to three years of the 
crash, the entire international monetary system was in crisis as countries around the 
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world desperately tried to stem the outflow of foreign capital and gold reserves, which 
created desperate strains on the ability of governments to prevent domestic banks and 
industries from collapsing (Eichengreen, 2004). As the economic historian Charles 
Kindleberger put it, `the stock-market crash is less interesting for the irony it permits the 
historian, bemused by the foibles of greedy men, than for starting a process which took 
on a dynamic of its own' (1973: 127). No matter how tempting it is to characterise the 
Great Crash as an example of the inherent and capricious flaws of global capital, it is 
impossible to disentangle the systemic financial panic that gained momentum after the 
crash from the historical peculiarities and instability of the inter-war gold standard era 
(Eichengreen, 1996: 2004). 
Without going into too much detail, it would seem that in the midst of a 
temporary breakdown in the gold standard as a result of World War I, the emerging 
financial centre of New York was encouraged by foreign orders of short term capital to 
fund war debts. During the interwar years when the gold standard was re-established, it 
is also apparent that a frenzy of lending and investment opportunities opened up for 
domestic and foreign capital in the US as property and consumer durable markets 
expanded in the 1920s, inspiring a speculative search for yield in a period of cheap 
money4 (Eichengreen, 2004: 7). As the Federal Reserve raised interest rates to quell the 
speculative excesses of Wall Street `too late' (Eichengreen, 2004), it would seem that 
this provoked a series of bank failures based on bad loans making it necessary for 
commercial banks to liquidate foreign loans made to European and Latin American 
countries (Kindleberger, 1973). As countries in Europe and Latin America suffered 
from weak balance of payment positions in comparison to a resolute American trading 
partner and because `credibility was the causality' (Eichengreen, 1996: 75) for states 
acting in the context of the inter-war gold standard, countries were forced either to raise 
interest rates or create capital controls in order to prevent international economic 
arbitrage (ibid. ). As interest rates increased and as output and prices fell in response to 
deflationary policies and conditions, `it follows that the main engine of deflation was the 
banking crisis in the United States and the currency crisis in other countries' 
(Eichengreen, 2004: 15). 
With the benefit of hindsight, the nail in the coffin is ultimately attributed to 
`gold-standard mismanagement' (ibid.: 11), because the `international system was 
rendered unstable by British inability and United States unwillingness to assume 
responsibility for stabilising it' (Kindleberger, 1973: 292). Putting the historical 
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specificity to one side if we may, what cannot be ignored however, is that this systemic 
financial crisis was stimulated by the over-extension of cheap credit and the 
concentration of unaccountable capital into speculative areas of investment and 
international arbitrage, induced by precisely the same philosophy and reality that we are 
witnessing today. There is therefore some irony in Kindleberger's assessment of matters 
when we compare what he stated earlier with his summary argument that `it is difficult 
to maintain that the stock market was a superficial phenomenon, a signal or a triggering, 
rather than part of the deflationary mechanism' (1973: 127). 
The second significant aspect of the Great Crash was the extraordinary way in 
which the collapse, as alluded to earlier by Keynes, translated into real economic 
hardships for the common man with political consequences for the entire world. As 
Keynes noted in his Essays of Persuasion, `the extreme violence of the slump is noticed. 
In the three leading industrial countries of the world - the United States, Great Britain, 
and Germany - 10,000,000 workers stand idle' (Keynes, 1963: 136). As noted by 
Keynes, unemployment was perhaps the biggest issue facing governments during the 
Great Depression in a climate of piecemeal or nonexistent social security systems and 
complete failure of governments to stimulate the gaps left open by over-production 
(Hobsbawm, 1995). Writing about the cultural mood in the aftermath of the Wall Street 
crash, Fraser (2005) observes that `the thing that no previous panic or slump had 
managed to do, however, was produce a foreboding that the whole system of production 
and distribution had reached a state of terminal breakdown' (2005: 368). This is no 
surprise. Unemployment rates among industrial workers reached half-century highs in 
between 1931 and 1936 right across Europe and other developed countries such as 
Australia, Canada, Japan and the US (Bairoch, 1993: 11). The lowest recorded figure of 
unemployment during this time was France with 15.4 per cent in 1932 and the highest 
figure was Germany with 43.8 per cent in 1932, with the US not too far behind with 
37.6 per cent in 1933 (loc. cit.: 1993). According to economic historian Paul Bairoch, a 
series of protectionist measures reduced the volume of trade by 30 per cent and the 
value of trade by 60 per cent between 1929 and 1932 (1993: 9). Within this time, the 
flow of international capital dropped by over 90 per cent (Hobsbawm, 1995: 89). 
For Eric Hobsbawm (1995), historian in the tradition of Annales School of 
History, the Great Slump was of colossal importance in shaping the political history of 
the 20th century or what Hobsbawm described as the `Age of Extremes', which makes it 
all the more fascinating that Churchill was to stare `into the economic abyss's that was 
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Keynes' nightmare and see it through until morning sixteen years later. With complete 
candour and in all academic seriousness, Hobsbawm remarked, `but for it, there would 
have been no Hitler', `no Roosevelt' and it is `extremely unlikely that the Soviet system 
would have been regarded as a serious economic rival and alternative to world 
capitalism' (Hobsbawm, 1995: 86) If anything, Hobsbawm captured the political 
significance of this period quite superbly when he reflected on the times in comparison 
to modem financial changes; 
The Great Slump confirmed intellectuals, activists and ordinary citizens in the belief that 
something was fundamentally wrong with the world they live in. Who knew what could be done 
about it? Certainly few of those in authority over their countries, and certainly not those who 
tried to steer a course by the traditional navigational instruments of secular liberalism or 
traditional faith, and by the charts of the nineteenth century seas which were plainly no longer to 
be trusted. How much confidence did economists deserve, however brilliant, who demonstrated, 
with great lucidity, that the Slump in which even they lived, could not happen in a properly 
conducted free-market society, since (according to an economic law named after an early 
nineteenth century Frenchman) no overproduction was possible which did not very soon correct 
itself? In 1933 it was not easy to believe, for instance, that where consumer demand, and 
therefore consumption, fell in a depression, the rate of interest would fall by just as much as was 
needed to stimulate investment, so that the increased investment demand would exactly fill the 
gap left by the smaller consumer demand. As unemployment soared, it did not seem plausible to 
believe (as the British Treasury apparently did) that public works would not increase 
employment at all, because the money spent on them would merely be diverted from the private 
sector, which would otherwise have generated just as much employment. Economists who 
simply advised leaving the economy alone, governments whose first instincts, apart from 
protecting the gold standard by deflationary policies, was to stick to financial orthodoxy, balance 
budgets and cut costs, were visibly not making the situation better. Indeed, as the depression 
continued, it was argued with considerable force not least by J. M. Keynes who consequently 
became the most influential economist of the next forty years - that they were making the 
depression worse. Those of us who lived through the years of the Great Slump still find it almost 
impossible to understand how the orthodoxies of the pure free market, then so obviously 
discredited, once again came to preside over a global period of depression in the late 1980s and 
1990s, which, once again, they were equally unable to understand or to deal with. Still, this 
strange phenomenon should remind us of the major characteristic of history which it exemplifies: 
the incredible shortness of memory of both the theorists and practitioners of economics. It also 
provides a vivid illustration of society's need for historians, who are the professional 
remembrances of what their fellow-citizens wish to forget (Hobsbawm, 1995: 102). 
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Why is it that we have forgotten? In one very important respect, our forgetfulness of the 
past is born out by our `ahistoricism' (see chapter five). There are other reasons why we 
have forgotten the significance of the Great Slump. Simply put, we no longer believe it 
is possible in the modem world. For many of us, it is now automatic to think that the 
global political economy has reached an advanced stage of globalised production that 
far surpasses the more primitive, inflexible and embryonic global political economy that 
existed in the 1920 and 1930s. While it seems complacent and ahistorical to accept this 
argument, can we really dismiss it out of our respect for the past? We must admit, free- 
market capitalism has proved far more robust than originally thought. For example, it 
has outlived Karl Marx (1887/1995), disproved Keynes (1936/1973), evaded Karl 
Polanyi (1946) and perplexed John K. Galbraith (2004). Has present-day capitalism 
evolved to such an extent that it is impossible to return to the conditions of the Great 
Slump? It's not necessarily true that present-day capitalism is more advanced or even 
that we are beyond systemic crisis. We can never rule out history repeating itself. But 
perhaps, like a bar of wet soap, present-day capitalism has become more slippery, as we 
will try to understand. 
Capitalism at the turn of the 20th century, through the inter-war and post-years, 
was dominated by the organisation of capital and labour into mass tailorised industrial 
production (Aglietta, 1979: Harvey, 1990: ). Without an effective mechanism of demand, 
capitalism, as noted by Keynes and Marx before him, was susceptible to bouts of over- 
production and mass unemployment. The Great Slump demonstrated two things. Firstly, 
that markets could not be relied upon to clear themselves in the short-term. As Keynes 
famously remarked, `in the long run, we are all dead'. Secondly, the slump confirmed 
that it was highly difficult to re-organise and restructure `organised capitalism' in a 
short space of time (see Lash and Urry, 1987). Besides the logistical complexities of 
mass economic re-organisation during this time, it should also be noted that the free- 
market had become much more effectively politicised as a result of the Great Slump 
(Hobsbawm, 1995). For example, corporatism, economic planning, stable exchange 
rates and universal welfare coverage were all seen to be peripheral or radical policies 
until the 1930s recession brought them to the foreground of mainstream policy (Cox, 
1987: 152-209: Hobsbawm, 1995). As Ruggie (1983) and others have noted about this 
time, the economy became re-embedded into society enabling, at least in Western 
Europe, what some have described as the `post-liberal' (Cox, 1987) or `post-ideological' 
state (Judd, 2005: 362). Rallied by these fresh initiatives, the post-war period, otherwise 
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known as the `Golden Age of Capitalism' repaired and absolved many of the cracks and 
tensions of organised capitalism (cf. Aglietta, 1979: Glyn et al, 1990). Re-inspired by 
the military work ethic, universal welfare provision, wage bargaining, US foreign aid, 
productive investment, nationalised industries, stable exchange rates and a mass market 
for consumer durables, the `Fordist model of growth' - as it became later known, 
provided a stable and coordinated mechanism of demand to the extent that the `policy 
problem for much of the golden age appeared to be how to damp down excess demand 
rather than how to boost it to maintain full employment' (Glyn et al, 1990: 60). 
Unfortunately, the mechanism worked too well and relied too much on the stabilising 
powers of the US, not only in foreign policy terms, but also economically, in terms of 
how the US approached the `Triffin Dilemma' which was written into its `exorbitant 
privilege' 6 (Eichengreen, 1996). The 1970s, `the decade of diminished expectations' 
(Judt, 2007: 477) reversed the Fordist logic of accumulation as inflation eroded income 
and caused recession and unemployment at the same time (see Brenner, 2001). As an 
economic and political philosophy, Keynesianism had been discredited and was soon 
replaced by an older, more robust liberal philosophy, which had managed to strengthen 
the empirical credibility of laissez faire during its interregnum. 
This change in economic and political philosophy promoted one defining idea: 
for an economy to enjoy prosperity consistently in the long term, it must find efficiency 
in the short-term through the proactive creation of competitive conditions and full 
information. Excessive government intervention, control and regulation of the economy 
were seen to be part of the problem, not the solution. De-nationalisation, de-regulation, 
liberalisation, privatisation and de-industrialisation were all part of a general process of 
returning political economy back to the discipline of the free-market. From this point 
on, the supply of money would not be influenced by the need to maintain demand 
conditions. Instead, money capital would be set free - and this newfound freedom from 
the constraints of state regulation would develop a mechanism of allocation and private 
governance according to its own competitive logics. 
As far as possible, the neoliberal state would assist the efficient supply of money 
in two ways. Firstly, states would now base their investment decisions based on three 
conditions: that it did not crowd out private investment; that it did not upset the free- 
market through external shocks and cause uncertainty; that it did not encourage an 
inefficient supply of money leading to inflation. Controlling the rate of inflation through 
the interest rate would be central to this policy because inflation had become the enemy 
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of purchasing power, economic stability and asset values. But this could only be made 
credible if politicians passed this power over to an impartial and technical authority (see 
Baker, 1999). Central bank independence became a common sense idea that reassured 
the intentions of free-markets on all three counts. Secondly, governments would help to 
build a more transparent market culture between consumers and producers outside of the 
traditional framework of citizenship. In this new transparent culture of full market 
information, governments too would be scrutinized by free-markets. Just like ordinary 
people in the street, governments would receive a credit rating in a world of 
disintermediated market governance and this would have a significant impact on fiscal 
and monetary policy (cf. Sinclair, 1994: 2000: Leyshon et al., 1998). For example, a 
careful balance would need to be struck between low inflation and low interest rates. 
Too much inflation would require high interest rates to quell money growth; high 
interest rates would slow investment; too much state borrowing to fill the gaps left open 
by low investment would fuel inflation expectations and higher interest rates, sounding 
the alarm for uncertainty and capital flight (see Kirshner, 2003). 
In this sense, capitalism was re-organised, not on the basis of priorities 
emanating from the social context, but from priorities determined by the pecuniary 
interest. For Cerny amongst others, this has led to an `embedded financial orthodoxy' 
where `economic production and exchange is shaped first and foremost by financial and 
monetary imperatives' (Cerny, 1994a: 226). The post-war emphasis on full employment 
has been replaced with the post-Bretton Woods emphasis on creating suitable conditions 
for capital mobility. Summing up these changes, Jonathan Kirshner has argued, 
Domestic or international, policy target or regulatory framework, there are no `neutral' choices 
about money. Rather, every macroeconomic phenomenon and monetary policy has significant, 
inevitable differential and political implications. Within the plausible set, the difference between 
the aggregate economic consequences of one choice over another will typically be ambiguous, or 
so modest as to be dwarfed by its considerable differential and political consequences. Money 
Rules - now more than ever - but rules serve political masters. The contemporary salience and 
excitement of huge, influential financial markets has obscured this underlying, formative and 
consequential reality. In their disparate inquiries, students of money in general and political 
scientists most particularly must return to that basic starting point - money is politics (Kirshner, 
2003: 657, my emphasis). 
However, if money rules and serves political masters, it is not obvious anymore exactly 
who are the political masters and who are the followers of this embedded financial 
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orthodoxy. There is a tendency to see financial markets as operating above the level of 
the commonplace, recreating the representation of global finance as an elite, technical 
and esoteric space devolved from the actions or inactions of people in society (cf. 
Langley, 2002b: Sinclair, 1999). But there are strong grounds for adding another 
dimension to Kirshner's maxim: money politics is ordinary. 
For example, unlike the interwar and post-war days, the extraordinary mobility 
of capital enables the global economy to achieve a level of productive flexibility so that 
supply and demand can re-adjust more quickly than at any other period in history. We 
should remember what Harvey argued as early as 1990, 
I am therefore tempted to see the flexibility achieved in production, labour markets, and 
consumption more as an outcome of the search for financial solutions to the crisis-tendencies of 
capitalism, rather than the other way round. This would imply that the financial system has 
achieved a degree of autonomy from real production unprecedented in capitalism's history, 
carrying capitalism into an era of equally unprecedented financial dangers (Harvey, 1990: 194). 
Capital mobility ensures that the profit motive and its performance either improves 
through the restructuring of production, or else it moves elsewhere (cf. Froud et al, 
2000a: Grahl, 2001: Green, 2000: Minns, 2001: Watson and Hay, 1998). In other words, 
it is against the rules of efficiency to pump-prime what has reached its limit. Demands 
for transparency in corporate governance between managers and their shareholders (or 
stakeholders) facilitates the all-seeing eye of mobile capital (cf. Aglietta, 2000: Bauman, 
2000). It is no surprise therefore that we should observe similarities between the liquid 
interests of capital and the highly flexible and technological nature of goods and 
services (Castells, 2000). The tiny, irritating differences and nuances between goods and 
services has shattered consumerism into a vast spectrum reflecting the fetishism of 
individualisation, which unlike Fordist production, serves to accelerate competition and 
adaptation between producers and their consumers. The flexibility achieved in 
production is also becoming a natural or given part of employment security and risk - 
social security systems are becoming individualised and flexible (Taylor-Gooby, 2000), 
even working practices are becoming the aforementioned (Amoore, 2004), because 
`flexibility' achieves one goal: it reduces the amount of time for productive capital and 
financial capital to re-organise their priorities at the least possible cost, so that markets 
really do become `market clearing'. Therefore, a lot of effort has gone into building, 
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`planning' and radicalising the self-regulating market so that it clears itself (cf. Polanyi, 
1944). 
We can observe this most clearly in the financial markets. As the financial expert 
Patrick Young put it, `the capital market revolution is born of new technology and is 
driven by new technology; and it will ultimately change the lives of every individual on 
the globe' (Young, 2003: xxv) leading to a future in financial markets that will bring 
`Liquidity! Accessibility! Transparency! ' (ibid: xl). As a result, financial markets rest on 
a procedural tautology: investment is only allocated on the guarantee of financial returns 
and the knowledge that financial losses or expected risks can be minimised through 
liquidity (cf. Green, 2000). At its most superficial level, money capital is not interested 
in the means or the ends with which production is realised, but whether expectations of 
performance can be fulfilled (Golding, 2001). Reduced to its pure form and without 
incident, the movement of capital manages to ride the surf of ethics because it is 
protected by a fickle and narrow concept of accountability - as it chases after whatever 
is in the public's imagination of success, either in society or in the markets. Immanuel 
Castells could not have put it better when he argued, 
There is a growing decoupling between material production, in the old sense of the industrial era, 
and value making. Value making, under informational capitalism, is essentially a product of the 
financial market. But to reach the financial market, and to view for higher value in it, firms, 
institutions, and individuals have to go through the hard labour of innovating, producing, 
managing, and image-making in goods and services. Thus, while the whirlwind of factors 
entering in the valuation process are ultimately expressed in financial value (always uncertain), 
throughout the process of reaching this critical judgement, managers and workers (that is, 
people) end up producing and consuming our material world - including the images that shape it 
and make it. The new economy brings information technology and the technology of information 
in the creation of value out of our belief in the value we create (Castells, 2000: 160). 
However, the innovations that make liquid capital possible and risk-averse mean one 
thing: flexibility achieved through capital mobility creates social costs and 
consequences for society that are neither discussed nor up for reasonable debate. 
Lawrence Summers, former US Treasury Secretary to the Clinton Administration once 
argued in a public lecture that the benefits of financial innovation outweigh the costs 
with a rather revealing analogy, 
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How best to think about fmancial innovation? An analogy may be helpful. The jet airplane made 
air travel more comfortable, more efficient, and safer, though the accidents were more 
spectacular and for a time more numerous after the jet was invented. In the same way, modem 
global financial markets carry with them enormous potential for benefit, even if some of the 
accidents are that much more spectacular. As the right public policy response to the jet was 
longer runways, better air-traffic control, and better training for pilots, and not the 
discouragement of rapid travel, so the right public policy response to fmancial innovation is to 
assure a safe framework so that the benefits can be realized, not to stifle change (Summers, 2000: 
3). 
This statement by Summers reveals the contradictory reality of modem financial 
markets: despite spectacular financial accidents that are repetitive and social in their 
consequences, the structural nature of the financial system continues to evolve as a 
teleological manifestation. Unlike the Great Crash that caused the social politicisation of 
the economy, financial crisis in the contemporary period encourages `more' not less 
innovation despite the recurrent paradox that it recreates. It's almost as if we now accept 
periods of creative destruction as market corrections that belong to the cycles of 
economic nature. In this sense, we can understand what Summers means: only by 
understanding the empirical flaws of the economy can we perfect its beneficial 
functions. But as John Gray argued, the `hegemony of liberalism has gone with an 
apologetic mode of theorizing' (Gray, 1995: 144). 
As a society, would our complete and utter disengagement with the causes and 
consequences of financial crisis imply that we continually accept the apologies of 
economists, or have we accepted that the benefits outweigh the costs and decide not to 
pursue their underlying structural reasons? In this sense, what Grey should also say is 
that society has become very forgiving lately. But forgiving of what exactly? In recent 
history, core nations of the liberal West have not yet experienced the hardships and 
anxieties of a full-scale systemic financial collapse. For example, we have experienced 
nothing like the dramatic scenes in Argentina or Russia, where inflation sky-rocketed, 
where social order broke down, where people actually stood hungry on the streets with 
no access to money. Instead, financial crisis in the West has been experienced in 
individualised pockets, due to sporadic domestic incidents and their imbrication to 
global financial developments in distant lands e. g. East Asian crisis. It is therefore 
important to ask a vital question: why is financial innovation a normal and necessary 
function of creating `enormous potential for benefit, even if some of the accidents are 
that much more spectacular'? And why do we readily accept the assumption that the 
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evolution of financial markets will create more benefits and less financial dangers to 
society? How do we now measure benefits and costs - in economic and pecuniary terms 
- or social, cultural and political terms? 
We should at least remind ourselves at this point that international financial 
accidents do have serious consequences, that their causes and effects are not just 
economic, but social, cultural and political - making any separation between these fields 
of understanding seem potentially naive and disastrous. For example, the last historical 
figure to call for a `new World Order' in international financial governance was 
Vladimir Putin (FT, 2007b). Before him, it was Adolf Hitler. As Van Dormael put it 
plainly, 
In October 1939, after conquering Poland, Hitler offered peace to France and Britain, 'on three 
conditions: one of them was the settlement of the international currency problem. But the 
governments of France and Britain had reached a point of no return. After a long period which 
had been neither peace nor war, the only way out was war (Van Dormael, 1978: 3). 
However, it is not necessarily that fellow-citizens accept the technical assurances of 
economists or even that they have `chosen' to forget the blunders of history, because 
this would suggest some sort of insight into the past that would emphasise, even more 
greatly, the profound sense of social naivete that economists bestow to the common 
(wo)man. It's more likely, based on Plato's simile of the cave, that what remains 
unhidden is also hidden, that `hiddenness' - what we cannot see or know, has become a 
form of truth that continually evolves and reflects the appearance of essence with the 
ideas that describe what essence is (Heidegger, 1988/2002). Employing the language of 
Antonio Gramsci to explain the social acceptance and acquiescence of Thatcher's 
neoliberalism, Robert Cox - the famous International Relations theorist argued that we 
have all succumbed, in a matter of speaking - to neoliberalism as a form of `hegemony': 
not only has a group interest and philosophy become dominant, but the ideas 
underpinning this dominance, such as homo ceconomicus, have become shared 
experiences for institutions and individuals throughout society. In this sense Cox argues 
that `hegemony' is like a `soft pillow: it absorbs blows and sooner or later the would-be 
assailant will find it comfortable to rest upon' (Cox, 1983: 139). It's almost as if the 
pillow has become our cave, our resting place, our place of ease and truth, but this 
situation is assumed only to continue given that the pillow retains its comfort. As 
Hobsbawm argued, 
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Democratic systems do not work unless there is a basic consensus among most citizens about the 
acceptability of their state and social system, or at least a readiness to bargain for compromise 
settlements. This, in turn, is much facilitated by prosperity... Where governments have enough to 
distribute to satisfy all claimants, and most citizens' standard of life is steadily rising in any case, 
" the temperature of democratic politics rarely rises to fever-pitch (Hobsbawm, 1994: 138-137). 
Thus, it is not only that we believe that our global political economy has reached an 
advanced stage of globalised production, or even that we accept economists as the new 
aesthetic high priests. It's more likely that a certain trade-off moves in tandem and holds 
hands, so that our political economies are prevented from slipping off into an abyss, not 
just through economic advancements, but through the crude, common and perpetual 
aspirations of material satisfaction - facilitated of course by the new economy's circuits 
of value production that are constantly in motion. Yet, this sentiment requires us to 
make clear why we believe our global economy is at a superior stage of development 
and why it is structurally repetitive. In other words, why does politics bubble beneath 
the level of fever-pitch? Or more poignantly, why do we think our pillow is comfortable 
to rest upon? 
Financialisation: a comfortable pillow, a hidden politics 
The proposition here is quite simple: financialisation is the source of our comfort and 
ambivalence with the circular de-politicisation of wealth-management. But what does 
financialisation mean exactly? Before we develop an understanding of financialisation, 
let us afford ourselves the early curiosity of mind to think about exactly what 
financialisation suggests in abstract terms. When we think of the concept of 
`globalisation' for example, we can imagine a world that is shrinking in time and space, 
a world that is having to face up to the challenges of global diversity. In many respects, 
globalisation appears to be a homogenising-ideological process in cultural, economic 
and political terms. For example, `Americanisation', `McDonaldisation' or 
`Neoliberalisation', are all expressions that we can come across in newspaper articles, 
academic papers or everyday conversation that help describe the precise nature of 
globalising influences. But on the other hand, globalisation can also suggest with some 
optimism that the world is open to difference, that we can imagine a world governed 
through difference, by more global democracy, transparency and accountability, not 
less. In this sense, economic, cultural and political globalisation is the means by which 
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differences can be confronted and resolved through global linkages and institutions that 
are socially purposeful. In contrast, financialisation implicitly suggests that the means- 
ends relationship is far less open and confused. Financialisation presupposes that the 
economic world should and will be governed by financial criteria. 
For example, Ronald Dore describes financialisation as the `increasing 
dominance of the financial industry in the sum total of economic activity, of financial 
controllers in the management of corporations, of financial assets among total assets, of 
market securities, and particularly of equities among financial assets, of the stock 
market as a market for corporate control in determining corporate strategies, and of 
fluctuations in the stock market as a determinant of business cycles' (Dore, 2002: 116, 
my emphasis). If we read into Dore's notion correctly, then financialisation is a 
cumulative and all encompassing process whereby financial actors, symbols, modes of 
truth and practices of control become more dominant in quantitative terms, and this 
physical dominance alters the surrounding economic reality, what it prioritises, how it 
interacts and how these inputs lead to new influences that create qualitative outputs in 
an economy that is represented as new and uncertain. There is no suggestion that 
financialisation is for the greater good and there is no apparent explanation to its cause; 
it is merely a fact of life. But what is perplexing about the very notion itself is its 
tautological suggestion. Like globalisation, it assumes that there is a non-financial space 
to be financialised; that financialisation will continue relentlessly and that this is a 
natural part of progress in human history. It is noticeable too that financialisation is 
expressed purely as an economic phenomenon that is responding to its own internal 
logics and the external environment out of necessity, otherwise it wouldn't exist. As an 
objective phenomenon of the social world, financialisation therefore implies that it is 
stretching the challenges of progress and the methods of human manipulation to catch 
up, get ahead and respond to economic nature. In other words, we cannot avoid the 
suggestion that it is a transformative condition of historical inevitability, a modernising 
influence prevailing through its self-contained logic outside and separate from 
traditional relationships and functions in society, culture and politics. 
It is important to understand that financialisation has so many other coordinated 
dimensions and so we should expand Dore's shareholder inspired definition to include 
all those other ingredients that make-up its systemic character, such as: the transnational 
extension and diversification of the financial services sector across nations, city-spaces 
and off-shore centres (Cohen, 1998: Langley, 2002a: Martin, 1999a: Sassen, 1999: 
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Palan, 2002); the decompartmentalisation of finance, insurance, investment, 
consumption and production (cf. Cerny, 1993: 1994a/b: Martin, 2002: Nitzan and 
Bichler, 2000); the sophistication of disintermediated forms of calculation and re- 
regulation (cf. Sinclair, 1994: de Goede, 2001: Knights, 1997); the `securitisation of all 
potential sources of value' (Castells, 2000: 155), that has broadly contributed to the 
proliferation of all sorts of debt, both secured and unsecured, belonging to households, 
corporations and governments (Warburton, 2000); the growth of the asset-management 
industry, including investment brokers, hedge funds, insurance firms and pension funds 
(cf. Clarke, 2000: Harmes, 1998: Ericson et al, 2000), for the responsibility of 
controlling and protecting the influx personal savings and idle capital through the 
careful management of financial risk; `risk', that is attached to the strategic creation and 
trading of global asset claims and debt securities; the very same liabilities that have 
emerged from the creation of debt, their underlying liabilities, in addition to their asset 
price volatility (cf. Ben-Ami, 2001: Green, 2000: Strange, 1998: Tickell, 2000). 
The key observation from this is the web that financialisation completes and 
leaves behind, not just something that skims the transnational surface, but something 
that reaches into the depths of society from where its architecture can be admired from a 
more holistic vantage point. For example, transnational capital and off-shore trading - 
the full expression of liquid capital, links in with changes in the relationship between 
production and consumerism along the lines described above, facilitated naturally by the 
shareholder revolution, disintermediation and re-regulation, enabling greater access to 
the global institutions of the capital market, either directly or indirectly, affording 
individuals, companies and governments the opportunity to off-load their savings and 
liabilities or simply to gain better credit terms. 
This broad definition describes financialisation as an economic, institutional and 
surface level phenomenon that we can observe and experience in our daily lives. But 
while we can understand the quantitative dominance of financial actors, practices and 
instruments in the global economy, we have not quite yet drawn out their qualitative 
significance. For example, in 2001 there was $1500 billion worth of daily foreign 
exchange transactions in the international financial economy and only 2 percent of this 
related to trade and investment in goods and services. As the Economist argued `the rest 
is, in some sense speculative. But it is hard to distinguish between the two' (Economist, 
2001a: 105). The extraordinary production and circulation of financial asset values 
above and beyond that produced by real economic production, even the obfuscation 
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between financial and productive variables, suggests that there is a financialisation of 
the global economy. The fact that Tesco, an ordinary supermarket chain, obtained 
profits from personal financial services worth £202 million in 2005 is evidence that 
financialisation is altering our whole notion of shopping and consumerism (Times, 
2005). There is even a website called Financialization. com dedicated to the whole idea 
of the online financial supermarket. Its `motto is simple, why pay high rates of interest 
to the bank and credit card companies each month? Why not get the best deals available 
and keep your money working for you'. 
Today, we can now obtain credit so much easier than in the past and this also 
suggests that financialisation is really influencing our daily lives. For example, the 
national household debt to income ratio reached 160 percent in 2006 (FT, 2006: 3). Of 
the 1.4 million debt problems dealt with by Citizens Advice, 360,000 cases resulted 
from credit cards (Guardian, 2006: 27). Due to the amount of personal debt in the 
economy, worth more than £1 trillion in 2006, the rate of personal bankruptcies has 
increased. In 1986, Individual Voluntary Arrangements (IVAs) were introduced in order 
to lessen the financial burden of personal debts without the stigma of bankruptcy. Since 
2002, the number of people entering personal bankruptcy arrangements with debt 
management companies more than doubled in four years to 11,105, potentially reaching 
100,000 cases annually according to industry experts (FT, 2006: 3). Noticing the trend, 
the Chair of the Consumer Credit Counselling Service stated, `over the last four years, 
there has been an industrialisation of the IVA process from it being a cottage industry' 
(FT, 2006: 3). But is this last example evidence of financialisation too? For it would 
seem that the hard edges of capitalism are being worn away by the soft solutions of what 
- financialisation? Based on this last example, could we really postulate here, with any 
ounce of sense, that financialisation occurs because it feeds off and reacts to 
financialisation? 
Herein lies our first problem. It would seem that the concept of financialisation 
can describe real world phenomenon, but it does not explain what it is, how or why it is 
happening, or indeed, why it is political and exists `at all'. Our second problem is that 
financialisation describes real world observations that are economic in nature, but which 
can't be explained solely by economic determinism or rational economic explanation 
alone. For an economy that encourages the notion of easy money and easy bankruptcy 
`simultaneously' confounds rationality. In the first instance, facilitating a course of 
action that would risk personal bankruptcy and the implications thereof, cannot be 
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explained entirely by the poverty of individual reason, a corollary that economism 
would tend to reach, for even if the decision was the result of sound mind, it is quite 
easily the case that bankruptcy, based on pecuniary criteria alone, is the more profitable 
option over repaying the debt. We must remember therefore that rationality does not 
stand alone from the historical and social context of its execution, or the extra-economic 
dimensions that explain the more subjective, non-rational causes of particular decision- 
making, that would tend to refute `objective' rationality. Besides the economic problems 
of sustainability that this kind of situation throws up, such economic activities are post- 
philosophical: the social, ethical, moral, even existential dilemmas that financialisation 
creates appear not to matter until they have occurred. 
It is therefore important not to forget that the germination of financial ambiguity, 
thrown up by instances of financialisation, is deeply embedded in the fertile soil of 
Western economic rationalism. For example, the will of economic freedom is based on 
the apolitical, ahistorical and essential notion of `man' as a competitive and rationally 
calculative being. As Nietzsche (1887/1996), Marx (1887/1995), Foucault (1966/2002), 
Polanyi (1944), Sennet (1978) and Giddens (1994) all realised in their different ways, 
this type of economic revisionism whitewashed the traditional, craft-centred, pre- 
modern representations of man as a social, collective and imperfect being - and made 
modern man a `reflexive personality' (Sennet, 1986: 151-153) of capitalist society and 
the `self-regulating market' (Polanyi, 1944). Continuing the spirit of this ideal and the 
lineage of the classical utilitarians through to the modern day, scholars such as Friedrich 
Hayek (1944) further institutionalised Adam Smith's notion of the `invisible hand', 
effectively helping to delimit the space of metaphysical curiosity to mechanistic 
empirics. As Hayek (1944) argued, a free - self-organising society is determined by 
automatic and self-equilibrating tendencies that are brought about through competition 
and natural adaptation to the external economy. All around us, we can see, that this is 
not just some idea buried in history, but an lived reality, an economic life in motion (cf. 
Miller, 1998). 
There is a distinct sense in this argument that as ordinary human beings in this 
market driven society, we have far more control over our economic destiny than what 
we might think, not in the sense that we can adapt and anticipate economic changes 
more efficiently or even calculate more effectively, because these are `reactive' 
responses to economic nature that we hold as natural, external and beyond our political 
control. In contrast, there is a gleam of light here that suggests that our response to the 
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economy does not have to be exogenously reactive, but endogenously `proactive', 
thoughtful, measured, philosophical, subjective and debatable, provoking the question, 
what can the economy do for us and our needs as a society in order to fulfil the good life 
for all and as best as possible, not: what can society do for the economy? The common 
mistake that we find in neoliberal economic argument, which is also by its very nature 
conventional wisdom, is that society, politics, culture and psychology are often taken to 
be variables of the economy, that tag along like dogs to a master that is superior in 
thought to his silly mutts (Wolf, 2004). When things go wrong, naturally, it is the mutts' 
fault, for they did not pay attention to the order or the training. But there are always 
lessons to be learned for the master, for the mutts' reacted in ways that were not 
anticipated at the time. It begs the obvious question, should we lie down like dogs to this 
economic master, should we place trust in his role and argument, or should we listen to 
our own experiences, our own political voice that demands a more ecumenical relation 
and eclectic methodology amongst the social disciplines? We should not be frightened 
of opening up this subjective path to scrutiny because it is a democratic process - 
through the very nature of dialogue we re-learn the reflexive responsibility of ideas and 
the importance of balanced judgement in their contribution to society. In this, our 
subjective experiences of the economy, in whatever way they appear to us, is more 
valuable than what we have traditionally thought, because it opens up all those `other' 
areas that have been excluded from explanation and suppressed in epistemological 
terms. In order to accomplish this however, our ideas towards the economy need to 
escape the bounds of economic orthodoxy and determinism, so that our ideas question 
the necessities demanded by reality, instead of learning to manage them better. 
Towards a Cultural International Political Economy: Theory, Concepts and 
Methods 
Given the conditions of our present existence and the imbrication of economic 
knowledge and practice, it is important that we demystify, deconstruct and re-politicise 
what is lost in our daily musings, so that we regain control of production and the 
anonymous circuits that is musters, not as a matter of efficiency, but as a matter of 
repairing the responsibility to our future-as-past, to the public space that fosters this 
continuity and the consociational ties that it encourages. In what follows, we will 
attempt to outline an approach to knowledge and practice that delivers a sharp, yet 
subtle reading of the `political' for an age that diffuses the pointed edges of its many 
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shades. Within reason, part of the aim is not to get too bogged down by the nuances and 
questions that the approach of Cultural International Political Economy (CIPE) throws 
up, for there are many burrows and prospects within it. Our aim is to throw caution to 
the wind, to contribute a position amongst many in an ongoing debate (Amin and Palan, 
2001: Carrier, 1998: Daly, 1991: de Goede, 2003: du Gay and Pryke, 2002: Jessop, 
2001a: Laffey, 2004: McKenzie, 2004: Miller, 1998: Palan, 2001 a/b: Steinmetz, 1999: 
Thrift, 2005), to suggest a move `towards' questions of culture in IPE, rather than 
setting a definitive stall. What shall be important about the following, is to be specific 
about the importance of Cultural IPE as a way of knowing the world; and as way of 
changing the world by expressing its central facets and implications, and by drawing up 
a pedagogical framework of concepts or frames of reference - that shall help the reader 
progress from these foundations with, at the very least, an ineffable grasp of their 
implications. Thus the groundwork laid out here will be elaborated in more detail as we 
fashion a concept of financialisation in Part I of this thesis. 
The reader will have noticed that the concepts of politics, society, globality, 
economy and culture, up until this point, have been articulated as self-referential 
domains in their own right. Politics, is traditionally understood as the world of 
government, public administration, citizenship and the rule of law; what we might call 
`the modem apparatus of power' - and is concerned with such issues as power, 
legitimacy, accountability and social justice (cf. Cerny et al., 2000); Society, is usually 
understood as the study, not just of individuals, but of the social relationships between 
individuals, of what we call society: its relations, functions, oddities, norms, 
organisation(s), interaction(s), sometimes in historical context, sometimes not (cf. 
Giddens, 1990). Globality or the international, is the study of international relations and 
institutions, as well as a study of the connections between local/national and 
transnational spheres of influence (see Scholte, 1997); Economics, has been defined as 
`those activities and processes [that] involve a means to an end, satisfying external goals 
to do with provisioning', wealth and distribution (Ray and Sayer, 1999: 4-6). Culture 
has been defined by those `practices and relationships to which meanings, symbols and 
representations are central' towards creating `signifying practices', where such `patterns 
give meaning to, and orient social behaviour' (cf. Ray and Sayer, 1999: 4-6, Williams, 
1981). In simple terms, there has been a tendency to separate out questions of culture 
and economy into separate parts and to see their relationship as `asymmetric' (Ray and 
Sayer, 1999). Such a dichotomous approach has even been used in relation to politics 
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and culture (see Steinmetz, 1999: 20: Lane and Ersson, 2002), or politics and economy 
(cf. Gilpin, 2001: Chavagneux, 2001: ). 
In many ways, it makes sense to separate out their forms; it simplifies their 
meaning into effable representations and renders their relationships into controlled areas 
of systematic `problem-solving' (Cox, 1983/1996). But, it achieves this function at the 
great expense of reducing our complex world into facile gestures. It shatters the matrices 
splicing together all the aforementioned domains into parsimonious units, which 
ironically, limits our ability to fathom and to attain rapprochement between the slippery 
questions of our time i. e. wealth, distribution and power; the historical and relational 
reasons underpinning such privileges; the transient representations that support them; 
the consequences that they euphemise; the conventions that they trivialise; and most of 
all: the latent potential to control `the rate' at which they evolve (Polanyi, 1944: 37). As 
Foucault demonstrates the point; 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you 
really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it 
accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it 
traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It 
needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole body, much more 
than as a negative instance whose function it repression (Foucault, 1980: 119). 
This is precisely why a move towards Cultural International Political Economy is 
significant and purposeful, to see `that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be 
accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult' 
(Foucault, 1988: 155). It will be noticeable that we are slowly moving away from self- 
referential categories of knowing and moving towards a form of knowing, an 
epistemology, and in turn a way of looking at the world - an ontology, that is rather 
chaotic, transient and rebellious (cf. Amin and Palan, 2001: Daly, 1991/2004: Jessop 
and Sum, 2001); especially, in comparison to rationalist epistemologies like economics, 
that demands order, continuity and formal rules in its methods of information gathering; 
so that it can understand the world objectively, as if man is a lab rat in this world 
scurrying beneath the eye of the economist's disdainful microscope. It isn't just 
economists whom engage this privilege, but sociologists, political scientists even 
ironically, historians, whom intend to extract definitive truths from the big wide world, 
as if this extraction of knowledge is like a gold mine that we know exists, but for the 
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minute, it is beyond our methods, beyond our comprehension. In one way such 
rationalist epistemologies accept reality as essence, as truth; but actually, sometimes this 
is employed as a convenient assumption, a practical method, which derives itself from a 
lineage of empiricism, which is mobilised as a `means of separating the disorder from 
the orderings in social life. Thus, rationalism at least in some of its variants, does not 
deny `irrationalities' but seeks to banish them as ontological noise' (Amin and Palan, 
2001: 562). 
The cuts of flesh that rationalists exclude as waste or noise to lucidity - are 
precisely the forms of soft or qualitative data that the cultural historian is interested in 
(cf. Bauman, 2000: Williams, 1981: 29). Noise is an uncontrollable, if not sometimes, a 
spontaneous outlet and spasm of the human condition; it speaks to us - though we may 
not listen, it implores our attention - though we may not see it; it is the impenetrable 
`shadow cast by man' in modern thought and the `blind stain by which it is possible to 
know him' (Foucault, 1966/2002: 356). However functional it maybe, it is therefore a 
vain project to singularly end `man's alienation by reconciling him with his own 
essence' (loc. cit. ), because the shadow of humanity will forever produce darkness over 
those who bellow in its contradictions. The cultural historian can only bring light to the 
shadows, if he first tunes in to the noise; and so the analyst is compelled to listen for 
noise in the present; those utterances of tiny disgrace that we flippantly discuss; to seek 
out their double or equal-opposite; to demystify their charms; to investigate their 
weaknesses; to understand their origins through the `backward gaze' (Thrift, 2005: 2); 
to seek out their contingent arrival on a platform that stabilises the equal and the 
opposite, the light and the shadow, the rational and the irrational into disparate parts; 
and which motivates new forces of cultural history that will forever escape our 
comprehension. `That change is endless and that freedom can never fully be achieved 
does not invalidate progress. Quite the contrary: it renders the idea more important than 
ever' (Bronner, 2004: 40). 
The notion of `culture' is therefore central to an understanding of history as an 
unfolding drama of small incidents with macro significance. As Raymond Williams 
helps us to understand, 
What the cultural sociologist or the cultural historian studies are the social practices and social 
relations which produce not only `culture' or 'an ideology' but, more significantly, those 
dynamic actual states and works with which there are not only continuities and persistent 
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determinations but also tensions, conflicts, resolutions and irresolutions, innovations and actual 
changes (Williams, 1981: 29). 
We have suggested that the cultural historian is interested in the soft vicissitudes of 
modem living, which contrasts widely to the project of rational empiricism (cf. Amin 
and Palan, 2001: Langley 2002). And now it will be important to understand how the 
noise presents itself and how we should study it. The notion of `cultural historian' is 
used here to denote an interest in the culture of present history and the history of 
cultural presents (cf. Thrift, 2005: Williams, 1981). But we proceed now to introduce 
the next layer of understanding, because culture is inseparable to questions of economy; 
in fact, we go as far as to say here that the economy is a cultural episode (cf. Amin and 
Thrift, 2004: du Gay and Pryke, 2002). As Clifford Greetz famously argued `man is an 
animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those 
webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law 
but an interpretive one in search of meaning' (1973: 5). 
This throws us into the deep end of what it means to study the economy through 
cultural spectacles, not to turn hard data into unequivocal facts and knowledge into 
immutable wisdom, but to understand the temporary compulsions of economic agents 
and the qualitative imprints on history that they leave behind. `Temporary compulsions' 
is an interesting expression and one that highlights the transience of economic being 
(see Harvey, 1990: 3-38), of acting economically in the world; because it suggests that 
the motivations precede the impulses of acting, that the motivations are of a different 
time, a time in the near or distant past, where experience precedes essence, and where 
essence is the mirage, the object of (our) affection, the attraction to something that has 
not yet been acquired (cf. Hall, 1996: Palan, 2001b). It denotes the discursiveness of 
economic agents (de Goede, 2003); the indeterminacy of one foot in the past, one foot in 
the present; but also in relation to history as something that can never escape its past, no 
matter how persuasive the present can be in this endeavour (Amin and Palan, 1996). it 
denotes the ephemeral quality of being economic, doing economics; for the compulsions 
that drive actors somehow loose their impetus, their inspiration, as the next catalyst 
formulates itself in the imagination; an idea that is connected only by its affect (cf. 
Bourdieu, 1998). `Though ideational', cultural political economy `does not exist in 
someone's head; though unphysical, it is not an occult entity' (Greetz, 1973: 10). Thus, 
economic agents acquire what is not already theirs through a series of confrontations 
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with materiality, with others in the spectrum of the economy, which is shattered into 
different positions, different dispositions (Bourdieu, 1998), that can reveal themselves in 
the form of violent revolutions e. g. Bolshevism, or what we may call the diminutive 
revolutions of the commonplace i. e. when I do not get my morning paper. 
This necessarily requires us to understand what the motivations for activeness 
are, where they have come from; how they have been inspired; how they relate in a field 
of otherness; how they are situated in historical and social context; how they will change 
through time; and what they will produce. If we step back for a minute and imagine our 
own circumstances - and look to the space that occupies us, wherever we might be; we 
will find that the world around us speaks to us through its many forms; that these forms, 
these manifestations of materiality, are also ideas that we hold as our own, and which 
we share with others, who may or may not always agree that our ideas are true (cf. 
Polanyi, 1957). The subject, the economic actor, even the rationalist, is intertwined with 
a reality that they may (or may not) hold as being true. The subject is not separate or 
independent from this reality, the object of our vision; we do not look at our neighbour 
as a person, but as an idea, a representation that alters and shapes how we behave in 
relation to him or her. And the person is one of many different representations, which 
make up the distinctiveness and connectiveness of materiality; because representations 
only make sense in relation to others in a diverse spectrum of `differentiation' and 
`distinctiveness' (cf. Bourdieu, 1998). For example, it is not as if we would suddenly 
decide to walk naked down the high street, because this is a form of communication to 
others, one that is specific to our history and not essential to it, that perceives it as 
unacceptable and `mad'; and even if we did this in spite of its associations, it would 
denote an intention - and as an intention it belongs to something, something in the 
fleeting past that has been inscribed in the subject, the agent, who is activated by its 
lingering presence (cf. Hall, 1996). As Michael Polanyi argues, 
All these inarticulate achievements are guided by self-satisfaction. The adaptation of our sense 
organs, the urge of our appetites and fears, our capacity for locomotion, balancing and righting, 
as well as the processes of learning which an inarticulate intelligence develops from these 
strivings, can be said to be what they are and to achieve what they are said to achieve, only to 
the extent to which we accredit their implied assent to their own performance, shaped by them 
in accordance with standards set by themselves to themselves. Therefore, at each of the 
innumerable points at which our articulation is rooted in our sub-intellectual strivings, or in any 
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articulate feats of our intelligence, we rely on tacit performances of our own, the rightness we 
implicitly confirm (Polanyi, 1957: 100). 
Hopefully, through this reading, our ideas are already beginning change how we see the 
economy; not as something ontologically given, where prices go up and down; where 
market institutions such as Tesco create new jobs; where economists speak in a 
language we do not understand; but, as something that we create ourselves, something 
that we constantly engage with and perform (Thrift, 2005); no matter how significant or 
insignificant the performance; because in our tiny efforts to confirm what we know and 
to derive simple pleasures from the act of knowing, or not knowing, - we reaffirm the 
historical specificity, trajectory and social constitution of the economy in its many forms 
and relations; its institutions and products; its priorities and outputs; its privileges and 
inequalities; its adverts and commentaries; its consumer fashions and celebrities; its 
epistemic artisans and aesthetic priests; its relations to government, community and the 
self; and even its social consequences, which sometimes affect us, but sometimes not. 
`All the world is a stage' Shakespeare once said - the economy of our times is no 
different. Thus, we should see cultural economy as an attempt, 
... to identify the varied 
impulses and articulations through which value is formed, added, and 
circulated; summing to what can only be described as a cultural economic ensemble with no 
clear hierarchy of significance. These impulses and articulations are not only plural mixed, but 
also performative, since they involve not only following the rules of the game but also constantly 
establishing new rules (Amin and Thrift, 2004: XV). 
The economy that we perform and confirm is also the economy that seduces us, that 
charms us into unspoken submission (cf. Foucault, 1980: 109-133). We must not forget 
however, that the economy of our time is culturally and historically specific (Thrift, 
1997). For example, if we were to massively simplify the history of the economy for 
didactic reasons only; then we could say that the emergence of capitalism, taking Marx 
as our reference point, represented the expanded economisation of cultural traditions 
and relations; produced through people of faith and of a religious calling: the `spirit of 
capitalism' (Weber, 1930/2001). As Weber argued - this spirit was the motivation of 
puritan asceticism, which `did its part in building the tremendous cosmos [and cloak] of 
the modem economic order' as `fait decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage' 
(ibid.: 123-124). However, the economy of `specialists without spirit, sensualists 
51 
without heart' (ibid.: 124) gradually transformed itself, taking Polanyi (1944) and 
Hobsbawm (1995) as a our frame of reference, through the socialisation of economic 
industrialisation - ironically leading to an existential war and a post-war period that 
promised to contain all promiscuity, subversion and decent throughout its coldest stages 
(Harvey, 1990). And since the collapse of the Berlin wall, we have seemingly passed 
into a new stage, where capitalism is again celebrated, where anything can become a 
commodity; a stage that we could describe as the expanded culturalisation of 
economisation (cf. Thrift, 1997: 2001b). Contrast for example, as a matter of 
comparative literature, the difference between Thorstein Veblen's Theory of the Leisure 
Class (1925) with Pierre Bourdieu's Distinction (cf. Bourdieu, 1998). In the former, 
Veblen persuades us that the leisure class i. e. the upper class, invest in goods not only 
for their material pleasure, but for what they say about the person's class and moral 
distinction. Today, there is evidence of this e. g. fine-dining; but there is also less 
evidence of this, not because it doesn't exist, but because the economy now moves in 
such unpredictable, non-linear ways, that it is not a question of class, but one of taste - 
the central idea of Bourdieu's Distinction (passim. Bourdieu, 1998). 
Outlining a Framework of Understanding: Knowledge, Belief and Disposition 
Unfortunately, we have reached the stage where the reader will be unimpressed to find 
that none of the ideas expressed above are `new'. Like Bourdieu's Distinction, the 
cultural historian floats upon a sea of methodological and epistemological nuances, 
which force us to reach `social positions' not as a matter of taste, however, but as a 
matter of navigating the search for hidden truths. Before we go on, we must remember 
that the purpose of this specific project centres upon one defining interest: to understand 
the motivations for social change and their consequences. Within this general enquiry, it 
is proposed here that there are three broad categories of motivation that defy and enable 
social change: knowledge, belief and disposition. 
Taking Michael Polanyi (1957: 69-124) as our frame of reference, the first 
category refers to the method of knowing, which can be effable or ineffable, so that 
knowledge derives from the perception of the world and its inter-dependence with the 
social and historical context. But knowledge also translates into signs and 
representations, which the knower can make sense of, either through articulate or 
inarticulate means, so that their meaning can be manipulated and confirmed so as to 
create judgement. Thus, knowledge is a way of understanding the world, but also a way 
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of representing it (de Goede, 2003). The second category belongs to the first in the sense 
that our beliefs are part of a tacit coefficient, but in order for belief to be instilled 
autonomously, it first has to be produced, initiated and rationalised. It is readily 
acknowledged as a starting point of this thesis that `knowledge and rationality make real 
material distributions and effects possible' (de Goede, 2003: 95). But the Foucaultian 
understanding of discourse lacks the ability to assess the nature of social change, unless 
of course, it is carried out by the method of genealogy. Instead, it is proposed in this 
thesis that there needs to be a greater understanding of the `subtle interactions between 
`agents in institutions' and `institutions in agents" (Amin and Palan, 1996: 211) so that 
we can examine the dialogue of subjectivity inside economic discourse. The reader will 
of course detect an overlap, but the point is to suggest that the constitution of belief 
needs to be deconstructed `not' as a static affect in time; but as moving target through 
time, which necessarily asks us to focus on the actors acting on belief and the 
consequences that this creates. The third category which Bourdieu calls habitus belongs 
to the past, belongs to identity in the past, and the instances that formulate memory as a 
lineage to belonging, so that the very performance of identity, of self, is a product not of 
choice, but of taste; and taste is an equal opposite of distinction, `because being 
inscribed in the space in question, he or she is not indifferent and is endowed with 
categories of perception, with classificatory schemata, with a certain taste' (Bourdieu, 
1998: 9). This takes on a material dimension, because its history precedes essence, and 
in preceding essence the enactment of taste is also path-dependent and a `blind stain' 
difficult to remove. None of these concepts make sense however without providing a 
skeletal framework of analytical concepts from which to put `their' flesh on to the 
bones. In what follows, it is argued that the cultural political economy is organised by 
the relations between the following: governmentality; expert-systems; reflexive 
economic practices. 
Governmentality 
We begin broadly with the notion that we cannot escape our history, our structural 
history, the history of territory and of state, which has moved from panoptic forms of 
deliberate and explicit forms of bodily control (Bauman, 2000: 11) to a reversal of this 
logic; where man is governed not by man nor by government, but through himself; 
through `technologies of the self (Foucault, 1997: 223-251); technologies deployed in 
civil society, where control has become the subtle art and fantasy of the watcher, the 
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economic citizen, who engages in the pre-discursive forms of structural power, by 
enacting his own micro-power, his own bodily power and sense of self; his own sense of 
taste within a market economy -a culturalised economy that has more subtle, seductive 
and pernicious forms of power running through its exchange relations. For those 
unconvinced by this, just go to the supermarket and keep watch of your reactions and 
emotions to the symbols of material goods. The economy is therefore part of a macro 
system of what Foucault and others have called `governmentality' (cf. Foucault, 1978: 
Miller and Rose, 1990: Lemke, 2001); where government and the market structures 
informing the logic of the state is produced by the mentality of its citizens. It is 
proposed, as is consistent with others in this academic field (ibid. ), that the morphology 
of relations enabled by governmentality is a prior condition for knowledge, belief and 
practice. This comes in the homologous form of distinctive-signs, such as policy 
briefings; white papers; green papers; tax changes; interviews; media commentary; 
statistics; charts; bill boards etc., so that `political rationality is not pure, neutral 
knowledge which simply `re-presents' the governing reality; instead, it itself constitutes 
the intellectual processing of the reality which political technologies can then tackle', 
e. g. `agencies, procedures, institutions, legal forms' etc' (Lemke, 2001: 191). In simple 
terms, governmentality refers to the initiation of action and personal self-conduct 
through the very presence of connective representations across a diverse spectrum of 
governance that help to normalise and abnormalise certain forms of behaviour. While 
governmentality is fractured among many different authorities and representations, such 
diverse units are also connected making up the spatial whole, which is subject to 
constant scrutiny and reflection by those who reinforce or challenge its unified 
emergence. Like a kaleidoscope, governmentality circulates different patterns and 
colours of light creating images that are constantly adapting to the desire for more 
stimulation - or even more pleasure. 
Expert-Systems 
However, the conditions of governmentality are also enabled by expert-systems, which 
not only help to produce the politico-ethical structures of governmentality, but which 
are in turn influenced by the wider territorial conditions that augment their transient 
forms. Such expert-systems are also miniature governmentalities acting in a social field 
of competitive value creation. `By expert systems I mean systems of technical 
accomplishment of professional expertise that organise large areas of the material and 
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social environments in which we live today' (Giddens, 1990: 27). Taking Giddens's 
highly useful concept to hand, an expert-system can be a `theoretical class', as in a 
group of academics working within a specific field (Bourdieu, 1998: 10-13), or it can be 
an institution, such as a commercial organisation, which takes on a physical form and 
yet like a theoretical class, its boundaries are fictitious and porous. Scott Lash helps us 
to understand the significance of `expert-system' as an analytical concept, 
And however one might want to dispute the normative implications of Giddens's theory, its 
purchase on late modernity's empirical reality is considerable. Though Giddens's largely 
positively valuated expert-systems seem to be very much the same as Foucault's (wholly 
negatively valuated) `discourses', they are in fact a much broad concept. Whereas Foucaultian 
discourses are frameworks regulating the systematic occurrence of serious speech acts, expert- 
systems are much wider in scope. They refer at the same time to the practices of say 
professionals and other experts; they have a strong institutional aspect; they can also refer to the 
expertise objectified in machines such as aeroplanes and computers, or in other objective systems 
such as monetary mechanisms (Lash, 1994: 117-118). 
Very much like governmentality, expert-systems provide innovative methods of social 
organisation, mental and physical tools that facilitate being in different social contexts. 
They `entangle' individuals through the production of belief, a prior condition of 
knowledge and autonomous action (Callon, 1998). Unlike governmentality, expert- 
systems operate in a competitive social field of differentiation in order to attract certain 
dispositions or `habitus', that are prior to innovations and exist in materiality. One of the 
advantages of employing this concept is that we can determine the changing forms of 
the expert-system, within itself i. e. the debates within the expert, and secondly we can 
understand the inter-subjective dynamism between these debates in relation to their 
wider contexts. Thirdly, this injects politics in to the cultural economy concept/debate as 
we highlighted above, which has been lacking, because we now see expert-systems as 
part of a struggle to create a certain type of economic value and production. 
Reflexive economic practices 
It is proposed that the concept of `practice' bears more analytical fruit over the concept 
of discourse in an enquiry concerned with social change; especially the Foucaultian 
sense of the term, because we are interested not only in how identities are regulated 
through initiated structures of language and knowing, but how identities put their own 
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carefully selected habits or dispositions into practice, creating change unpredicted by the 
Foucaultian affect. An economic practice is also a space of mediation between the 
expert-system and the lay consumer. To `engage in cultural practice means to utilise 
existing cultural symbols to accomplish some end... so that the important theoretical 
question.. is 
how to conceptualise the articulation of system and practice' (Sewell, 
1999: 47). 
There is also an emulative dimension to economic practices in society that 
identities tend to follow, not only of performing consumer tastes, but of creating their 
own personal forms of `ontological security' (Giddens, 1990). We cannot avoid the 
many economic practices in society e. g. everyday consumption patterns, and the notion 
of `practice' affords us the privilege of being able to describe and deconstruct the 
specific forms that it takes, so that we understand the seductive powers motivating the 
very practice itself. But it is important to understand that `system and practice constitute 
an indissoluble duality or dialectic' (Sewell, 1999: 47), so that we must also consider the 
changing forms and meanings of economic practices, and what they mean also for 
society as a whole. 
Thus, before we develop an understanding of reflexivity, it will be important to 
open up a parenthesis to what Bourdieu (1998: 1-13) means by his concept of `capital' 
as it has some bearing for our analysis later. Heuristically, Bourdieu suggests that 
different agents and social groups have different combinations of cultural and economic 
capital at different times and in different contexts. While Bourdieu (1998) makes a 
conceptual separation between cultural and economic capital, we would be wrong to 
think that he fits into the same category of Ray and Sayer (1999). For Bourdieu (1998), 
it is futile to make this methodological separation if one is to assess the sociological and 
political significance of discursive structures, power and change. For example, those 
activities and processes involved in the `means' of provision are also culturally 
informed and endowed with meaning for agents acting in a context that can equally 
facilitate or constrain the reproduction of certain forms of provisioning, depending on 
the forms of representation that they accumulate. In separating cultural from economic 
capital, Bourdieu is simply making the hypothesis that those activities that are 
traditionally thought of as cultural, such as going to the cinema, taking a siesta, even 
mannerisms, are only thought of as cultural because they represent distinctions. But 
secondly, such cultural distinctiveness is not only endowed with economic meaning to 
the `other', it is also economically underpinned and influenced. While we can separate 
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culture and economy into separate parts, temporarily, it becomes futile if we are to 
explain why and how agents enact their own tastes. For example, corporate executives 
or civil servants may have similar levels of economic capital, more access to 
provisioning than say office workers, but they may alter in their mannerisms or attitude 
towards activities that define their identity e. g. fine dining, which could invariably alter 
their access to higher levels of capital. The differentiated positions that these cultural- 
economic assemblages project, creates a dynamic topology or social `field' that is also a 
`structure of the distribution of different kinds of capital, which are also weapons, 
commanding the representations of this space and the position-takings' in a struggle, as 
we suggested above, to conserve or transform it (Bourdieu, 1998: 12). 
Finally, Bourdieu's notion of distinction; the idea that life is a struggle of 
representation and enactment within the social field, is also, we propose here; a 
reflexive process. In order to understand the significance of social change it is necessary 
to have a conceptual understanding of reflexivity. Anthony Giddens (1990) argued that 
late modernity, the contemporary period, has been `radicalised' due to the consequences 
of modernity. Giddens as well as his German colleague Ulrich Beck (1992: 1994) 
observed that the character of late modernity is captured by a new phase of 
modernisation described as `reflexivity'. As Giddens argued, `the reflexivity of modern 
life consists in the fact that social practices are constantly examined and reformed in 
light of incoming information about these very practices, thus constitutively altering 
their character' (Giddens, 1990: 38). 
However, there are different conceptions of reflexivity. Ulrich Beck (1994: 
1999) for example, argues that the industrial society of the solid modernity that once 
was during the 19`h and early 20th centuries has been undermined by the self- 
undercutting of modernity, creating uncontrollable dangers to society that we cannot 
avoid, and must render controllable if we are to re-invigorate our own sense of social 
control and destiny that is no longer just an `appendage of the machine'. Beck (ibid. ) 
describes this new reality as the `risk society', a manufactured society in as much as 
such risks need not exist. But Beck takes as his starting point an ontological perspective 
of risk, which necessitates him into a false-positive i. e. to assert that the only way 
forward, is to face our reality, which will compel us to rein in risk. But Beck does not 
consider the alternative position put forward by Scott Lash (1994), which is to raise two 
main issues: (1) that man is imbedded in his own historical and aesthetic pleasures 
creating greater expectations of the means that channel them; (2) that man will 
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inevitably carry out his dispositions as a matter of reformulating his past experiences 
through more secure ones in the present. In contrast to Beck and Giddens, Lash's notion 
of `aesthetic reflexivity' (1994) means, quite possibly, that modernity will bend in ways 
not necessarily defined by a final end such as social justice, but possibly, aesthetic 
reflexivity is an extension, an evolution of what previously existed, a radicalisation of 
market relations that `lock-in' productive circuits of problem-solving devolved of any 
`idealistic' proposal to counter them. 
Methods of Knowing, Methods of Understanding 
Cultural IPE offers us a deeper, more complex explanatory system of tools from which 
to deconstruct and demystify, describe and examine, reflect and intervene, not so that 
we pin down what causes the effect, because this is implausible in a world of 
ontological complexity, indeterminacy and path-dependency; but how causality itself is 
imbricated in institutional relations of context and interaction, between the subjects of 
capitalism and their objects, between the ideas that they hold dear and the distinctive 
forms that they represent. In so doing, we are interested in the nature of transformation, 
but also what transformation means for the human condition. We are interested, as 
analysts of cultural history, to explore the inputs of change and the outputs that they 
create and normalise. This is not to denigrate, to shun, to depreciate or patronise how 
people think about the world, but to provide a wider spectrum of understanding than 
what currently exists in neoliberal accounts of knowledge; to show people how history 
moves by a sleight of hand, based on an illusion of necessity, urgency and teleology of 
inevitability, a path that economic agents so easily tread by themselves. This is not a 
subversive project, or even a subjective one at that, because in assembling the systemic 
tools of understanding, which derive from historical understanding and not from ideas 
alone, we engage ourselves inter-subjectively with propositions about the world, which 
speak to us objectively or not at all (Polanyi, 1957). In this sense, research is such that 
we act as intermediaries between the text and our reading of the text (Chambers et al., 
2004), which requires an incessant responsibility, if we are to situate ideas in reality 
knowing the potential of their consequences. Michael Polanyi could not have articulated 
this research method better, 
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Such is the personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding. But this does not 
make our understanding subjective. Comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive 
experience, but a responsible act claiming universal validity. Such knowing is indeed objective 
in the sense of establishing contact with a hidden reality; a contact that is defined as the 
condition for anticipating an indeterminate range of yet of unknown (and perhaps inconceivable) 
true implications. It seems reasonable to describe this fusion of the personal and the objective as 
Personal Knowledge (Polanyi, 1957: VIII). 
Thus, we cannot avoid the proposition or the circumstance that tests its stability or 
instability. And in this sense, research is a two-way dynamic that formulates ideas, holds 
them to the light of the day, until the funnel of doubt gradually reduces itself in a 
temporal process that flows from epistemological uncertainty to ontological implication. 
For example, the notion that financialisation is a cumulative process has to be tested and 
understood first of all, which requires also, an understanding of transformation, not just 
as narrative, but as ontological deconstruction. Along this journey, a cultural historian 
necessarily observes `facts' more as reference points, as milestones that constitute an 
historical disposition and a specific cultural context. For example, `texts themselves, as 
well as having an abstract form, are an aspect of a larger socio-cultural practice' 
(Chambers et al., 2004: 42). In contrast, conventional methods distinguish mainly 
between Primary and Secondary sources of data, but this thesis considers that `methods 
are often most productive when their rules and conventions are transgressed or 
combined' (Chambers, 2004: 42). For example, there have been two uses of primary 
data in this thesis. Firstly, a research project cannot survive without dialogue, without 
questioning people inside of reality, which requires in some instances `experts' from a 
specific field, but also lay people in a wider field of ordinariness. The two are just as 
important as each other, not for what they are, but for how they see the world before 
them; what they say about it and how the world interacts from their own perspective. 
This institutes a formal and an informal process of recording data, which we could 
tentatively call `detection' and `extraction'. 
In the first instance, expert-systems and lay-systems can direct the observer to 
realities previously unheard of, like a detective following a chain of evidence, it is 
incumbent that he or she asks the questions and records the answers, not to denote fact, 
but to dispel myth, to acquire material worthy of interest that can either extend 
propositions or rebuff them in ways unanticipated. This informal practice of acquiring 
knowledge through the simple art of conversation is constant, cumulative and 
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anthropologically intended, as a way of quiet, reflective observation so that we enhance 
our responsibility to ideas, theories and concepts on the one hand and to materiality on 
the other. The second dimension is a formalisation of the first dimension, what some 
describe as `the interview technique'. It is not superior in content or method, but more 
simply as way of recording, historicising and standardising on paper, findings that can 
be physically manipulated, analysed and understood in their relational context. This 
research carried out both informal and formal techniques of primary observation, which 
we will now discuss in stages. 
The first stage of this thesis, the stage of frightening uncertainty, could be 
described as foundational knowledge, setting forth an experiment of ideas and 
propositions, which led in this case to a PhD saving conference paper. This paper 
entitled: `Not such an Equitable Life? Unpacking the social, cultural and political from 
Financialisation . was delivered to an audience at the British International Studies 
Association (BISA) conference at Birmingham University 2002. It was built upon an 
inter-relationship between background knowledge and detection work, pressing the 
buttons, squeezing the pressure points - in order to resolve and to amalgamate the 
uncertain gap between theory and practice. Inter-personal relationships are inevitably 
created as a result, especially if the object of investigation is controversial and especially 
if those under investigation see in your work a means to an end. But we must understand 
that case-study analysis is one specific level of analysis that rests beneath two levels 
above: (1) the top layer is the theoretical lens, the theory of knowledge i. e. epistemology 
and methodology; (2) the second layer (in this case) is the object i. e. financialisation; 
and the third layer (3), as we have mentioned is the case-study, that intends to say more 
about the middle and top layers, than it does about the infinite and infinitesimals detail 
of the bottom layer. This is primarily the value of foundations built upon 
epistemological and ontological deconstruction. The bottom layer, the ineffable, is made 
effable by recourse to a framework of understanding that corresponds to a wider set of 
academic `expectations', both tacit and explicit. It is then possible to `arrive' at 
conclusive implications, which then suggest a direction for change. 
Detective work in this case and in others involved e-mails, telephone calls, 
formal letters to organisations e. g. the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO). On other occasions, it involved 
actually going to people's homes; business conferences e. g. the Institute of Directors; 
central bank meetings e. g. Newcastle and London; financial planning seminars e. g. 
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Dublin and Newcastle upon Tyne - upon where observatory mental and physical notes 
were taken of the speakers and in some cases their audiences, their information packs, 
even down to the representations of gender and body language, whether it made a 
difference or not. Going to financial planning seminars proved to be extremely fruitful, 
if its employment could not have been acquired earlier, because in many ways financial 
planning seminars are `points of sale', not neutral sites of learning, but places of 
entanglement, from where the researcher can become an `actor', to pretend to be 
someone else i. e. a young person who wants to (and probably should) save for a 
pension, which is interesting when you're `not' interesting or `profitable' to their 
business. 
The more formalised method of this dimension culminated in `proper' style 
interviews, upon where the researcher writes a letter, waits for feedback, a rebuttal, but 
is often happy to find a lending hand, an inquisitive person, whom also seeks a wider 
outlet in your work, but whom often never wants to be formally recognised or quoted in 
the public arena. It is therefore better to hold the pretence of a researcher, rather than a 
PhD student, a tactic that is buttressed by putting the recorder to one side, pen in hand, 
poised to listen rather than to threaten. Nine such formal interviews took place: one 
former cabinet Politician; one high ranking civil servant working for the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman; one pension trustee; one actuary; four lay people working on the Equitable 
Life case, and countless follow up e-mails; in addition to one London investment 
practitioner. 
The second formalised method of primary enquiry came in the form of a web 
questionnaire (Please see Annex A). This was a qualitative questionnaire designed for 
Equitable Life policyholders, past and present - and the purpose was to understand why 
people invested in Equitable Life as a vehicle for their savings. At the heart of this 
questionnaire was to understand the significance that people attached to the products 
that Equitable was selling; the reasons why Equitable was their preferred choice; the 
expectations they had towards their products; and why expectations provided the drive 
to acquire more. It also asked the respondents to be clear about the information they 
drew upon. For example, was it effable or ineffable forms of knowledge that initiated 
and stabilised their calculation? This questionnaire also asked respondents to describe 
how they felt, focusing on the emotive side of financial products, both before the crisis 
and after the crisis, in an attempt to understand how the morphology of relations kept 
Equitable Life going, but also why it fell apart making calculation unstable. Lastly, it 
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also considered the transience of identity. As savers invested in their products, they 
were principally financial identities, but after the crisis, they revolted and turned into 
politico-financial identities. The questionnaire remained on the web for one whole year, 
not just in one place, but in two different places. It was on the Equitable Life Members 
Action Group (EMAG) website and it was on a sister site belonging to the Equitable 
Life Trapped Annuitants action group (ELTA), a different class of saver effected by the 
company. On the negative side, I received only twenty questionnaire responses, but on 
the plus side, I received a lot of valuable and rich information, which I used throughout 
my thesis. 
Finally, this research project drew upon secondary information sources. This 
included: (1) literature e. g. self-help literature and financial magazines; (2) academic 
papers e. g. the archive of actuarial papers provided by the British Institute of Actuaries 
provided a rich source of data from which to compare historically and to understand 
contextually the changing nature of financial knowledge informing pension 
transformations; (3) commercial and public policy documents both public and 
confidential; (4) adverts e. g. a collection of Equitable Life's adverts was acquired from 
the PHSO after vain attempts with the company. Such data are not drab artefacts for us 
to describe as if our intelligence aspires from what our heads can empty on the page; but 
they are representations of context, of history unfolding, society in progress and action, 
which necessarily requires us always to situate these references, their significance into 
context e. g. their wider politico-ethical relationships and consequences. But this does 
not come easily without, firstly; a fertile framework of understanding, an epistemology 
that asks us to shed our preconceptions of the world, a lonely business, one that 
manifests itself initially in cynicism, but which nevertheless sews ideational seeds, new 
didactic powers of analysis that correspond not to this school or to that school, because 
the practice and intention of demystification and analytical narration is transdisciplinary. 
Testing propositions does not make us scientists of the social world, we are not 
trying to extract laws out of reality, but we are trying like scientists to understand the 
world better, to know it better even though it evades us, even though modernity is a 
`perilous act' (Foucault, 1966/2002: 357); and in the same vain as those in the 
Enlightenment, we are trying constantly to make the world a better place to live, no 
matter how `asymptotic' (Bronner, 2004) or `feeble' (Habermas, 1985a) the project of 
modernity is. In this sense, we are not trying to create a finality, an ending to history, 
but more modestly to `reclaim' the Enlightenment project by `fostering the will to know 
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and fight against prejudice' to `insist upon tolerance and reciprocity', to demand `a 
public democratic sphere, and the accountability of institutions'; effectively, to create 
the possibility of `personal liberation, popular empowerment, and overcoming the spell 
of myth and nature' (Bronner, 2004: 29). 
Reflections: Outline of the Thesis 
The first part of this thesis has been an important step towards understanding Cultural 
(International) Political Economy on the one hand and financialisation on the other. We 
have yet to clasp hands, to understand how our theoretical approach of the economy 
applies to our distinct approach to financialisation. Part of the novelty of this thesis is to 
develop a notion of the economy as a cultural life in motion, where the variables of 
action are extensive, contingent and interdependent, creating historically distinct social 
contexts that merge as if like a chaotic pattern or art piece made of different concepts, 
colours and materials that somehow come together and make `sense'. From this point of 
view, culture is a constitutional notion; we make sense of it by understanding what 
formulates it and with this we need to understand that there are so many disparate parts 
that make up the sum of the whole, enabling certain forms of action that reproduce 
consequences for society. While we have outlined a turn towards questions of culture in 
IPE, we have yet to be specific about what culture means, especially in relation to our 
subject area. As a result, Part I of this thesis will therefore be an attempt to construct a 
Cultural IPE approach to Financialisation, which we will discuss further below. 
Part of the aim of this thesis is to examine financialisation in depth and to 
explore its dimensions through the lens of Cultural IPE. To do this, we need to ask 
ourselves what financialisation is and what it means. In Part I of this thesis, we will 
journey through three different chapters on financialisation passing from the material to 
the theoretical. Chapter two provides an in-depth background and analysis of Britain's 
financialised economy. It demonstrates the extent to which financialisation has become 
embedded in the British economy and it explores some of the interrelations between 
work, consumerism and financial production. What we find broadly is that 
financialisation is indispensable to the sustainability of Britain's economy, even though 
it is responsible for fuelling the inequality, instability and trivialisation of modern 
British politics. This chapter is important because we need to understand the surface 
layer of our economy, to understand its systemic linkages and the connections that 
require or even `demand' financialisation as an implicit aspect of socio-market 
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regulation. This is important because we focus on the outputs of an economy that is 
facilitated by inputs, an infrastructure committed to the reproduction of this system, 
made up - not just of foreign institutional investors, but normal domestic pension funds, 
commercial institutions that serve the public, intermediaries that channel ordinary 
savings into a financial system that essentially maintains the politico-ethical nature of 
Britain's modern-day political structure. By understanding financialisation in material 
terms and by exploring the significance of its contribution, we can then begin to 
understand how financialisation works, why and what for. 
In chapter three, we will attempt to situate financialisation in historical context 
and examine its novel features. Economists tend to see financialisation as a relatively 
new phenomenon dating back to the 1970s when the Bretton Woods exchange rate 
mechanism collapsed (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000: Stockhammer, 2004: 2005). 
Furthermore, economists and politicians alike look upon global finance as an 
extraordinary provider of wealth and distribution, something that is unquestionably part 
of our world and here to stay for the long term. In this sense, global markets are usually 
constructed in the political imagination as institutional networks that float above our 
heads. Chapter three of this thesis intends to deal with these questions and asks 
principally, how and why does financialisation manage to sustain itself? Once we begin 
to situate this question in historical context and break it down into its component parts, 
we will begin to reveal a hidden politics in financialisation that manifests itself as 
`crisis-management' -a repetitive regime in motion. 
From this chapter we will have a foundation from which to move to chapter four, 
which tries to establish fixed parameters for measuring the financialisation of the 
economy and the potency of the above proposition. Polanyi's central observation in the 
Great Transformation was his feeling that the economy was qualitatively different as a 
result of central political changes that had conspired to make the industrial machine the 
epicentre of 19`h century social relations. `Instead of economy being embedded in social 
relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system' (Polanyi, 1944: 57). 
Using Polanyi as our guide, it is suggested that financialisation encourages the transition 
from disembedding to re-embedding, where social relations become released from 
traditional values and socio-economic relationships, and moulded around the pure 
incentives of the free-market, from where individuals are expected to navigate the 
economy more efficiently according to the reflexivity of individual tastes between 
consumers and producers. It is in this chapter that we try to flesh out some propositions 
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regarding financialisation using a cultural IPE approach within the confines of a 
framework that draws upon Polanyi's major study. In this sense, what we propose is that 
financialisation is a cumulative process because while it encourages disembedding it 
also encourages re-embedding, which facilitates even more greatly, the expansive 
repetition of the regime based on the commercialisation of solutions. Whether it is 
merely a question of repetition is an empirical question, because as we have made clear, 
it is quite possible, as in Polanyi's study, that new powers of social accountability will 
become evident as financialisation progresses. 
In Part II of this thesis, we move on to the next stage. Armed with our 
understanding of financialisation from a cultural IPE perspective, it is now possible to 
explore the financialisation of private pension provision. We take this in four steps. 
Firstly, it should be noted that private pension provision is in the midst of a 
transformation from a collective approach with its origins in the post-war period 
towards an individualised approach with its ambitions firmly rooted in the hopes and 
promises of commercial-cultural life. The most obvious starting point of this 
transformation is the 1980s and in Chapter Five we attempt to understand how 
economic history was re-written through the emergence of a new private pensions 
policy. What we find in this chapter is the gravitation towards a coherent set of policies 
designed to stabilise financial change and along with it, the idea that individuals should 
be free to choose their own economic destiny, even their own financial future. 
In Chapter Six, we delve more deeply into this subject, by going beyond the 
macro constitution of neoliberal governmentality to explore the activities of the expert- 
system within this aspiring context. In this chapter, we look very carefully at Equitable 
Life and understand how the oldest, most credible life assurance company in history 
warped the ethical and commercial boundaries of financialisation to deliver the most 
favourable returns for captivated savers - ordinary middle class people who bought into 
a consumer dream of money for nothing with a producer that was equally influenced by 
the reflexivity of taste and disposition. Importantly, the ordinary saver and the 
institution, were part of an overall momentum that drove financialisation down avenues 
that are now shrouded in controversy, culminating in a series of legal stand-offs between 
state and citizen that has now escalated to the level of the European Union. 
To understand the motivation for financial innovation and the consequences of 
Labour's Third Way proposal to commercial pensions' regulation, in Chapter Seven we 
attempt to understand the historical evolution of actuarial knowledge and its relation to 
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key changes in private pension provision. In particular, we examine the discursive and 
fortuitous nature of actuarial knowledge in the 20`h century leading up to the tech-stock 
crash of 2000, which provides us with a more critical understanding as to why 
companies are closing down their final salary pension schemes. In the penultimate 
chapter, our question is to understand why new Labour's Third Way solution to private 
pensions' policy failed giving way to a reflexive governmentality that enhances and 
reinforces a laissez faire approach to commercial regulation that facilitates, even more 
greatly, the idea of flexible stock market investment for the social masses. 
In our final concluding chapter, we reflect upon the qualitative changes within 
financialisation and ask whether it is a socially repetitive regime of accumulation, or 
whether, repetition has been informed by new powers of socialisation and re- 
politicisation. In addition, we reflect upon an alternative model of economic life 
regarding pension provision and funding - that also outlines a more equitable and 
ethically motivated economic system for re-synthesising society and economy inside a 
more responsible framework of social accountability. 
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PART I 
Towards a Cultural IPE of Financialisation 
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Chapter Two 
Destiny, Economic Power and the `New World Order': 
Britain's Financialised Economy in Critical Perspective 
Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown MP, 
... 
200 hundred years ago a famous British foreign secretary said that the new world had been 
called into existence to redress the balance of the old. In 1990 another old world ended 
dominated by the cold war and people talked then in 1990 of a new world order. What they 
actually meant then was a new political order and what was not foreseen then, but is obvious 
now from everything that we see and do, what we experience in everyday of our lives, is the 
shear scale, speed and scope of globalisation, and it's only now that we can begin to understand 
that the world order that globalisation brings and what its going to look like is driven forward not 
just by the balance of military strength, the cold war times, or ordinary political power, its being 
driven by a seismic shift in economic power that we see around us. But what does the new world 
order mean for countries like ours who are looking to succeed. I suggest that the countries that 
are going to succeed are those that combine flexibility, free trade, open markets, with proper 
stewardship of the environment and investment in education, infrastructure and innovation, and 
the question for us is how we meet and master all these challenges to ensure that Britain 
enhances its competitiveness in the process and realises what I believe is our destiny of success 
in this new world order. 
New World Order speech, 15tb of May 2007, CBI annual dinner 
Introduction 
For Gordon Brown the new world order is one of a seismic power shift in favour of 
economic globalisation. Just like a wave that escalates in the distance and draws closer 
and higher with each blink, it provokes the question, are we to sink or swim? Those who 
might stand up to the wave will invariably fail, but for those who use the wave's 
propulsion will be carried by its destiny to a shore of success. From Gordon Brown's 
perspective, Britain maybe awash with economic globalisation, but its power can at least 
be directed, `used' in favour of meeting the challenges of the economy and its global 
competitiveness. In this sense, Gordon Brown's statement about drawing success from 
the new World Order is significant because it identifies the `object of power' and in 
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objectifying this power, Gordon Brown insists that Britain is separate to its structure and 
its unfolding. For example, Brown constructs an idea of `the problem' and then seeks to 
address it through means that are internal to its logic; and even in material terms, the 
effect of this power is yet to make itself known to us, because it is built upon fait or 
`faith', as even Brown himself makes clear. And this is why we turn to a material if not 
cursory understanding of the linkages and circuits that make up the house that Gordon 
help build. Though we must recognise that this chapter forms only a background to an 
appreciation of what `we' reproduce through our daily economic performances, and how 
they are facilitated in the world-system as if they were immutable and designed only for 
us. This chapter is therefore part analysis and part commentary - an attempt to connect 
the dots between production, work, consumerism and finance and to explore these 
relationships in a wider global context. The primary reason for doing this is to illustrate 
that Britain is a platform that benefits from the ripened fruits of emerging market 
industrialisation and financialisation. It is"perhaps from this point of view that we really 
can understand `not' why globalisation is our destiny; but why it must be our destiny. 
This is where the power lies. 
This chapter is divided into four parts. Firstly, we closely examine the make-up 
and constitution of the British economy and ask what it produces and what it employs if 
it is indeed - the fifth largest economy in the world. Having looked at the some of the 
relationships and linkages between employment and production, we ask a fundamental 
question: how does the British economy sustain itself? In the second section, we explore 
the industrialised linkages between Britain and the world-system and outline some 
emerging patterns that have serious long-term implications for the continuity of 
Britain's economic competitiveness. -Thirdly, we look at the expansion in global debt 
and particularly of securitisation, which as we make quite plain, is responsible for the 
growth in consumer finance, investment banking and hedge fund business, which is 
driving London's leading position as a world financial centre. Finally, we return to the 
main point, which is that financialisation is a self-perpetuating process and is an 
essential part of how Britain regenerates its privileges, inequalities and disparities in a 
model of sustainability that requires stabilisation or perhaps even cultural economic 
regularisation: a political act with no visible or obvious explanation, until now. 
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The British Economy: a model of progress? 
According to the Economist magazine Anglo-Saxon countries - such as America, 
Canada, Britain, Australia and New Zealand, have the lowest levels of household saving 
in the world and the latter two have negative rates of saving. But even in thriftier nations 
such as Japan, France, Germany and Italy, national savings have fallen. As a percentage 
of GDP, net national saving rates for Japan, Germany, Italy, France, Britain and the 
United State hovered below and just above the meagre 5 percent mark in 2003. Japan, 
known for its exceptionally high saving rates saved 5 percent of after-tax household 
income in 2004 compared with 15 percent in the 1990s. This compares with America 
which saved less than 1 percent of after-tax income. According to one estimate for the 
UK, the annual shortfall in saving amounts to £27 billion every year (Economist, July 
13`h 2002: 29). What is happening? Why are the advanced industrial countries saving 
too little and what is the significance of this? 
The British economy is held up as a model of progress in the globalised world 
for every nation to follow and it is in this country that we can highlight a level of 
comfort at its most advanced level (cf. Hirst and Thompson, 2000). In a timely 
documentary presented by Peter and Dan Snow called What Makes Britain Rich (BBC, 
2006), it is revealed that Britain's economy is the 5th largest in the world turning over 
one trillion pounds a year. If we examine the pie chart compiled from this documentary 
(see chart one), then it is not difficult to see that Britain has not only gone on a spending 
spree, but it has become a nation of consumers in a transnational service driven 
economy. For example, 22 percent of Britain's economy is unambiguously produced by 
services in retail, such as wholesale outlets and shopping malls (12%); personal 
services, defined by the program makers as hairdressing, sports clubs, restaurants, hotels 
and tourism (5%); and private services, somewhat less defined as private health care 
services (5%). As can be seen, the contribution of the service sector to Britain's trillion 
pound economy has overtaken manufacturing by 9 percent, which has declined since the 
1950s from 36 percent to 13 percent, even though Britain's economy has grown three 
times larger (BBC, 2006). In the heydays of the old economy, sectors of relative 
importance such as Forestry, Fishing, Farming, collectively contributed 5 percent to the 
economy in the 1950s, whereas today they contribute only 1 percent in a much larger 
new economy. Mining, Oil, Gas and Quarries contribute just 2 percent. But Britain has 
become a nation titillated by its various consumption of media, software technology and 
mobile phones, which is facilitated by R&D and unique approaches to design. 
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According to the documentary makers, the creative sector contributes 9 percent towards 
Britain's economy. None of this would be possible of course without the transport, 
communication and the utility sectors, which contributes 10 percent. Unsurprisingly, in 
light of Britain's property boom in recent years, the property business makes up 16 
percent or £160 billion of Britain's economy and is strongly service sector orientated as 
at least £100 billion or 10 percent is made up of income from `rent, housing market 
sales and estate agent fees' (BBC, 2006). 
The Government (13%) could not be entirely described as a service, without 
mocking, but it is strongly public service sector orientated in the way that it invests and 
controls fiscal priorities in areas such as education and health. But perhaps the most 
staggering facet of Britain's economy is the size of the f nancial services sector. With a 
collective make-up of insurance firms, pension funds, hedge funds and business 
consultants, this sector contributes a massive 17 percent to Britain's trillion pound 
economy. For the programme makers, Britain is an economy of the future, because the 
old tangible industries making up productivity such as mining, farming and 
manufacturing, have been replaced by much more intangible areas of production to the 
extent that Britain has been described as a model of the `knowledge economy'. 
Chart One: Britain's Trillion Pound Economy 
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If the emergence of the knowledge economy represents a structural shift from the old 
economy to the new economy, then where does the money come from to support its 
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continuity? One explanation is that the Labour government has reinforced the economy 
through economic reform, new jobs and a minimum wage. Since Tony Blair's reign 
began, employment has increased by 3.5 million, an increase of 15 percent since 1993 
and the jobless rate has also decreased during this time by 10.5 percent to 5 percent 
(Economist, 2006: 33). Discounting inflation, we can also see from chart two that 
average gross weekly earnings have increased right across the spectrum of Britain's 
employment sectors. Government spending on public services, such as the NHS, has 
also increased year on year since 1996 at an average rate of 4.9 percent, outstripping the 
average GDP growth of 2.8 percent between 1994 and 2004 (ibid. ). We might take from 
this that sustained Government investment and a greater proportion of jobs in the 
economy paying higher average weekly wages have combined to create more disposable 
income, which has had the effect of creating greater consumer demand for services and 
techno-commodities. As far as optimistic problem-solvers are concerned, Britain is one 
of the wealthiest nations with a GDP per head of around £17,880 - ranked 13`h in the 
world for living standards and ranked 21st in the world for its population of 59.4 million 
(Economist, 2007). Based on this very simple and optimistic review of the economy, it's 
no wonder that Britain has so much money swimming around. But actually, the reality is 
much different. 
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In exciting new comparative research, Pontusson7 (2005) finds that `rising inequality of 
disposable household income is a rather pervasive trend across the OECD countries in 
the 1980s and 1990s' (2005: 38). Using the latest figures to calculate the Gini 
coefficient to measure income inequality, Pontusson found that the Gini coefficient 
increased in Britain from 27 percent at the earliest possible recording to 34.5 percent 
between 1979 and 1999 (ibid. ). This effectively means that 34.5 percent of Britain's 
total national income would have to be redistributed in order to achieve perfect income 
equality. To put it crudely in terms of Britain's trillion pound economy, this means that 
£345 billion would have to be redistributed from households with the highest income to 
those of the lowest. In 1961, the Gini coefficient for income before housing costs was 
0.260 (George and Wilding, 1999: 134) and considering that Britain's economy was 
three times less the size in today's money (BBC, 2006)8,1961 would have needed £83.2 
billion worth of re-distribution, a crude figure that is still more 4 times less the 
contemporary figure. For those who might argue Britain has cleaned up its act, it is also 
worth noting that inegalitarianism has been a sustained feature in Britain since the 
1980s, just like the US, as the Gini coefficient has risen year on year in average annual 
increments by about two-fifths (0.38%) (Pontusson, 2005). To put this in context, 
Britain shares its experience with other Liberal Market Economies (with the exception 
of Ireland) such as the US, Australia and Canada where the average Gini coefficient for 
disposable income increased from 29.3 percent to 33 percent with an annual average 
change of 0.24 percent (Pontusson, 2005: 36-44). This compares with the smaller and 
more egalitarian Nordic Social Market Economies (Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden) where the average Gini coefficient for these countries rose only from 22.1 
percent to 25.2 percent with an average annual change of 0.18 percent between the early 
1980s and late 1990s (ibid.: 36). But what is the source of this inequality in income? 
For Pontusson, `increases in gross earnings inequality correlate very closely with 
increases in disposable income inequality on a cross-national basis' (ibid.: 41). 
Astonishingly, Pontusson finds with the exception of the US that `Gini coefficients for 
gross earnings increased significantly more than Gini coefficients for disposable 
income' and especially in Britain (0.62% highest, Australia lowest 0.2%), lending a 
`great deal of plausibility to the claim that growing inequality of income from 
employment represents the primary reason why the distribution of disposable income 
became more unequal in these countries between 1980 and 2000' (ibid.: 41). However, 
73 
it should be noted that the Social Market Economies appear to be much better at 
offsetting `inegalitarian labour market trends' than their Liberal Market counterparts 
such as Britain, the US, Canada and Australia (ibid.: 36). The general feeling here, 
which is supported by Pontusson's research, is that Liberal Market Economies seemed 
to have accepted the trade-off between `equality and efficiency' despite how Social 
Market Economies `exemplify policies that seem to mitigate the trade-off' (ibid.: 13). 
Interpreting the general philosophy guiding public policy within LMEs, Pontusson 
argues that `distributive egalitarianism' is seen to `distort market forces and efficiency', 
`leading to slower growth, less employment and lower average standards of living' 
(ibid: 4). Instead, Britain like other LMEs, has embraced ideas such as the `knowledge 
economy' in order to strengthen national competitiveness in a global economy, by 
enabling transnational capital to be more efficient, dynamic or `uninhibited'; less 
constrained by rigid labour markets and red tape and yet more inspired by a more 
entrepreneurial or `creative class' of worker (Florida, 2002). But the implication of 
Pontusson's work is the suggestion that the composition and `quality' of employment 
has changed and become more unequal, leading to the further suggestion that the means- 
ends relationship has been served, but not unproblematically. 
As we begin to look under the rock that buffers the land behind it, it is possible 
to glean quite a different understanding of the knowledge economy in terms of 
understanding how Britain's trillion pound economy is supported. If we examine chart 
three that divides Britain's total workforce of 31.5 million by industrial classification, 
then we can see that the Public sector employs over 25 percent of Britain's workforce. 
The Public sector, including education, health and administration, is ranked highly in 
terms of average weekly wages and is also the sector that has greater flexible working 
practices, more retirement benefits and a more robust Union representation for today's 
standards. On the other side of the spectrum, manufacturing employs only 10 percent of 
the working population and as this sector has declined over the years and as more 
foreign companies have taken over British companies with the threat of either 
restructuring or moving abroad for reasons of cost (BBC, 2006: Economist, 2006a: 14), 
this has tended to sap labour pressure on companies to provide employment benefits and 
rising real wages, where the impetus for both has fallen against lower rates of 
profitability (see below). As the General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress put it: 
`low redundancy pay, limited consultation arrangements and few, if any, obligations on 
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the departing employers make the UK the easy option for any multinational boardroom 
looking for a jobs cull' (FT, 2006i: 15). 
Chart Three: Total UK Workforce by industrial classification 2006 
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From chart three we can also see that the service sector is by far the largest sector of 
employment providing 51 percent of total employment. Just under half of the service 
sector jobs are provided by the Finance and Business Services sector which contributes 
21 percent of Britain's total workforce. Amazingly, one in five people in the UK are 
now employed in the financial services sector. One could be forgiven for thinking this is 
a good thing, because if we look at chart two this is also the sector that pays the highest 
average weekly wages where the increases in pay have far outstripped those flat-lining 
increases in manufacturing and other sectors. But we should be cautious with such 
averages for two reasons. Firstly, geographically speaking, a third of Britain's trillion 
pound economy is generated by workers in London and the South East (Daily Mail, 
2006). 87 percent of London's economy and 80 percent of the South-East economy is 
made up by the service sector, where the average yearly salary is £24,100 and £20,400 
respectively (Daily Mail, 2006). In comparison, the average yearly salary for the North 
East is £14,000, for Yorkshire it is £15,400 and for Scotland it is £16,400 (Daily Mail, 
2006). Secondly, averages tend to mask the wage disparities within the financial 
ýý (' 
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services sector itself. For example, the Guardian reported that City bonuses had 
increased in 2006 by £2.5 billion taking the net figure of financial rewards for the City's 
employees to £19 billion, `equivalent to the country's entire annual transport budget' 
(Guardian, 2006). While financial services bonuses accounted for £10 billion, a good 
chunk was left over for a smaller group of financial specialists. In comparison to the 
manufacturing sector, it would seem that rising real wages and bonus levels in the 
financial sector is based on the necessity for safeguarding and attracting talented 
employees, rather than a reflection of labour pressure or union representation (Roberts, 
2004: 8-11). 
So far, we are building up a picture of a UK workforce that is divided by a 
concentrated number of highly paid jobs in concentrated areas; general geo-economic 
disparities; and unequal pressure on employers to maintain distributive and egalitarian 
employment packages across different sectors. But the underbelly of the knowledge 
economy is far more unequal than what we might think. If we look at chart two, then it 
is not difficult to see that there is a sharp disparity between the best paid jobs and the 
least paid jobs. It is also worth considering that averages tend to conceal the wage and 
geo-economic disparities within each sector. For example, this point comes more 
sharply into focus when we compare the Finance and Business Services sector with 
those sectors that specialise in leisure and retail. Making up more than half the service 
sector and employing 30 percent of the UK workforce, Distribution, Hotels, Restaurants 
and other Services provide the lowest weekly average earnings in the UK (see chart two 
and three) below Agriculture and Fishing. This could even be attributed to the 
minimum wage that provides a guideline that some firms, especially ones in the service 
sector, may stick to. Alternatively, one of the implications of the service sector is that 
the workforce has been far less inclined to apply pressure on companies to increase 
wages and benefits in line with profitability. One of the reasons for this is that service 
sector jobs, especially in leisure and retail, do not require high-level qualifications. It is 
interesting that the expression `McJob', referring to low-paid and monotonous forms of 
employment, has recently been accepted into the Oxford English dictionary despite the 
oddity that it is rarely, if ever, used in everyday conversation. Perhaps this is rather like 
a Freudian slip, an unspoken truth that reveals the subconscious concerns of the nation 
that the service sector has gotten too big and needs justification. Or else, people do use 
`McJob' in everyday language and why not: some parts of the service sector are known 
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for their high turnover of employees, high rates of part-time employment and little 
Union representation. 
On this matter, if we look at chart four, then we can see that part-time 
employees represent over 25 percent of the total workforce once we factor in self- 
employed part-time workers. If we weigh this up against chart five, then we can see 
women make-up well over three-quarters of part-time employment or 20 percent of all 
part-time employment, in comparison to men, a gender group that takes up less than a 
quarter of part-time jobs making up only 6 percent of total employment. Excluding 
overtime, part-time workers make only 62.1 percent of median hourly earnings of full 
time employees. It is surprising to learn that part-time female employees earn 67.8 
percent of full time hourly earnings in comparison to men who earn only 57.5 percent 
`due to a higher proportion of females working part-time throughout their careers and 
particularly in the higher income age groups' (Dobbs, 2006: 49). Nevertheless, the 
increasing proportion of females in the workforce and the high proportion of females in 
part-time employment has been a source of wage restraint and this has surely been 
compounded by the growth in economic migration. Additionally, the amount of self- 
employed people has grown to over 13 percent, where the level of job security has been 
described as `precarious' as individuals in this sector take responsibility for their 
employment, tax returns, retirement security and all the other psychological pressures 
that come from working without certainties or working from home9. The implication of 
all this, is that while the amount of people employed in Britain's knowledge economy 
has gone up, the quality of those jobs has been diluted, not only in terms of what they 
pay out and how they are protected and insured, but in terms of their comparative value 
and skill level which is judged far more unforgivingly in a much more fluid and 
competitive global labour market place, as we shall understand in more detail. 
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Chart Four: Total percentage of Full-time, Part-time and temporary workers in 
the UK 
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If income and wage inequality is such a pervasive feature of modern Britain, why is 
consumer spending in the economy on services, houses and tax-deductible commodities 
so large and sustained? One theory that remains on the margins of economic analysis is 
that the modem liberal economy is also informed by an economic culture of 
consumerism. The notion of consumerism is an important concept to this thesis and its 
employment will be used differently as we proceed to different chapters, but for now, it 
should be suffice to say that a whole burgeoning 
literature explores the qualitative 
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reasons why consumerism has become such a formidable feature of advanced 
economies and their cultural workings (cf. Baudrillard, 1996: Storey, 1999). For 
example, one theory is that consumerism is based on the need to perpetually construct 
and belong to an identity that we compose ourselves - that we gain control of ourselves, 
so that it creates a distinction in a sea of aesthetic averages that constantly transforms 
itself (e. g. Storey, 1999: 128). In being unconstrained by the traditional past, the ethos 
of another esteemed theory, we find meaning and introspection through the discourse of 
economic consumerism around us, no matter how weak or ill fated it is (cf. Giddens, 
1994). In other words, we consume not merely out of necessity, in terms suggested by 
Marx's `use-values', but because we derive personal value out of consumer goods that 
describe and enable our sense of character to flourish or relax under competitive 
conditions. This literature is but a sophisticated extension of the ideas of Thorstein 
Veblen (1925) whom observed in the late 19th century that capitalism, far from being a 
mechanical system of class conflict or an economic effect of homo ceconomicus was 
actually a more banal reality informed by everyday people engaging in `conspicuous 
consumption'. 
In simple terms, Veblen (ibid. ) observed an emerging group in society called the 
`leisure class', Marx's bourgeois. Afforded a privileged status and more throw away 
time, this group were quite able to experiment with their material aspirations in a market 
society, so that the individual aspirations and desires of this group became intertwined 
with their consumer habits and motives, constructing certain fashions that would build 
the road for the rest of society to follow (Veblen, 1925: 60-80). If there is an indication 
that this theory has come in from the cold, then we should look no further than a study 
in the Economic Journal that recently investigated `the importance of Veblen effects in 
the determination of work hours, namely the manner in which a desire to emulate the 
consumption standards of the rich may influence an individual's allocation of time 
between labour and leisure' (Bowles and Park, 2005: 397). Taking a broad cross-section 
of both LME's and SME's, to use Pontusson's concepts, Bowles and Park's (2005) 
research suggested that `increased inequality induces people to work longer hours' 
where the `underlying cause is the Veblen effect of the consumption of the rich on the 
behaviour of those less well off (Bowles and Park: 2005: 410). This is no surprise 
either. According to a study of wills by William Rubinstein at Aberystwyth University, 
the super-rich have increased their wealth by between 500 and 600 percent and during 
this same time, the retail price index has risen by 60 percent at the same time that social 
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attitudes to income disparities has softened (Economist, 2006: 33). Even a curious 
glance at employment figures for Britain would support Bowles and Park's research. 
For example, even since 2005 total weekly working hours have increased from 919.9 
million to 927.1 million in 2007 with an annual increase of 2.7 percent. Those with 
second jobs now account for 3.7 percent of the total working population, an aggregate 
change of 4.4 percent since 200510. A recent poll on happiness even suggested that the 
poorest region, the South-West, has a population far happier, more relaxed and less 
stressed than the second richest region, the South-East, which is also said to be the most 
miserable region due to commuting and work hours (FT, 2006b). The suggestion from 
all this is that consumers are working harder in order to consume, either directly or 
indirectly, which is actually driving the wedge of inequality actually deeper. But why 
doesn't the bottom fall out beneath the wedge? How does the whole remain intact 
socially, politically and economically, and why? 
The best of both worlds 
The argument here is that Britain's unequal knowledge economy of consumerism has 
been supported by two formidable considerations, one deemed to be more politically 
significant than the other (especially to this thesis). But actually, if we interpret these 
two factors carefully, they are actually interlocking and part, possibly, of the same 
historical process in the world-system. As we understood earlier, Britain's financial 
sector plays a prolific role in terms of its contribution towards the general economic 
output of the economy. Even national employment is dominated by the financial and 
business services sector. Uncontroversially, the old headquarters of the National Coal 
Board, the bastion of the industrial economy, is now a leading hedge fund - the 
centerpiece of the new financial economy (BBC, 2006). In many ways, the rise of 
London as an omphalos to the global financial economy is like a twisting hurricane that 
sucks life in around it, replacing the old industrial society and its cultural edifice with a 
new more dynamic logic, social organisation and cultural understanding that has set 
radical modernity free. This global financial logic and its sacrosanctity inheres in the 
cultural fabric of everyday life. But what is important to understand is that this is part of 
an overall balancing act in the global economy between mass financial accumulation 
and mass industrial accumulation in two competing regions of the globe. For world- 
systems theorists examining changes in the nature of capitalist accumulation over time 
(Arrighi, 1996: 2003: Arrighi and Silver, 1999: 2001), hegemonic instability has a 
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strong historical association with the rise and follies that usually occur with the excesses 
of international financial expansions of one financial centre (cf. Arrighi, 2003). In this 
historically supported theory, the hegemonic instability of financial accumulation in one 
state-centre is usually underlined by the incremental emergence of competing 'cash- 
boxes' of productive accumulation that amalgamate into world hegemonies e. g. London 
(Arrighi and Bello, 1999: 2001). While we have recently observed cracks in the US 
centred model of capitalist hegemony e. g. Enron and the like, we have neither seen a 
shift of hegemonies or even a shift in the nature of accumulation from finance to 
production one primarily focused in commodity production. Instead, it is more accurate 
to say that the current financial expansion of Anglo-American dominated 
disintermediation and securitisation, is neither state-centred in its hegemony nor global 
in its representation as a global marketplace. It is constituted by an inclusive spatial or 
regional flow of capital between city-states that is best captured by Germain's notion of 
`decentralised globalisation' (1997) or even `globalising hegemony". Many authors 
have talked, for example, of a global financial triad existing between Wall Street, 
London and Tokyo (Martin, 1999a: Langley, 2002)12. But such colossal financial city- 
centers are also now competing with the likes of Dubai and Shanghai which are 
beginning to adopt Western approaches to finance (2004a). 
However, the institutional and ideational dominance of this Anglo-American 
financial expansion has been off-set and facilitated by a shift in the regional hegemony 
of productive accumulation from the West to some of the strongest emerging economies 
such as China, India and East Asia (Economist, 2006a). As financial services and the 
centres of their financial control have gathered momentum, driven in part by a crisis of 
Western centred industrialisation in the 1970s (Brenner, 2000: Arrighi, 2003), emerging 
economic regions of the world have pursued nationalised initiatives of high economic 
growth and industrialisation. In fact, as the Anglo-American financial expansion has 
intensified and globalised, so too has the pace and contradictions of emerging market 
industrialisation. The East Asian crisis, in many ways, was the first detonation of their 
cataclysmic concrescence. But far from a hegemonic and productive shift, emerging 
nations have tended to stabilise and regulate, for a time, the globalising hegemony of 
Western dominated financial accumulation that has been superincumbent on Eastern 
centred industrialism. The key observation however is that there has been a serious 
intensification of financial accumulation in the regional centres of financial control, and 
an intensification of industrial accumulation in the major regional centers of industrial 
81 
control. Before we move on to a much more in-depth understanding of the 
contemporary Anglo-American financial expansion, we will briefly examine the 
significance of emerging market industrialism. 
In dealing with the least significant consideration (to this thesis) first, it is 
important to recognise that fledgling consumerism in the richest nations such as Britain 
and the United States, has been facilitated by the changing nature of production and the 
shifting geopolitical centres of productive accumulation, which are in fact interrelated. 
Today, we are in the midst of a revolution and evolution in Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT), which has in quantitative and qualitative terms, 
expanded the capacity to increase and interpret information at speed (Castells, 2000: 
Economist, 2002). For Immanuel Castells `a converging set of technologies in micro- 
electronics, computing (machines and software), telecommunications/broadcasting, and 
opto-electronics' are `process-orientated' technologies of `information processing and 
communication' that have been central to mind-boggling developments in mobile phone 
technology, internet services, data-processing and nanotechnology, which are all 
collectively part of the `digitization' of the economy (Castells, 2000: Economist, 
2002a). Some such developments have emerged as real inventions, but others have been 
encouraged by the romance and momentum of technological evolution and the urgency 
for `real time' technologies (Economist, 2002a), if not the expectation of their imminent 
arrival. For Castells, `the new economy brings information technology and the 
technology of information together in the creation of value out of belief in the value we 
create' (Castells, 2000: 160). 
As a result, there is an increased pace to commodity adaptations that are 
incremental, gimmicky and innovative, rather than inventive. It is noticeable for 
example that a lot of companies such as Gillette, Nokia and others have tapped into the 
idea of technological urgency and inventiveness. For example, it is reported that Gillette 
spent $750 million developing its three-bladed Mach three razor over seven years 
(Economist, 2001b). This type of innovation has also become a point of competition as 
less well known companies have been able to emulate and compete, far more 
effectively, on the basis of gimmicks and innovations at cost price, which has placed 
even more emphasis on the importance of branding and its maintenance. Just think of 
the many Gillette razors that have spun off as result of the Mach three and the many 
copied versions that are available from supermarkets. Effectively, the overall result is 
that it has been possible, of late, to purchase a DVD player from as little as £40 to as 
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much as £200. The internet is also very much like a virtual market-place that tailors 
almost every kind of product to whatever cost and aesthetic specification that is needed. 
It's not just technology either. Supermarkets such as Asda and Tesco have been able to 
develop their own brand names in clothing fashion too at competitive prices. But what 
has augmented this? The suggestion here is that there is another development in the new 
informational economy that is driving consumerism, besides the technological and 
branding commodification of competitive exchange values. As Immanuel Castells 
argued, 
Thus, while the informational, global economy is distinct from the industrial economy, it does 
not oppose its logic. It subsumes it through technological deepening, embodying knowledge and 
information in all processes of material production and distribution on the basis of a gigantic leap 
forward in the reach and scope of the circulation sphere. In other words, the industrial economy 
had to become informational and global or collapse (Castells, 2000: 100). 
It is important to understand that the global economy of today is quite different from the 
global economy of the 1930s or even 1950s. In many ways global production has been 
turned on its head. For example, agriculture accounts for 4 percent of world GDP, 
industry and manufacturing accounts for 28 percent and services accounts for 68 percent 
(Economist, 2007). In terms of the structure of employment, agriculture accounts for 4 
percent of employment, industry 26 percent and services 70 percent (ibid. ). At the most 
recent G8 summit, Vladimir Putin reminded the world that 50 years ago 60 percent of 
world gross domestic product came from the Group of Seven industrial nations. Today, 
Putin reminded his colleagues, 60 percent of world GDP comes from outside the G7 
(FT, 2007b). In terms of the origins of trade for some of the G7 nations, 38.1 percent of 
the world's trade is exported from five of the G7 countries (US, UK, Japan, Germany 
and France), which provide 33 percent of the world's imports (Economist, 2007). In 
recent times, the emerging market economies of Europe, Asia, South America and East 
Asia have expanded their dominance in the world economy. According to an article in 
the Economist (2006), emerging countries contribute over 80 percent of the world's 
population, contain 60 percent of the world's foreign exchange reserves, provide over 
half of the world's GDP and export over 40 percent of the world's trade, an increase of 
20 percent since the 1970s. Asia alone provides 30 percent of the world's GDP, which 
has doubled over four decades (ibid. ). It is also highly significant that east Asian 
emerging economies have become `creditor nations', generating current account 
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surpluses from export orientated growth and amassing huge volumes of excess capital 
(FT, 2007a). For example, East and South East Asian countries have $3,280 billion 
worth of foreign currency reserves between them, up by $2,490 billion since 1999 (FT, 
2007a). That is almost 77 percent of the world's entire foreign exchange reserves. This 
is partly explained by the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, where East Asian 
nations decided, quite contrary to the Washington consensus that promotes flexible 
exchange rates and competitive financial markets, to buffer and insure export orientated 
growth through well oiled competitive exchange rates (ibid. ). 
Besides the deeply embedded historical reasons for this development, in recent 
times, the combination of ICTs and techno-hype have accelerated the interdependency 
between Western and emerging centres of global informational accumulation. This 
globalisation argument suggests that this has occurred because technology has enabled 
the structures of production to be much more efficient, decentralised and flexible, but 
also because the globalisation of production is taking advantage of cost-efficient, 
amenable and competent emerging market economies. Part of the East Asian crisis is 
actually explained by the over-investment in industrial capacity that over-flowed into 
areas such as property creating speculative opportunities led by Western portfolio 
capital. But underlying this general trend, which is illustrated by the economic rebound 
of East Asia, is a far more simple and intricate global shift from Western centered 
industrialism to emerging market industrialism, from the West's geopolitical monopoly 
of informational accumulation to its global spread 13. 
For example, India has been described as the `world's back office' as it accounts 
for 80 percent of the world's low cost off-shore market. To put this into some sort of 
context, India's economy has transformed itself to the extent that over 51 percent of its 
GDP is produced by the service sector, despite this sector contributing only 23 percent 
of India's total employment (Economist, 2007). In 2003, India also had $80 billion 
worth of foreign exchange reserves, almost 12 percent of its GDP suggesting it has 
become an important exporter to the world (Economist: 2003a). Based on upper 
estimates, India's export market in IT enabled services is expected to total around $65 
billion or 9.4 percent of India's total GDP14 (2004d). Secondly, it's not just that global 
firms are spreading their supply chains and importing goods from emerging markets, 
they are actually moving to emerging economies too. For example, China has now 
become the central productive regime in the world economy. China's total imports and 
exports account for 70 percent of its GDP and it's estimated that China now accounts 
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for 10 percent of world trade (Economist, 2004c: 2006a: 2007). China's current account 
surplus has grown to an astonishing £217 billion, the equivalent of 8.2 percent of its 
GDP and its foreign exchange reserves have reached over a trillion (FT, 2006a: 2007d) 
(a quarter of the world's total currency reserves). 
However, a good chunk of this trade surplus is created by foreign owned 
companies which contribute 58 percent of China's total exports and especially high- 
value added products (FT, 2006g: 17). For all this, there is something quite omnipotent 
about China's rise as the world's industrial giant. In 2004, China's economy accounted 
for a quarter of global GDP growth and this was sustained over five years (Economist, 
2004a/b). What seems to be happening in China is that its economy is sustained by 
export led growth, which is creating a trade surplus that is heavily dependent on the US, 
Japan and Europe. Meanwhile, the huge foreign reserves that are accumulating as a 
result, a rate of $50 billion a month in the first quarter of this year (FT, 2007a), are 
helping to undervalue China's currency that is tied to a weakly valued US dollar, which 
is enabling Chinese state banks to benefit from their 90 percent focus on lending as a 
source of revenue to fuel borrowing at a low cost of capital (FT, 2006a). Such low 
interest rates have encouraged the stock market to inflate, encouraging speculation and a 
gambling appetite even amongst ordinary people, and an investment rate worth 40 
percent of GDP that is sustained, not just by China's high saving rate, but by retained 
earnings from company profitability (FT, 2006a). The accumulation of surplus capital 
resulting from competitive exchange rates and low interest rates is encouraging foreign 
investment, merger activity and takeovers, even a Chinese withdrawal of domestic 
investment to foreign lands (Economist, 2005b). 
Thirdly, it's not just the spread of informationalism, it is the shear scale of 
emerging market industrialism that has had two noticeable effects on LME's such as 
Britain. Firstly, in between 1995 and 2005, Britain experienced the oddity where 
consumer spending (3.5% annually) zoomed ahead of GDP growth (2.8% annually) by 
about two fifths annually over ten years without facing problematic issues of inflation 
(2006b). Beyond the EU25 and the US, the UK depends on imports from 36.2 percent of 
the world's emerging economies, but it is important to understand that more than half of 
the EU25 are considered as emerging countries (Economist, 2007). Additionally, Britain 
like the US, has tended to import (£460 billion) significantly more than it exports (£350 
billion) over the years, and finished and semi-finished manufacturing products have 
taken up a significant percentage of gross imports (56.3% and 23.9%) (ibid. ). Britain's 
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main exporting destination is the US (15% of total), which heavily depends on Asia and 
China for its imports (ibid. ). For example, in 2005 32 percent of China's merchandise 
exports went to the US, Japan's export contribution was 23 percent and 22 percent of 
India's exports went to the US (FT, 2006e/g). The suggestion is that Britain like other 
LMEs have benefited from the low cost of commodities from emerging market 
competition, and from the success of the American economy that has helped to stabilise 
British and European economies. One compelling argument is that the shear size and 
scale of China's economy and its huge export market to Asia, the US and Europe has 
played a much larger influence in determining the nature of global competition than 
previously thought. As Economist magazine argued, 
Cheaper goods from China do not just reduce the prices of imports, but the prices of all goods 
sold in competing domestic markets. And competition from emerging economies holds down 
inflation not just in traded goods but also in non-traded ones, by restraining wages... By running 
current-account surpluses, these economies are currently adding more to global supply than to 
demand, so their net effect on the rest of the world is disinflationary (Economist, 2006: 24). 
Secondly, only now that Asia is demanding more of the world's resources are Western 
nations beginning to feel inflated prices not only through the petrol pumps but also in 
the supermarkets. The significance of emerging markets and their facilitation of the 
structures of Western economies is now becoming greatly appreciated. There is 
therefore the suggestion that emerging markets have not only restrained inflation, but 
have enabled the `combination' of moderate inflation levels and cumulatively lower 
levels in the cost of borrowing since the 1990s (Economist, 2006a). Thus, the theory is 
that disinflation in commodity markets has cancelled out or assisted inflationary forces 
in asset and financial markets. For example, consistently low interest rates have fuelled 
a borrowing binge in mortgage and credit arrangements throughout the US and the UK, 
increasing the dependence on stable property values. This will all make more sense as 
we continue, but from a real economy point of view, it's not necessarily true that 
emerging markets have kept inflation low in LMEs such as Britain and the US, it's more 
likely that they haven't caused an economic effect, until now, creating fears and 
prospects of sustained inflation in vital commodity and consumer markets and placing 
pressure on financial markets to maintain what they have created - especially as the 
knot tightens on credit conditions. For example, the Financial Times recently reported 
that `retail food prices are heading for their biggest annual increase in as much as 30 
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years' and there is a serious concern that this change is structural rather than cyclical 
(FT, 2007c). Economists represent this as an exogenous and sectoral `shock' that the 
system needs to absorb, but this rather conceals the wider diagnosis which is that 
economic symptoms felt in the West, especially related to price changes of this nature, 
emanate from a general process of polarisation in the productive and wealth generating 
centres of emerging countries. Not only are emerging countries such as India and China 
becoming wealthier at the top of the income spectrum, but their populations are 
becoming better educated, more extravagant and more expectational. 
Let us briefly look at some of the broad changes that characterise emerging 
market developments. For example, according to an article in the Financial Times, even 
if the top 10 percent were creamed from the top of India and China's combined output 
of 1 million engineering graduates per year, which compares to the Euro-US output of 
170,000, `the two Asian giants now graduate more quality engineers than from the 
West' (FT, 2006h). Secondly, if China is an important proxy of emerging market trends, 
then it is significant that the retail industry in China estimates that there are between 10 
and 13 million mainland customers for luxury goods (Economist, 2004f). According to 
the Economist, Armani hopes to open 20 to 30 new shops in the mainland by 2008 
(Economist, 2004f). Car sales in China have increased four-fold from 1 million in 2001 
to 4 million in 2004 (FT, 2006g). With the luxury car market growing at 2-3 percent per 
year, inward investment in China's car industry totaled $13 billion in 2004 (Economist, 
2004g). 
But the combination of industrialisation and urbanisation in both China and 
India has placed significant strains on infrastructure. Both countries have experienced 
demand strains on rural resources and agricultural products, which has had the effect of 
dwindling rural incomes and magnifying migration or the `push-effect' from the 
countryside to over-sized city slum populations (FT: 2006c: FT: 2006d). For the first 
time in history, more people live in urban areas than rural areas and one-quarter of this 
urban population (560 million people) lack access to clean water and sanitation (FT, 
2006c). According to recent figures, an estimated 300 million Indians survive on less 
than $1 everyday and 160 million lack access to clean water (cf. Economist, 2004a/e: 
2006d). According to a recent report by the Financial Times, India's urban population 
will increase from 575 million by 2030 from 285 million today (2006d). With up to 70 
percent of the population living in the countryside 
living with severe financial 
constraints (Economist, 2004a: FT, 2006d) and with an estimated 
40 million looking for 
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work (Economist, 2004a) such internal dynamics will place greater strains on the Indian 
government and the economy to expand and distribute its highly concentrated sectors of 
growth. It has recently been estimated that India will have to spend $150 billion on 
infrastructure in the next five years, with a third of this investment in cities (2006d). 
While India's urban trend is creating a huge supply of untrained cheap labour, China is 
experiencing the contradictory trend of labour shortages in a period of demand. As 
healthcare provisions and social security arrangements have reached their limits in 
manufacturing areas such as Guangdong province and as rural incomes have increased 
through demand at higher prices, migrants have been returning to rural areas 
(Economist, 2004h). The combined effects of industrialisation and urban bifurcation are 
precisely why China, a nation more equipped financially than India, accounted for 85 
percent of the world's increase in energy demand, a third of the increase in world oil 
consumption (Economist, 2006a), a greater reliance on oil imports which increased 30 
percent in 2004 second only to America (Economist: 2004b/c), and a greater reliance on 
agricultural imports which doubled between 2001 and 2004 to $33 billion (FT, 2007d). 
More than anything, this is a sign of a gradual re-balancing of China's economy from 
export-orientated growth towards mass consumerism, a trend that India and other 
emerging economies soon hope to adopt. 
What we have tried to illustrate here is the point that emerging market 
industrialisation has partly offset and subsidised the composition and continuation of 
Western consumerism, especially in the UK and US, which has created four long-term 
implications. Firstly, the high composition of low paid and insecure forms of 
employment in Britain has been partly encouraged and yet counter-balanced by 
competitive commodity prices in food, goods and services from emerging economies. 
Secondly, this direct form of wage restraint could also have acted as an indirect form of 
wage restraint, as unskilled wage labour is seen to be compensated through plentiful 
commodities at competitive prices. Thirdly, the increasing flexibility of international 
capital and employment both in the West and abroad has also provided a much more 
fluid and competitive labour marketplace (although this is different across Europe) (see 
FT, 2006i). Emerging countries are beginning to provide a source of well-qualified 
employees. The threat of capital flight provides both a muzzle to labour's political voice 
and provokes a sense of social invidiousness to emerging trading nations such as China 
in a global regime of free trade. For example, Britain's manufacturing base and 
domestic labour market, just like the US experience, has been judged far more intensely 
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in relation to countries with budding competencies. It is no surprise therefore that the 
hollowing out of industrial forms of employment in the West, partly created through 
productivity gains, has nevertheless been filled in with other sectors of dominance such 
as service-led consumerism. For the US and the UK especially, immigration has been a 
necessity of economic growth, creating somewhat of a disinflationary force on wages. 
While Britain is a special case, it is not surprising that the financial sector has replaced 
industrial accumulation as the main form of national production. Only in the financial 
sector, the workhorse to the world, has there been a sufficient rise of wages as a reward 
for highly lauded skills and productivity that have managed to soak up a modicum of the 
monetary excess in the world's financial system. 
Fourthly, the Anglo-American centres of accumulation founded upon financial 
informationalism and consumerism are that much more prone and susceptible to the 
contradictions of emerging market industrialisation and urbanisation, given the shear 
scale and speed of the populations and processes involved. It is apparent that the 
emerging markets are suffering from the contradictions in their export orientated growth 
patterns and are accumulating large foreign reserves, savings and surplus capital as a 
result. Despite the emerging nations being described as `creditor nations' to the world, it 
would seem that there are limits on the ability of such emerging countries to re-invest 
and supply badly needed infrastructure at the same pace that urban industrialisation 
demands. What is more is that the West has grown an appetite for low cost productive 
facilitation, while the emerging nations have developed an appetite for investing their 
surplus assets of foreign reserves and savings into reserve currency denominations such 
as US treasury securities and other reserve currency denominated securities such as 
Sterling in order to provide and protect export orientated growth at competitive 
exchange rates. The United State's gigantic capital account deficit has acted as a holy 
reservoir for thirsty borrowers and mortgage intermediaries over a consistent period of 
seasonality. So far, the rain and the foreign capital have not dried up, allowing 
consistently lower interest rates in the US and elsewhere through international financial 
arbitrage. 
In one very important respect then, the emerging nations rely on export 
orientated growth for capital expansion to feed their domestic demands and the Anglo- 
American dominated financial expansion has become deeply reliant on the creditor 
nations to ingratiate Western excesses and inequalities. Thus, there seems to be a 
structural impasse of sorts that is developing between the developed nations and the 
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emerging nations, between mass financial expansion and mass productive 
industrialisation. There is a profound concern that this capital recycling mechanism 
could very well be a source of instability as policymakers and politicians try desperately 
to wean China and other emerging countries off their surplus investment strategies and 
secondly, their Western (as opposed to Asian regional) export orientated strategies. Not 
much consideration however has been given to the issue of what happens if the 
emerging nations divest from the US deficit. For now, this impasse could very well be a 
mechanism of capital recycling stability, but it could also very well be a source of 
instability and profound political conflict if handled recklessly. 
We began this analysis by trying to understand how Britain produces its trillion 
pound economy. Looking at Britain's employment as a whole, we hinted at great 
inequalities and discrepancies emerging from the quality, composition and visible wage 
disparities of Britain's labour force. The nature of Britain's unregulated inequality, just 
like many other countries, is supported by the argument that economic freedom is good, 
because surplus capital is re-invested and inevitably creates a `trickle down effect', so 
that social distribution is a natural outcome of profit maximisation. Quite the contrary to 
economic reason, this analysis suggests that income and wage inequality in Britain is 
part of the self-fulfilling logic of inequality. In this reasoning, greater income inequality 
creates greater spending on consumer goods and services, which maintains, if not 
encourages the structural momentum of Britain's employment composition. In other 
words, the concentration of wealth at the top of the income spectrum and its 
concentration geographically, encourages the structural composition of the service 
sector founded upon consumerism, increasing the necessity for low cost facilitation (e. g. 
technology and emerging markets) and a public policy of competitive labour markets 
and flexibility, which attracts tax averse mobile capital, creates wage restraints, 
suppresses trade union politicisation and increases the level of social dependency on 
mobile sources of wealth creation for employment, government spending, private 
investment and social security. The point here is that inequality is a double-edged 
sword: something is catalysing it, but something is subsidising it too. Consumerism and 
low inflation conditions emerging from techno-hype and emerging markets is not 
enough to explain the functional and sustained relationship between inequality and 
consumerism. There is something else that is propelling and regulating Britain's 
consumer society and it is proposed here that it has something to do with the eminent 
rise of the global financial economy. 
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Anglo-American Financialisation 
Broadly speaking, what are the financial markets about? In a nutshell, the financial 
markets invent new forms of credit and debt. Plain vanilla bank capital is useful but 
unexciting, because credit and debt in the financial markets can also be a claim of 
ownership, or more simply a form of investment, that supplies borrowers with a source 
of funding at rates of interest, or expected dividends, that provide a yield for investors. 
With all sorts of different flavours of debt finance available, there is also the market for 
financial derivatives, the candy toppings that provide a fungible means of speculative 
insurance against asset price changes. Borrowers have acquired an appetite for the long- 
term, lenders and other financial intermediaries have acquired an appetite for asset- 
management and then there are hedge funds, arbitragers, who make money for rich 
clients or corporations by making lightening bets and trades, through derivatives, on 
even the slightest asset price differentials. Very much like a merry-go-round, the 
borrowers or the intermediaries acting on behalf of the borrowers, are always able to sell 
their horse to the next buyer and for every horse available - no matter how rickety it 
seems, there is always - at least theoretically speaking, a paying customer ready to 
exchange their horse before the ride has finished. It's only when the ride jitters, stops or 
when there is no paying customers that things tend to become awkward and unfair. 
While on this merry-go-round, the market players are so confused and over-lapping, but 
like any organized mess the financial market is rather like an eco-system, where the 
investors are also the borrowers, where the manufacturers are also the traders, where the 
bankers are also the speculators. 
The financial wilderness, just like its animal kind, is a world of symbolic 
meaning, structure and hierarchy, with different financial animals of sorts sniffing 
around each other picking up scents of different kinds; making their physical identity 
known; allotting a Darwinian pecking order; constantly anticipating their chance of 
success; using their vibrancy to sex up their attractiveness to possible mates and 
knowing intuitively if their identified prey is too big to catch or swallow. Sometimes 
animal symbols, instincts and calculations work, but sometimes they don't. Like any 
eco-system there are dominant predators like hedge funds that hover over their prey or 
behemoths like states that are just too big to tackle, though George Soros would 
probably disagrees. But such a food chain misses the most fundamental point: they are 
all part of the same momentum of historical energy and discursive structure that is 
peculiar to the ongoing Anglo-American financial expansion. Like any form of 
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competition for success and in this case `profitability', the market players are constantly 
inventing and competing to acquire the most (strategic) amount of financing, including 
revenue or credit, at the least possible cost. And it is this perpetual competition between 
market players, be they governments, investment banks, local governments, car 
manufacturers or hedge funds, that constantly look to the market to see how they can tap 
into and benefit from the vast circulation of debt and expectation. However, one thing is 
certain about the rise of the financial market economy. There are no gentlemanly rules 
or textbook guidelines that help determine how finance should be done properly 
anymore. There are only thinly regulated opportunities and dangers which are an octane 
function of calculation, credibility, blind luck or a combination of all three. 
A lay understanding of the stock market inspires thinking about volatile share 
prices and caffeine fuelled financial traders shouting down telephones. Some may even 
be forgiven for thinking that the stock market is ancillary to the real economy, where the 
mechanism of the financial heart pumps money and credit around the circulatory 
system, providing vital organs such as the brain with oxygen and energy that then allow 
it to perform key tasks. Just as it would be unusual for the heart to play more than a 
mechanistic role in the control of the body, it is also unusual to suggest, with good 
reason, that the financial markets have grown out of and evolved beyond the intentions 
of their original design to become the harbinger of economic and social life. But 
perhaps, as it is the suggestion here, that we are also talking of quite a different 
economic animal in historical terms, not just as a matter of scale, but in terms of the 
nature and organisation of this scale as an institutional, normative and historical 
influence. It is therefore not so unusual to describe the financial economy or new 
economy as an `ecosystem' (Feng et al. 2001) where the boundaries of control have 
been blurred, where finance plays much more of an institutional and cultural role in the 
economic and political governance of the economy. But to appreciate this, it is 
necessary to understand that the financialisation of the economy is based on the 
technical development and proliferation of the bond and equity markets as a source of 
credit and control. But with this, we may face a few misconceptions. 
For example, most lay interpretations of the financial markets usually hone in on 
the relationship between companies in the real economy, the stock market and 
information surrounding the share price. Firstly, this tends to belie a common and 
traditional view of looking at the economy, where productive companies in the real 
economy are separate and distinct from institutions in the financial economy. But the 
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reality is far from black and white. Productive companies are no longer just 
manufacturing firms or industrial companies. They are service sector firms such as 
Tesco or technology related firms such as Google. It's not just productive companies 
that belong to the stock market either, it is financial companies too. What's more is that 
publicly scrutinised and so-called productive companies listed on the stock market have 
all developed much more robust financial and accounting departments, and in a lot of 
cases - their own financial services e. g. General Electric. The financialisation of the 
economy has tended to facilitate companies and demand more of their products and the 
interests that protect them (Borsch, 2004: Froud et al., 2000: Gibbon, 2002: Jurgens et 
al., 2002: Kadtler and Sperling, 2002: Reiter, 2003). Secondly, a common presumption 
is that the stock market acts definitively as an intermediary between borrowers of 
financial or equity capital on the one hand and lender-savers of shareholder capital on 
the other. A lay understanding of the stock market might suppose that companies in the 
real economy raise finance primarily through the public sale of company shares on the 
stock market, in the form of an initial public offering (IPO)16. To an extent, this is quite 
true. From 1993 to 2003, £171 billion was raised from the public sale of company 
equity on the London stock market (Roberts, 2004: 73). As we can see from chart six, 
the allocation of equity in the international market has also followed an upward trend 
since 1983, increasing spectacularly at the peak of the equity bull market in the year 
2000 and dramatically recovering from the tech-stock crash after 2003. The secondary 
trading of equities on the stock market has followed a consistent upward trend despite 
the tech-stock crash. As can be seen from chart seven, the average daily turnover of UK 
equities has increased year on year hitting £16.4 billion in 2007. In 2003, secondary- 
market turnover of UK equities totaled £1,876 billion, `a fourfold increase over the 
previous decade' (Roberts, 2004). 
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Chart Six: Announced international equity issues for all countries 
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Chart Seven: Average daily turnover of UK Equities: London Stock Exchange 
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However, in recent times, the stock market has come under heavy flack from political 
economists critical of the financial economy and its general direction (Aglietta, 2000: 
Cutler and Waine, 2001: Dore, 2002: Dumenil and Levy, 2001: Franco, 2003: Golding, 
2001: Henwood, 2001: Shut, 2005: Stockhammer, 2004: Warburton, 2000). One of the 
key criticisms that is made from this broad but mutually sceptical literature, either 
explicitly or implicitly, is that the stock market is more effective as a mechanism of 
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corporate control, incredulity, speculation and instability than as a central resource and 
conscientious guardian of financial capital, especially in times of speculative 
accumulation (Aglietta and Breton, 2001). While the stock market provides finance for 
productive capacity through the sale of public equity, it has been argued recently that in 
the majority of cases, stock market affiliated companies finance their projects through 
retained earnings or other forms of debt in order to retain autonomy from shareholder 
priorities (Aglietta and Breton, 2001: Borsche, 2004: Englen, 2002: Gibbon, 2002). The 
share price becomes the key financial indicator of financial confidence (Froud, Papazian 
and Williams, 2004) and companies maintain a cunning but cordial relationship to their 
shareholders through dividend policy or share buy-backs (Dumenil and Levy, 2001: 
Golding, 2001: Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000). Like a game of poker, a successful 
player has to appear confident without giving away too much. Too much debt might 
lower the share price. Low recorded profit might constrain the share price. This 
representation reiterates, in many respects, the stock market as the evil monster of 
`short-termism', an expression that was used to describe the general attitude of the City 
in the 1990s and one that became popularised in the minds of the public with the 
publication of the Will Hutton's critical sweep, The State We're In (Hutton, 1996). But 
in so far as there is a problem with the stock market, it is important to remember that all 
members involved in the Stock Market play a strategic game in what Golding (2001) 
aptly called the `Great Expectation Machine'. What is evident according to recent 
evidence, is that publicly rated corporations have all re-designed their corporate 
strategies in one way or another due to the added influence of the stock market and its 
emphasis on `shareholder value' (Aglietta, 2000: Golding, 2001: Williams, 2000: 
Warburton, 2000). How companies have done this and what the aggregate effect of this 
has been is still a contentious question (see O'Sullivan, 2003), especially when the 
Anglo-American experience has been compared to the European continental experience. 
As a macro question of political economy, compelling evidence suggests that the 
stock market, especially in the US and UK, has been based on a `capital market double 
standard' (Feng et al., 2001) that has rewarded, especially in recent times, companies 
with inflated earnings and expectations surrounding `new technology' products and 
services, totally independent of real product market activity, while punishing older 
companies with high costs associated with more rigid productivity, high labour costs 
and lower turnover creating a new finance-led productive pecking order (Feng et al., 
2001: Froud et al., 2000a/b). It is interesting for example that the best performing firms 
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in the stock market have been financial and consumer related firms, while the least 
performing firms have been the industrial and utility sectors (please see chart ten, 
eleven and twelve). From a financial point of view, the stock market has encouraged a 
clean new chapter in how the new economy interacts with the financial market. Under 
this perspective, efficiency creates its own rewards as well as greater access to capital. 
But from a political economy perspective, it has encouraged the size of the corporate 
`equity' coupon pool to shrink, concentrate (Froud et al., 2001 a: 2002), or become more 
laden with debt and exposure to volatile financial markets (Aglietta and Breton, 2001). 
For example, it is widely known that trading in the FTSE 100 companies comprised 85 
percent of UK equity turnover in 2002, compared with 57 percent in 1996 (Roberts, 
2004: 74). The proportion of UK equities owned by institutional investors more than 
doubled rising 28 percent to 61 percent between 1963 and 1992 (Roberts, 2004: 113). 
Those critical of the financial optimists, such as those group of scholars called the social 
accountants (Froud et al., 2002a) or the regulation theorists (Aglietta, 1998: Boyer, 
2000), put forward the case that institutional investors, acting on behalf of the privileged 
40 percent of high income class savers, search for yield in the equity markets by trading 
performance margins, which has the counter-effect of shrinking the corporate sphere of 
productive capacity and hence tradable secondary equity coupons (Froud et al, 2001: 
2002a). As the demand for productive performance intensifies by institutional investors, 
it causes a counter-effect on productivity, economic growth and capital gain (Aglietta 
and Breton, 2001: Froud et al, 2002: Stockhammer, 2004). As the social accountants 
argue, `expectations of the stock market have done no more than establish a long term 
operating contradiction between what the capital market requires and what management 
can deliver from competitive product markets' (Froud et al., 2002: 137). This naturally 
conflicts with conventional wisdom that the stock market attracts and finances new 
companies on the investment side, while providing consistent yield for savers on the 
savings side. Under the financial view, the stock market is a force for the productive 
good, whatever happens. 
Turning the coin of conventional wisdom on its head, the alternative and more 
specific argument propagated by critical political economists is that the cyclical 
pressures of stock market performance encourages firms to restructure their labour costs 
and their employee benefits in an effort to reduce operational costs and long-term 
liabilities (Froud et al., 2000a: Cutler and Waine, 2001: 2002: Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 
2000); to buy back shares in order to inflate company earnings (Golding, 2001: 
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Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000); to replace equity financing with alternative sources of 
debt financing (Aglietta and Breton, 2001); to use their retained earnings for the 
acquisition of financial assets creating the illusion of productive expansion (Krippner, 
2002); for example, to encourage horizontal mergers and acquisitions (Froud et al., 
2000b); to invest in areas that help company earnings rather than expand productive 
capacity (ibid, 2000b); and to base financial investment decision-making based more on 
the expectation and probability of results, rather than the resolve to build results 
cumulatively over time (Feng et al., 2001). This political economy approach to the stock 
market even possibly explains, to a certain extent, why the UK continually transforms 
itself as a result of its capital market sponsors, based on the image or vision of the 
knowledge economy, without necessarily thinking of its consequences. From a political 
economy perspective of the financial markets, and the following is only mutually 
exclusive to the literature highlighted, there is a `one step forward, two steps back' logic 
to stock market inspired activity that is inherently iniquitous and destabilising over its 
cyclical highs and lows. 
Without going into too much detail, charts eight, nine and ten lend some 
piecemeal illustration and support to this critical view of political economy. As we can 
see from chart eight, since 1998 the number of companies listed on the UK stock market 
has sharply dwindled in 10 years by 40 percent from 2087 to 1264. This reflects two 
things: the changing composition of the economy from old to new and the consolidation 
of the new economy firms based on best performance. From 2002, when the financial 
economy began to recover from the tech-stock crash, the value of annual equity turnover 
has sharply increased year on year, almost doubling from £1.8 trillion to £3.4 trillion 
within five years. What is noticeable from this point onwards is the development of an 
inverse relation between the value of the equity market and the number of shares traded. 
The number of shares traded has actually fallen by just under 16 percent while the value 
of the equity market and the level of equity turnover has risen by over 30 percent in both 
cases, suggesting that the coupon pool has retracted or else become more concentrated. 
If we examine chart nine that looks at equity turnover by trade size, we can see that 
there has always been an appetite for trading in large volumes and particularly buying 
and selling in large volumes. 
However, as we can see from chart nine the level of concentration has increased 
over time. In 2003,43.9 percent of all `sell' trades were carried out in volumes over 1 
million pounds. In May 2007, this figure was 54.7 percent, accounting for less than half 
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the year! This level of concentration, especially on the sell side may account for the 
slide in the number of shares traded, which has had the effect of inflating the equity 
value and turnover of shares. 
Chart Eight: A comparison of Stock Market Activity: UK listed companies 
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Chart Nine: Total UK equity turnover by trade size 
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It is entirely possible that the concentration of share trades is also based in sectors of 
best performance. If we look at the sectoral performance of the FTSE 100 companies by 
equity turnover and market value, we can see that the four highest rates of equity 
turnover relate to the financial, consumer service, basic materials and energy sectors 
(see chart ten and eleven). However in May 2007, the financial and service sectors 
accounted for 43.7 percent of all equity turnover in the FTSE 100 index (chart ten). 
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What is striking from chart ten below is the sharp and expeditious increase of equity 
turnover in the financial and consumer service sectors (chart ten), which contrasts to the 
flat line rises of their equity market values (chart eleven), suggesting that these two 
sectors are where the `sell' trading action is. The three lowest have been the IT, utility 
and industrial sectors. Turning to chart eleven, we can also see that the four highest 
equity market values correspond to the financial, energy, service and consumer good 
sectors and this has been a general trend since 2004.50 percent of the entire market 
value of FTSE 100 shares relate to the financial, consumer goods and service sectors 
(chart twelve). The four lowest equity market values in 2007 relate to the industrial, 
utility, telecommunications and health care sectors and this has also been a long-term 
trend since 2001, discounting the equity value of the health care sector which has 
followed a downward trend (chart eleven). These historical trends in the value of the 
equity market and its turnover correspond highly to the changing sectoral composition 
of the FTSE 100 index (chart twelve). In 1999,55 percent of the FTSE 100 index was 
made up by financial, consumer retail and service sector companies. In May 2007, this 
figure was 63 percent. Those sectors that have reduced their share of the FTSE 100 
index have been industrial, telecommunications and IT companies (chart twelve). 
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Chart Ten: FTSE 100 companies: UK equity turnover by business 
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Chart He%en: FTSI 100 companies: equit,. market value by business sector 
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Chart Twelve: FUSE 100 companies bý business sector: 1999 versus 2007 
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For regulation theorists and social accountants alike, this intensification of financial 
accumulation is precisely the moment when the stock market adversely influences and 
regulates the behaviour of firms and households involved in the coupon pool. We cannot 
accurately measure what effect the financial economy has had on the real economy or 
what the direction of causation is, this is a job for an economist. But we can see an 
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interrelation of activity in two respects'7. Firstly, there is an obvious continuity in the 
changing composition of the UK economy as we observed earlier, but it would seem 
that this bears some relation to stock market activity. In the stock market, industry is one 
of the least performing sectors and the service sector is one of the best performing 
sectors. It would seem that the stock market has been least excited by industrial activity 
and more excited by service sector activity. For example, as the amount of industrial 
companies in the FTSE 100 has declined, the amount of service sector companies has 
increased (see chart twelve). In the real economy, manufacturing profitability and 
investment levels have diminished and so has the share of manufacturing employment 
(chart thirteen). What has been lost in manufacturing has been gained in service-led 
growth, investment and employment (chart fourteen). The obvious difference between 
these two sectors, as illustrated by chart thirteen, is the difference in levels of 
profitability, but what is more significant perhaps is that service sector investment has 
risen above profitability in five consecutive years since 1998, whereas manufacturing 
investment and profitability has fallen year on year. This would suggest in some sense 
that manufacturing firms have been unable to compete with service sector firms in terms 
of financial performance and have lost their place in the FTSE 100, due in part to real 
economy activity, but also because service sector firms have captured the imaginations 
of financiers, who are able to prosper much more from larger and more consistent 
upward returns. Secondly, in the real economy it is apparent that service sector 
profitability has outgrown investment from 2004 and this is consistent with the high 
levels of equity value and turnover that we are observing in the stock market. Whether 
the stock market is reacting to increasing performance in the real economy, or whether 
firms are competing to create or express surplus at a time of rapid shareholder activity, it 
is not possible to tell. But there is a discrepancy in the performance levels between the 
manufacturing economy, otherwise known as the traditional economy, and the service- 
led new economy, where the financiers seem to be trading rapidly on the instant 
expression of surplus capital, rather than the expectation of financial results from 
investment. Based on this short analysis, those firms that can produce expectations of 
results or high operational surpluses, such as financial institutions or service sector 
firms, are more likely to have high equity values and a guaranteed place in the finance- 
led hierarchy, a reminder that the organisation and tastes of the financial economy are a 
simulacra of the hopes, necessities and desires of ordinary people acting in the everyday 
economy. 
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Chart Thirteen: Profitability and investment levels in the UK's manufacturing 
and non-Financial Service sectors 
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Chart Fourteen: Employment changes in the UK's manufacturing and non- 
financial service sectors 
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Indebted to Global Debt 
The relationship between stock market listed firms and the secondary trading of equities 
is a crucial dimension of the financial system. The shear market value of equities in 
response to their demand by institutional investors demonstrates their regulatory 
importance and influence over households, financial institutions and governments. 
However, the connection between the stock market and publicly listed corporations is 
but one dimension of the financial system and the over-emphasis on shareholder value 
has tended to exclude how this dimension fits into the financial ecosystem as a wider 
context of social analysis' 
8. The additional problem is that this analysis focuses too 
much on the notion of the coupon pool as being solely constituted by the issuance and 
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trading of equity related coupons, when the `equity' coupon pool is perhaps the smallest 
form of financial provision in the entire monetary system; and when the secondary 
trading of equities competes with other fixed interest securities and their derivative 
forms. In more general terms then, through the masculine representation of the stock 
market as the control center of the real economy, in addition to the analytical skew 
towards shareholder value, we possibly miss what is perhaps the most technically 
significant and political dimension of the financial markets: the colossal size, 
institutional make-up and turnover of the ever proliferating global bond market (cf. 
Warburton, 2000). 
In this wider understanding, the financial economy is not just made up of share 
deals and stock prices, but is akin to an enormous game of tennis with multiple players 
on each side hitting debt balls of different colours and sizes, in the form of bonds, 
marketable derivatives or other tradable securities, that reach their opponents who either 
gain or lose from their next strike. Though the equity market is conceptually different 
from the bond market, the issuance and trading of equities and bonds in the financial 
market, in addition to money market activity, is inter-related and adds to the complexity 
of the game. Within this game of debt proliferation, there are all kinds of different 
players involved: governments, financial institutions, manufacturers and pension funds 
all over the world are attempting to find new avenues of credit and accumulation. Some 
are serving new balls, some are just wanting a consistent rally, others are attempting to 
find open spaces, but all are trying to beat the net and gain the reward. In this sense, a 
more encompassing view of financialisation considers that the growth and sophistication 
of equity and bond finance, in addition to the institutions and instruments surrounding 
their cycles and perennial development, is an ongoing challenge of transcendent 
intensification that is fuelled by its own contradictions and appears to accelerate and 
expand without a final limit. 
In practical terms, the size of the bond market and its daily turnover is 
unprecedented as we shall observe and it is important to understand that the bond 
market far surpasses both money market lending and equity issues as the major form of 
financial provision and intermediation. Chart fifteen provides us with a breakdown of 
the three main types of financial provision in the international monetary system. What is 
immediately noticeable is the difference in size between the bond and money markets. If 
we examine chart fifteen, we can see quite a formidable difference between the size of 
the domestic bond market at an outstanding level of issuance approaching $36 trillion 
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and all outstanding instruments in the domestic money markets standing at around $8 
trillion. From this table, we can also see that bond market finance is far more significant 
than money lending even in the international market sector. The international issuance 
of equities is a drop in the ocean in comparison. Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
compare the domestic level of equity issuance with the bond and money markets, but it 
is possible to suggest that equities, as a source of primary market provision, is dwarfed 
in comparison by the provision of marketable debt securities in the domestic and 
international markets. 
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If we examine chart sixteen that provides an understanding of how money has been 
raised on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), we can see that fixed interest securities 
have been a popular way of raising money from 1998. In 2006 over 73 percent of all 
money raised on the stock market was in the form of fixed interest securities. Money 
raised by equity issuance was just 7 percent. Turning to chart seventeen, we can see that 
shares make up only a small fraction of total capital issuance, compared to bonds (52%) 
and commercial paper (43%). In the international market of the Stock Exchange, over 
92 percent of money raised was through debt securities in 2006, while only 5 percent 
was raised through equity issuance (chart eighteen). This resonates in the global 
economy too. For example, looking back at chart fifteen, the total 
issuance of 
international equities stood at $66.1 billion in the first quarter of 2005, in comparison to 
the total amount of outstanding international bonds standing at $13.4 trillion in the same 
International bonds and notes 
total issues 
  Domestic bonds and notes total 
issues 
International money market 
instruments total issues 
---" Domestic money market 
instruments total issues 
104 
period. Perhaps, the significance of shares and their extremely large values make their 
mark in the secondary market as we have shown above. As chart nineteen illustrates, the 
turnover of shares in the UK and international market is exceptionally high, especially 
in comparison to fixed interest securities, due to the liquid nature of this type of 
investment. But looking at chart nineteen, the turnover of fixed government securities 
has still been far more significant than equity turnover over the last decade. 
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Chart Sixteen: Primary money raised on the domestic market of the London 
Stock Exchange 
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Chart Eighteen: Primary money raised on the international market of the London 
Stock Exchange 
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Chart Nineteen: Annual turnover of all equity issues and debt instruments on the 
London Stock Exchange 
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Chart twenty provides us with a more in depth understanding of financial affairs in the 
UK. In 2000, the peak of the bull market, equities represented 28 percent of all net 
financial acquisitions in the UK. Today this figure is just 5 percent. But other things 
have overtaken equities. For example, the amount of money domiciled in the UK or 
belonging to UK institutions has increased exponentially (see currency and deposits, 
chart twenty) reflecting the growth of the UK financial sector and the importance of 
Britain, and more specifically London, as the financial control centre to the world. The 
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amount of short-term lending has increased considerably reflecting the boom in 
consumer and mortgage borrowing, but also the growth in asset-management and 
financial arbitrage. Curiously, if we examine chart twenty-one, the largest borrowers of 
short and long-term loans are financial institutions and those that have the greatest 
exposure to this type of debt instrument through their liabilities are not financial 
corporations, as one might expect, but non-financial corporations, households and 
investment intermediaries, namely brokers and hedge funds. The liabilities faced by 
non-financial corporations ties into an anomaly in the issuance of shares. If we look at 
the pie chart (twenty-two) below that deconstructs the net figure of capital issuance, a 
figure that represents capital issues minus repayments, we can see that there is a greater 
amount of repayments made on shares than the original amount issued, reflecting the 
amount paid back to shareholders through equity buy backs to an estimated value of 
£3.8 billion. This type of activity has been commonly associated with three 
explanations. Firstly, that firms buy back their equity stakes in order to reduce the 
amount of shares available and thereby increase their earnings per share (EPS) or 
secondly, that firms use equity buy-backs as an alternative to dividends for rewarding 
their shareholders. Thirdly, private equity firms have become extremely popular and 
controversial in recent years for offering corporations an alternative to the vagaries and 
transparencies of the stock market. In effect, it would seem that the corporate sector is 
relying more on money market and private equity in conjunction with buy-backs in an 
attempt to avoid performance pressures in the stock market or else they are simply 
finding `more' private arrangements of financial governance in a financial competition 
of `all against all' (Williams, 2000: 6), as predicted by Aglietta and Bretton (2001). 
If we re-examine chart twenty-three, the amount of securities has also increased 
year on year and this growth has been spurred on again by financial institutions of 
various kinds, reflecting the demand for long-term maturing assets by the likes of hedge 
funds, that like to borrow short (hence their liabilities from loans) and invest long 
(Warburton, 2000: 152), or international banks and pension funds that demand a longer 
maturing asset for protecting their debt and retirement liabilities (more detail below). 
Chart twenty-three illustrates which institutions have the greatest demand for this debt 
instrument and what their exposure is. While the financial sector as a whole has a great 
appetite for debt securities of different maturities, it is the government sector, non- 
financial corporations and auxiliary financial intermediaries, such as investment banks 
and hedge funds, that have incurred the greatest number of liabilities. While there is a 
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greater amount of liabilities from loans amounting to £6.3 trillion, there is a greater 
exposure to liabilities emerging from securities. For example, for every lending liability 
that financial corporations have on their books, there are assets worth 2.3 times as much. 
For every security liability that financial corporations have on their books, there are 
assets worth just 1.5 times as much. In this more subtle reading, liability exposure to 
securities tends to be that much more than liability exposure to loans and this is across 
the board for the financial sector as a whole (ONS, 2007: 164-167). 
Chart Twenty: Financial account UK: net acquisition of financial assets from 
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Chart Twenty-One: Total UK loans in the fourth quarter of 2006: financial 
assets versus liabilities 
Source: Office for National Statistics (2007: 164-167) Financial Statistics, June No. 542, 
http: //www. ons. gov. uk 
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Chart Twenty-two: Net issuance 2006: capital issuance by instrument (UK 
residents, all currencies) 
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Chart Twenty-three: Total UK securities other than shares in the 4th Quarter of 2006: financial 
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All this reveals a significant truth about how money is raised in today's financial 
markets. In essence, the global economy has observed a structural transition away from 
debt denominated banking intermediation to security denominated capital market re- 
intermediation. The significant difference is that the provision of debt is no longer based 
primarily on a private model of intermediation between depositors and borrowers, but 
debt is issued as a security, floated, priced and traded in the public capital markets. The 
traditional banking model has been quite literally turned inside out and on its head. The 
depositors are also now the savers, the lending intermediaries are also now the investors 
or the consultants, the big borrowers are now the investment intermediaries or 
L L'4. 
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governments, and the merry-go-round spins round so fast it is unfathomable sometimes 
to understand just who are the real risk-takers. In the traditional bank-based model, 
banks took on the risks of lending in a world of asymmetric information. But today, 
developments in global finance have intended to transcend information asymmetries, 
because lending is no longer cautionary, it is an exchangeable and fungible commodity 
that is priced as a reflection of risk. This represents quite a serious change in the nature 
of the financial system that has inspired many fortuitous transformations in the 
institutional and organisational nature of global finance 19 
For example, it is important to consider that the unravelling of the post-war 
period in the 1970s, the end of Bretton Woods, the rise of offshore financial markets, 
two energy shocks, mass unemployment and global inflation created a profound sense 
of global economic turmoil, revolution and the need to control it. Out went the post-war 
ideas of Keynesian economic philosophy and in came the reprieved, the `I told you so' 
people of `fiat finance' (Polanyi, 1944), revamped as game theorists, monetarists and 
neoliberals (see Hay, 2004), for their key idea that peace and liberty, even from 
economic volatility, can only be created if it is led by natural selection; a Darwinian rip 
off, because under this new economic philosophy, freedom was to be the equal and 
opposite of competition; the free-market kind. For the financial sector and for the 
general public influenced by financial restructuring, the execution of neoliberal 
economic philosophy did not create quite the straightforward and peaceful transition 
that was hoped for, nor the political utopia that was propagated under this 19`h century 
idea20. For Leyshon and Thrift (1997), restructuring of the international financial system 
has become distinguished by `four motifs': 
... an intensified 
level of competition between financial agents; increasingly sophisticated means 
of issuing and using debt; financial innovation linked to the management and exploitation of risk, 
and the importance of volatility as a means of amplifying both profits and losses. To this extent, 
the global financial services industry can perhaps be seen as an example of an industry in which 
a modus operandi based upon notions of `allocative efficiency' was replaced with one based 
more upon `market efficiency' (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997: 206). 
The net effect of this has been to let debt roll out like a never ending carpet, except 
greater risk has called for greater resources, expertise and more sophisticated tools `to 
push the envelope' in all areas of finance, an expression often used in mathematical 
circles, but one now increasingly heard in financial ones too. Before we explore the 
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reasons why bond finance has ballooned it is important to comprehend the geopolitical 
and sectoral source of issuance for bond market finance. If we look at chart twenty-four, 
compiled from the databanks of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), we can see 
quite conspicuously that the raising of debt securities is concentrated amongst the G7 
countries. 83 percent of all domestic securities and 67 percent of all international 
securities raised in the world originate in the G7 countries. The second observation is 
that the domestic market for debt securities is far larger than the international market 
and this has something to do with the emphasis that governments worldwide, especially 
developed countries, have placed on their domestic bond markets for raising long-term 
finance. 
Chart Twenty-four: G7 debt and geopolitical concentration: outstanding 
amounts of domestic and international debt securities 
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If we examine table twenty-five, which provides a sectoral breakdown of all securities 
issued domestically (in the world), we can see that governments are by far the largest 
long-term borrowers of financial capital. Of all domestic securities issued and traded in 
the bond markets, government issuance makes up just under 50 percent of all bonds 
issued by various institutions worldwide. Britain's Debt Management Office (DMO), an 
executive arm of HM Treasury that manages the UK government's financial affairs, 
provides a rather perspicuous history of gross national debt since 1855 in the form of a 
diagram21 (Please see Annex D, Diagram Two). Since the mid 1940s, the diagram 
shows that there has been an inverse relationship between the percentage of debt to GDP 
and the nominal amount borrowed. For example and understandably, in 1946 debt to 
GDP was 252 percent, an unprecedented exposure of liabilities that nevertheless fell 
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dramatically to 40 percent within 34 years. But as debt to GDP has fallen, and today the 
figure hovers above 40 percent, the nominal amount of money raised through 
government bonds has risen from 629 million in the year 1900, the lowest recorded 
nominal value in the 20`h century, to over an estimated £480 billion in 2007. This 
represents an 80 percent increase since 1980 in nominal terms. This is a reminder that 
Britain's economy has grown three times larger, especially since the 1950s, and that this 
expansion of GDP to over one trillion pounds annually coincides with the emergence of 
London as a world financial centre and Britain as a transnational knowledge economy. 
Chart Twenty-five: Outstanding amounts of domestic debt securities by sector 
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Chart Twenty-six: Outstanding amounts of international securities by sector 
and maturity 
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Before we get ahead of ourselves, there a number of reasons for such heightened levels 
of government borrowing through the bond market. Firstly, it has allowed governments 
instant access to funding for public services and other activities at a cost that is spread 
over a longer period of time. In 2005 for example, the DMO issued bonds with a 
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maturity spectrum of 50 years. In this sense, the government is making an assumption, a 
commitment and a claim that the economy will continue to grow into the future, that 
there will be a determination to honour liabilities and that these liabilities and luxuries, 
will be provided by future generations of young and even unborn workers. Secondly, 
when Gordon Brown complains to his opposition party about the days of boom and 
bust, he is really talking about the vulnerability and sensitivity of fiscal policy to 
unpredictable and volatile economic cycles, that became prevalent in the 1970s and 
1980s. In essence, tapping the bond market allows governments the perfect way of 
raising finance instantly without having to stimulate the economy and aggravate 
inflation rates through costly public deficit financing, tax increases, maladroit interest 
rate decreases or monetisation22. The raising of bond finance in the financial markets, to 
a certain extent, has represented a calm tonic for maelstrom activity in the real economy 
and a back door, or possibly even a quiet room, to its noisy politicisation. 
Thirdly, the costs of raising debt this way have therefore been lower in the short- 
term, politically and economically, and more consistent for governments because there 
is a self-fulfilling nature to bond finance that is based on a trade-off. Fundamentally 
speaking, the raising of debt securities this way represents both a pledge and an 
assurance to the bond masters that governments will not allow inflation to erode the 
capital gain or yield of their investments both in the present and in the future. Implicitly 
it is in the interests of governments to do this. For example, 72 percent of all gilts issued 
by the UK government are conventional (chart twenty-seven). Government debt would 
not be attractive to investors if it were likely to erode in capital value. Considering that 
the government has placed so much emphasis on the claims of the young and the 
unborn, it would be unwise for any government, particularly the UK government, to 
damage the interests of pension and insurance funds, especially when their holding of 
UK gilts amounts to 59 percent of the entire market (see chart twenty-seven). In more 
explicit terms, there are more immediate short-term costs attached to inflation. For 
example, 27 percent of all gilts are index-linked, meaning that the UK government is 
obliged to compensate investors for inflation. Additionally, it is in the interests of all 
governments, borrowing this way, to steady and dampen, as much as possible, interest 
rate increases. Any increase in the short-term rate, the base rate, can effect the yield of 
long term dated securities in the secondary market, making it more costly for 
governments to furnish their debt over the course of the long-term. Interest rate 
increases used to ward off money growth and dampen the rate of inflation can increase 
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the borrowing costs for lenders and increase the risk of debt default. Government debt is 
a more credible investment because it is protected through the availability of more 
financial resources, but corporations are more likely to default as a result of increasing 
interest rates, which is precisely why the credit rating of debt by various international 
agencies such as Moody's etc., has become so important as a way of informing investors 
about the credibility or riskiness of the debtors, which is further built into the cost of 
corporate capital, a form of lending that is generally more expensive than government 
lending (Sinclair, 2005). As a result, even a whiff of inflation, whether it is from 
economic growth or an increase in the price of energy, can send the bond markets 
rattling (Grahl, 2001 alb). In effect, given that governments have become the main 
beneficiaries of long-term debt securities, it is in their interest to control inflation, to 
expand economic output without increasing inflation23, to stabilise expectations of 
interest rate changes over time and accede to the happiness of the bond traders. Just like 
Dante followed and trusted Virgil through the travails of the inferno, governments and 
ordinary people have followed the principles of Hayek, Friedman or Greenspan, and 
seem to think without reflection that we have conquered the challenges of postwar 
purgatory to reach the heavens of global financial paradise. When we think that 
volatility in the real economy has been replaced by the perennial volatility of financial 
market activity, it is probably more likely that we are at the beginnings of another steep 
slope and learning curve in economic history. 
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O. Qhart Twenty-seven: Distribution of gilt holdings 2004 (fourth quarter) 
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It isn't just governments that have become heavily involved in the bond markets. It is 
financial institutions and corporations too and the rate of issuance has been rising in 
both markets (twenty-five and twenty-six). If we examine the domestic market for debt 
securities, we can see that over 39 percent of all securities are issued by financial 
institutions and 11.5 percent is backed by corporations. Roughly speaking, this is a 60 
percent increase since 1990 in both cases. In the international market sector, such as the 
Euromarkets, financial institutions have increased their issuance year on year and 
represent over 74 percent of all outstanding debt securities. Corporate issuers represent 
only 11.4 percent of all outstanding international securities. The second main point here 
is that the issuance of bonds, whether they be government or corporate have tended to 
be longer-term maturities. As we can see from both charts, all issuers with a remaining 
maturity of up to one year represent 25 percent of all domestic debt securities and 17 
percent of all outstanding amounts of international issues. 
Why is disintermediation so advantageous for financial institutions? 
Conceptually, a debt security is a transferable and fungible financial value earning 
interest issued by a financial institution on behalf of a borrower that provides the 
creditor the legal right over the asset backing the debt and the ability to trade the asset 
value in the secondary markets along with the protected claim. Debt securities have 
enabled financial institutions the ease of arranging finance for borrowers in the capital 
115 
market, through the calculated issuance of a security that essentially brings borrowers 
and investors into a paper agreement that provides immediate funding on the one hand 
and the prospect of long-term yield on the other. Instead of taking the risk and cost of 
lending and default directly, banks and other financial institutions have been able to 
issue debt on behalf of a client acting as a third party, while earning fees and 
commission for doing so. The advantage of this has been that financial institutions have 
been able to avoid the uncompetitive drag on revenue by regulations and capital 
adequacy constraints. This has benefited international banks and helped re-consolidate 
their position as major players in the financial world in three important respects. For 
example, banks have increasingly entered into the world of absolute return by 
establishing their own high-risk high return investment departments - otherwise known 
as hedge funds. Additionally, banks have also issued debt on behalf of clients and then 
further divided and sold the debt to a number of different investment markets. Secondly, 
the other effect is that it has allowed holders of debt obligations, paper contracts, to be 
sold a whim's notice to a diversified financial world that is sometimes very willing to 
take on the price and yield of an extremely risky financial obligation. Technology and 
methods of mathematical calculation have effectively enabled liquid finance to change 
hands very quickly and at a risk that either minimises danger or else maximises profit. 
For every borrowing requirement there is, no matter how likely it is to default, there is 
an investor who can repackage it, insure against it or sell it, on the assumption that it has 
some worth24. 
What is clear is that the changes in global finance have enabled banks and other 
financial services to increase their lending capabilities for ordinary people requiring 
overdrafts, mortgages and loans in a much more competitive financial retail 
marketplace. Net lending in the UK is well over one trillion pounds (see chart twenty- 
eight), which is having the effect, temporarily speaking, of feeding the cultural economy 
and resolving, temporarily or not, the deficiencies internal to its composite structure. In 
other words, financial innovations at the global level are helping to facilitate and 
maintain ordinary practices at the level of the everyday (cf. Langley, 2002b). On a 
practical level, it would seem that financialisation has become an integral part of how 
the UK economy is regulated. When the debt-merry-go-round comes to an end, or if 
speculation causes volatility as investors look for yield, then this could translate into real 
problems for the ordinary household as predicted by regulation theorists and the social 
accountant alike. But if financialisation is potentially volatile and sensitive to this kind 
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of event, why is it that the UK government favours this as a model for ordinary folk to 
subsidise their income and channel their savings (Please see diagram one in Annex D 
for an understanding of this model). If financialisation has become indispensable to the 
continuity of Britain's competitiveness and success in the modern world-economy, then 
why and how does it continue to sustain itself ideologically and practically? The 
suggestion here is that financialisation is not just an economic phenomenon that happens 
to regulate events through market forces, but is actually a discursive regime of 
regulation founded upon cultural economic dynamics. To assess the question of 
sustainability, we must turn to a more comprehensive understanding of the economy and 
its cultural workings. 
Chart Twenty-eight: Outstanding Amounts of Total Net Lending to 
Individuals and Housing Associations 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has been a journey through the British economy. It has dissected the 
component parts of the economy and examined their overall contribution to growth, 
employment and other activity such as consumerism. But on this journey, we suggested 
that consumerism is facilitated by the flouring or burgeoning of developments 
elsewhere; those countries that not only mass produce industrialised activity, but attract 
foreign investors and businesses, which see in these nations a way of facilitating and 
maintaining their competitiveness in a sea of torrid global waters, where companies 
must dance on the water or be stung by its techno-dynamism. Contrary to conventional 
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wisdom, Britain is a country privileged by these historical structures, which help 
underpin and (globally) regulate, Britain's standard of living. In many ways, this global 
regularisation is self-fulfilling. Consumers buy foreign goods from countries wanting to 
step into the league of world leaders, and in return, foreign countries accumulate foreign 
currencies, which in turn, they invest in the Anglo-American dominated circuits of 
wealth management. 
Beneath the surface of this arrangement however, lies a reality that we would 
rather forget about. As emerging markets develop and evolve within this global 
framework, the strains of industrialisation will inevitably become significant as 
urbanisation casts a critical eye on those who consume from the poverty of other 
nations. The intensification of industrialisation undoubtedly helps to facilitate rich 
nations in the West by keeping consumer costs competitively low. And this is politically 
significant because we tend to think this is the natural way of things; that we have 
reached an advanced stage of wealth production protected by the vanguard of the central 
bank, which supposedly manipulates the price of money so as to prevent inflation. But 
in equal measure, it would appear that competitive prices have enabled and reiterated 
the normalcy of the service sector, a key source of growth, which is also not a 
homogenous sector, but a highly differentiated configuration, one with high wage, 
gender and geo-economic disparities. The financial sector forms the core of this sector 
and its roots are firmly embedded in the city of London, where people inhabit a highly 
concentrated area of wealth; and yet they are apparently miserable for it. But what does 
the City do? As one former investment banker put it: `it's sitting on the flows of money 
of the whole world and basically, it's clipping a little bit off the top as the money flows 
round' (BBC, 2006). It's no wonder then that Britain is bursting with debt, because the 
global economy is indebted to the highest trillion hilt and this production of debt, in the 
form of debt securitisation, belongs mostly to the G7 countries, which circumnavigates 
throughout the world based on the simple premise that Banks are `big boys' and can 
self-regulate themselves. This comes down to a simple justification as the following 
hedge fund manager explains: 
The very fact that there is so much activity here makes the market more efficient and if the 
markets are more efficient then it makes things cheaper, it makes mortgages for people cheaper; 
makes loans for companies in every part of the country cheaper; it frankly adds to the exchequer. 
There is an enormous spin off from the activity we've got here (BBC, 2006). 
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And as soon as this is said and we begin to think of our own financial circumstances, we 
begin to realise that `maybe we do need all this'; maybe financialisation is fait. But as 
we ponder this question, we should ask ourselves whether it is `them' or `us' who 
control the rate of financialisation and the unsteady assumptions that underpin its self- 
ordained provenance. Because pension funds, mutual and insurance funds, and the rapid 
normalisation of hedge funds and other forms of saving and investment, belong not to 
the financial institutions that divine them, but to the people that save with them, either 
directly or indirectly. 
Given the weight of issues that have amounted from this analysis, in the next 
two chapters, we reflect upon the meaning of financialisation and theoretically explore 
its constitutional nature using literature from a diverse spectrum of the social sciences. 
Importantly, we will attempt not only to situate present-day financialisation in historical 
perspective, but we will understand how and why it manages to sustain itself, not as an 
objective economic phenomenon, but as a discursive regime of cultural regulation. 
Taking on board the ideas of Bauman (2000), as touched upon in Chapter One, we will 
begin to understand financialisation as a rather liquid and repetitive process. In Chapter 
Four however, we will attempt to establish some parameters, derived from the work of 
Karl Polanyi (1944), the inspiration of which helps us to see the emergence and 
persistence of financialisation as a process of qualitative transformation leading to 
certain political implications regarding the future and progress of our economies. 
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Chapter Three 
Thinking about Financialisation 
Introduction 
We have yet to find a sensible debate that articulates the principle reasons for the 
existence of extended financial markets and the progression of financialisation as 
outlined clearly in Chapter Two. We begin therefore by trying to understand the 
relationship between the real economy and the financial economy - and arrive at the 
notion that the financialisation of the economy is founded upon the commercialisation 
of risk -a complete reversal of the traditional relationship between the real and financial 
economy. What we don't quite understand or what has not been made explicit is the 
question of where this unique trend has come from and why it persists. By 
understanding the origins of present-day financialisation, we can begin to understand 
how it has evolved. The second part of this chapter therefore tries to understand how the 
present-day dynamics of the real-financial economy have emerged. What we find 
especially, which places the first section into context, is that the priorities of history 
have changed through time, that there is nothing essential or written in stone about the 
objective nature of the financial economy: it is first and foremost -a discursive social 
act. 
But as we make clear in the third section, the creation of the global financial 
economy is part of a repetitive trend that can be observed in world-history, but which 
nevertheless, has evolved into modem-day global financialisation that presents 
characteristics and trends unseen before. Out of the cycles and developments of world- 
capitalism, periods of financialisation have proven to be far more sophisticated in their 
influence and control of economic life, to the extent that it is pertinent and even 
necessary to begin thinking of financialisation as a finance-led regime - an autonomous 
regulatory structure made up of unrestricted relationships between consumers and 
producers of finance (Boyer, 2000). The political question, however, remains. Given the 
weight of historical evidence that suggests financialisation is an unstable and ambivalent 
social phase of history, and given the suggestion that the process has developed beyond 
political and ethical controls at the global level, how and why does it manage to contain 
itself or at least subdue its own contradictions? Politically, would this suggest 
financialisation is at a new stage of sustainability or has it merely become part of a 
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system of modern-day expectations, to the extent that financialisation sustains and 
repeats itself, not because it is driven economically, but because it is a cultural activity? 
We therefore return to the original question, which is, what is the normal relationship 
between the real economy and the financial economy? The answer quite simply depends 
on the purpose of the economy, as truth it is not synonymous with reality. In the latter 
part of this chapter, we therefore arrive at the notion that our cultural economy is 
responsible for the contingent development and progression of financialisation, as it is 
able, in theoretical terms, to evolve out of what appears to be a repetitive process of 
crisis-management -a reflexive regime in motion. 
The Real Economy and the Casino 
Curiously, the concept of financialisation is yet to establish itself as part of the 
nomenclature of public life. For example, we are yet to hear a politician argue that 
`financialisation is changing our world order' or that `we must brace ourselves for the 
financialised future' making it all the more puzzling that there should be a website 
dedicated to it. To an extent, financialisation has an uninviting and abnormal tone to it, 
especially if it is informed by conventional wisdom: the notion that the financial system 
is a benign, distributional and mediating apparatus of the real economy. For example, 
towards the end of the Second World War, John Maynard Keynes helped build the 
foundations of the post-war international monetary system that became known famously 
as the Bretton Wood exchange rate mechanism. We should remind ourselves what 
Keynes said of the `proper' relationship between the financial and real economy, 
Let no one suppose, however, that we for our part intend to return to the chaos of the old world. 
To do so would bankrupt us no less than others.. . We intend to develop a system of international 
exchange in which the trading of goods and services will be the central feature. Financial and 
capital transactions will play their proper auxiliary role of facilitating trade. Gold will retain its 
appropriate places at the central reserve and the means of international settlements. (Keynes, 
quoted in Van Dormael, 1978: 10). 
There are two noticeable features of this ideal Keynesian framework. One, the financial 
economy is separate and distinct to the real economy. Two, the financial system plays a 
`facilitating' and `auxiliary' role in the efficient allocation of capital to the real 
economy. What Keynes designed in his Bretton Woods proposal was an international 
financial system where the `means' of stable financial resources fulfilled the ends of 
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trade and full employment. The economic means fulfilled the social ends resonating in 
Ruggie's famous concept `embedded liberalism' (Ruggie, 1983). The concept of 
financialisation would appear to turn this Keynesian model on its head. To suggest that 
financialisation is changing our world and that we must prepare for its effects would 
suggest three things. Firstly, it would suggest that the financial system is extending its 
means above and beyond the real economy, creating linkages and circuits throughout 
the economy, which are then circulated back into the financial system. While 
financialisation builds and extends its systems globally alongside production, it is 
obvious that financialisation is transforming the notion of the real economy itself, how 
we understand `production' and `productiveness' - and even possibly how we perceive 
and relate to the role of finance in society. For example, it is implicit in Dore's 
conception that the economy and production itself is the object of financialisation (Dore, 
2002). In fact, if we read into Dore's notion further, production is becoming a site of 
financial control linked to the rhythms and imperatives of the stock market. Thirdly, it 
would suggest that the financial system is becoming a self-contained sphere of influence 
in its own right, no longer just a mediating apparatus, but a sociological structure of 
normativity that transcends and represses democratic control through its softening of the 
public imagination. Unlike Keynes' proposal, the means of financialisation carry the 
ends of financialisation in a direction that is boundless and uncertain, confusing even 
Marx's endless dictum, `accumulation for accumulation's sake, production for 
production's sake' (Marx, in Harvey, 1999: xxvii). 
Financialisation therefore raises a number of ethical and normative issues. 
Financialisation forecasts its own realisation through the rise of financial actors and 
criteria, which then play a privileged role in the realisation of economic ideas. It is 
implicit that financialisation helps to alter its external conditions. But why should 
financial actors play a more significant role in the determination of life's circumstances 
and distributional channels above priorities circumscribed by politics, culture and 
society? Why should hedge fund managers, accountants, corporate executives, financial 
economists, central bankers and independent financial advisers play a privileged role in 
the depoliticisation of political economy and the governance of our freedom? But it isn't 
just the practitioners of finance that become more important, because while 
financialisation is represented as an economic phenomenon, it also promises to 
transform how the culture and politics of the economy functions in society. Ordinary 
people too become the object and the subjects of financialisation. As the website 
122 
financialization. com makes clear, finance can be tailored to work hard for you! 
Althusser argued that capitalism has the habit of hailing our identities and 
financialisation is no different (see Hall, 1996). It is thereby unavoidable that 
financialisation transforms society's political and cultural sensitivities to financial 
market practices creating certain moral dilemmas. For example, if financialisation is a 
continuous process, at what point does financialisation reach its limits and become 
abnormal - and who sets political limits on this or is able to create channels of 
impartiality? Or does financialisation describe a process whereby the growth of finance 
encourages a dependency that is already excessive? How would we know or even 
escape this? 
To understand the significance of financialisation, it is important that we revisit 
the theoretical relationship between finance and the real economy. As Budd explains, 
Within economic theory, financial markets exist to manage time and uncertainty. In the first 
case, they intermediate between different rates of time preference between savers and investors. 
In the second case, risk is a serious impediment to the optimal allocation of recourses in 
economic life unless there is a set of contingent commodity markets. Where the number of 
available markets is smaller than the number of contingent commodities, an efficient allocation 
of resources is still possible if sufficient financial instruments exist. In other words, financial 
asset markets exist because there is an incomplete set of markets for commodities. Hence, there 
is a logic to the creation of new financial instruments which stems from the allocative functions 
within the real economy. However, the transmission mechanism between the financial and real 
economy appears to be out of kilter in the late twentieth century because the dominant mode of 
regulation generates financial instruments whose purpose goes well beyond the needs of 
allocative efficiency. Therefore, the claims for global neoclasscism are refuted by the behaviour 
of international financial firms, and globalisation is reduced to hegemonic ideology (Budd, 1999: 
121-122). 
Leslie Budd is arguing in conventional, somewhat Keynesian terms, that the real 
economy innovates and stretches product markets, effectively commercialising the 
future as a potential marketplace that does not quite exist in its material form i. e. 
creating calculable relations between demand and supply. Financial markets, in 
theoretical terms, join savers and investors together with different time horizons and risk 
preferences. As the financial market is assumed to increase the value of savings over the 
long term, older generations tend to have a more risk-averse preference than younger 
generations. Regardless of these assumptions however, as long as this financial meeting 
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place is in balance and is constantly attracting new savers, enough financial capital 
should be available to meet the demands of high risk, high return activities generated by 
the real economy. In other words, if our reading of Budd is correct, then traditionally 
speaking, it is the real economy that leads and takes risks and it is the financial market 
that follows. If the real economy stretches markets continuously and extends the 
possibilities of growth and all the factors that are employed by its entrepreneurialism 
and risk-taking spirit, this would explain why financial markets are assumed to grow in 
value cumulatively over time: because active product markets continually escape the 
conditions of their own destruction. This would clearly distinguish enterprise as `the 
activity of forecasting the prospective yield of assets over their whole life' from 
speculation as `the activity of forecasting the psychology of the market' (Keynes, 1936: 
158-159). 
In this reading, Budd's (1999) analysis leads to two points. Firstly, the financial 
and the real economy are out of kilter because the financial economy is producing more 
surplus assets and instruments beyond the `needs of allocative efficiency' suggesting, 
principally, that global finance has become speculative as opposed to enterprising. 
Problematically, Budd does not explain why the financial economy is out of kilter with 
the real economy and explains the arrival and persistency of this conundrum in 
ideological terms, which would seem to miss the more subtle point: that risk-taking in 
the real economy has broken down and financial capital is being channelled into the 
financial economy for the sake of its own accumulation. 
How we identify and frame this problem has a direct consequence on the 
solutions we imagine. If we take Budd's primary point for example, it would lead to the 
idea, put long ago by Keynes, that capitalism has the tendency to create economic 
outputs out of speculative purposes producing unstable conditions for enterprise and for 
growth. For example, in the aftermath of the Great Crash and before the Bretton Woods 
agreement was signed, Keynes observed famously that, 
Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is 
serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlwind of speculation. When the capital 
development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to 
be ill-done. The measure of success attained by Wall Street, regarded as an institution of which 
the proper social purpose is to direct new investment into the most profitable channels in terms 
of future yield, cannot be claimed as one of the outstanding triumphs of laissez-faire capitalism - 
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which is not surprising, if I am right in thinking that the best brains of Wall Street have been in 
fact directed towards a different object (Keynes, in Dimand and Dore, 2000: 516). 
This resonates today with Susan Strange's argument that capitalism, once again, has 
turned itself into a giant Casino, where `mad money' is `erratically manic at one 
moment, unreasonably depressive at others' (Strange, 1998: 1). This argument would 
tend to represent global finance and all of its practices as essentially `abnormal'. Not 
only would this provoke a breakdown in dialogue with the financial community, it may 
even obscure and undermine the notion that global finance can be transformed to fulfil a 
wider set of social functions and interests e. g. Keynesianism being an example of one 
alternative to conventional wisdom (cf. Wolf, 2004: Young, 2000). This argument is 
naturally followed by the notion that `finance has become decoupled from production to 
become an independent power, an autocratic over the real economy' (Cox, 2000: 27). 
This argument not only omits the historical reasons for the rise of global finance, but it 
neglects the specific constitution of global finance and its relation to ordinary people, 
not only in regard to their savings and deposits, but also in relation to their lending, 
consumer and working practices (Amoore and Langley, 2002). As a result of 
deregulatory changes for example, global finance is not outside the realm of ordinary 
practices in society. Far from being independent and abnormal, global finance is linked 
to the everyday and the commonplace (Langley, 2002b). If Strange's and Cox's ideas 
were followed to their natural conclusion then public policy would call for heightened 
regulation, constriction, even reversal of global financial markets, as opposed to tackling 
the deeply embedded cultural circuits, incentives and norms underpinning and directing 
the nature of global finance itself (Ben-Ami, 2001). As Ben-Ami suggests, the essential 
representation of global financial markets as `mad' and `de-coupled' may propose a 
prescription based on a faulty diagnosis of the symptoms, instead of the underlying 
disease. 
For Ben-Ami and others, the real problem does not emanate from financial 
markets, but from a complete breakdown in the `reciprocal' relationship between the 
risk-taking nature of the real economy and the allocative mechanism of the financial 
economy. As Ben-Ami argues, we are not facing the capriciousness of Casino 
Capitalism, but of `Cowardly Capitalism', 
For about a decade a powerful mood of risk aversion has reshaped the financial markets. To the 
extent that there is a problem, it is basically the opposite of the one generally identified. There is 
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a new economy in which fear of financial instability and the demand for more forms restraint are 
central. The financial markets reflect the same culture of restraint that drives its 
critics... Unfortunately, the attempt to stifle uncertainty in markets can have a down side. The 
market system inevitably involves a degree of risk - there is no guarantee that a particular 
investment will make a profit. The attempt to create a culture of restraint in which risk is always 
managed - which itself indicates a profound lack of confidence in the capitalist enterprise - can 
also mean curtailing possibilities of growth (Ben-Ami, 2001: 2-3). 
Essentially, Ben-Ami is arguing, in the shadow of Keynes, that the symptoms of 
financial speculation present themselves as volatility, not because there is incessant risk- 
taking and gambling, but because economic agents have become `cowardly' of capitalist 
enterprise. As a result, the preference of all savings and investments becomes orientated 
not by the long-term goals of the real economy, but by the short-term changes of the 
financial economy, encouraging risk-aversion and privileging Keynes' notion of 
speculation as `the activity of forecasting the psychology of the market'. What Ben-Ami 
seems to be saying is that the ascendancy and power of financial markets has gone hand 
in hand with greater weaknesses in the real economy, because financial actors have been 
unwilling to take risks on real economic activities and opportunities, creating instead, 
concentrations of capital in the financial markets through what Budd describes as the 
`paradox of risk' (Budd, 1999, see below). As Ben-Ami has argued, `during the era of 
cowardly capitalism, a mood of risk aversion [has] coincided with a period of relatively 
slow economic growth' (Ben-Ami, 2001: 5). The reason for this, as Ben-Ami suggests, 
is related to the crisis in profitability that took place in the 1970s, well documented by 
post-war analysis (Brenner, 2001), which encouraged surplus capital to find financial 
channels of accumulation, rather than productive ones e. g. Euromarkets. Reading Ben- 
Ami, it is possible to de-leverage the risks from financial markets by redirecting the 
incentives of accumulation from financial channels, which are risk-averse, to productive 
channels that generate risks based on the consequences of enterprise. 
However, there is a distinct sense that Ben-Ami underestimates the difficulties of 
restoring enterprising capitalism based on a limited understanding of the structural 
changes and cultural ethos that financialisation has created, a point that Cox (1987: 
2000) and Strange (1998) raise more emphatically. For example, it would seem that 
cowardly-capitalism is something more pervasive, systemic and `continuous' than what 
Ben-Ami seems to suggest. The problem facing Ben-Ami is that all around we can find 
indicators from economic pundits that the real economy is `cyclical', which tends to 
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conceal the underlying structural reasons for its relative strength or weakness (see 
Brenner, 2001). Sometimes the real economy is strong, other times it is apparently 
weak, but a group of political economists are beginning to unveil what's underneath the 
cycles of the market, which would tend to enlighten Ben-Ami's insights. For example, 
Wolff has found that US corporate profitability increased between 1980 and 1997 
mainly because `real wages grew more slowly than labour productivity' and because 
`structural shifts in employment led to very low- growth in the overall capital-labour 
ratio' (Wolff, 2003: 497). For Wolff, the relative gains of capital have increased above 
those of labour. As Wolf argues, `one must conclude that economic and political power 
shifted in favour of capital, beginning in the 1980s' (Wolff, 2003: 497). This work is 
contiguous with research carried out by Engelbert Stockhammer (2004), who supports 
the notion that financialisation has led to the slowdown in accumulation, especially in 
France and the USA. Examining the effect of `financialisation on the investment 
behaviour of non-financial firms', Stockhammer makes the case that the rise of financial 
markets, the shareholder revolution and the rise of incomes from financial markets, has 
placed an emphasis on `profitability' as opposed to growth, due to the rentier interests of 
absentee owners, which has `potentially played an important role in reducing 
investment' and the `slowdown in accumulation' (Stockhammer, 2004: 738). Others still 
have gone further arguing more strenuously that `the increasing importance of financial 
activities in generating revenues for non-financial firms and the growing share of 
financial sector profits in the overall economy should be regarded as evidence of 
financialisation... [extending] backs some twenty to thirty years' (Krippner, 2002: 33). 
Aside from the piecemeal evidence that this offers us, we do get a sense in which 
cowardly capitalism, as described by Ben-Ami, is part and parcel of the risk-averse 
nature of financialisation that continues even despite the contradictions, inefficacies and 
inequities cast by the penumbra of extended financial markets. But how do we account 
for this shadow and why is it difficult to grasp and impossible to shake? 
The Historical Significance of Modern Financialisation 
Should we therefore see contemporary financialisation as new and unique to all other 
periods in history? As we argued above, work carried out by historian Fernand Braudel 
(1984: 604) and world-systems theorists (Arrighi, 1996) would tend to guard against 
any assertion that the contemporary financial expansion is new in history, but what we 
can say is that modem financialisation is unique for its time and contained within it is a 
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framework of core elements that formulate its lineage and path-dependency (cf. 
Dumenil and Levy, 2001). While economists see global financial markets as a relatively 
new phenomenon, the origins and peculiarity of modem financialisation dates further 
back to the period of the late 19th century upon where finance capital was first observed 
by Rudolf Hilferding (1981). An analogy is useful here. For example, in the nature 
meets nurture debate, babies reproduce the genetic make-up and characteristics of their 
parents, but they develop physically and mentally within the constrictions and 
conditions of their environment. Modem financialisation is no different. What we 
should understand from the outset is that modem financialisation was born out of an 
Anglo-American conception, except, in the grand scheme of things, the United States 
unwittingly became the lone parent only to be wholly re-united with its former Anglo- 
Saxon partner, the UK, in the 1980s 
Firstly, it is perhaps important to understand that the issues underpinning Ben- 
Ami's `cowardly capitalism' became the subject of much debate in the 19th century. 
Between 1856 and 1862, the modern corporate organisation, otherwise known as the 
joint stock company, was formalised into English company law based on the principle 
of `limited liability' (Gamble and Kelly, 2000), a concept that was transported 
throughout Europe and America. This was a proposal starkly defended by the 
proponents of laissez-faire such as John Stuart Mill in England and investor capitalists 
such as J. P. Morgan in the United States (Gamble and Kelly, 2000: Fraser, 2005). 
Before this took place, the joint stock company pooled together large amounts of 
external funds from ordinary savers and financial intermediaries to finance the 
execution of productive developments such as rail or bridge building. But such large 
concentrations of capital in `miniature empires' (Gamble and Kelly, 2000), created the 
obvious issue of accountability between the company and the public interest, which led 
to a political conflict between those that supported unlimited liability and those that 
supported limited liability. `Care' was a necessary condition of the principle of 
unlimited liability and was an essential component of thrift. Essentially, a person of 
reasonable mind would only invest what one could afford to lose. After all, investors 
and the owner-managers were fully responsible for all the liabilities incurred by a 
business, without limit. Not knowing what one was investing in became especially 
relevant after events such as the South Sea Bubble in 1720 (ibid. ). For some, i. e. Adam 
Smith and Joseph Schumpeter (1949), by its very nature, unlimited liability could only 
encourage a joint campaign of productive responsibility between the investor and the 
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owner-manager, so that the methods and implications of production were fully 
understood and utilised by the entrepreneurial spirit that formulated them. 
Under limited liability, shareholders were only made responsible for the nominal 
value of their shares and not liable for the company's debts. Taking the responsibility of 
unlimited losses out of the equation, limited liability reduced this logic to a rational 
form of calculation. Separating ownership from management - and separating the 
responsibility of production from investment, financiers and savers won or lost only on 
the assumptions of their investment decision-making, which could be entirely 
incongruous to the actual methods and implications of productive strategies put in place 
by managers. Separating management from the ownership of production created the 
concern that entrepreneurialism would be diluted as objective and external motivations 
replaced subjective and internal motivations reducing the creative passion and 
dynamism of enterprise to a more diverse and complex set of interests (Gamble and 
Kelly: 2000). It is no surprise that Marx saw this as a positive development towards the 
social ownership of production - an idea commodified by business strategists such as 
Peter Drucker some years later. While the proponents of limited liability argued that it 
would prevent financial losses to the public and strengthen the public accountability of 
management, defenders of unlimited liability proposed that the former would replace 
`patient labour and moderate expectations' with `ambitious hopes and the habit of 
gambling in shares' (Lord Brougham 1838, in Gamble and Kelly, 2000: 31). Limited 
liability was supposed to institutionalise a wider public responsibility, but actually, it 
arguably narrowed its entrepreneurial and consociational spirit as Smith and Schumpeter 
had warned (Gamble and Kelly, 2000). As Gamble and Kelly argued `the company 
became first and foremost a bearer of private property rights rather than the upholder of 
wider public responsibilities' (ibid.: 34). 
Arguably, this determined the foundations and building blocks upon which 
modern financialisation developed. From this point on, the large corporate organisation 
would be made responsible to financial intermediaries and savers who would now have 
an interest in protecting their accumulated wealth. Managers too, accountable to their 
shareholder owners only through financial performance, could create business strategies 
narrowly defined and incentivised by this interest, regardless of their wider ethical and 
social implications. We need only mention Enron as an example of a `real economy' 
firm that financialised its operations for profit and gain due to the incentives of 
shareholder value, regardless of the consequences (e. g. Froud et al., 2004). 
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Nevertheless, during this time, the public concern and the narrow material concern for 
financial performance became synonymous, creating a lasting divide between the 
entrepreneurial spirit of enterprise and the financial spirit of speculation; a fight that 
continues even more vehemently today (Dore, 2002: Erturk et al, 2004: Kadtler and 
Sperling, 2002a/b). In many ways then, `limited liability' established a precedent based 
on a moral dilemma and set history on a course that would fuse together, in its purest 
form, the risk-averse nature of investors with their own material interest in capital 
accumulation for its own sake. 
Secondly, while limited liability sprung from Britain's industrial and financial 
power, it is interesting that it became ratified during a series of recessions that would 
help augment the transference of empire from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana (cf. 
Germain, 1997: Langley, 2002). Britain's industrial infrastructure internalised 
production costs through its extensive world imperial economic structure made possible 
through the industrial revolution, free trade and the capital recycling mechanism of the 
Gold Standard, which channelled excess money capital into London making it the centre 
of world financial control (Arrighi, 1996: 247-265: Braudel, 1984: 157). Not long after 
the depression years between 1873 and 1876, it is interesting that London's financial 
power increased during this time due to an abundance of industrial money capital in the 
City (Braudel, 1984: 242-246: Germain: 1997: 51). As `colonial rivalry and competition 
for exotic markets - became acute' (Polanyi, 1944: 19), the hundred years peace that 
haute finance managed to contain was ending (ibid.: 1944). As Britain's imperial 
competition with Germany heightened (Cox, 1987) and protectionism increased, the US 
seemed to recover well into the 20th century through its vast internal markets and 
corporate restructuring en masse, which was helped along by the renaissance powers of 
J. P. Morgan and his followers. As a result of the First World War, Britain's financial 
capabilities to support the gold standard were beginning to face both domestic and 
international pressures (Eichengreen, 1996: 2002) as New York gradually emerged as a 
world financial centre (Langley, 2002). Such changes would set history on a course that 
would lead to the iconic celebration of America's financial might through the prodigious 
inauguration of the World Trade Towers, a sky-scraping project that grew as tall and as 
fast as each (de)regulatory movement that encouraged the globalisation of finance (see 
Helleiner, 1994). Out of the late 19th century, Fraser argued, 
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New York became the unquestioned headquarters of a network of industrial and financial 
concerns whose scope and perspective were truly national, even international. Indeed, the 
'morganisation' of the economy was what would enable the US to seize the leadership of the 
world economy from the still family based, private capitalism of their British rivals. It was no 
longer circumscribed by the familial or regional interests of particular industries or the 
mercenary provincialism and near-sightedness of an earlier Wall Street. Devil-take-the-hind- 
most chaos was to be subjected to a civilizing surveillance, even a kind of planning, albeit one 
that excluded the faintest hint of public supervision and direction (Fraser, 2005: 153). 
Thirdly, conditions emerged in the US and elsewhere that placed an emphasis on the 
control of market uncertainties. While the cosmopolitan-imperial organisation structured 
Britain's extensive ties of free trade (Hilferding, 1981), the US began to consolidate 
itself inwardly through vertical integration, developing a `corporate-national' 
framework of organised capitalism that managed to internalise transaction costs. As 
Arrighi argued, the formation of `vertically integrated, bureaucratically managed, multi- 
unit business enterprises' pioneered the `supersession of the market' through its `power 
to control or suspend competition in the procurement of primary inputs and in the 
disposal of final outputs' (Arrighi, 1996: 293-294). Rudolf Hilferding was the first to 
notice during this period that finance capital was moving away from its liberal, 
`buccaneering' pursuits and concentrating its organised control over industry. Just like 
events in the U. S., Germany's finance capital intended to take uncertainty out of the 
equation through the direct manipulation of prices across a broad cross sector of 
industry (Hilferding, 1981: 234). But in Germany, finance capital presented itself as the 
formal organisation of industry along the lines of `state-monopoly capitalism' (Arrighi, 
1996: 293). In the U. S., laissez faire was saved by the re-ordering of industrial 
capitalism by the Morganisers, whom helped to make the new `age of the publicly 
traded industrial corporation' (Fraser, 2005: 152) an `effective foundation of a new 
stage of capitalism on a world scale' (Arrighi, 1996: 293). 
Periods of financialisation have continually raised the relationship and moral 
issue of speculation as a form of gambling. For example, the plethora of financial 
products that existed on the Dutch stock exchange in the 17`h century and the calculation 
of asset price movements that made speculation rational, and sometimes irrational, can 
be described as little different to today (cf. Chancellor, 2000: Langley, 2002: 45). But 
what is perhaps different about modern financialisation, in contrast to all other periods, 
is how `risk itself went through a metaphysical transformation' (Fraser, 2005: 223). As 
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Fraser explains, `the gambler's mad conceit, that he depended not on luck but on a kind 
of inner divination, was smuggled into the science of speculation... as speculation and 
investment... began to merge into the latter' (cf. Fraser, 2005: 224: de Goede, 2004). 
Coincidentally or not, a social and scientific preoccupation with risk and 
uncertainty blossomed alongside the burgeoning of corporate capitalism. We should 
remember that one of the key texts to emerge out of the Chicago School was Frank 
Knight's classic economic text Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Knight, 1921). Drawn 
towards an initial understanding of profitability and entrepreneurialism, Knight touched 
presciently on issues of uncertainty and probability six years before the famous 
scientific unveiling of the `uncertainty principle' in 1927 that effectively demonstrated 
the centrality of probability distributions to quantum physics. As Knight's thesis made 
clear, risk is a measurable form of uncertainty with probabilities that can be objectively 
known, whilst uncertainty is an immeasurable form of randomness that is subjective and 
cannot be known. As Knight argued, `the problem of meeting uncertainty thus passes 
inevitably into the general problem of management, of economic control' (Knight, 
192125). The conditions that influenced Knight's theories on economic life during the 
inter-war years became very significant in the post-Bretton Woods era when public risk 
became `privatised' (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000). For example, modem finance today is 
developed out of the basic principle that uncertainty can be dispensed with through the 
calculation of financial risk according to the `diversification' of `consolidated' and 
probable uncertainties - key ideas found in Knight's theoretical essays, which can be 
seen in modem asset-management techniques. The institutional frameworks and to some 
extent the cultural frameworks of this were already put in place and flourishing in the 
late 19`h century (de Goede, 2004). For example, Fraser's cultural history of Wall Street 
covers the period in the late 19`h century when the drafting of limited liability led to the 
notion of shareholder ownership and `the simmering middle class appetite to play the 
market' as `banking houses began to convert to the small investor' (Fraser, 2005: 228). 
Not only would this corporate revolution and approach to uncertainty influence the 
principle-agent problem that gave rise to the shareholder revolution in the late 1970s 
(Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000), popular or shareholder capitalism was to become a 
core policy of British Conservativism in the 1980s (Martin, 1999b). 
Fourthly, unlike Britain and Europe, the U. S. state seemed almost removed from 
the double movement that was taking place against the backdrop of social reforms, trade 
union movements and anti-liberal sentiments in Europe (cf. Cox, 1987: Lash and Urrt, 
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1986: Hobsbawn, 1995: Polanyi, 1944). The largely disorganised middle classes of the 
US dominated service sector meant that the political control and organisation of U. S. 
capital came from the top down, not from the bottom up (Lash and Urry, 1987: 67-83). 
For example, the only reason why the New Deal proposal and the Keynesian movement 
gained mass political favour in the US was because of the Great Depression. This was 
the `first great crisis of modernity' as Braudillard called it and the first crisis of early 
modern financialisation (see Horrocks and Jevtic, 1999: 6). As Fraser put it, `the Street 
retreated into anonymity, still exercising immense economic weight and political 
influence, but no longer a source of public desire and anxiety. Forty years of silence are 
perhaps the most telling evidence of how indissolubly the Crash and the Depression 
were connected in the popular mind' (Fraser, 2005: 370). What replaced early modern 
financialisation was a more socio-economic commitment towards trade and full 
employment (Ruggie, 1983: Eichengreen, 1996). As regulation theorists have argued, 
the `golden age' became `founded upon and reproduced by a particular system of 
production' and `regulated by a set of co-ordinating rules.. . within a particular 
international order' (Glyn et al., 1990: 41) developing a `virtuous circle of high profit, 
high investment-led growth cycles' (ibid.: 61). For forty years, the political supremacy 
of haute finance, like the cold war, was placed in the freezer only to come out and thaw, 
without any restraint, once the walls came down, not just in Berlin, but for transnational 
capital too. But even while financialisation had been locked away, it still bubbled in the 
minds of the old guard beneath the surface in Wall Street (Fraser, 2005) and in London 
too (Burn, 1999)26. 
Lastly, the return of global financial markets and capital mobility is related 
directly and indirectly to the contingent factors that facilitated America's leading role in 
political and economic affairs. For example, the Eurodollar market emerged not only 
because of the United States' colossal public and commercial investment in Europe and 
Asia (Eichengreen, 1996: Judd, 2005), but because the US tried to stem its balance of 
payments deficit through capital controls, not only to appease a more competitive 
Europe, but also to stabilise the dollar as the international reserve currency, which had 
become the object of speculation by the very same private capital markets that the US 
had tried to manipulate and thwart (Golding, 200 1)27. In some strange way then, the 
global political economy today is the outcome of domestic and international pressures 
caused by America's late entering into domestic political consciousness, in addition to 
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the historical and economic conditions and contradictions that eventually facilitated 
them onto the world stage. 
What reveals itself here is a distinction between an early stage and a late stage of 
modem financialisation. The early stage of finance capital emerged alongside and 
helped re-organise corporate capitalism in favour of the United States' self-enclosed 
market dominance, eventually finding its limits and downfall through the over- 
zealousness and naiveties of market participants, not only in the financial sector but in 
the Federal Reserve too. If we take Kindlebergers's (1973) assessment of matters, then 
the breakdown of the Gold Standard created a vacuum of state responsibility and 
experience, meaning that this was the first time that the baton of private governance was 
passed ad hoc to American led finance for its `self-regulation'. The latter stage of 
financialisation however, the post-Bretton Woods stage, has seemingly become much 
more sophisticated in its self-regularisation, which is the cause and consequence of its 
decentralisation, dynamism and transnationalisation, as we shall understand. 
Sandwiched in between these two stages of financial ascendancy was a phase of 
growth led by what J. K. Galbraith called the `technostructure' of the modern industrial 
enterprise (Galbraith, 1967). As Galbraith said at the time, it was surrounded with an 
`air of quaintness that attaches to the suggestion that the United States is run from Wall 
Street' (1967: 67). Writing during the post-war decades of economic boom, `idealism' 
and `heightened political consciousness' (Judd, 2005; 448) Galbraith argued, 
Given the agreement on economic growth as a social goal, the goal of the technostructure has a 
strong social purpose. Members can identify themselves with it in the secure knowledge that they 
are serving a larger purpose than their own. They seek to further the growth of their firm. This 
furthers the growth of the economy. Identification, as a motivation, reinforces self-interest that is 
associated with such expansion... The acceptance of economic growth as a social goal coincides 
closely with the rise to power of the mature corporation and technostructure. And the latter has 
had every reason to value it as a social goal. It does not argue the merits of this goal. As always it 
proceeds by massive assumption. What other goal could be socially so urgent? (Galbraith, 1967: 
183-184). 
In some sense, Galbraith was celebrating the post-ideological conditions of the post-war 
economy and the collaboration between capitalism, collectivism and social purpose. 
This was met with disparagement by philosophical Marxists such as Herbert Marcuse, 
whom argued that the impact of this progress `turns Reason into submission to the facts 
of life, and to the dynamic capability of producing more and bigger facts of the same 
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sort' of one-dimensional life (Marcuse, 1964: 13). But Galbraith was writing in the post- 
war context that pursued a `corporatist version of the Enlightenment project' that 
believed in `linear progress, absolute truths, and rational planning of ideal social orders' 
(Harvey, 1990: 35). This was a period in time where it was possible and credible for 
Galbraith to argue that `it can be a highly rational course' to avoid the `unpleasant 
contingencies' of the industrial enterprise through `unremunerative expansion' in order 
`to hold the organisation together' not only to maintain social purpose but to provide its 
economic fruits (Galbraith, 1967: 183). As Marcuse lamented, `it is a good way of life - 
much better than before - and as a good way of life, it militates against qualitative 
change' (Marcuse, 1964: 14). But no sooner had Galbraith published his thoughts on the 
social merits of the New Industrial State, was it gradually dawning on policy-makers, 
businessman and bankers that the structure of `international production and financial 
mediation' was changing - and hence the qualitative nature of capitalism too, because 
`evasion and exit' were fast becoming strategic imperatives for corporations, financial 
institutions and governments (Goodman and Pauly, 1993: 51). The rationality that 
Galbraith discussed positively and freely was soon to become irrational and distasteful. 
Post-war (ir)rationality is now diametrically opposed to the common-sense focus on 
profitability, shareholder value, corporate streamlining, flexible labour markets and the 
fetishism of individualised purpose (cf. Galbraith, 1967: Boyer, 2005: 2002b). With 
some irony, this last dimension is encouraged to reflect on the images of entertainment 
projected by films such as Wall Street, Rogue Trader or more recently A good Year, for 
their derision of the opportunistic, avarous and ephemeral life of the individual financial 
sportsman, whose irrational representation is naively independent of the structural levers 
of high finance that rest beneath their fingertips. 
Present-day Financialisation: a more radical, disorganising kind? 
Out of the long-twentieth century and going into the 215t century we have so far 
observed three stages of contemporary capitalism that underlie the origins, 
discontinuity/continuity and transformation of modern financialisation. The first stage 
could be described as corporate-fmance capitalism, the second stage industrial- 
corporatist and the third more uncertain stage, radicalised-financialisation. We have 
attempted so far to illuminate the former two stages and now it will be important to 
begin thinking about the historical significance of the most recent stage of 
financialisation. Arrighi and Silver's (2001) work is useful here because they would 
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tend to theorise these three transmutations of modem capitalism as a `systemic cycle of 
accumulation', an world-historical process that mimics Marx's (1887/1995) general 
formula for capital M-C-M, something that we will now explore in more detail. 
In his abstract understanding of commodity values, Karl Marx (1887/1995) 
differentiated between two general formulas of capital that he observed in commercial 
tendencies and strategies. The first of these was called C-M-C, which refers very simply 
to the `transformation of commodities into money, and the change of money into 
commodities' for the `appropriation of use-values' and the `satisfaction of wants' (ibid.: 
94). In contrast, the formula M-C-M refers to the `transformation of money into 
commodities, and the change of commodities back into money' (ibid.: 99). Marx further 
defined M-C-M as the `limitless circulation of capital' as an end in itself, `value in 
process, money in process, and as such, capital. It comes out of circulation, enters into it 
again, preserves and multiplies itself within its circuit, comes back out of it with 
expanded bulk, and begins the same round ever afresh' (loc. cit.: 99). These are two 
qualitatively different formulas and episodes of capital in their formation. For Arrighi 
and Silver, C-M-C means `concreteness, rigidity, and a narrowing down or closing of 
options' as a `means of securing an even greater flexibility and freedom of choice at 
some future point in time' (2001: 260). Whereas M-C-M means `expanded liquidity, 
flexibility and freedom of choice' so that capital reverts to its money form if the 
expectation of freedom goes unfulfilled (loc. cit.: 260). While Marx's formula M-C-M 
is intended to depict the different logics of individual capital investments, Arrighi and 
Silver have borrowed Marx's formula to illustrate and examine `patterns of recurrence 
and evolution, which span the entire lifetime of historical capitalism as a world system' 
(Arrighi, 1996: 4). As Arrighi and Bello make clear, 
The central aspect of this pattern is the alternation of epochs of material expansion (that is, MC 
phases of capital accumulation) with phases of financial rebirth and expansion (that is, CM 
phases). In phases of material expansion money capital `sets in motion' an increasing mass of 
commodities (commoditised labour power and gifts of nature included); and in phases of 
financial expansion an increasing mass of money capital `sets itself free' from its commodity 
form and accumulation proceeds through financial channels (as in Marx's abridged formula 
MM). Taken together, the two epochs or phases constitute a full systemic cycle of accumulation 
(MCM) (Arrighi and Bello, 2001: 260). 
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As we have already touched upon, the consolidation and take-off of US led corporate- 
finance-capitalism coincided with the breakdown of the Gold Standard and the ultimate 
dissolution of pax Britannica. The transference of corporate-finance-capitalism to 
industrial-corporatism (M-C) was driven by the sustained politicisation of free-markets 
in Europe that began with spontaneous acts of self-protection from the self-regulating 
market (passim. Polanyi, 1994) and ended with the final turn against liberalism as a 
result of the Great Slump (Hobsbawn, 1995: 85-109). While America approached 
Keynes' Bretton Woods system half-heartedly, Marshall Aid signified America's 
wholehearted commitment to a compromise in the nature of capitalism and ironically 
achieved many of Keynes' ideas for a stable monetary system, except through different 
means i. e. the European Payments Union (see Eichengreen, 1996: 106). As Brenner's 
well supported analysis helps us to understand, the shift from industrial-corporatism (M- 
C) to radical-financialisation (M-M) was part of a general squeeze on profitability that 
`resulted from the intensification of international competition leading to over-capacity 
and over-production' between 1963 and 1973 (Brenner, 2001: 17). The `manifestation' 
of this problem in high interest rates and low aggregate demand into the late 70's and 
early 80's was followed by what Brenner called the `turn to finance' as a `huge shift in 
financial activity ensued, not only in the US but across the advanced capitalist 
economies, reflected in the growing share of the national product, as well as of 
investment in plant and equipment going to finance, real estate and insurance' (cf. 
Brenner, 2001: 24-25: Dumenil and Levy, 2001: Harvey, 2005). The conditions of 
stagnation throughout the 1980s and 1990s was followed by public and private 
measures, such as financial de-regulation, popular privatisation, fiscal austerity 
programs, productive restructuring, rationalisation and wage repression (see Brenner, 
2001), rewarded of course by the `bang' of a re-invigorated, `post-gentlemanly' stock 
market revolution that carried into the late 1990s. 
This most recent turn to finance off-set a reversal of Galbraith's central post-war 
observations i. e. `the loss of power of stockholders in the modern corporation, the 
impregnable position of successful corporate management [and] the dwindling social 
magnetism of the banker' (Galbraith, 1967: 68). We could not therefore deny the 
extraordinary parallels between this three-pronged volte-face and the post-Depression 
decades of late l9`h century America. For example, the modern corporation emerged 'in 
response to price competition and the crisis of capital immobility and illiquidity' 
(Fraser, 2005: 152), leading to a reorganisation of industrial capital along the lines of 
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corporate accountability set forth by the financial `guardian[s] of social harmony' (loc. 
cit. ). Just as stagnation led to conditions of corporate-financialisation in the late 19th 
century, stagnation was followed by conditions of financialisation in the 1970s, but 
unlike the short era of corporate-finance capitalism, something appears to be much 
different about financialisation this time round, or does it? 
In many ways, world-systems theory and historicity sheds critical light on the 
some of the core dimensions of financialisation. As Braudel put it, `every capitalist 
development of this order seems, by reaching the stage of financial expansion, to have 
in some sense announced its maturity: it is a sign of autumn' (Braudel, 157: 1984). For 
example, the self-expansion of capital in the city-state of Genoa in the 16`h century 
emerged on the back of its merchant networks rivalled to Venice (Arrighi, 1996); the 
hybrid rise of the nation-state and of Amsterdam as a `world financial centre' followed 
in the footsteps of Genoa and Venice, reproducing `large volumes of capital' on the 
back of its `mercantile entrepöt' roots, even while its trading networks established 
elsewhere (Langley, 2002: 43); the industrial revolution of a more nationalised British 
imperial state created an over-abundance of capital centred in the private-public 
networks of `the City' (Germain, 1997: 44-57); and finally, the US defined industrial- 
corporatist economy was followed by its global financialisation. 
Firstly, these are connected systemic cycles of accumulation that are `contingent 
upon, and thoroughly shaped by, historical and geographical factors' (Arrighi and 
Silver, 2001: 269) that are part of an `evolutionary pattern towards regimes of increasing 
size, scale and complexity' (ibid.: 264). Secondly, it is noticeable that each systemic 
cycle of accumulation has been defined by the `leadership of particular communities and 
blocs of governmental agencies' (Arrighi, 1996: 9), which have `simultaneously played 
the role of leader in processes of state formation and of capital accumulation' (ibid.: 14). 
Thirdly, the more `powerful these blocs have become, the shorter the life-cycle of the 
regimes of accumulation that they have brought into being' (Arrighi and Silver, 2001: 
267). For example, the time that it has taken dominant regimes to reach the autumn of 
their hegemony in the form of a financial expansion has been shorter. Fourthly, it is also 
noticeable that `financial expansions have been an integral aspect of hegemonic crisis, 
both past and present, as well as of the eventual transformation of past hegemonic crisis 
in hegemonic breakdowns' (ibid.: 271). Fifthly, in history, the concurrence between 
periods of financialisation and hegemonic crisis has usually intensified the demands of 
the hegemonic state to `reflate' its waning power through its `continuing centrality in 
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networks of high finance' and by turning its `privileged access to the overabundant 
liquidity in world financial markets' to its advantage (loc. cit. ). Lastly, each financial 
expansion has been followed by a hegemonic transition and the transmutation of 
capitalist accumulation onto a more extensive plain (ibid. ). Following Braudel, Arrighi 
paints what has been the fait of all past financial expansions, 
Over time, however, financial expansions have tended to destabilise the existing order through 
processes that are as much social and political as they are economic. Economically, such 
expansions systematically divert purchasing power from demand - creating investment in 
commodities (including labour power) to hoarding and speculation, thereby exacerbating 
realization problems. Politically, they tend to be associated with the emergence of new 
configurations of power, which undermine the capacity of the incumbent hegemonic state to turn 
to its advantage the system-wide intensification of competition. And socially, the massive 
redistribution of rewards and the social dislocations entailed by financial expansions tend to 
provoke movements of resistance and rebellion among subordinate groups and strata, whose 
established ways of life are coming under attack (Arrighi, 2003: 68). 
Based on this extensive and fascinating historical study of the world-capitalist system, 
Arrighi and his followers suggest that `we should be sceptical about the long-term 
stability of the present global dominance of finance capital' and the `associated reflation 
of US power' (Arrighi and Silver, 2001: 274). While we should be sceptical, perhaps the 
significant question is not `how soon and how catastrophically the present global 
dominance of finance capital will draw to a close' (ibid.: 273), but how financialisation 
manages to overcome the contradictions that Arrighi et al. describes so meticulously 
above. Because world-systems theorists use a comparative methodology to understand 
present transformations, they tend to miss the political significance of contemporary 
financialisation as a history of the present. Even Arrighi acknowledges that `while the 
economics of the present transition is in key respects similar to that of past 
transitions... its politics and sociology are quite different' (Arrighi, 2003: 69). World- 
systems analysis also inspires a more critical question: why should it be inevitable that 
we forecast and reach financial destruction before qualitative change can begin again? 
Putting this question to one side, Arrighi et al. suggest that the continuation of 
financialisation and of US leadership in the global political economy is inextricably 
linked. They tend to see financialisation as a temporary phase of excess capital 
accumulation and inter-state competition for mobile resources. While there are strong 
grounds for suggesting that `we have seen this all before', there are equally strong 
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arguments for suggesting that our present stage of financialisation will be much more 
indefatigable as an autonomous and evasive structure in its own right, which is why it 
requires our critical intervention. 
Firstly, we should consider the decentralised nature of global financialisation. 
For example, even world-systems theorists seem to suggest that we are in an 'in- 
between' stage of world-capitalist development. For example, while political power is 
embedded in national structures, the world-system seems to be subject to the 
disorganising influences of mobile capital (see Amin, 1996: Germain, 1997). Spatially, 
different parts of the globe are competing for the attraction of mobile capital facilitating 
the re-creation of world financial centres, off-shore spaces or `cash-boxes' comparable 
to Genoa and Venice in the 16th century - and while we should not underestimate the 
systemic ties and linkages of global capital, these cash boxes are developing their own 
mobile resources and sources of liquidity independently of events in the United States. 
This is precisely why we should see that the decentralised logic of financialisation has 
become a form of structural power, which is both `collective in nature and fragmented 
in practice' (Germain, 1997: 171). In other words, not only is there a certain degree of 
`homogeneity' in the views of financial actors `towards the exercise of power over 
access to international credit', but `power is exercised through individual firms via their 
individuated decisions to grant access to power' (Germain, 1997: 171). While Arrighi 
posits that financialisation ensues through inter-state competition for mobile capital, it is 
also important to understand the point that market actors too have a competitive interest 
in the continuation and mutation of global financialisation. In other words, 
financialisation represents the privatisation of structural power as markets have been 
`empowered to exercise increased authority... indirectly through market forces, where it 
is lodged in the multiple actions of commercial firms engaged in the competitive 
provision of access to stocks of internationally mobile capital' (Germain, 1997: 171). 
Secondly, this is compounded by the transnational character of financialisation, 
which is significant because `travelling light has become an asset of power' and `fluid 
domination' in its own right (Bauman, 13: 2000). For Bauman, mobile capital has 
almost completed one part of the project of modernity, the complete annihilation of 
space through time making the prime technique of power `escape, slippage, elision and 
avoidance' (Bauman, 2000: 11). In the era of `heavy modernity... time was the means 
which needed to be husbanded and managed prudently so that the returns of value, 
which were space, could be maximised' (Bauman, 2000: 118). In light modernity, `the 
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effectiveness of time as a means of value attainment tends to approach infinity... and 
since all parts of space can be reached in the same time-span no part of space is 
privileged, non has `special value'. If all parts of space can be reached at any moment, 
there is no reason to reach any of them at any particular moment and no reason to worry 
about securing the right of access to any' (loc cit: 118). In many respects, we should 
interpret this is as the radicalisation of risk-aversion and its embeddedness in the centres 
and institutions of global finance capital. 
In this sense, states may increase their dependence on financialisation to reflate 
their competitive status and world bargaining power with mobile capital, but the 
continuation of financialisation will be subject to its decentralisation throughout 
different geo-economic centres in the global political economy. In fact, knowing this 
can only intensify the structural power of mobile capital through an appreciation of its 
liquid transnationalisation. 
Thirdly, this links in with what we could tentatively call here as the socialisation 
of the anti-market. It was Braudel whom divided capitalism into three methodological 
layers, which he described - bottom to top - as the founding layer of material life, in the 
middle - the market economy and at the highest level - the zone of the anti-market, 
where `the great predators roam and the law of the jungle operates' (Braudel, 982: 229- 
30). At the level of the anti-market, `what marks contemporary financialisation is the 
extent to which, to varying degrees but to almost universal extent, world credit practices 
are subject or respond to speculative motivations' (Langley, 2002: 90). But it is 
important to understand that the speculative motivations of the anti-market have become 
an engrained feature of the new circuits of value creation under informational capitalism 
at the level of the new market economy. As Castells explains, `expected growth value is 
the rule of thumb for investment in the new economy... it looks like greed is now 
expressed more directly in value creation through the expectation of higher value - thus 
changing the rules of the game without changing the nature of the game. This is not 
speculation. Or else, all capitalism is speculative. Because within the logic of capitalism, 
creation of value does not need to be embodied in material production. Everything goes, 
within the rule of law, as long as a monetized surplus is generated, and appropriated by 
the investor' (Castells, 2000: 160). As Hoogvelt presses the point, we are going through 
a `phase of deepening, but not widening, capitalist integration' (Hoogvelt, 2001: 121). 
Not only is there a level of consonance between the anti-market and the market 
economy, we are also observing a suffusion of their influence into the founding layers 
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of material life. As Hoogvelt put it, `of still greater significance is the manner in which 
such structural integration is becoming internalised in the behaviour of economic agents, 
be they entrepreneurs or workers, consumers or producers' (Hoogvelt, 2001: 133). 
In sum, contemporary fmancialisation seems to have evolved to a level beyond 
the city-state, beyond the nation-state and now operates on a transnational plain beyond 
borders, seemingly creating a fluid and much greater state-social dependency on mobile 
recourses. But if this is the case, then this would compel us to face one of Arrighi's 
central observations. Highlighting the transformations in the world-system from 
`scattered to concentrated capitalist power', world-systems theorists stress the point, as 
demonstrated above, that the `expansion of capitalist power over the last five hundred 
years has been associated not just with inter-state competition for mobile capital ... but 
also with the formation of political structures endowed with ever-extensive and complex 
organisational capabilities to control the social and political environment of capital 
accumulation on a world scale' (Arrighi, 1996: 14). Given the transnational, 
decentralised and socialised character of financialisation, as suggested here, could it be 
feasible to think of financialisation as the source of our social, political, even `cultural 
economic' regulation in society? Is it possible that financialisation continues, even in 
the face of its own contradictions, because it has become a deeply embedded part of our 
state-social-economies? 
Finance Capital, Regularisation and Crisis-management 
The contention that finance capital is socially and economically regulative in periods of 
financialisation is not new. Writing in the early 20th century, Rudolf Hilferding (1981) 
observed that the nature of capital was evolving out of its liberal, entrepreneurial and 
buncaneering roots, into a more organised, regulated and monopolistic mode of late 
capitalism described as finance capital. As Hilferding argued, `thus the specific 
character of capital is obliterated in finance capital. Capital now appears as a unitary 
power which exercises sway over the life processes of society' (Hilferding 1981 in 
Daly, 1991: 84). Hilferding's argument was that financial capital was unifying its 
control over the means of industrial production through the formation of banking 
cartels, where market uncertainties could be controlled through price determination, 
thereby making market fluctuations the subject of accounting logic and calculation 
(Hilferding, 1981). For Hilferding, at this late stage of capitalism `the ceaseless turnover 
of money has attained its goal in the regulated society' (Hilferding 1981: 324). 
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Hilferding believed that the movement towards finance capital represented one of the 
final turns in the dialectic of capitalism towards its total organisation. If the proletariat 
were to overtake the means of production, finance capital would be their starting point. 
Since the turn against finance capital beginning in the early 20th century, the 
resurrection of global finance `like a phoenix risen from the ashes' (Cohen, 1996) has 
inspired many to return to Hilferding's theories. But as global finance has taken `flight 
and soared to new heights of power and influence in the affairs of nations' (ibid: 268), it 
would seem that financialisation has made redundant the `structuralist economism' of 
finance capital. As Glyn Daly explains, 
The notion of organised capitalism... ultimately extinguishes all contingency and indeterminacy 
insofar as it constitutes a fixed totality whose limits may be rationally determined by reference to 
the (external) metaphysical construction of the economic space. Economic identity remains 
frozen within the structural system of differences which Hilferding transforms into a universally 
intelligent object: organised capitalism. Hilferding, then, clearly represents continuity rather than 
rupture with traditional conceptions of the economy. Thus it does not matter whether the 
capitalist totality is presented as a nomenclature or structural system, the point is that both kinds 
of totalities are endowed with a rational/objective centre, an a priori essence, which identify 
them as idealist... That is to say, the Saussurian logic of enquiry, which attempts to fix identity 
within a closed structural system, displaces and obscures all attempts to understand the 
emergence of new identities outside this system. History, in this sense, is at an end (Daly, 1991: 
86). 
One of the key differences between finance capital and financialisation is that the latter 
is moving towards a fully financialised economy, a financial regime of accumulation, 
where the inputs and outputs of finance become productive in their own right - and 
where the mediating circuits and logics of financial production become circulatory and 
to an extent: self-fulfilling. With finance capital, the means are separate and distinct 
from the ends, but in the later case, they are clearly ambiguous returning us to face 
another of Hilferding's original arguments. By regulating industry, finance capital could 
potentially regulate market uncertainties and emasculate the social politicisation of the 
economy. From a Marxist perspective, the means of finance capital justified and 
stabilised its own ends. In contrast, today's financialisation appears to reproduce itself, 
not through formal and external measures of calculation and control, but through 
endogenous, implicit and informal market exchange relations. If there is a difference 
today, then it is not so much that the economy is organised by finance capital, it's that it 
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has become much more disorganised, decentralised and autonomous within the de- 
personalised bounds of financialisation itself. Whereas finance capital regulated society 
through economic calculation, financialisation appears to be a form of social regulation 
in itself. What finance capital achieved through economic-industrial controls, 
financialisation achieves through social interaction (cf. Hilferding, 1981: Martin, 2002). 
From this perspective, financialisation has become the envy of finance capital. 
In an attempt to close down many of the uncertainties regarding financialisation, 
Boyer (2000: 2005) and Aglietta (1979: 1998: 2000) - two renowned regulation 
theorists, have begun to theorise the causal mechanisms, connections and institutional 
logics of the emerging `finance-led regime'. The intention of regulation theory in this 
context is to understand the `properties and possibilities of long-term reproduction' 
where `finance has imposed its logic' (Boyer, 2000,118). In many ways, Boyer and 
Aglietta are `imagining' and speculating what an integrated financialised economy 
would mean for the state, society and the economy. This research project has been 
inspired by the many transformations that have emerged out the 1990s e. g. `giant 
mergers, capital mobility between countries, pressures on corporate governance, 
diffusion of equity among a larger fraction of the population' (Boyer, 2000: 166), 
signalling that the financialised growth regime is a very real `candidate for replacing 
Fordism'. Drawing their analysis from the American and British experience, where 
financialisation in empirical terms has progressed most, both authors (Aglietta, 2000: 
Boyer, 2000) map out the causal linkages and implications that we can delineate briefly 
here. 
In simple terms, the financialised growth model places greater pressure on 
corporations to increase their profitability through corporate governance, to reduce their 
labour and capital costs, encouraging a greater incorporation of technological adaptation 
into their productive inputs and outputs. As profit expectations rise, asset prices rise as 
institutional investors soak up gains in equity, creating capital and speculative gains for 
ordinary households with pensions and savings, but also for lenders, whom benefit from 
more sophisticated approaches to leverage and risk-management - necessitated by the 
very same asset price rises, but which nevertheless facilitates more indebtedness to 
households and corporations as banks merge and diversify to insure their liabilities. The 
losses made by labour flexibility are thereby compensated by the pro-cyclical 
movements in stock and security prices, enabling greater demand through consumption, 
encouraged of course by the fetishism of techno-commodities, leading to greater 
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expectations of corporate profits... and so financialisation just goes on and on and on. As 
Aglietta argued, 
One is left with impression that the wealth-induced growth regime rests upon the expectation of 
an endless asset price appreciation. The dynamic is self-fulfilling as much as it is reflexive 
because market sentiment induces firms and individuals to act in such a way that expectations 
are fulfilled. This market sentiment is a co-ordination of expectations around a convention shared 
by the financial community: the economy has reached a new age of capitalism! Can this 
convention be robust or fragile? It depends upon a heavily leveraged financial structure and is 
therefore vulnerable to liquidity conditions... Ultimately, the central bank is the linchpin of the 
whole financial structure. Only the central bank can thwart a melting down of inflated asset 
prices if an unexpected shock causes the convention to crumble and launches a contagious flight 
to quality (Aglietta, 2000: 156). 
It is highly interesting that regulation theorists should suggest that we are in a transition 
phase between Fordism that reproduces wage-earning social relations and the 
financialised economy, which widens the scope and function of finance-led growth 
alongside the wage-labour nexus. For Boyer (2000), the transition period is defined by 
the rise of pension funds `leading to increased market prices and the appearance of 
financial bubbles' as demographic pressures place pressures on institutional investors to 
reward their beneficiaries. What is interesting is the prediction from Boyer that this 
`transition phase' will encourage a greater financialisation of the economy as the scale 
and differentiation of savings tied up in different stock market assets is widened for the 
purpose of monetary gain and ironically, stability. Just like Castells argued above, in the 
financialised regime, speculation doesn't exist if savings become a `normal' part of a 
financialised regime of virtuous growth. However, Aglietta and Boyer recognise that the 
finance-led regime not only `exacerbates' income and wealth inequalities, but that it 
moves us closer towards more repetitive or even more aggressive structural instabilities 
(Aglietta, 2000: Boyer, 2000). As Boyer argued, `for regulation theory the challenge is 
thus to try to determine the roots of the next structural crisis... and do so before the 
eruption of a major financial crisis which would demonstrate the structural limits and 
inner contradictions of such a regime' (2000: 142). For Boyer and Aglietta, the 
emerging financial regime of accumulation clearly lacks an emerging social mode of 
regulation, to put it in regulationist terms, which would help to counter-balance the 
contradictions and stabilise the regime as a virtuous model of growth. Aglietta tries to 
imagine ways of redirecting the micro-incentives of institutional investment so that asset 
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growth rises gradually and not speculatively, but while regulation theorists try to deal 
pragmatically with the emerging fmancialised context, their work raises a number of 
critical issues. 
Firstly, regulation theory drives the idea home that finance could very well be a 
fully fledged sphere of production in its own right, where savings are also investments 
and a source of income, created by the anonymous circuits of financial exchange value. 
In this sense, we are impressed by the distance and contrast between world-systems 
theory and regulation theory. In the former case, we are in a temporary phase of social 
ambivalence - and in the second case, we are entering a new phase of financialised 
production, making it necessary in methodological terms that we reconcile the 
politicised dimensions of the former while incorporating the normalising suggestions of 
the latter. Secondly and related to this, regulation theory provides us with a neat idea of 
where our societies are heading, but they do not theorise the transition or explain how 
and why it is occurring. Instead of exploring the politics of social change, they try to 
problem-solve the system that they pre-empt. Thirdly, regulation theory takes us closer 
to the notion that economic agents in society help to construct and reproduce the cultural 
webs and conventions of financialisation through market exchange relations. But by 
accepting ontologically the realism of the finance-led regime and how it presents 
deductively, regulation theorists inductively fill in the gaps and thereby engage in 
writing the teleological and post-philosophical consequences of financialisation. For 
example, regulation theory tries to `organise' the structural linkages into an imagined 
regime, to close down uncertainties and to pin economic identity down, which 
effectively helps to depoliticise the emerging regime that has so far proven (and even 
promises) to be perpetually unstable (cf. Froud et al, 1997: 352). In this sense, we are 
returned to the very same criticisms that Daly made of Hilferding. As a result, 
financialisation is reduced to a quantifiable effect of the financialised regime, what we 
might call cyclical intensities resulting from the motivations of asset price movements. 
Fourthly, by imagining agents as `economic identities' acting with bounded 
rationality, regulation theorists tend to exclude the contingent political, social and 
`cultural economic' dimensions that emerge within financialisation itself and which 
facilitate its indeterminate, ambivalent, iniquitous and self-destructive nature -a point 
that Arrighi et al. (2001) raises more emphatically above and which has been supported 
by others (Langley, 2002). Fifthly, regulation theorists have traditionally made a 
distinction between the regime of accumulation and the mode of social regulation. The 
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latter consist of `habits, customs, social norms and enforceable laws which create 
`regulatory systems'... thus mitigating the conflict inherent in capitalist social relations' 
(Tickell and Peck, 1992: 192). In their analysis of the finance-led accumulation, they 
have tended to focus on the regime and treat the social mode of regulation as a 
consequential variable and a problem-solving device. By working out the causal 
variables within the system, they cannot see that the hermeneutic surroundings of actors 
and their interactions constantly shape the unfolding nature of the regime itself. The 
social and cultural constitution of the regime and its consequences are not to be 
undermined if financialisation has proven to be a sign of autumn. 
In historical terms, we must remember that fmancialisation is an abnormal phase 
of financial growth, which has tended to destabilise and fragment societies, both 
politically and culturally. In order to re-politicise financialisation, it is more fruitful to 
begin thinking of financialisation as an incomplete, institutional and cultural economic 
dynamic and a regime of regulation in perpetual motion. This not only allows us to 
begin thinking of how financialisation inspires a transition from industrial-corporatism 
to a more elaborate financialised society, but it opens up the question of how a social 
mode of regulation is introduced to stabilise and normalise the transformation, even 
despite its crisis tendencies. 
Samir Amin (1996) provides us with a way of thinking about financialisation 
that neither forgets its excessive origins and progressive contradictions, nor 
underestimates its potential to contain, perpetuate and regulate its global expansion. 
Amin shares the same sentiments as Arrighi that financialisation, historically speaking, 
is `always a sign of crisis, that is to say of relative stagnation' of productive 
accumulation producing results that are `eventually insupportable, increasing 
inequalities in a manner that is so rapidly disastrous that the process is thrown into 
doubt by inevitable social and political struggles' (Amin, 1990: 244). Asking himself 
whether financialisation is a necessary stage for productive growth to be re-established, 
Amin argues, `I would say on the contrary financialisation is a mode of crisis 
management, not the preparation for its end' (loc. cit.: 244). In this single thesis, Amin 
manages to alter how we perceive financialisation and what questions we ask, because 
while the concept `crisis management' recognises the fragile nature of its accumulation, 
it implores us to examine its political and power dimensions that seduce and suppress 
social factions into its repetitive and seemingly indissoluble protraction. As Amin helps 
us to understand, 
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... the 
dominant powers have only given responses which exacerbate the consequences.. . the 
conditions have been recreated in which dominant capital tries to impose unilaterally the utopian 
logic of `managing the world as a market', through the ensemble of the currently prevalent 
deregulation policies. As has been said, globalisation serves to dismantle the national social 
contracts produced through centuries of social struggle without providing any significant 
replacement on either a global or regional scale (on the scale of the European Union, for 
instance). As I and others have frequently written, this response which is not a response has led 
to global financialisation. The depression is expressed by the enormous growth in surpluses of 
capital which cannot find any profitable outlet in the expansion of productive system. The major, 
perhaps even exclusive, preoccupation of the dominant powers is to find financial outlets for 
these surpluses in order to avoid the catastrophe (for the system) of their massive 
devaluation... In its turn this global financialisation becomes locked into a regressionary cycle. 
By its own momentum the system gives to financier-rentier capital the opportunity of always 
ensuring that its own interests prevail over the general interest, whatever the cost be for national 
and global economies. The incredible growth of inequalities of income, at all levels from the 
local to the global, produced by the increasing hold of income from sources other than 
production (i. e. financial rent) over relatively stagnant production fully expresses the irrationality 
of the system (Amin, 253: 1996, my emphasis). 
Besides the huge generalisations of this, Amin encourages us to return to the logics of 
Marx's M-C-M, to understand how it has been institutionalised and how `value in 
motion' progresses logically and naturally from Ml to M2 as a recurrent accumulation 
strategy and historical condition not only for global capital but for ordinary people too. 
Secondly, we normally think of crisis-management as a relationship between state and 
market, but this concept suggests that financialisation is a teleological manifestation that 
is written into the fabric of state-society relations, unveiling contexts that propel more 
intensive financialised solutions. For example, Amin even abandons Braudel's 
hierarchical methodology and suggests that the globalised `law of value not only 
dictates economic life under capitalism but all aspects of social life' (1996: 219). By 
abandoning Braudel's framework, we are asked to re-examine the tectonic 
interrelationships that facilitate financialisation, between those groups and institutions at 
the level of material life and those at the level of the anti-market, so that we understand 
the systemic and unfinished morphology of financialised capitalism and what, how and 
why it manages to repeat itself, despite its more vulgar alienating tendencies. 
Significantly, this even alters how we imagine and define a mode of social regulation, 
not only in terms of how it is constructed, constituted and why, but how it can also be 
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perceived as a source of normative power or what Foucault described as `capillary 
power'. What we must not forget however, is that the relationships and dynamics 
between institutions and people are constantly in flux, which means that crisis- 
management is either reified or taken in new uncertain directions. As Amin reminds us, 
Financialisation as a mode of crisis-management will prevail over the potential dimensions 
which could allow it to become a moment of transition to a more socially progressive mode of 
accumulation on both the local and global levels (Amin, 1996: 258). 
Given the perpetual and political nature of financialisation, we can therefore begin to 
understand the subtle tautology that it contains and which lends support to the notion of 
crisis-management as a socially instituted process. Just like globalisation, there is 
always a non-financial space to be captured. It is therefore important to understand that 
financialisation is universalising; it extends social connections across borders, between 
people and institutions, but in capturing the hearts and minds of the non-financial, or at 
the very least, setting external conditions on its autonomy, financialisation is also 
intensifying; it provokes internal responses that intensify the nature of the connections 
themselves. 
In support of this general idea, Table One Annex C (see appendices) provides a 
very detailed summary of the history of financialisation as a repetitive process of 
stability, crisis and reinvention since the early 1970s. Simply put, there have been six 
historically distinct periods of stability and crisis, which have facilitated a new more 
radical phase in the history of crisis-management. The first two periods could be 
described as a crisis of domestic and international Anglo-American `intermediation'. In 
the former case, Britain experienced a rather severe brush with financial crisis as a new 
more competitive and specialist banking sector emerged, probably as a result of the new 
Conservative policy in the 1970s eliminating Banking cartels and encouraging 
competition. The secondary banking sector, as it became known, borrowed from short- 
term money markets and lent long to property companies, forcing the Bank of England 
to provide a `life-boat' when property values dwindled (Roberts, 2004). Much the same 
occurred in the crisis of International Intermediation (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997: 118). 
As international banks over-lent to third world nations, inspired mainly by new 
competitive conditions, the crisis of International Intermediation inspired an 
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international regulatory response by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
requiring commercial banks to retain monetary reserves as rainy day money. 
The crisis of intermediation mediation encouraged international banks and 
corporations to borrow from the capital markets and to securitise and trade debt off the 
balance sheet. This was the beginning of a new era in global finance described as 
Anglo-American disintermediation and global liberalisation. The capital market 
revolution encouraged governments to abandon currency controls and to take advantage 
of securitisation by deregulating host exchanges e. g. London's Big Bang October 1986 
(Warburton, 2000). Much of what was stabilising and expanding the new regime of de- 
regulated capital in the 1980s and 1990s also encouraged contingent consequences i. e. 
the Maxwell affair. The structural consequences of this period made financialisation 
more robust, strengthened its competitiveness and decentralisation, encouraging banks, 
pension funds and hedge funds to travel farther a field - to global lands where the 
benefits of arbitrage were greater due to asset price discrepancies emerging from 
booming liberalised capital markets and East Asian stock markets. The fact that Nick 
Leeson, the infamous Rogue Trader, could bring down Britain's oldest bank Barings 
and a host of global markets with it, exposed the unregulated character of transnational 
capital. 
What we experienced after the East Asian crisis was a movement against 
globalisation, which became depoliticised due to the terror attacks of 9/11. From 1998 
to 2001, there was a prolific and pervasive `crisis of Anglo-American calculation' (see 
de Goede, 2001), signifying that the opportunities and pressures of capital market mania 
had become excessive and out of control, even for ordinary real economy businesses 
and academics! Some of the brightest and best examples of high-capitalism came 
tumbling down e. g. Long Term Capital Management (U. S. ) and Equitable Life (U. K. ), 
augmenting a rip roaring assault on all aspects of corporate governance calling for 
further transparency. The effect of this has been ambiguous. Recently, HSBC's 454- 
page `annual report' weighed 1.47 kilograms forcing the post-office to limit the amount 
a postman could carry due to back injuries. What this said about today's financial 
climate is that knowledge is not necessarily power. Overcoming information 
asymmetries produces more information and more responsibility for overcoming 
financial risk, which is precisely why international banks and other highly leveraged 
financial vehicles have reacted with more sophisticated approaches to diversification 
and `securitisation'. But what is significant about this new octane phase of global 
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finance is the significant change in discourse that has come with the turf, reflecting an 
underlying change in circumstances, but also the omnipotent self-representation of 
global finance to transform danger into normal, even bland opportunity. For example, in 
the 1980's corporate bonds were called `junk bonds', but as an increasing number of 
economic institutions from all walks of financial life have demanded and produced 
`more competitive' debt securities, junk bonds are now just part of a plethora of 
respectable high-yield securities. However, it would appear that we are on the cusp, 
once again, of a significant change in the history of crisis-management. As the 
Economist argued in September 2006, 
The world is once again in the grip of a spree of lending, but this time to companies rather than 
countries... Forsaking the sunlit uplands of global finance, the market for capital is plunging into 
the shadows (Economist, 2006: 9). 
What we learn from this table is that financialisation entails a huge expanse in financial 
business that seemingly stretches across space through its global universalisation, and 
deepens its necessity through its intensification of more radical financial solutions - 
buttressed of course by the actions of states acting in a multilateral framework (cf. 
Hoogvelt, 2001). Each re-regulatory movement has been followed by an innovative 
response of some sort by financial capital. As we reflect on the table and the transitions 
from intermediation to disintermediation to securitisation, we are persuaded that in 
`financialised countries, like Britain and the US, the new macro-economy has lots of 
surprises in store along an unstable trajectory, but the new circuits of financialisation are 
unlikely to vanish like snow in May because they reflect and support the material 
circumstances and aspirations of ordinary shareholders' (Williams, 2000: 11). By 
`ordinary' shareholders, Williams (see Williams, 2000: 200la/b) does not just mean 
corporate executives either, as we shall understand later. 
Within this we might notice that financialisation suggests something else, 
something more perplexing: like globalisation and unlike `finance capital', it is a 
process that is perpetually unfinished. We have already characterised financialisation as 
the growing dominance of the financial services sector. The very notion itself suggests 
that this dominance will continue. If financialisation extends across non-financial 
spaces, is transformative of reality - of structure and therefore how agents behave in 
relation to structure, then agency is also responsible for altering the nature and course of 
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structure. Whether agents are inside or outside of financialisation, it seems not to matter, 
for as long as fmancialisation is in continual transformation, then the space of the other 
forever escapes its grasp. But we have already missed something. If by inference we are 
suggesting that financialisation presumes `the space of the other', are we not also saying 
that this is positioned against the `space of the same'? By implication this would suggest 
that there is always an inherent imbalance between the `space of the same' in relation to 
the `space of the other' at all times. If sameness is not a foregone conclusion then this 
would suggest that it is subjectively and discursively (re)constituted, even within its 
own dimensions. If Hilferding's conception of finance capital extinguishes all 
`contingency and indeterminancy' (Daly, 1991: 85), then financialisation would appear 
to do the opposite, because the inherent struggle for sameness suggests that it is also a 
struggle of power and representation at the micro, meso and macro levels, which would 
force us to question the inevitability, teleology, even normality of financialisation as a 
`disorganising' influence of social life. As Glyn Daly helps us to understand, 
... the notion of 
disorganised capitalism must flow from the recognition that the economic space 
no longer presents itself as a fixed totality, as if it were constructed independently of its 
articulations with other social practices, and that the identity of the economic subject cannot be 
unified or predetermined. It must refer, instead, to the constant process of dissolution and 
recomposition in economic identity and to the making and remaking of new economic subjects. 
From this perspective, the notion of disorganised capitalism, then, is one which would 
theoretically underline the complex and varying ways the plurality of the economic space is 
actually identified, and the ways in which the identities there are under permanent threat of 
subversion by other differential articulations, other discourses, and is therefore continually 
having to be redefined and renegotiated (Daly, 1991: 92). 
So far, this chapter has provided an in-depth historical understanding of financialisation. 
Methodologically speaking, this chapter also transforms how we imagine 
financialisation within International Political Economy, which encourages us to delve 
more deeply into the shifting sands of macro-structures that rest on the social 
interactions of the contingent-hermeneutic. In typical literature within IPE, scholars 
have tended to use the notion of `structural power' (Cox, 2000: Germain, 1997: Gill, 
1995: Strange, 1994) to explain the omnipotence of global finance and this notion tends 
to focus on the top layers of capitalism, Braudel's anti-market, and this concept has been 
criticised because while it recognises the who, it does not explain the how. Secondly, 
the notion of structural power has tended to treat capital as a fixed, immutable entity, 
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when in fact financialisation suggests that the notion of capital and `value-making' is an 
inherently ambivalent and contestable process. Two authors (Gill, 1997: Harmes 2001: 
2002) within this school have sought to address these points, but too much emphasis has 
been placed on using the blunt and grandiose instruments of critical theory and 
methodology to crack small nuts. For example, it is welcome that Harmes (2002) has 
examined the everyday mass investment culture in relation to the broad public policy 
ideas of neoliberalism and tries to incorporate cultural ideas into his Gramscian 
framework. But Harmes uses language such as internalisation, decentralisation, 
operationalising and instutionalisation. This welcome analysis of transformation is a 
thesis on the creation, standardisation and to some extent the seduction of neoliberal 
forms of everyday culture through investment practices, an outside-in analysis of micro- 
power and change, but not an inside-in understanding of interactionism within the 
evolving cultural economy itself, which would tend to consider the more subtle, 
contingent, aesthetic, intricate, discursive and reflexive dimensions of micro-politics. 
Likewise, Stephen Gill (1995: 1997), another neo-Gramscian, has incorporated the ideas 
of Foucault and particularly his notions of `capillary power' or `panopticism' to describe 
how power works under neoliberalism. In an important sense, Gill has replaced 
Foucault's methodology of power as a divisive narration of neoliberal power. For 
example, while the notion of capillary power has a real and lasting methodological 
value, Foucault's specific use of panoptic power was time and space specific. If we read 
Bauman (2000), then it is important to comprehend that the nature of micro-power in 
society has qualitatively changed, from a society that was watched in the 19th century to 
a society that keeps watch in the 21St century. In effect, both authors have successfully 
described how change occurs linearly without necessarily understanding why change 
occurs as a non-linear, heterogeneous and `uncertain' development. There is therefore a 
bias of empirical continuity detected in this analysis, as if the authors want 
neoliberalism to express how they feel about its philosophical underpinnings, so that the 
methodology can be utilised to its fullest, either out of cynicism or possibly because the 
non-essentialist, discursive and reflexive nature of Gramsci's theoretical potential has 
tended to be under utilised, a criticism raised by de Goede's (2003) post-structural 
insights28. 
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Conclusion 
In broad terms, we have moved towards the notion that financialisation is not just a 
process, or even a regime, but a fluid cultural economic life that encourages financial 
innovation and inventiveness based on the persistent commercialisation of solutions - as 
a result of the inherent speculative limitations of global financial capital. Because 
nations are trapped into a competitive process and because it has been internalised by 
consumer relations, it is likely, based on this understanding, that financialisation will 
constantly transform itself according to the contingent and even random confrontations 
inside economic society. What we know for sure is that financialisation is path- 
dependent - it evolves out of lacks and expectations that have become instilled at certain 
points in time. What we require now is an interpretative framework of financialisation 
that will help us to understand its trajectory and orientation, which will also help us to 
understand how financialisation occurs from a cultural political economy perspective. In 
Chapter Four, we make this our objective. 
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Chapter Four 
Financialisation as Disembedding and Re-embedding 
Introduction 
Taking our concept of financialisation as a transformative and repetitive regime of crisis 
management in motion, it will be the aim in this following chapter to theorise 
financialisation from a Cultural IPE perspective. It is the key claim of this thesis that 
financialisation has proceeded in two stages that we call `disembedding' and 're- 
embedding' i. e. the economy is released from traditional social relations and institutions 
- and this is followed by a process of re-embedding, where social relations become 
`embedded in the market system' (Polanyi, 1944: 57). We make this separation 
heuristically, but also practically to demonstrate disembedding as the prerequisite of 
financialisation and the struggle to re-embed its social consequences. As a result, we 
find in the work and ideas of Karl Polanyi (1944) the central framework from which to 
make some effective claims and propositions regarding the nature of financialisation as 
a culturally transformative process. 
Karl Polanyi's (ibid. ) work is significant because we learn that the qualitative 
nature of modern day economic globalisation has its roots in the vicissitudes of social 
and political change that took place in the 19th century. In simple terms, Polanyi makes 
the claim that the economy was ripped out of the community and social relations that 
defined it, as a result of abstract concepts and aspirations of progress, making the 
`economy' the central organisational framework and imaginary ideal upon which social 
relations and individuals should interact and measure themselves. For Polanyi, a model 
such as this was simply not possible or sustainable for human relations, because it 
exposed individuals to the ruthlessness and inequities of the free-market economy. 
Instead, Polanyi observed a political and social counter-reaction against this ideal, 
which arguably deepened and lasted up until it reached fever-pitch in the 1970s. In 
similar terms, this thesis tries to suggest that there are many parallels that can be drawn 
between the great economic transformation in the 19th century and the great financial 
transformation that we observe today. 
In the first section of this chapter, we try to suggest that we can extract the 
concepts of disembedding and re-embedding to suggest that financialisation, like 
Polanyi's observations, has passed through two different stages of transformation. Once 
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we have made this clear and applied it to financialisation, we can then begin to theorise 
how this has taken place using a Cultural IPE approach. In the second section for 
example, we begin with the concept of financial risk and propose that it is a central part 
of how financialisation works. In conventional terms, we are meant to believe that risk 
is a natural consequence of our reality - that we must deal with risk in order to make it 
controllable and accountable. In contrast, we suggest here that risk is a construction of 
economic ideas - and such ideas and ideals performatively frame the organisation of the 
economy into an infrastructure of acceptance and calculation. Once we have examined 
financialisation this way from the top-down, we then explore how it might be initiated 
and articulated from the bottom-up. Again we draw upon cultural economic literature to 
understand the stabilisation of financial ideas. All throughout this chapter, we spell out 
what we mean by disembedding and re-embedding financialisation. And in the final 
section, we come to an understanding of re-embedding financialisation as `capital 
market compression'. 
Theorising the post-Bretton Woods Transformation 
In 1944, Karl Polanyi delivered a thesis that put forward the central idea that the market 
economy was not the outcome of some transhistorical evolution in market exchange 
relations, but instead, `the effect of highly artificial stimulants administered to the body 
social in order to meet a situation which was created by the no less artificial 
phenomenon of the machine' (ibid.: 57). In other words, the socio-economic 
organisation of production was the effect of a man made set of plans and theories that 
institutionalised an abstract notion of human beings to `behave in such a way as to 
achieve maximum monetary gains', and this rational concept of what it meant to be 
human was formulated out of an a priori understanding of self-regulating markets. As 
famously Polanyi argued, 
Ultimately, that is why the control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming 
consequence to the whole organisation of society: it means no less than the running of society as 
an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations 
are embedded in the economic system. The vital importance of the economic factor to the 
existence of society precludes any other result. For once the economic system is organised in 
separate institutions, based on specific motives and conferring a special status, society must be 
shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. This is the 
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meaning of the familiar assertion that a market economy can function only in a market society 
(Polanyi, 1946: 57). 
We must remember that Polanyi's theory of disembedding was inspired from his 
anthropological understanding of economic man before modernity bended back on itself 
and became driven by self-interest (cf. Foucault, 1966/2002). As Polanyi argued, if `one 
conclusion stands out more clearly than another from the recent study of early societies 
it is the changelessness of man as a social being' (Polanyi, 1944: 46). Polanyi's key 
point was that `man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships' and 
his `human passions, good and bad, are merely directed towards noneconomic ends' 
(ibid.: 47). Essentially, Polanyi was arguing that modern theory and history had 
distorted the historical continuity of man as a social being embedded in tradition (cf. 
Giddens, 1990). In the course of the 19th century, theoreticians, historians, politicians 
and pragmatists teased out of man what was entangled in other non-utilitarian and 
communitarian interests, to instil in society what was necessary in order to fulfil the 
modern vision of progress and freedom, which could only be attained through economic 
self-interestedness alone. As Polanyi lamented, man `does not act so as to safeguard his 
individual interests in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his 
social standing, his social claims, his social assets. He values material goods only in so 
far as they serve this end' (ibid.: 46). Sharing the same insights of Michel Foucault 
(1966/2002) some years later, Polanyi believed that the `discovery of economics was an 
astounding revelation which hastened greatly the transformation of society and the 
establishment of a market system' to the extent that the social sciences rank `as the 
intellectual parents of the mechanical revolution which subjected the powers of nature to 
man' (1946: 119). For Polanyi, the imposition of the self-regulating market and the 
creation of the market society opened up an entirely new field of raw human relations, 
reduced to primitive and narrow human functions and interests, that exposed ordinary 
people to the bare tendencies, irrationalities and institutions of the free-market 
mechanism. Ironically for Polanyi, it was this unstable fiction that propelled modernity, 
in the muse of Foucault's thoughts, to turn even against itself through spontaneous bouts 
of social self-protection. 
Drawing parallels to Polanyi's work, the era of industrial-corporatism was the 
culmination of `embedded liberalism', where the economy became moulded, imbricated 
and shaped by the needs of a much more politically conscious society, which had 
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tirelessly called for its socialisation and national control (Ruggie, 1983: Eichengreen, 
1996). Just like Polanyi found that the `human passions' were submerged in social 
relationships and community ties, much of the post-war period of industrial-corporatism 
stabilised and reified socio-economic identities through community-industrial relations 
(Bauman: 2000). The bonds that inter-locked `individual choices in collective projects 
and actions' was the full expression of `solid modernity' and this was facilitated by 
`patterns of communication and co-ordination between individually conducted life 
policies on the one hand and political actions of human collectivities on the other' 
(Bauman, 2000: 6). For a time, industrial-corporatism privileges a two-way model of 
citizenship that synchronised the individuals de jure status in civil society with 
egalitarian intentions and socially purposeful institutions that enabled their de facto 
potential too (Bauman: 2000). 
Historically speaking, Arrighi and Silver (2001) believe that financialisation is a 
phase of disembedding `because this tendency brings about massive, system-wide 
redistributions of income and wealth from all kinds of communities to the agencies that 
control mobile capital, thereby inflating and sustaining the profitability of financial 
deals largely divorced from commodity trade and production' (2001: 263). While 
Arrighi and Silver emphasise the monetary dimensions of disembedding, David Harvey 
(2003) focuses on the social and institutional sacrifices coerced by what he describes as 
`accumulation by dispossession'. Similarly to Arrighi and Silver, Harvey has argued 
that the `umbilical cord that ties together accumulation by dispossession and expanded 
reproduction is that given by finance capital and the institutions of credit, backed, as 
ever, by state powers' (Harvey, 2003: 152). 
In this thesis, disembedding has two different yet inter-related meanings. On the 
one hand, it means the deliquescence of traditional, post-war institutions, practices and 
conventions; and on the other hand it means: the initiation and stabilisation of risk- 
management practices, monetary expectations and habits achieved through articulate 
and inarticulate ways of knowing. In an attempt to explain how and why this occurs, we 
posit in this thesis that financialisation disembeds the traditional social practices, 
institutions and identities of industrial-corporatism and re-embeds them into a more 
progressive configuration of social relationships linked to the evolving financialised 
economy. Heuristically, it will be important to distinguish between disembedding and 
re-embedding as two distinct but repetitive historical phases in the course of 
financialisation. Methodologically, this allows us to understand disembedding as a 
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socially instituted process, one that is fortuitous and cumulative in its contribution to the 
conditions of re-embedding. For example, while Polanyi believed that the establishment 
of the self-regulating market was a wholly artificial process, this thesis will look more 
carefully at the micro-level changes, interactions, conflicts and strategies that derive 
from evolving circumstances in the contingent-real and the hermeneutic-imaginary, 
which help to propel financialisation to new heights. This will allow for a more complex 
and comprehensive explanation of transformative action between institutions, people 
and dominant market practices. In contrast to Polanyi, it is the proposition and perhaps 
the paradox that disembedding emerges from the contradictions, expectations and 
identities of industrial-corporatism, which have nevertheless been seduced by the new 
ideas and fruits of financialisation. There is therefore something subtle, almost 
unnoticeable about disembedding, which would also suggest that it coincides with the 
appearance of stability and stabilisation. 
Re-embedding on the other hand coincides with periods of rupture, instability 
and interregnum. In this sense, disembedding takes account of the de-regulatory 
innovations inherent in periods of financialisation and re-embedding takes account of 
the re-regulatory forces that help to re-stabilise, reconfigure and normalise transition 
phases. This latter phase is facilitated not only by the state, but by reflexive social forces 
such as institutions, expert-systems and group identities, otherwise captured by a 
process that we may describe as the `disembedded regulation of the past over the 
future'. It is possibly in this latter phase that we would expect the constraints and 
limitations of the past to be unleashed and calmed by the horizon of expectations, 
strategies and discourses in the present. Financialisation maybe a regime of collective 
dispossession on the one hand, but it may equally be a regime of individualised 
repossession on the other. 
Financialisation and Risk 
Marx's formula M-C-M is an investment formula for liquid capital that carries a number 
of helpful implications (Marx, 1887/1995: 93-100). Firstly, one of the inferences is that 
there is less profitability and strategic value in productive investments i. e. money tied 
down by its commodity form (M-C) could translate into its devaluation. This would 
suggest that there is not an adequate source of demand or that conditions of demand 
cannot be sustained or guaranteed over the long-term. This sentiment is either induced 
from market results e. g. profitability, labour costs, competition and technological 
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availability, or else it is deduced from market realities. This also raises some central 
issues regarding the investment formula for productive capital M-C. In one very 
important respect, if M-C means a `narrowing down of options' for the purpose of 
`securing an even greater flexibility and freedom of choice at some future point in time' 
(Arrighi and Silver, 2001: 260) then M-C is also a factor of market confidence and 
perception. In other words, deductive and subjective responses to market realities could 
very well take precedent over inductive and objective realities. For example, new 
markets are invented not because old markets become saturated, but because 
uncertainties are based on calculated risks and `managed', as Frank Knight (1921) made 
clear. Theoretically speaking, we therefore come to the conclusion that C-M-C is a 
patient investment logic that follows from a level of coherence and consistency between 
opportunities and constraints in physical reality and ideas towards their manipulation. 
For example, this was a fundamental part of the industrial-corporatist phase of M-C 
where risk-taking was based on the productive expansion of enterprise achieved through 
investment in the creation and circulation of commodities. As Glyn et al argued, `the 
significance of the growth of consumption lay not only in the impact of mass living 
standards but on the assurance it gave to those taking investment decisions of a steadily 
growing market' (Glyn et al., 1990: 50). 
However, when we talk of the discontinuity of industrial-corporatism we also 
mean the deliquescence of this capitalist order, achieved on the basis of its own 
contradictions, but also because `sustained financial expansions materialise only when 
the enhanced liquidity preference of capitalist agencies is matched by adequate 
`demand' conditions' (Arrighi and Silver, 2003: 263). For example, with over 24 years 
experience in the financial industry we should take Tony Golding seriously when he 
argued that `the Eurodollar market first emerged in the 1950s. It arose because European 
exporters to the USA had ended up with surplus dollars' (Golding, 2001: 17). 
This raises a number of points. Firstly, M-C-M is an investment logic that 
emerges out of the initial stages of financialisation called C-M, because returns are 
made from capital in its liquid form. Secondly, C-M is inaugurated as a result of an 
excess supply of idle capital that accumulates in the M-C phase of the investment cycle. 
Thirdly, this also suggests that the concrete returns from monetary flexibility in their 
immediate and short-term form outweigh the `potential' costs of patient investment 
projects that have become uncertain and incoherent. M-M is an extension of M-C-M and 
expresses no explicit intention to invest into the commodity circuit. In fact, M-M 
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expresses the turning of money into money for the sake of its own accumulation, capital 
growth and monetary re-circulation. What's more is that M-M suggests that it is based 
on an autonomous framework of institutions, agents and practices that are related to 
commodities only as a consequence of their mobility, because M-M represents in many 
ways the formal commodification of liquid capital itself. 
However, we have to consider that the higher stages of M-M are facilitated by 
the earlier stages of C-M. Not only is C-M driven by an excess supply of capital, but it 
is also facilitated by market incentives or what Arrighi and Silver call `demand' 
conditions. In other words, for C-M to make a satisfactory adjustment to the fully- 
fledged investment logics of M-C-M and M-M, there has to be adequate demand 
conditions at M2 that are greater or in propensity to the initial supply of capital at M'. In 
contrast to the investment formula M-C, C-M is quite different because it implies a 
breakdown in patient investment due to a level of incoherence between market signals 
and sentiments. As we argued above, C-M is also the outcome of surplus assets arising 
from M-C, which gives rise to the problem of how to manage and control financial 
assets so that M2 is equal or greater than M'. If we remind ourselves of our discussion 
above (cf. Budd, 1999: Ben-Ami, 2001), then M-C-M is therefore an extension of the 
breakdown in M-C, because M-C-M is also an unaffected circuit of mobile capital and 
risk-aversion. For example, as long as capital maintains its liquid form, it can avoid the 
costly penalties of uncertainty and market incoherence. M-C-M therefore proposes that 
`risk' has not only become an objective entity of the world, but that its continual 
management has coincided with the institutionalisation and reproduction of M-C-M as 
investment logic of `risk-aversion'. Eatwell and Taylor explain the contradictory and 
tautological underpinnings sustaining the liquidity of capital M-C-M, 
The potential instability of financial markets is based on the possibility of switching funds into 
and out of investments. Swings of convention translate into sharp fluctuations in asset prices that 
in turn reinforce the swings in confidence. In these circumstances it might be thought desirable to 
limit the ease with which investors can make the switch. If investors were locked into long-term 
investments, then markets would not be plagued by boom and bust waves of buying and selling. 
But here lies an important paradox. Without liquidity, without the ability to sell and recover cash 
invested, many investors would be simply unwilling to take risks at all... the ability to exit from 
an investment by selling a financial asset is, at one and the same time, a necessary foundation for 
investment in a market economy, and the source of the instability that can undermine investment 
and wreck the market (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000: 16). 
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This formulates four key questions: (1) how did the circuits of risk-aversion become 
institutionalised and produced; (2) what demand conditions did risk-aversion facilitate; 
(3) how and why is risk-aversion reproduced and for whom; (4) what have been the 
political and cultural economic consequences of risk-aversion? 
To formulate an answer to this question it will be important to go beyond 
conventional approaches provided by scholars in the IPE discipline. So far, World- 
Systems (Arrighi, 2003) theorists and scholars of International Political Economy 
(Cerny, 1993: 1994: Dodd, 1995: Gilpin, 2000) have made a number of insights into the 
production of demand conditions, sympathising with Helliener's basic argument that the 
`globalisation trend in finance... is [not] beyond politics' (Helleiner, 1994). Financial de- 
regulation, privatisation, flexibilisation and liberalisation are all examples of state 
restructuring that have been employed to reinvigorate growth and stability through 
capital mobility (see Palan, 2001 a) . The almost universal appeal of this policy, even in 
countries such as Russia and China, demonstrate the pervasiveness of the `deregulatory 
ratchet effect' that has recreated core states into a conundrum of the marketplace 
(1994b). Macroeconomic policy changes have also increased demand conditions as core 
states have increasingly called on the bond markets for assisting budget deficits (e. g. 
Grahl, 2001a). The adoption of independent central banking has signalled the intention 
of states to deepen the range of financial investment opportunities by setting long-term 
goals and expectations of stable real economies, minimum inflation and asset price 
stability (ibid. ). State intervention to correct systemic financial instability, as a last 
resort, has also been a powerful tool for giving confidence to market actors. This 
amounts to the argument that states (re)produce stable conditions for market actors, 
which in turn influence the policy decisions of states. But as Underhill has argued, 
`political authority is not just vested in the formal institutions of states.. . but it is also 
present in the agents of the market as part of the state-market condomimium. The 
market is governance, even as it appears to work in mysterious, private ways' 
(Underhill, 2000: 824). 
A central part of `market as governance' centres from the notion of financial 
risk. We have become accustomed to the notion that `risk' and the `risk society' is a 
natural part of the evolution of modernity, an historical process that self-undercuts 
industrial society through the increasing exposure of manufactured dangers and threats 
to human existence (Beck, 1994: 1999). This necessarily calls on societies, governments 
and people to calculate threats accurately, to forewarn the dangers of progress and to 
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prepare for the implications of the risk-society adequately. Within this period of 
disembedding, we might even sense that the risk-society propels all of us, through its 
exposure, to turn against this history as a natural `reflexive' outcome, to make risk and 
its manufacturing more accountable, transparent and governable. But it is important to 
ask, what is the qualitative nature of reflexivity and where does it lead? This is perhaps 
the problem with Beck's notion of reflexivity as Lash (1994) and Bauman (2000) have 
both picked up on, because he tends to assume that the risk society will encourage 
positive and logical reflexivity that is beneficial for all of society. As Lash (1994) has 
argued, Beck's definition of reflexivity is founded upon a rational separation of the 
subject from the object, a Beckian 'I am I', which tends to underestimate and omit the 
aesthetic contexts that compel agents to react reflexively and strategically in different 
political directions; what Lash calls `aesthetic reflexivity'. In other words, individuals 
may react reflexively to the conditions of the risk-society and while this may create 
accountability, it may also `lock in' the risk-aversive nature of financialisation, which 
upon a historical reading, is the basis of our world-historical problems and should be not 
the starting point of our solutions. For example, examining risk and especially financial 
risk as an ontological category underestimates the social contexts and conditions that 
have made risk and its privatised aversion a desirable and fundamental part of 
financialisation and its cultural economic regularisation. 
In this sense, it is important to understand that financial risk is not a 
transhistorical output of the industrial society, but a product of manufactured demand 
conditions in the disembedding phase of financialisation. For example, under the 
Bretton Woods monetary exchange rate system, financial instabilities were managed 
and internalised through the public coordination of international monetary adjustment. 
When this began to breakdown and as capital began to accumulate off-shore, 
`opportunities for profit proliferated, regulatory structures inhibiting flows of capital 
were challenged as 'inefficient' and `against the national interest', and the modern 
machinery of speculation was constructed' (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000: 2). In other 
words, volatility in exchange rates, differentiation in interest rates, even alterations in 
financial asset prices themselves, exposed transnational and national capital transactions 
to both the threat and opportunities of market uncertainty. As Eatwell and Taylor 
explain, the ending of Bretton Woods inaugurated the systemic 'privatisation of risk', 
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The story of the new order is about financial risk. All financial assets embody some risk. The 
new international rules of the game have changed the character, the incidence, and the scale of 
risk. In turn, this has brought about radical changes in the operations of the private sector, both 
households and corporations. The public sector has changed too, both because the financial risks 
it faces have changed, and because it has the responsibility of managing the dangers that the new 
risks can pose for the standard of living (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000: 6). 
Like Beck, Eatwell and Taylor propound the neoliberal notion of financial risk as an 
ontological category and suggest that the transformation of society is an inevitable and 
logical step in the history of the risk-society, especially if it is be managed effectively 
and responsibly. The contradiction of course is that financial risk did not emerge 
because it represented a danger to society, but because it represented a threat to the 
speculative interests of financial capital. Only as a result of the expansion in speculative 
practices and the institutionalisation of M-C-M has liquid capital become in Eatwell and 
Taylor's own words, `the necessary foundation for investment' and the `source of 
instability that can undermine investment and wreck the market' (Eatwell and Taylor, 
2000: 16). As a result, we might say that `financial risk management does not just react 
to but creates particular definitions of insecurity' (de Goede, 2004: 213). 
From the top down: performativity and the production of risk 
In an attempt to repoliticise financial risk and reflect upon the systemic implications of 
financial decision-making, a cultural IPE of financialisation turns this notion of financial 
risk on its head and investigates the ways in which it has been naturalised and 
commodified in financial discourse and social relations. One of the key insights of this 
approach is the notion that financial risk is a social construct, a `profitable cultural 
process, which rests upon gendered constructions of danger and security' (de Goede, 
2004: 205), one that is `integral to culturally specific forms of life, which it defines and 
supports' (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1993: 730). But if financial risk is a social 
construct, what does this mean and how should we now imagine it? 
As an ontological category, financial risk alters the perception of how we 
understand surplus capital and mobile capital, because we must remember that `risk' is 
the suggestion of danger and not the consequence of the event itself. As Ewald argues, 
`nothing is a risk in itself, there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can 
be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event' (Ewald, 
1991). Ewald helps us to understand that there is already a prescribed intention and 
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known objective in the identification of risks. Let us not forget that Frank Knight (1921) 
differentiated between risk and uncertainty - the former was defined as an objective 
entity of the world, a measurable form of uncertainty with calculable probabilities and 
the latter was defined as an unmeasurable and random condition, more a state of mind 
and not `in effect an uncertainty at all' (Knight, 1921: 205). In other words, financial 
`risk constitutes an objective translation of what otherwise would remain subjective 
uncertainty. It designates an objective reality which disciplined knowledge can open up 
to prediction and control' (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1993: 730). 
In the disembedding phase of financialisation, the notion of financial risk 
therefore reverses the perception of the (international) financial marketplace as a 
complex causal field of random adjustments into a symbolic and experimental space of 
predictive financial management. As a result, `the dangers constructed in financial 
discourse are the dangers of secular time and the unpredictable future' (de Goede, 2004: 
205). Thus, `finance' becomes the temporal and spatial dimension of opportunity and 
neglect, but also the self-enclosed and expert discourse that helps to organise the 
financial markets through the identification, calculation and (re)commodification of 
financial risk. The individuated character of risk, the notion of there being more risks 
attached to some areas of finance rather than others, is a by-product and an indication of 
the sophistication of this organising process, which nevertheless helps agents to 
coordinate and connect their different preferences for risk and reward. As Green has 
argued, `modern risk is the product of imperfect attempts to create and enforce social 
order' (Green, 2000: 87) as `financial markets have produced risk as an attitude to the 
future not only to cope with threats but to entrench their systems of wealth creation and 
epistemological authority' (ibid: 81). This attitude to the future, built upon the notion of 
imagined risk and danger, transforms the appearance of reality into essence and 
encourages necessitarian demands for its expert identification and control. Thus `the 
modern risk culture described here is not an ephemeral phenomenon but a deeply 
entrenched order with roots in modern social and economic systems' (Green, 2000: 87). 
In complete contrast to Green (ibid. ), a Cultural IPE of financialisation looks at 
the modem risk culture as a moving fleeting target, one that is perpetually reproduced 
by the identification and (re)commodification of financial risk. What appears to be a 
deeply entrenched order is actually an ephemeral phenomenon that continually unfolds 
due to the competitive logics that are engrained in the dual tautologies of financial risk 
(Budd, 1999). For example, financial innovations in technology and instruments 
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designed to build spare financial capacity (see below) leads to a convergence in the 
returns on financial assets as competition muscles out profitability and drives down the 
cost of transactions. Just like buying a pair of cheap jeans with borrowed money and 
selling them more expensively on a-bay pocketing the difference, through this continual 
process - jeans will increase in price, compelling the buyer to borrow more money on 
the expectation that there will still be a profitable difference between the return and the 
borrowing cost. As Budd argues, `using risk managing products to gain better returns 
potentially levers up the risk to the whole financial system' (ibid.: 123). Secondly, the 
production of debt, whether it be mortgage or credit debt, can be bundled together into a 
fungible debt security or bond, which can be sold in the secondary marketplace to 
investors, who may decide to invest in a derivative form of the financial asset, rather 
than having full exposure to the underlying asset itself. As Budd argues, 
At one level, technological and financial innovation is overcoming the constraints of time and 
space, but the layering of financial assets `stretches' them away from underlying price changes. 
In order to break out of a potentially zero-sum game, banks and securities houses constantly 
search for new asset categories on which to `layer' financial instruments. However, this search 
creates another tautology, a `paradox of risk'. This is a variant of the classical `paradox of thrift', 
which occurs where an increase in the desire to save causes a fall in actual savings because 
national income falls. By the same token, the paradox of risk occurs where the desire to hedge 
risk, through innovative financial instruments, actually causes an increase in systemic risk 
(Budd, 1999: 123). 
In both the disembedding and re-embedding phases of financialisation, we will expect to 
find the centrality of risk-management not only as an incentive for controlled financial 
growth, but as a general solution to the contradictions that these `path-dependent' 
incentives create. But what we also have to understand is the close affinity between the 
discipline of finance and the financial marketplace as a symbolic and socially structured 
space. Methodologically speaking, conventional neoliberal economy and financial 
economics share a notion of reality as ontologically given, which prescribes a rationalist 
separation between the knower and the known (cf. de Goede, 2004: Maurer, 2002: 
McKenzie, 2003). `The result is a `spectator' theory of knowledge that separates theory 
[knowledge] and practice' and this `implicitly acknowledges the assimilation of 
knowledge with information' (Amin and Cohendet, 2004: 18-19). In complete contrast, 
Cultural IPE collapses the separation between the economic subject and the economic 
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object and initially reverses the causality of economic reality as a consequence of 
economic knowledge. In Callonian terms, economics `performs, shapes and formats the 
economy, rather than observing how it functions' (Callon, 1998b: 2). We could interpret 
this as the `practical effort to make the world conform to the structures of the 
conceptual' (Carrier, 1998: 2), but it is more realistic to recognise that `knowledge does 
not only result from a one-way cumulative process (from information to knowledge or 
knowledge to information), but requires feedback loops between the different main 
components involved (data, knowledge, wisdom)' (Amin and Cohendet, 2004: 19). 
The implication here of course is that finance is a dynamic between theory and 
practice, so that ideas and reality are constantly inter-changing and contingently 
evolving along their path-dependent histories. This notion is important to our concept of 
financialisation. It disturbs the rationalist epistemology of modern financial discourse 
that propounds the `linear process of knowledge formation', i. e. the notion that `data is 
turned into structured pieces of information, information contributes to the stock of 
knowledge, and knowledge is converted into wisdom or `meta-knowledge', which 
encompasses beliefs and judgements' (Amin and Cohendet, 2004: 18). But we must 
understand that this dynamic between theory and practice is made necessary because of 
the `mutual susceptibility' and social nature of financial markets (McKenenzie, 2004) 
that have the capacity, as do humans, to avoid what Golding (2001: 60) describes as 
`negative surprises' through imitation e. g. herding as one example, or quite simply 
because the financial markets have become a game of `managing expectations' (ibid., 
see below). By implication, the social nature of financialisation is also compounded by 
its competitive logic and this entails an unfolding drama in the clash of financial ideas. 
This is precisely the point put forward by Nigel Thrift, whom argues that there has been 
a `cultural turn in capitalism' (Thrift, 1999) due to the commodification of knowledge 
and infotainment (Clarke, Tickell and Thrift, 2004). As Thrift explains, `to begin with, it 
has made capitalism into a theoretical enterprise in which various essentially virtual 
notions (networks, the theoretical enterprise, the new economy) are able to take on flesh 
as, increasingly, the world is made in the likeness of these notions through the power of 
consulting solutions' (Thrift, 2002: 377). Thus, by implication, we are encouraged to 
explore financialisation as a `performative economy' that is, 
... always engaged 
in experiment, as the project is perpetually unfinished. Capitalism is therefore 
a highly adaptive and constantly mutating formation; it is a set of poised systems. The whole 
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point of capitalism, then, is precisely its ability to change its practices constantly, and those who 
run corporations must be able to surf the right side of the constant change that results, or risk 
being washed up on the reefs of irrelevance - and thrown into bankruptcy (Thrift, 2005: 3, my 
emphasis). 
This notion of financialisation as a performative economy requires some qualification. 
The key point of this is to suggest that risk and its management becomes a conditional 
effect of financial knowledge and conscious design. We have intimated that financial 
knowledge is `performative', but we mean this in the broad sense of the concept i. e. 
Callonian performativity (cf. 1998: McKenzie, 2004). Much work has criticised 
Carrier's (1998) and Daniel Miller's (1998) use of the concept `virtualism' for 
projecting the idea that our world is a simple product of economic abstraction - that we, 
the people, perform its consequences. `This is because economics has the authority to 
transform the world into its own image. Where the existing world does not conform to 
the academic model, the onus is not on changing the model, testing it against the world, 
but on changing the world, testing us against the model' (Miller, 1998: 196). While we 
have already pointed out the futility of this, because of the feedback loops between 
knowledge and practice, what Miller argues is of some virtue, because he suggests that 
the irrationalities of practice in materiality almost re-legitimate the epistemic authority 
of economic theory, in whatever guise it reproduces, so that we are reduced to chasing 
our tail. In this chase, it is possible that financial knowledge alters with circumstances, 
but that financialisation is reproduced as a result. But this opens up two further points. 
Firstly, Carrier argues `economic thought shapes economic practice. This is 
because people are driven by ideas and idealism, the desire to make the world conform 
to the image' (Carrier, 1998: 5, my emphasis). In `shaping' the world with a `desire' 
does not reduce performativity to the idea that we live in a virtual reality, it denotes an 
intention and therefore does not stand in contrast to the broad notion of economic 
performativity put forward by Callon (1998). As McKenzie argues, `generic 
performativity' in this sense `points to the fact that the categories of social life are not 
self-standing, `natural' or to be taken as given, but are the result of endless 
performances by human beings and by non-human entities and artefacts as well' 
(McKenzie, 2004: 305). The adoption of financial risk in the discourse of financial 
knowledge introduces the idea that uncertainty can be calculated, and it is the 
calculative technologies, as well as the wider morphology of relations between contexts, 
actors and their representations that constitutes networks of articulate and inarticulate 
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knowledge (see below). As McKenzie argues, `unlike homo ceconomicus, actual human 
beings have limited information processing and calculative capacities, and so they turn 
to the aid of economic theories and to the technologies in which those theories are 
embedded. In doing so, they configure themselves, and render theory performative' (cf. 
McKenzie, 2002: 52). But it is possible that such conformance to the expectations, 
practices and technologies of abstraction can create `counter-performative' reactions: 
i. e. where their `widespread adoption can undermine the preconditions of its own 
empirical validity' (McKenzie, 2004b: 306). While it is possible that humans perform 
and conform to the innovations of conscious design, such performances may also 
produce cumulative realities, irrationalities and transitivities unforeseen by the short- 
sightedness of epistemological rationalism, as practice escapes knowledge, takes on a 
dimension unpredicted or uncontrolled by the a priori abstraction - as contradiction is 
`intrinsic to culture' (Miller, 1998: 190). 
We are therefore suggesting that financialisation is a product of abstraction, of 
calculative conditions that makes sense to those in the context; that this performance 
becomes socially systemic through competition and mimesis; that systemic conditions 
especially in the financial environment can lead to periods of uncertainty; creating a 
dependency not just on calculative technologies, but on human judgement and contact 
with those in the know. As Golding helps here to understand, 
As we observed earlier, investors abhor uncertainty. They have a deep-rooted desire to make the 
world a more predictable place. Much effort is expended by the institutions in an attempt to 
reduce the uncertainty element in the complex and unstable world that surrounds them. 
Institutional investors know they cannot control the future but they do believe they can, to some 
degree, tame the future... Expectations are big business in the City (and, of course, on Wall 
Street). Generating these expectations on an ongoing basis is a massive operation involving 
many thousands of participants: analysts (both external and internal), equity salespersons, 
corporate executives, financial public relations and others. Together, they collaborate to provide 
the fund managers with the expectations they demand. Expectations are `manufactured' by the 
equity part of the City in the same way that Detroit makes cars or Paris produces haute couture. 
The process resembles a sophisticated machine, `the Great Expectation Machine', working 
constantly to satisfy the institutional craving for greater certainty (Golding, 2000: 60-62). 
However, if risk and uncertainty have become important concepts to financial 
knowledge and the financial industry, such displeasures and ontological possibilities 
don't just turn up on someone's doorstep as an invitation. We must remember that risk 
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does not describe a given reality; it describes a certain method of wealth production that 
we call risk-aversion. We have already suggested that the international financial 
environment changed and this possibly induces the concept of risk to knock on doors, to 
ask for an invitation inside expert-systems, who may not have previously thought it was 
possible, or even sensible. The missing element to this however, which is not obvious, is 
the notion that financialisation is also a series of ongoing competitive struggles between 
competing financial expert-systems or `theoretical classes', each with their own 
different collective histories. This is precisely what Pierre Bourdieu means with his 
concept of Distinction. As Bourdieu argues, `to exist within a social space, to occupy a 
point or to be an individual within a social space, is to differ, to be different' and `being 
inscribed in the space in question, he or she is not indifferent and is endowed with 
categories of perception, with classificatory schemata, with a certain taste, which 
permits her to make differences, to discern, to distinguish' (Bourdieu, 1998: 9). Just like 
Bourdieu's concept of the social space, financialisation is a world of distinction, where 
each agent, social group or expert-system has its own collective history, a memory of 
habitus as a traceable lineage of `classificatory schemas, principles of classification, 
principles of vision and division, different tastes' that `retranslates the intrinsic and 
relational characteristics of a position into a unitary lifestyle, that is a unitary set of 
choices of persons, goods [and] practices' (Bourdieu, 1998: 8). In other words, 
economic agents spin webs of financialised significance from out of the compulsions 
and conditions of the past, what Bourdieu calls `dispositions' or what otherwise could 
be called the enacted space of belonging, the memory of identity - that exists in a state 
of `virtuality, not as something given but as something to be done' (ibid.: 12). As 
Shakespeare put it, `to be or not to be that is the question', and for Bourdieu the 
intention behind enactment or at least the effectiveness of the intention is shaped by 
what he describes as the social `field', which he describes as `both a field of forces, 
whose necessity is imposed on agents who are engaged in it, and as a field of struggles 
with which agents confront each other, with differentiated means and ends according to 
their position in the structure of the field of forces, thus contributing to conserving or 
transforming its structure' (Bourdieu, 1998: 32) 
In the ongoing accumulation of financialisation, whether it be in the 
dismebedding or re-embedding phase, we will find agents or expert-systems with 
different tastes, different ways of approaching the world, influenced by dispositions; and 
in both phases we will find on-going attempts by various agents or theoretical classes to 
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transform or conserve forms of calculation or methods of wealth-production `without 
anyone being able to claim that [the] objective was a conscious design' (ibid.: 98). It is 
therefore incumbent upon the researcher to seek out and to define the lineage of such 
dispositions, to understand what point or social condition agents are coming from, so 
that we may understand their tastes and the linkage that this creates with calculative 
behaviour, or even how agents engage in a struggle to define or conserve value creation. 
As Bourdieu argues, 
The effect of this is that the so-called political struggle to modify the structure of the economic 
field is at the heart of the object of economic science. Not even the criterion of value, the central 
bone of contention between economists, can escape being an object of conflict in the very reality 
of the economic world. So that, in all rigour, economic science should include in its very 
definition of value the fact that the criterion of value is an object of conflict, rather than claiming 
that this struggle can be decided by an allegedly objective verdict and trying to find the truth of 
exchange in some substantial propriety of the goods exchanged (Bourdieu, 1990: 89). 
However, in the disembedding phase of financialisation, we would expect to find 
deregulatory innovations in financial ideas and novel approaches to the handling of 
wealth and the calculation of uncertainty. Perhaps even the innovative character of 
financial ideas - the ascendancy of competitive expert-systems in the post-Bretton 
woods context, is enough to displace and out compete traditional forms, taking the wind 
out of their sail, replacing their social position, and undermining their cultural and 
economic capital in maelstrom conditions. But so far we have only concentrated on the 
dynamic role of expert-systems as a contributory factor in the evolution of financial 
discourse and this arises, as we will assume, due to the technical nature and demands of 
calculating financial risk in competitive conditions. However, the demand conditions for 
financialisation do not just arise out of the performative innovations in financial risk- 
management, because the struggle for value creation also occurs at the level of the 
ordinary saver. We will therefore take Bourdieu's concept of distinction and all of its 
implications with us, but before we go further, it is necessary to open up a parenthesis, 
to explore the relationship between the saver and financialisation. 
Class, Savings and Expectations: Financialisation from the bottom-up 
Moving from the inductive-hypothetical to the deductive-empirical, Froud et al. (1997: 
2000a/b: 2001: 2002: 2004) build upon Boyer and Aglietta's ideas and examine the 
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contingent material and institutional connections between households, corporations and 
institutional investors, with the idea of examining the `trajectory drivers' (Froud et al., 
2001: 72) of financialisation that emphasise issues of `linkage, leverage and magnitude' 
(2002: 125) as opposed to the macro mechanisms of `circuits, flows and sectors' (cf. 
Froud et al., 2002: Aglietta, Boyer). We normally think of the stock market as 
something in London, something on `the telly', but actually Froud et al. persuade us that 
the capital market or the coupon pool, where stocks and shares are traded, is as much a 
regulator of household and company behaviour as it is a consequence of their own input, 
their own stake in its cycles and flows, or quite simply: their implicit regulation. As 
Froud et al. (2002) highlight their position, the coupon pool is `where all different kinds 
of financial paper (bonds and shares) are traded in the capital markets' and `coupon pool 
capitalism is constituted when, under specific conditions, the capital market moves from 
intermediation to regulation of firm and household behaviour... or, at least, those 
households which save/invest on a significant scale' (Froud et al., 2002: 78). Like Boyer 
and Aglietta, they understand that financialisation is partly a `consequence of 
widespread share ownership in a frame where macro flows and monetary forms are 
crucial' (ibid.: 125). Their most important insight, however, is the notion that the 
household has become a central institution in the financialised economy, `where savings 
and investment circuits divert middle class savings and expectations for retirement onto 
the stock market and where the household buffers the consequences for individuals who 
have not made the necessary savings [taking] us away from coherence and stability' 
(ibid.: 125). 
In the disembedding phase of financialisation, it is apparent that the ownership 
of stock market capital or corporate equities was drawn along national lines. For 
example, savings were directly invested into the stock market as a result of the sale of 
public equity and indirectly through pension funds, insurance and mutual funds. As a 
result of the switch from deposits into shares, UK households owned 75 percent of 
corporate equity in the mid 1990s. The interesting issue that Froud et al. make is the 
point that savings have become the `prerogative of the fortunate 40 percent in the top 
two household quintiles by income' (Froud et al., 2001: 73). In the UK, average gross 
household income in Q4 is £28,000 and in Q5 it is £48,000. For the authors, such 
income levels afford `surplus discretionary income' making it possible for such income 
groups to save 10 percent of their income and `monopolise savings'. For example, it is 
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argued that these top two income groups have accounted for up to 80 percent of all 
savings and investments in the UK (ibid.: 74). 
The key point however, is that the fortunate 40 percent have tipped the balance 
in favour of a demographic and expectant profile of savings that have become 
increasingly weighted towards beneficiaries and those most able to save in the income 
spectrum (see also Engelen, 2003a/b). This is how Froud et al. and others explain the 
bull market of the 1990s, which has turned the `conventional understanding of 
investment-accumulation-profit-social distribution upside-down' (Minns, 2002: 46). As 
a result, the disembedding phase of financialisation appears to be the result of an 
imbalance between a concentrated level of demand for high-performing assets on the 
one hand and a limited supply of high performing assets on the other, creating pressures 
for financial performance on institutional investors. The US and UK `have realised a 
type of capitalism where, for the first time in history, depositing capitalists outnumber 
surplus creating workers' (Froud et al., 2002: 148), creating what the authors describe as 
a giant Ponzi scheme, where `neither household savers nor their professional fund 
managers want to think about whether the corporate earnings base is adequate or reflect 
for too long on why most of the gains come from share price appreciation' (ibid.: 91). 
This in turn has created great pressure on corporate firms linked to the stock market to 
increase their accounting performance, which has produced `a long term operating 
contradiction between what the capital market requires and what management can 
deliver' (Froud, Johal and Williams, 2002: 137). Such an operating contradiction has 
encouraged firms to restructure their operations, to `flexibilise' their productive inputs, 
employee benefits and their working practices so that financial accounts become more 
competitive, so that corporations seek debt and liability solutions from alternative 
avenues to the stock market, shifting the supply of securities elsewhere and handing 
capital light companies the advantage `reinforcing' what might amount to `a strong 
tendency towards instability' (ibid.: 149). In other words, we might say that there are 
strong grounds for suggesting that the period of disembedding is to be followed by a 
period of re-embedding, 
... as the 
financial ecosystem survived the bubble it created and that this ecosystem is likely to 
continue given the supply-side pressure of middle-class savings. The most probable result is not 
waves of creative destruction attributable to Schumpeterian technological change but continuing 
incoherence spread by the financial system that acts in the name of capitalist innovation to secure 
middle class retirement (Feng et al., 2001: 501). 
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We can't help but think that there is something odd about this. It's almost as if we are 
suggesting that the middle class saver has been catapulted into a position of 
empowerment, of political agency, of aesthetic reflexivity. In this last instance, we are 
reminded here again of Marx's discussion of commodities in Capital (1887/1995). As 
the capitalist economy created the mass organisation of labour centred on the 
profitability imperative, the production of use-values only made sense if it also created 
an exchange value or monetary gain by meeting the demands of mass organized 
production. The implication of a mass organised capitalist society is that it discursively 
follows whatever has exchange value so that `commodity fetishism' is not only an 
outcome of `perpetual profit seeking' or `value in motion' (Harvey, 1990), but the 
unintended consequence of individuated and imagined `desire' arising from the 
commodity becoming a `citizen of the world' (Marx, 1887/1995: 35). Marx captures in 
many ways the meaning of aesthetic reflexivity, when he argued the following; 
The form of wood, for instance, is altered by making a table out of it. Yet for all that, the table 
continues to be that common, every-day thing, wood. But, as soon as it steps forth as a 
commodity, it is changed into something transcendent. It not only stands with its feet on the 
ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its 
wooden brain grotesque ideas, for more wonderful than `table-turning' ever was (Marx, 
1887/1995: 42). 
In this sense, we are therefore required to think of saving as a commodity or product, as 
a process of commodification and production, and standing in relation to other methods 
of saving, the commodification process takes on a life of its own - so that the simple act 
of saving becomes, down the line, the avant-garde of social change, financialisation and 
even, ironically, depoliticisation. Effectively, we are talking here about the consumerism 
of financial products in society, where savers attach significance to the products they 
invest in. The work of Thorstein Veblen becomes partly relevant here, because we are 
leading to an argument that points out the `ceremonial character' of financial 
consumption as a `derivative of growth' and as such `it is a new end, by selective 
process, of a distinction previously existing and well established in men's habits of 
thought' (Veblen, 1925: 61). The material contingency of savings would in this view 
seem indispensable to the notion that savings have become part of the `consumers 
gratification' and `peace of mind', begging the question whether their expenditure 
`aside 
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from acquired tastes and from canons of usage and conventional decency... is a net gain 
in comfort or in the fullness of life' (ibid.: 79). 
We would therefore be naive to think that the pressures for financial 
performance have arisen simply because of demographic factors alone; the notion of a 
concentrated supply of assets over available equity securities (cf. Clarke, 2003a/b: 
Froud, et al., 2002: Engelen, 2003). For why was it necessary to pin the hopes and fears 
of savers on equity capital? It would be equally naive to believe that performance 
pressures have resulted from the filtering of savings accrued from `surplus discretionary 
income' (Froud et al., 2001: 73-74). Even to frame this within an orthodox language of 
demand and supply is confusing, for who supplies and who demands - the saver or the 
intermediary, and if one or the other demands, what kind of demand is it, who does it 
target, what does it represent and why does the seemingly 'disinterested'29 act continue? 
This is not a criticism per se; it is more an inclination to propose that there is an 
alternative explanation for the heightened expectations of the middle class saver. For as 
Veblen argued, `in the process of gradual amelioration which takes place in the articles 
of consumption, the motive principle and the proximate aim of innovation is no doubt 
the higher efficiency of the improved and more elaborate products for personal comfort 
and well-being' (Veblen, 1925: 64). While financial innovation becomes linked with the 
pursuit of leisure, from the leisure class, this also introduces the idea that as the process 
of `conspicuous consumption' gets underway, it becomes `honorific', `the failure to 
consume in due quantity and quality becomes a mark of inferiority and demerit' (loc. 
cit. ). Such is the particularity of savings that we could not adequately extend this 
argument further, for it leads to the notion that the upper echelons of high class society, 
force upon those with little means, the urgency and inferiority of not saving, by 
implication of the conspicuousness of those who do. At the height of the disembedding 
phase of financialisation, 8 percent or less of disposable income was saved by those 
households in the first three income quintiles (Froud et al., 2001: 75) and this is unlikely 
to have changed much due to `negotiating the financial system at the margin, many 
people prefer to exclude themselves and attempt to survive in the cash economy' 
(Leyshon and Thrift, 1998: 32). Perhaps Veblen's ideas extend in an indirect way, as the 
demands for financial consumption create information conditions that lower income 
quintiles do not understand. Thus, there is no doubt, as we will try to incorporate, that 
there is something in the idea of a `theoretical class' with adequate monetary capital to 
lead in the struggle for consumer change as a means to create life-style and leisure, `the 
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financialisation of life-style', which could invariably bend back upon those with limited 
capital the contradictions that this extended imperative of wealth creation manifests. But 
we must also understand that this exists in a certain cultural-economic context, upon 
where the meaning of financial products i. e. the specific sign value of savings, is 
translated through to the subject, where the meaning becomes stabilised and upon where 
class identity is framed and sutured. 
The Production of Belief: Politico-Ethics and Miniature Empires 
As Bourdieu reminds us, `economic production functions only in so far as it first 
produces a belief in the value of its products; and it must also produce a belief in the 
value of the activity of production itself (1990: 89). Bourdieu provides us with a 
starting point here, because he is suggesting that the production of belief begins with the 
delicate art of the producer, but in turn, this delicate art only completes and legitimates 
itself in as much as it is believed by those it wishes to attract, which is assumed to be an 
autonomous enactment of confidence. Secondly and more subtly, Bourdieu is 
suggesting that production follows from a dual symmetry i. e. that the material value or 
meaning of the product which is singular, is inseparable to its existential meaning that is 
part of a wider contextual framework of production, which is plural. For example, `I 
speculate, to accumulate' is a precise example of how enactment is firstly identified and 
secondly justified, through certain subjective assumptions of what speculation will 
achieve and what this means objectively to others through its statement. This is quite 
simply an elaboration of Marx's use-values and exchange-values. For example, it is 
reasonable to assume that in market exchange relations, a person will not invest in a 
product simply because of its ethical implications, because this is charitable and not an 
exchange relation (ethical investing its an oddity here). A given product may have a 
wider symbolic significance, but to be a product it must also combine a use-value and an 
exchange value, or a material means to an end that cannot be separated from its wider 
ethical-political inputs and outputs. The point is that personal conduct is not coerced, it 
is free and yet the creation of that freedom rests upon historical conditions and 
motivations of belief. Here, we are gravitating towards the central idea that personal 
conduct is not enacted because it is cognitively autonomous from reality i. e. `I think 
therefore I am', but because it depends on the substantive-signs of that reality, which 
means that the nature of information conditions is a prerequisite for a certain type of 
conduct and a certain type of enactment. 
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Such a conception of the process of knowledge formation requires recognition of the cognitive 
features of the individual (that is, abandoning the rationalist hypothesis of the separation 
between the knower and the known), and in particular of the role played by those cognitive 
mechanisms - memory, pattern recognition, perception, communicative skills - at the interface 
between experience and practice, on the one hand, and beliefs and judgements, on the other 
(Amin and Cohendet, 2004: 19). 
In effect, the intricate webs of financialisation are spun by actors on a bed of meaningful 
information conditions. But before we can understand the significance of substantive- 
signs further, we will need to understand how conduct relates to the politics of 
financialisation. In the disembedding phase of financialisation, the state enables 
competitive conditions for mobile capital, due to crisis conditions and budget constraints 
`that ensue from the slowdown in the expansion of trade and production' (see Arrighi 
and Silver, 2001), what some have misconstrued as the growing power of the market 
over the state. But the state is neither separate from the market, nor in retreat; instead the 
`state-market condominium' is in transformation, an inter-subjective process of sign- 
production that encourages the freedom of capital to engage in certain forms of 
inventiveness as we shall explore. But this inventiveness is not simply economic. 
Economic change does not happen in a cultural or ethical vacuum; the `proles' in 
Orwellian speak do not suddenly disappear or forget the past. Appeals to an alternative 
way of life have to be seen in order to be believed and they must appear to absolve the 
limitations of the past. Therefore, it is imperative for us to understand that the recreation 
of certain forms of government are intertwined with the enabling, if not the alluring or 
tempting, of certain forms of subjectivity; what Foucault described as `governmentality' 
(cf. Foucault, 1977: 1978: 1979). With `government it is a question not of imposing law 
on men, but of disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, and 
even of using laws themselves as tactics - to arrange things in such a way that, through 
a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved' (Foucault, 1978: 95). 
This displaces our whole notion of sovereign government, turns it on its head, 
because we begin to understand that it is not citizenship that is governed, but the citizen 
that is self-governing. For Foucault, the practice of self-government proceeds through 
`technologies of the self interlaced in a matrix of production, signs, power and self, 
where such technologies `permit individuals to effect their own means... so as to 
transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
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perfection, or immorality' (ibid.: 225). We can now begin to appreciate that the 
subjective meaning of a product and the inter-subjective meaning of production, as we 
discussed above, is linked up to a certain kind of sovereign politico-ethical structure, an 
interface between the government and the self-governed. In our case, the disembedding 
of financialisation is linked to a specific neoliberal form of governmentality. As Lemke 
explains, 
The neoliberal forms of government feature not only direct intervention by means of 
empowered and specialized state apparatuses, but also characteristically develop indirect 
techniques for leading and controlling individuals without at the same time being responsible 
for them. The strategy of rendering individual subjects `responsible' entails shifting the 
responsibility for social risks such as illness, unemployment, poverty, etc., and for life in 
society into the domain for which the individual is responsible and transforming it into a 
problem of `self-care'. The key feature of the neoliberal rationality is the congruence it 
endeavours to achieve between a responsible and moral individual and an economic-rational 
actor. It aspires to construct prudent subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they 
rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative acts 
(Lemke, 2001: 201). 
Two questions arise: what are the prior conditions of neoliberal governmentality and 
how are the conditional effects of financialisation stabilised? The former relates to the 
initiation of substantive-signs and the latter relates to the re-stabilization of their 
dynamic representation. For the minute we will deal with the first. It was Michael 
Polanyi whom argued very simply that `to speak is to contrive signs, to observe their 
fitness, and to interpret their alternative relations; though the animal possess each of 
these three faculties; he cannot combine them... for the purpose of yielding new 
information' (1957: 82). In essence, language is a `translation mechanism' and an 
`intellectual technology' providing a `mechanism for rendering reality amenable to 
certain kinds of action' (ibid.: 7). Polanyi understood language to be forms of `writing, 
mathematics, graphs and maps, diagrams and pictures; in short all forms of symbolic 
representation' (ibid.: 78). Similarly, the responsible subject arises through the laying 
down of information conditions, heuristics e. g. calculative technologies, policy, tax 
incentives, reports, media, methods of display e. g. adverts, modes of representation e. g. 
sectoral comparisons or definitions of insecurity e. g. `you must save or else'. All are 
forms of symbolic representation that make up the substantive-sings or `manageable 
symbols', which can be contrived, observed and interpreted 
inside the jungle of 
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financial discourse. But while language emerges out of the symbolic representations of 
financial discourse, the conditions are still assumed to create uncertainty. For Callon, 
the ontological whole is greater than the sum of its parts; the act of calculation is an 
affect of their scrutinised morphology. `The conclusion that can be drawn from [this] is 
extremely simple yet fundamental: yes, homo ceconomicus does exist, but is not an a- 
historical reality; he does not describe the hidden nature of the human being. He is the 
result of a process of configuration' (Callon, 1998: 22). 
Now that we have laid down a pedagogical framework that links the contrivance 
of signs to a politico-ethical morphology of inter-related meaning and calculative 
conditions, we must also understand the arousal of expert-systems within this emerging 
field. From this assumption, it is possible to suggest that the disembedding phase of 
financialisation begins (and ends) with the expert-system. Anthony Giddens partially 
helps us here when he argues, 
Expert systems are disembedding mechanisms because, in common with symbolic tokins (such 
as money), they remove social relations from the immediacies of context.. . an expert disembeds 
in the same way as symbolic tokens, by providing `guarantees' of expectations across 
distanciated time-space. This stretching of social systems is achieved via the impersonal nature 
of tests applied to evaluate technical knowledge and by public critique used to control its form 
(Giddens, 1990: 28). 
There are a number of issues related to this. In one way, Giddens is proposing that the 
removal of social relations from the immediacies of context is initiated through the 
creation of (monetary) expectations, which hope to absolve the immediacies, constraints 
and even memory of the past, through solutions of a future-present. But this also draws 
our attention to the prior material relations and distinctions that are already imbedded in 
materiality. In other words, the expert-system can only guarantee its expectations, if it 
has first appealed to an audience interested to become `expectant'. In one way, 
economic expert-systems provide an economic `frame and format' (du Gay and Pryke, 
2002: 2-6) that articulates a series of propositions to be considered, to be tested, to be 
instituted, so that the expert-system becomes the product, the manifestation of its 
representation to an audience that takes on a dynamic of its own. As we suggested 
above, economic knowledge is inseparable from praxis; and 
in this sense, even the 
`miniature empires' of expert-systems are exposed, sensitive and amiable to the lay- 
systems opening their doors. 
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This leads us to the idea that economic `culture produces industry' (Negus, 
2002), which requires us to consider the power of `marketing' as a fundamental part in 
determining what is given privileged access, what is determined as a need or 'must- 
have' and what is not, according to what makes sense in the wider financial discourse. 
But as Negus argues, this process is also informed by the `patterns of power and 
prejudice arising from the ways in which the formation of particular industries has been 
shaped by such factors as class, gender relations, sexual codes [and] ethnicity' (ibid.: 
118). The implication of free exchange relations between producers and consumers 
means that the theoretical classes e. g. the middle class saver, inevitably derive their 
satisfaction for leisure seeking products from the bottom up. In defining a cultural 
definition of marketing, Slater (2002) argues how `each possible choice of product 
definition - of what the product could be - is simultaneously a choice of consumption 
relations and choice of competitors' (ibid.: 67). The development and diversification of 
retail finance is therefore organised and founded upon, not just different identities, but 
upon the enacted distinction of different tastes. As Aldridge argues, `a complex array of 
values, norms and culturally transmitted habitus is embedded in the private domain of 
personal finance' (Aldridge, 1997: 9). Retail institutions or expert-systems, in this 
context, therefore become the legitimate intermediaries not only of dispositions, i. e. 
historical frameworks of reference, but of politico-existential fulfilment. 
While we have moved towards an understanding of how expert-systems might 
play to the distinctions of habitus, we still do not yet quite understand how agents 
become `entangled' in webs of intermediation. Giddens suggests that `trust' is re-created 
in disembedding mechanisms through `guarantees' and `impersonal tests', which 
suggests that there exists a formal and inter-dependent bargaining process, between a set 
of fixed assurances that flow from within on the one hand - and a fluid framework of 
deliberate, heuristic, if not scientific devices for evaluating those guarantees on the 
outside. This recreates the fixed ideal of soft knowledge forms on the one hand and hard 
empirical knowledge for evaluating the credibility of representation on the other. This 
does not take into account the performative dynamic of capitalism, of financialisation, if 
not the changing contexts that supplant expert-systems and agents into a discursive field 
of confrontations. For example, Pryke and Allen (2000) have suggested that with the 
technological and ideational innovations of finance, new dimensions of space and time 
have created an `entirely new money imaginary', which is reflexively integrated into the 
financial system. As Pryke and Allen argue, `the engineering of monetary instruments 
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does not just take place against the backdrop of an acultural, asocial, homogenous 
`time', as financial economists would have it, but involves increasingly a fusion of times 
which infect and which are in turn infected by, changing cultural and social values that 
alter our ideas `of what money is and what it does' (ibid: 278). 
Taking his influence from the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer, John Allen 
(2002) has re-interpreted his exposition of three symbolic functions that come in the 
form of `expression, representation and signification'. The first is described as a visceral 
experience, where the hairs stand up on your head listening to music; the second is 
described as the imaginative play of signs as language, which is seen to be an 
unexacting measure of reality in its discursiveness; the third relates to Michael Polanyi's 
ideas (1957), that signs can be contrived, assembled and `managed' through the 
manipulation of abstract symbols, which can be precise and articulate so as to be 
mythical i. e. mathematics, or imprecise and inarticulate so as to be ineffable i. e. post- 
modernism (see Polanyi, 1957: 87). In much the same way as Polanyi, Allen (2002) 
argues that it becomes futile to separate the forms of symbolic representation, because 
`different industries, and the economic activities therein, play across a variety of 
symbolic registers - abstract, expressive, affective and aesthetic - and combine them in 
ways which stress certain kinds of symbolic usage at the expense of others' (ibid.: 47). 
It therefore becomes fruitless, if not folly, to separate `hard' from `soft' knowledge 
forms in an attempt to evaluate `aesthetic innovation', or even to assume that evaluation 
can proceed through one or the other, because they are inherently entangled in changing 
contexts of meaning. 
The same can be said of finance and the new forms of money and their associated risk 
instruments, which make it possible to combine rational, calculative practices with more 
imaginative representations of what money can do in a fast-fleeting world that are far removed 
from conventional monetary routines. Symbolic innovation in this context works across the 
symbolic registers in a particular way, echoing Cassirer's argument that meaning, or rather 
economic meaning, is independent not upon any specific notation or image, but upon what they 
express, represent or signify. In short, economic knowledge and meaning is dependent upon 
symbolic function and it is their entangled nature which differentiates one set of activities, one 
industry, from another (Allen, 2000: 54). 
If by implication it is impossible to be certain, why do we calculate uncertainly and how 
do we over-come this inherent paradox, in both the instant of our self-assurance to 
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calculate and throughout the discursive instances of temporality? To understand what 
will follow, we will summarise what has been previously argued so that we build up a 
pyramid of pedagogical understanding. For example, we have posited that the basis of 
calculation is linked to a founding layer of initiation, enabling and belief, the 
amalgamation of the politico-ontology i. e. the emergence of the responsible subject, 
with the topology of substantive signs, which we could collectively call as 
`ontopology'30. Secondly, in this de-regulatory context, we have also put forward the 
idea of miniature-empires such as `expert-systems' putting their creative spin on this 
wider politico-ethical context, which it is assumed, is intended to create the effect of 
`miniature governmentalities'. But still, we are lacking. It is therefore proposed that 
calculation has two more general dimensions with specific components: a tacit form and 
an emulative one. 
Tacit knowledge, Emulative (In)Security 
Michael Polanyi (1957) helps us with the tacit dimension because he argues that there 
are articulate and inarticulate forms of expression and knowledge, which both constitute 
language. The articulate dimension is also the more specific form, where for instance, 
economists can talk in the euphemistic language of demand and supply. Such a heuristic 
employment of language denotes objective facts about the universe, which we cannot 
avoid. Except, the more that we rely on these symbolic arrangements in order to gain 
`certainty', the more we become disenfranchised by their transitivity and their 
vagueness, just like a wet bar of soap we previously held. This is because `articulation 
pictures the essentials of a situation on a reduced scale, which lends itself more easily to 
imaginative manipulation than the ungainly original' (Polanyi, 1957: 85). Articulate 
forms of knowledge must therefore be intertwined with inarticulate forms of knowing, 
where for example, we can derive meaning from substantive-signs in reality, where we 
can know reality, without the ability to express or communicate why we know or what 
its significance is. In `order to describe experience more fully language must be less 
precise. But greater imprecision brings more effectively into play the powers of 
inarticulate judgement required to resolve the ensuing indeterminacy of speech' (ibid.: 
86). Polanyi gives the example of reading a letter; we know its specific significance by 
reading it, not by observing it, and the feeling of deriving significance is contained 
within us, a residue, a feeling that we can only translate generally and inarticulately. 
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There are perhaps, as Polanyi suggests, variations in the degree of inarticulation, which 
plot themselves on a spectrum of `ineffability' or `ineffable forms of knowing'. 
The mind which entrusts itself to the operation of symbols acquires an intellectual tool of 
boundless power; but its use makes the mind liable to perils the range of which seems also 
unlimited. The gap between the tacit and the articulate tends to produce everywhere a cleavage 
between sound common sense and dubious sophistication, from which the animal is quite free 
(ibid.: 94). 
`Minding the gap' is therefore a leap of faith into the darkness, with only a dim torch to 
spread light on what we hope to recognise and in this sense the stabilisation of meaning, 
our self-assurance to calculate instantly or across time, is preconceived by our 
perception and expectation of `routinisation'. As Polanyi put it, `only when repeatable 
utterances are used consistently can they have a definite meaning, and utterances 
without meaning are not language. The poverty of language can fulfil its denotative 
functions only if utterances are both repeatable and consistent' (ibid.: 79). It is therefore 
incumbent upon the human condition to expect continuity in specific forms of utterances 
and substantive-signs that allow us to reflect upon the deviation in their forward or 
incoming manipulation; what Comor calls `casual learners' (Comor, 1999). In this 
sense, we might say that specialised economic practices e. g. financial investment or 
saving, is framed through `integrative practices', which requires `heuristic 
framework(s)', `cognitive rules (both tacit and explicit), and teleoaffective structures' 
(Preda, 2001: 210). But we have to distinguish between the politico-ethical environment 
and those expert-systems acting inside this framework. 
In the wider ontopological environment, we would expect to find both articulate 
and inarticulate utterances that constitute knowing. For example; (1) public authorities; 
what they say and don't say in political terms and policy terms; (2) media outlets; what 
they tell us about expert-systems looking from the outside-in i. e. how media outlets 
present information and commentate on reality; (3) competitors; what they tell us about 
their competition, how they act in relation to others, what they represent through their 
adverts and points of sale; (4) people and word of mouth; what people say and don't say 
is of fundamental significance to the constitution and performance of the public sphere 
and its nature. Similarly, expert-systems produce outputs of knowing that are 
both 
articulate and inarticulate. Articulate utterances are ones 
designed to slip-steam 
information into cogent parts, to be specific about events inside the institution so that 
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`self-responsibility' is constantly informed. On the other hand, we would expect that 
expert-systems also produce inarticulate ways of knowing, through their administrative 
linkages, their adverts, their sale teams and points of sale. Comor partially helps us here, 
Although knowledge is finite, it is also firmly in place at the sites of governance to which 
people come. There they find fixed knowledge in the ways of being and behaving that 
characterise the governance of credit. At this point, people can submit to a process of learning, 
conform to what is expected of them, and even change their activities to comply with 
norms... conformance to routines is not unique. As forms of credit have multiplied and spread, 
people have reconciled the potential dilemma between what they know and fixed knowledge by 
complying with the expectations contained in various credit instruments (Comor, 1999: 178). 
But this compliance does not mean to say that people are empty shells in this process. 
For as Polanyi argued, `by being prepared to speak in our language on future occasions, 
we anticipate its applicability to future experiences... and these form a theory of our 
universe, which we keep testing continuously as we go on talking about things' 
(Polanyi, 1957: 80). In other words, whether calculation is instantaneous e. g. buying a 
paper in a shop; or more long term e. g. saving - entanglement is a prerequisite of 
calculation and it does not disentangle itself, calculation does not stop, until the 
exchange relation has completed itself (Callon, 1998). However, buying a paper in a 
shop would appear to be much more articulately composed than more complex 
phenomenon in the world, which we find hard to describe why we know it exists. But 
buying a paper is still an ineffable calculation. For example, I know how to buy a paper, 
but I don't know why I buy the paper, I just like reading the paper, I derive pleasure and 
emotion from it. Equally so, I know how to put my savings in a deposit, but I don't 
know why my savings are safe, I just think they are - through knowledge inputs that are 
effable and ineffable. Perhaps the difference between these two examples is not that one 
is more effable than the other, but that uncertainty widens the scope, and the spectrum 
of morphologous relations that conjoin different ways of knowing in the public sphere. 
But as Polanyi reminds us, `if perception prefigures all our knowing of things, drive 
satisfaction prefigures all practical skills, and the two are always 
interwoven' (Polanyi, 
1957: 99). In other words, we perceive, we calculate, we derive pleasure from 
reaffirming our knowledge of the world through `tacit performances of our own, the 
rightness of which we implicitly confirm' (ibid.: 
100). 
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Emulation is but an extension of the tacit coefficient of knowledge; it belongs to 
a way of knowing that we derive satisfaction from. As Veblen argued, `closely related to 
the requirement that the gentlemen must consume freely and of the right kind of goods, 
there is the requirement that he must know how to consume them in a seemly 
manner... conspicuous consumption of valuable goods is a means of reputability to the 
gentlemen of leisure' (Veblen, 1925: 64). Veblen argues that the leisure class emulates 
one another not only as a means of deriving material satisfaction, but as a way of 
displaying a certain class and moral instinct. In our case, we are suggesting that this 
display, this conspicuousness, is also a sign value to others: emulation is also a means of 
inviting tacit assurances towards uncertain practices. 
On the tube trains of London, most businessmen crumple their FT's and in this 
sense, Veblen is correct to say that consumption is conspicuous. But in conditions of 
uncertainty, this relationship is not necessarily given. As Bourdieu might have it, the 
leisure class do not conform to one set of homogenous conventions, calculation 
proceeds through dispositions, `habitus', which influences the precise nature of how 
emulation takes place. For example, my next door neighbour may buy a car that I want 
and he may buy it from a company that I do not trust upon talking to their staff. In other 
words, agents or social groups are defined by how they relate to other agents taking 
social positions in the field of `mutual exteriority'. Through `these categories of social 
perception, these principles of vision and division, the differences in practices, in the 
goods possessed, or in the opinions expressed become symbolic differences and 
constitute a veritable language' acting as mythical system of `distinctive signs' 
(Bourdieu, 1998: 8-9). The product may say something about us and our identity; it 
reassures our sense of self; but it also says something about the product and its 
representation of (in)security. In other words, emulation is based on a morphological fit 
between the dispositions of the consumer and the identity (representation) of the 
producer. For example, I meet people buying insurance, I like them, I like how they 
look and talk; how does this correspond to the institution that they talk of, and how does 
this relate to my dispositions? 
However, what happens when knowledge, both effable and ineffable begins to 
contradict one another? At what point does calculation become unstable and senseless? 
There is no linear answer to this question. Only the proposition that the contradiction 
can expose itself within the bounds of the expert-system, or even in the wider 
ontopological field. For example, random if not contradictory messages may arise from 
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within the expert-system, but equally they may conflict with sanguine and coherent 
messages from the outside field. For example, a car manufacturer may produce vast 
quantities of unsold cars, which are nevertheless rated well in the media. Alternatively, 
the outside field may produce contradictory messages that may raise critical questions of 
the expert-system, which may respond it turn by explaining the contradiction by 
drawing upon articulate and inarticulate methods of knowledge production. For 
example, a food manufacturer maybe putting too much salt in its products according to 
media outlets, and the food manufacture may respond in turn by drawing upon physical 
evidence of the manufacturing process and supporting this by a comparison to 
competitors, or by dealing with the media head on. In other words, it is entirely 
plausible and possible that information conditions can make sense, despite their 
contradictions, because again it depends on a morphology of calculative relations which 
are subject to the tastes of individuals. 
We have already suggested that disembedding removes individuals from prior 
contexts, prior cognitive frameworks, not only through an ideational competitive 
struggle, but by initiating a tacit framework of articulate and inarticulate forms of 
representation; off-setting expectations from where ideas take on the momentum of the 
real, from which point they are re-articulated. Disemebedding financialisation therefore 
creates expectations through monetary forms, displacing previously held notions of the 
economy, which then become stabilised through their repetition. After a degree of 
irreversible learning, we would expect that disembedding financialisation turns in on 
itself through the expectations that such forms have initially instilled and this process 
could be described as `aesthetic reflexivity', or what we have chosen to call capital 
market compression. 
Re-embedding Financialisation: Capital Market Compression? 
Disembedding fmancialisation reverses the conventional directions of risk-taking from 
the real economy to the financial economy. Under conventional assumptions, the real 
economy innovates and stretches markets to build new capacity and investment 
potential, but financialisation suggests that this logic is reversed: rather, the financial 
economy stretches new market capacity within the financial economy itself. Effectively, 
the same logics that applied to the real economy can be applied to financialisation. 
Without the entrepreneurial spirit of the real economy and the effective mediation of the 
financial economy, the real economy can suffer from over-production, a glut in the 
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supply of contingent commodities, which can lead to deflationary or even stagflationary 
conditions. Likewise, without capacity building within the financial economy, savings 
flow to concentrated areas, creating asset-price inflation, `irrational exuberance' and 
stock-market crisis. Like innovation builds capacity in the real economy, innovation in 
the financial economy extends opportunities of investment potential, without as it were 
leading to the conditions of financial crisis. In this sense, savings are organised `not' on 
the linear assumptions of risk and return emanating from the conventional outputs of 
Keynesian enterprise, but are organised on the individual preferences for risk-taking in 
the financial economy (see first section Chapter 3). In the first instance, it is the long- 
term performance and renewal of assets in the real economy that determines the 
allocation of savings, whereas in the second instance, it is the instant volatility or 
expectations of the financial economy that determines the allocation of savings and 
preferences for risk-taking. What is happening in the real economy in this sense is only 
of a secondary significance to asset allocations, because it is based on the conventional 
assumption that finance feeds real economic developments. 
The claim here is that re-embedding financialisation will attempt to resolve the 
dual contradictions of concentration and over-production through what Harvey has 
called `temporal and spatial displacement' (Harvey, 1990: 182). It is important to 
understand that Harvey uses these concepts to understand the `absorption of over- 
accumulation' in the real economy. We on the other hand, intend to borrow Harvey's 
concepts in order to demonstrate that the temporal and spatial `fix' is at the heart of 
financialisation. For Harvey `spatial displacement entails the absorption of excess 
capital and labour in geographical expansion' (Harvey, 1990: 183). In financial terms, 
there are two known examples of a spatial fix that are important for the reproduction of 
financialisation. In rudimentary terms, a spatial fix occurs when capital is enabled to 
supplant its roots in other geo-economic areas, so that we would expect the trans-local- 
national outputs of capital to expand. Or else, it is possible that a spatial fix could also 
come in the form of a re-articulation of domestic financial space as an invitation to more 
sophisticated mobile capital recourses. Harvey describes a temporal fix as `a switch of 
resources from meeting current needs to exploring future uses, or acceleration in 
turnover time so that speed-up this year absorbs excess capacity from last year' (ibid: 
182). There are three known examples of temporal fixes to financialisation that we can 
propose here. The first could be described tentatively as a process of inter-temporal 
socialisation. As the demographic balance progresses in favour of beneficiaries and 
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high-risk savers creating what Froud et al. (2001) call a Ponzi type of coupon pool 
capitalism, re-embedding financialisation will attempt to repair the inter-temporal flow 
between contributors and beneficiaries so as to avoid asset concentration (see Engelen, 
2003a). This becomes a cultural project as much as a political one as politicians 
`promote the stock- market as a painless way of generating a flow of income for a 
comfortable old age which can be extended to lower income groups' (Froud et al., 94). 
Risk-management is a second example of a temporal fix, not as an insurance 
technology per se, but as a technology of responsible transference and `wise' 
calculation. As LiPuma and Lee argue, `for speculative capital, the mitigation of 
circulatory risk depends on the compression or neutralisation of time. The directional 
dynamic is aimed directly towards the short-term [which] comes to define and dominate 
the temporality of movement and reproduction of speculative capital. The result is that 
the culture of financial circulation shapes social forms, such as abstract risk [and] new 
technologies' (LiPuma and Lee, 2005: 421). A third example of a temporal fix is when 
the coupon pool expands, which provides an outlet and a supply of differential coupons. 
This can occur informally in market exchange relations between those offering 
corporate securities, or it can happen in a more formal relationship, when the state 
deliberately expands or manipulates its supply of debt coupons to meet a known 
demand; what Arrighi and Silver (2001) might refer to as the networking of high 
finance. 
Thus, financialisation initiates capital market compression, globalisation 
decentralisation and re-intermediation from within the domestic sphere, between the 
global and the everyday. And this again, we propose, becomes the product of an act of 
initiation; a re-articulation of governmentality, so that the self becomes self-regulatory, 
a responsible saver to him/herself. Thus the target is not those whom already save i. e. 
the middle classes, but those who don't save, those on the periphery of the cash 
economy; those who find it difficult or inconvenient to save; those who must now learn 
to save for themselves in the jungle of financial discourse, not out of duty to one's state 
or to production, or even primarily to secure a safe pension income in the future, but to 
enable a life-style in a future-as-present, which uses the language of consumption 
against those whom enjoy the obvious fruits of their leisure. `In modern political 
culture, leaving things to chance, not just in business and finance but in conducting 
one's private life as well, have become morally suspicious and a sign of irresponsibility' 
(de Goede, 2004: 205). Re-embedding financialisation effectively learns from the 
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dispositions and shortcomings of a financialised past, as the politico-ethical structure of 
governmentality progresses the prior context of relations through the socialisation of 
financialisation `as a means for the acquisition of self, to initiate a morphology of 
proposals on `how to get ahead... for the expansive movements of body and soul' 
(Martin, 2002: 3). As Randy Martin helps us to understand, 
Financialisation promises a way to develop the self, when even the noblest of professions cannot 
emit a call that one can answer with a lifetime. It offers a highly elastic mode of self-mastery that 
channels doubt over uncertain identity into fruitful activity. It insinuates the fertile mind in a 
labyrinth of rules that channel and contain vistas overwrought with information. Paths do action 
with definable results that clearly distinguish good from bad in measurable terms of success and 
failure are provided when it seemed that nothing could be done. This is not to say that 
fmancialisation occupies all the room of the self or monopolises the ethical domain, but that its 
medium and its message make themselves known and heard above the din (Martin, 2002: 10). 
Such a proposal augments us into a further research stage, to understand how the 
politco-ethical structure is changing its enabling signs, through tacit suggestions of 
financial planning and policy, through to more explicit technologies of the self, at the 
inter-face between government and expert-systems. What products and modes of 
representation can the state-market condominium now muster to persuade us that the 
post-war era has officially come to an end, that re-embedding in Polanyian terms, must 
now revert to a more lucid, more logical and explicit utilisation of the free-market for 
inter-mediating people's lives in the capital market? And how does the emerging 
govemmentality now react to the heightened expectations of the middle class saver; how 
is the inter-temporal and inter-generational flow between the young and the old restored, 
if the anonymous circuits of wealth creation and risk-aversion are to be given the 
credence they do not deserve? 
Unlike disembedding financialisation, it is proposed that capital market 
compression re-articulates the role and format of the expert-system through the logical 
enabling of re-regulation, decentralization, re-intermediation and globalisation. In the 
re-embedding phase we would expect to find a re-regulatory response cutting across the 
market, the government and the self, as financial ideas become motivated by the need to 
heal the limitations and wounds of de-regulation, not by regressing it, but by tweaking 
or `rationalising' its imperfections. The contingent contexts of disembedding and the 
stakes involved means that financialisation does not just suddenly 
disappear in periods 
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of re-embedding, but this requires us to make a further distinction. Rationalist 
epistemology, especially in conventional economics, rests upon the idea that the world 
suffers from informational asymmetries a priori, which leads to the notion that 
knowledge can absolve imperfect communication a posteriori. The innovative stages of 
financialisation would appear to stretch informational asymmetries between economic 
actors, not because knowledge is incomplete, but because institutional change disrupts 
the conventional social topology and the traditional roles, expectations and 
communicative patterns between agents. Only as a result of atrophy and calamity is it 
possible to comprehend the significance of social change in retrospect and only as a 
result of this backward gaze is it possible to appreciate the ease with which agents 
identify `lacking information' as the almighty cause and consequence of `events' arising 
from disproportionate control. In this sense, we would expect that the re-embedding 
phase of financialisation is also the re-articulation of financial innovation, a period that 
attempts to dismantle boundaries guarding information, offsetting more fluid boundaries 
of transparency that decentralise (even more) control and financial responsibility too. 
But similarly to the dismebedding stage, the re-emerging financial discourse will 
institute substantive signs and calculative frameworks, both formal and informal that 
help the individual to collapse the uncertainty of the future through a more routinised 
approach to risk and its management. As Callon argues, 
Not only do accounting tools constitute space of calculability and define the way the 
calculation is made up, but also, through the reactions they provoke, new calculative strategies 
emerge which lead to the changing of goals (Callon, 1998: 24). 
Financialisation is therefore a process of socialisation, it extends the connections of the 
capital market throughout society and normalises their daily utilisation. But there is 
something noticeable here too. As a teleological force of nature, financialisation is a 
process of disintermediation, linking the capital market directly to the autonomy of 
individuals. Anthony Giddens argued that modernity was a process of disembedding, 
but financialisation suggests that the individual becomes the expert through access, 
information and knowledge. While the disembedding phase is a process of 
disintermediation, re-embedding introduces a phase of re-intermediation. Secondly, it is 
proposed that disembedding de-stabilises the status quo and the guarantees of the 
expert-system, so that we see a competitive increase in the number of expert-systems, or 
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at least the introduction of new experts in the field with new innovative proposals on 
financial planning. Within this, we might even find that the expert-system transforms 
itself in the new environment, offering more control and `flexibility'. The financial 
visionary Patrick Young provides an insight here, 
Ironically, communism has long promised but invariably failed to deliver "Power to the People". 
Now capitalism, and free-market capitalism in its essentially un-distilled form, is giving the 
individual the chance to shape their financial destiny, with better flows of information and access 
to markets, than has ever been witnessed at any previous time in history. The Capital Market 
Revolution provides private capital with all the tools it requires to take on large institutional 
funds and beat them. It won't be a walkover but at least now the deck is becoming less and less 
stacked against the individual. In other words, the private individual will become a more pivotal 
figure to the post-feudal marketplace than has ever been seen before (Young, 2003: 158). 
While the disembedding period initiated a relationship between expert-system and the 
lay individual e. g. doctor and patient, capital market compression promises to intensify 
the individuated responsibility for personal financial decision-making. This does not 
necessarily mean that the expert-system goes away, just that it transforms its aesthetic 
dimensions to absolve the memory of the past, while at the same time responding to the 
imperatives of the future-present. But one of the implications of capital market 
compression is that it could offer new linkages, new circuits of re-intermediation 
previously unspeakable. For example, it is entirely possible that new investment 
vehicles such as hedge funds become introduced as a way of fixing the temporal 
contradictions of financialisation. Or even possibly, an Americanisation of the capital 
market enters into the fray as Young predicts, as companies introduce new IT software, 
enabling greater individuated control of direct capital market investment. What is for 
sure is that none of this is separable to the re-articulated globalisation of financial space, 
where calls for new instruments and vehicles could begin to interfere and contradict 
with the regulatory arrangements intended to repair the past. 
What we have not got to forget either is the heightened expectations of the 
middle class saver. The identity of the middle class saver appears to have taken on the 
real and in taking on the real, it becomes important to understand 
how the performance 
of this identity impinges on the emerging financial 
discourse of re-embedding. 
Concentrating on the performance of gender identities and their contribution towards the 
economy, Judith Butler argues that the `economic, tied to the reproductive, 
is 
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necessarily linked to the reproduction of heterosexuality. It is not that non-heterosexual 
forms of sexuality are left out, but that their suppression is essential to the operation of 
that prior normativity' (Butler, 1998: 42). In the emerging financial discourse, it may 
not be the case that excluded or peripheral identities and income groups are left out, but 
it could be that they are suppressed as a result of the prior normativity. As we suggested 
above, it's not as if the government can wipe the slate of history clean and begin again. 
As Connolly argues, `politics is, as it best, simultaneously a medium in which unsettled 
dimensions of the common life find expression and a mode by which a temporary or 
permanent settlement is sometimes achieved' (Connolly, 1983: 151). In this sense, we 
should respect Nealson's reading of Butler's ideas when he argued that we need to `pay 
careful attention to the material specificity of the restrictions that make possible the 
construction and maintenance of a particular normativity' (Nealson, 1998: 28). In other 
words, what are those material factors that keep the lower income groups in the dark, 
while as it were, the leisure classes move towards the advantages of an inclusive flame, 
a light that remains exclusionary by implication that the former group have their eyes 
shut for reasons we do not yet know. What we can say is that this process is dynamic 
and open ended because financial discourse is moved by the performativity of identities 
performing their dispositions. This reiteration of dispositions becomes part of what 
Jackson calls the `practical politics of boundary maintenance'; 
Struggles over precisely which concrete deployment of which commonplaces are practically 
enacted are always also struggles about the identity of some particular actor, and hence part of 
the active process of bounding that actor - producing and reproducing it out of a transactional 
flow of everyday life. So actors, from this perspective, are more like contested zones of ongoing 
debate than like physical objects. Instead of possessing a constitutive essence, actors whether 
states or individuals - should be regarded as the product of ongoing constitutive practices 
(Jackson, 2004: 285). 
Hopefully, we are building up a mental picture of a struggle for financialised value 
creation that reconciles the interests between expert-systems, public bodies, lay 
individuals, middle class identities, regulatory agencies and politicians, all looking for a 
way to solve their dispositions, their sense of lack in a wider context of financialisation, 
a memory of dismebedded financialisation, where self-responsibility and individuated 
risk-management becomes more important, more sophisticated as all finance becomes 
motivated on the basis of `individual gain' but where `its means are wholly 
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deindividualising'; where `the individual is more fully one with the vast 
interdependencies of society than ever before', and where `the local [is] more fully 
consequent to the global' (Martin, 2002: 196). 
Before we finish this chapter and remind ourselves of our travels, we should bare 
this in mind. Capital market compression brings the capital market and its institutions 
closer to the land of material life, in body and in soul, and introduces new talking heads, 
new explosive information conditions, creating a morphologous structure that is more 
difficult to navigate personally and even professionally. Bauman makes a fascinating 
contrast between Foucault's panopticon and the emerging form of the synopticon. For 
Bauman, the `panopticon was first and foremost a weapon against difference, choice and 
variety' (Bauman, 1998: 52). Today, financialisation seeks to subsidise if not facilitate a 
`neoliberal programme' that creates `neither a disciplining nor a normalising society, but 
instead a society characterised by the fact that it cultivates and optimises differences' 
(Lemke, 2001: 200). But the consequence of this is that the `extasy of communication' 
has created forced the `forced extroversion of all interiority' (Baudrillard, 1985). `Risk 
is meant to be as felicitous as consumption once was to give meaning and direction to 
life' but `the attempt to maintain privacy may turn out to be a rearguard effort in relation 
to the demands for transparency affirmed through the embrace of financial risk' (Martin, 
2002: 152). By expanding the social topology of information, not just through 
consumerism, but though financial consumerism it adds possibly another dimension to 
our confusion and our self-induced and internalised domination. As Polanyi argued, `the 
conception in question is the focus our attention, in terms of which we attend 
subsidiarily both to the text and to the objects indicated by the text' (Polanyi, 1944: 92). 
In the disembedding phase of financialisation, heightened transparency, self-devolution 
of control could be the source of the problem as our focus of attention is spread even 
further across the complexity of information conditions, heightening the obscurity of 
information and what it means (cf. Amin and Cohendet, 2004). Returning to Bauman, 
`the panopticon forced people into a position where they could be watched. The 
synopticon needs no coercion - it seduces people into watching' (Bauman, 1998: 52). In 
this information society, media hype, government spin of what could be described as the 
`economy of expectations' all garners this perspective that knowledge is power in an 
uncertain world, not because it resolves the structural dilemmas caused by ontological 
insecurity, but because it allows self-interest and individualisation to survive, find 
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cursory meaning and compete. Whether this is effective for everyone, and whether this 
makes for an effective politics, it is yet to be known. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to spell out very specifically how a Cultural IPE approach 
applies to Financialisation. As we made clear in the first few chapters, financialisation 
refers to the growth of financial instruments, signs, institutions, practices, values etc., 
and this progression and evolution of the global financial infrastructure is having a 
tremendous influence both in the economy and in our daily lives. What we couldn't 
quite grasp in these initial chapters, but what seems obvious now, is the knowledge that 
financialisation is informed and encouraged, not just by political policy or objective 
trends, but by a heterogeneous and contingent culture of inter-linking relations, signs, 
practices, representations, emotions and perceptions that cut across the micro, meso and 
macro levels. What emerges from this chapter especially, is the feeling that 
financialisation is a cultural dynamic, one that has become internalised socially as a 
path-dependent process. However, the objective of this chapter was to suggest a 
propositional framework, drawing upon cultural (economic) literature, to help us to 
make sense of financialisation from its beginnings, not to its ends, but to its future 
orientation and trajectory. It is therefore proposed that the cultural economy is becoming 
financialised precisely because we have passed from two different stages: from 
disembedding to re-embedding. 
In Part II, we will attempt to examine the financialisation of pension provision 
using the framework outlined in this chapter. In Chapter Five, we will argue that 
financialisation emerged at a historically distinct point in time. At no other time did it 
seem possible for financialisation to occur. But in the 1970s, this did happen, not 
because it was forced on the people, but because, as we suggest here, history and culture 
clasped hands together, as financialisation became gradually socialised and normalised 
in the public imagination, setting a cultural momentum of expectations on its way. 
While Chapter Five will attempt to examine the initialisation of cultural financialisation 
in society, Chapter Six will look more closely at the expert-systems working within 
financialisation. Focusing upon the Equitable Life case, this chapter will explore how 
this institution progressed the boundaries of financialisation by examining its 
underpinnings and relations. Chapter Seven will explore the confrontations of value 
creation in the transformation of actuarial knowledge. And Chapter Eight will try to 
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understand the nature of re-embedding financialisation by examining the introduction of 
new Labour's policy on private pension provision. We will explore, in many ways, the 
re-articulation of re-embedding governmentality, its continuities and commercial 
shortcomings. In sum, the case-studies invite us to use what we have gathered in this 
chapter to examine the subtle processes of disembedding and re-embedding that have 
brought society and the capital market even closer together, which has the potential to 
endanger all hopes and dreams of fulfilling a secure, communitarian and just life. 
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PART II 
The Financialisation of Pension Provision 
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Chapter Five 
Disembedding Financialisation: Neoliberalism, Economic 
Freedom and the Personal Private Pension 
Introduction 
Today, personal private pensions are a normal part of everyday responsibility, especially 
for younger generations. Since the 1980s, the post-war institutions of welfare have been 
increasingly privatised, where the responsibility and the risk for providing insurance and 
income for old age has been shifted firmly on to the shoulders of the individual. It is the 
aim of this chapter to provide a contrary stance to the argument that the privatisation of 
welfare is a natural part of the evolution of our complex societies. In this chapter, we 
provide an examination of neoliberalism as a rolling governmentality that enabled the 
disembedding of post-war institutions and identities from the perceived constraints of 
the past. Neoliberalism in this sense, is the equal opposite of financialisation, which 
created a revolution in ideas towards economic freedom and strategies of enabling that 
would force the pendulum to swing in the direction of social change. We therefore 
examine the definitive-signs of disembedding governmenality at the macro, meso and 
micro levels of analysis, which reveal its aesthetic implications and its hidden charms. 
This chapter is set out as follows. Firstly, we examine the macro initiators of 
governmentality - the popular capitalism that swept through the nation constructing an 
imaginary context of personal economic control, in addition to individualised wealth 
creation and planning. Secondly, we examine the micro incentives and disincentives that 
compelled individuals to contract out of their occupational pension schemes into private 
forms of personal pension provision. Drawing upon qualitative material attained from a 
questionnaire (see Appendices Annex A), we will illustrate some of the intricacies 
underpinning the constructed demand for private pension provision. This chapter forms 
the backdrop to Chapter Six, because disembedding opened up a contingent space for 
the development of competitive expert-systems, which would carry the torch of 
financialisation in way that we can now not reverse. 
Popular Capitalism? 
In his most recent television program entitled A History of Modern Britain, former 
political editor to the BBC Andrew Marr argues that our modern politicians 
have been 
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undermined by `unintended consequences' (Costello, 2007). As Man put it, `this even 
happened to Margaret Thatcher... She came into office determined to make changes, and 
she promptly made them. But she thought the free market would create a nation of 
thrifty, sober conservatives, holding the Granthamite values of her alderman father. 
Instead, Britain went on a spending spree, and indulged in an incredible amount of 
excess.. . 
Not even Thatcher got what she expected (quoted in Costello, 2007: 69). In this 
sense, the failure of Thatcher was that she expected to replicate the social conditions of 
an older, more stoic generation -a pre-1914 imperial Britain, where interest rates 
adjusted to the external requirements of the gold standard despite their social costs, 
where social consciousness was inchoately gathering, when full scale politicisation of 
the economy was yet to take place. Spurred on by rational choice theorists and 
neoliberal economists (see Hay, 2004) with no concept of time, Thatcher expected to 
create an ideal out of the `dispiriting decade' 31 by reversing the edifice of social change 
built gradually since the beginning of the century. In this line of argument, Thatcher 
caused both revolution and disillusionment as the Conservative government unwittingly 
seduced society back into the box of the self-regulating market. All of this ran contrary, 
it seems, to the general dialectic of the state that had evolved out of the 19`h century to 
protect individuals, not from others, but from themselves placing subtle unseen limits on 
the extent of economic freedom. Rehearsing Andrew Marr's testimony to the Thatcher 
era, the problem with freedom and especially economic freedom, is that it is quite easy 
and practical to create, but not quite as easy to understand what it is for. 
The stock market, `once rid of its less savoury denizens, might just provide that 
`spiritual adventure' missing from the lives of the `common folk" (Fraser, 2005: 250). 
The speculative fever that rushed through the United States (late 19`h century) like a 
`metaphysical release from the anonymity and deadening conformity of industrial 
society' (loc. cit. ), describes de-regulatory Britain just as well in the 1980s. As Hirst and 
Thompson argued, `the UK is the only really `globalised' large industrial country in the 
G7 group... and UK citizens are already more directly vulnerable to `international' 
shocks through the financial system' (Hirst and Thompson, 2000: 336,348). The stock 
market, the individual, the social ownership of capital represented the primacy of 
Conservative thinking towards an idea of the `new' economy in the 1980s (Hutton, 
1996: 27-55). It was a project designed `to make the British people a nation of 
shareholders ... to create a popular capitalism 
in which more and more men and women 
have a share in the British industry and business' (Chancellor Nigel Lawson, Budget 
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Speech in Martin and Turner, 2000: 229). This was Marx(ism) turned on its head: the 
socialisation of capital was the decentralisation of collective power; an individualising 
project that was manifestly `de-individualising' (Martin, 2002: 195). 
During the 1980s, a whole host of policy innovations entered the scene at the 
macro level (Cerny, 1993: Martin, 1999b: Roberts, 2004: Warf, 1999): the sale of 
public-sector housing; the Big Bang de-regulations of the securities market (Cerny, 
1993) (1983-1986); the augmentation of financial self-regulation (e. g. The Financial 
Service Act 1986); the mass privatisation of the public sector (1979-87) (ibid. ). As 
Roberts argues, `privatisation was a means of enticing individual citizens to become 
participants in a shareholding democracy' (Roberts, 2004: 48, my emphasis). The total 
proceeds of selling off the state came to a whopping £70 billion in 1991, small change 
when we think that the accumulated and estimated cost of employing public sector 
consultants figures at £70 billion for a similar stretch of time (1997-2009) (FT, 2006j: 
3). Nevertheless, such privatisations are not to be undermined as definitive-signs of an 
expectant economy. For example, the sale of British Telecom (BT) was the largest 
equity sale known to man and the Conservative government could not afford to get it 
wrong (Martin, 1999b: Roberts, 2004). But even while BT was `big', the initial public 
offering of British Gas was `bigger'. The sale of BT was followed by an `unprecedented 
press and television campaign' and while this sale focused on creating a experimental 
hybrid between institutional investors and individuals, the sale of British Gas focused 
primarily on the small investor; the consumers of British Gas (Martin, 1999b). As 40 
percent of the equity stake was reserved for the public, `tell Sid' about the bid was a 
determined marketing campaign. In 1979,3 million individuals held shares. By 1991 it 
had risen to 11 million or 25 percent of the population; but by 1995 this figure had 
reduced to 9 million (ibid.: 269-271). 
As `the financialised self embraces risk ... risk tolerance blends reason into 
effect' (Martin, 2002: 195). The notion of creating `popular capitalism' was to inscribe 
this means-end. The 1987 stock market crash surfaced or exploded during this phase of 
popular(ising) capitalism, dwindling the share prices of all corporate companies. But 
even so, the volatile nature of financial markets encouraged an innate scepticism, not 
towards the market, but to the self `so that the spur of the future mercilessly digs into the 
skin of every present' (Nietzsche: 1887/1998: 100). As Ron Martin argued, 
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For many individuals, privatisation has not encouraged a general shift to a long-term 
shareholding culture. As a result of their initial under-valuation, privatisation share prices have 
tended to rise very sharply after flotation, and this has encouraged many shareholders to cash in 
their shares to make a quick windfall profit (Martin, 1999: 271). 
The emphasis on `profit' and personal gain through self-interest resonates in Karl 
Polanyi's `market society' (Polanyi, 1944). This sensory stage of disembedding 
financialisation constituted one part of a rolling governmentality. `Inflation, poor 
growth, and the disintegration of the nuclear family were all seen as the results of a 
degenerative collectivism, and in particular the restrictive institutions of the labour 
movement. Her [Thatcher] object was to best it and reinvent a Britain that was true to 
what she imagined to be `itself' (Hutton, 1996: 29). Margaret Thatcher represented a 
wider ideal of economic freedom to those disenfranchised by their own post-war 
expectations, as we shall see. But as Hutton argued, `by laying simultaneous claim to 
tradition and market radicalism it was facing two ways at once, without addressing the 
reasons for Britain's poor economic performance' (loc. cit, my emphasis). As the 
economic historian Barry Eichengreen insisted, `Britain's relatively poor growth 
performance is not blamed on anyone's lack of acuity. There were no unexploited 
opportunities for industrialists, bankers or unionists in the absence of a solution to the 
coordinating problem created by the historical inheritance' (Eichengreen, 1996b: 217). 
And yet, during her first visit to the United States as party leader in September 1975, 
and citing Milton Friedman in the publication of this speech two years later by the 
Centre for Policy Studies, Margaret Thatcher argued that: `it has taken us a long time to 
realise as a nation that unless we elevate the reduction of inflation to a first priority, 
moral values, our social and political institutions and the very fabric of our society will 
fall apart' (Thatcher in Douthwaite, 1999: 68). Taking the monetarists' argument as self- 
evident, `inflation' became both the object of the problem and the moral destiny of 
Britain's solution. 
To control inflation as moral cause implicated two factors: (1) to prevent the rate 
at which prices erode assets and earnings; (2) and to continue restructuring the economy 
so that this doesn't happen. In the first instance, the Thatcherite perception was that 
savers and retired people suffered from `negative real profits' and threatened a 
burgeoning pension and insurance industry `who are in a position where it becomes 
more and more difficult to plan and guarantee the flow of future income they have 
promised their beneficiaries' (Thatcher in Douthwaite, 1999: 68). As we can see, the 
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first instance slightly overlaps into the second, but we have to consider that it is 
employed through a deftness of touch. For example, in 1997 an article in the Economist 
put forward the case that Britain's `de-industrialisation' had `coincided with a rapid 
increase in manufactured exports from countries such as China and Brazil' (Economist, 
1997: 108). But while we would expect, following Thatcher and our knowledge of the 
1970s (see Brenner, 2000), to find manufacturing as the cause of inflation and rising 
prices, this is not the case according to this article. In fact, `in constant prices, the share 
of manufacturing output turns out to have remained stable over the past three decades in 
rich economies as a whole' - and furthermore, `productivity in manufacturing.. . rose 
more than twice as fast as in services', where `the rise in the nominal value of services 
in GDP reflects a rise in the relative price of services' (ibid. ). In other words, rising 
prices did not come from de-industrialisation or even manufacturing, but in this case, 
the Economist attributed the `problem' to the lack of a sector that was yet to fully 
manifest itself; as `fewer workers are needed to produce a given increase in 
[manufacturing] output, to service industries where more workers are needed' (ibid. ). 
Think about this argument for too long and it will begin to have its desired effect. 
Essentially, it argues that an economy must avoid rising prices and sectoral 
concentration; that it must encourage productivity wherever it comes from e. g. finance 
capital or Tesco; because wealth creation in such terms transcends all debate, all 
implication, when the means of productivity are also the ends of wealth creation: a 
simple tautology. As the Economist demonstrates the point, 
Deindustrialisation causes problems in economies unable to absorb the workers released by 
manufacturing. But those who would tackle this by subsidies or trade barriers are missing the 
point. As manufacturing continues to shrink in an economy, overall growth will increasingly 
depend on productivity in services. Policy should therefore focus on removing obstacles to such 
productivity growth, and creating a labour market in which workers can move freely from 
factory employment to services (Economist, 1997: 108). 
The removal of obstacles assumes that their elimination will lead to a higher, more 
evolved stage of wealth-creation, in comparison to those countries on the treadmill 
behind. As the article's title stated: `it's wise to deindustrialise' (ibid. ). In other words, 
the stage of creating wealth from services or the new economy had to be teased out and 
nurtured so as to create more economic and personal freedom, which was seen to `be a 
natural consequence of economic progress' (ibid. ). What we can glean from the two 
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factors highlighted above, is that people's property, their net worth, became a political 
tool during this stage from which to legitimate economic restructuring as moral code; 
and what's more is that the two were symbiotic; they faced each other as Hutton (1996: 
29) pointed out. But one of the key questions in all of this is why inflation became such 
a core issue to the Thatcher government, and a vehicle for restructuring the economy 
and morality at one and the same time? The reason for asking this question is not to 
depart from our current concern on discerning the distinctive-signs of disembedding 
governmentality, but to go deeper: to assess the compatibility or synchronisation 
between the new focus on personal economic freedom and the form of legitimation that 
this required? We must go deeper and return to the surface. 
For example, during the post-war decades, it would seem that cyclical growth 
rates in wages partially off-set the demand for growth achieved through productivity, 
where fiscal and monetary policy (and sometimes interest rates)32 was used to carefully 
manipulate demand conditions (cf. Glyn, 1990). `Inflation' wasn't necessarily an evil in 
these days because it formed part of a post-war convention or `balancing mechanism', 
which had the effect, over the course of the post-war boom, of harmonising borrowers 
and lenders through corporatist arrangements (cf. Douthwaite, 1999: 63-72: Glyn, 
1999). As Douthwaite explains, 
In other words, we have a balancing mechanism that generates inflation whenever it acts. When 
corporate profits are down, firms push their prices up to compensate. When corporate profits are 
up, increased investment pushes up the price of labour and possibly of land and capital as well. 
But for this mechanism to work, governments must have a sufficiently relaxed attitude to 
inflation to allow it to take place. If they interfere excessively, as Thatcher's three governments 
did, one or more of the main groups in the economy - borrowers, lenders and labour - 
inescapably suffers (Douthwaite, 1999: 70). 
But on the other hand, Douthwaite omits the significance of the Bretton Woods 
exchange rate mechanism that contained this balancing act. We should therefore add 
that due to the fixed nature of exchange rates in the post-war period, demand problems 
were relieved through the balance of trade, between deficit and surplus countries, 
through a series of international adjustment mechanisms and institutions (Eichengreen, 
1996: Glyn, 1990). Thus, Douthwaite's `balancing' thesis formed part of a wider set of 
post-war goals at the domestic and international level of governance (ibid. ). But 
Douthwaite's thesis is important because it reminds us of the discursive constitution of 
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inflation i. e. what makes common sense. In the post-war period, inflation was the 
quantitative effect of demand manipulation due to heightened political consciousness 33 
As Douthwaite points out, inflation was part of an implicit arrangement and `struggle' 
between different socio-political interests i. e. lenders, borrowers and labour. 
In the post-Bretton woods era, inflation was the (ir)responsible effect of 
monetary supply conditions, and this continues to be the case today. For example, it has 
become incontrovertible that inflation is to be controlled within a certain band-with34 in 
order to create price stability, which is assumed to enable security, employment and 
growth (see Bank of England, 2005). But as the Bank of England's own Inflation report 
stated in May 2005: `relative to the central projection, the overall balance of risks to 
growth is on the down side, while the risks to inflation are broadly balanced' (Bank of 
England, 2005: IV). In other words, the Bank of England is responsible for domestic 
price stability only: not events in the global economy. In contrast to the nature of the 
post-war political economy, this `constitutes an implicit attempt to depoliticise 
macroeconomic policy making by insulating decision making from popular pressures, 
by removing notions of societal winners and losers, and by asserting that a particular 
approach to policy is technically correct' (Baker, 1999: 92). Despite the facade of 
transparency that the Central Bank likes to project, it cannot even guarantee its own 
fundamental premise: `stability'; because while the post-war period attempted to contain 
international financial instabilities through various capital control mechanisms, Britain's 
present-day capitalism is more exposed to the translation mechanism between domestic 
financial institutions and their global operations (e. g. Hirst and Thompson, 2000), as we 
shall see. 
However, let us draw the reigns of this analysis, take stock and ask the question: 
what was the decade of the 1980s about? Why is the post-war period so different to the 
contemporary period? As the historian Tony Judt informs us here, `within three years of 
the end of the most prosperous decade in recorded history, the post-war economic boom 
was over. Western Europe's `thirty glorious years' gave way to an age of monetary 
inflation and declining growth rates, accompanied by widespread unemployment and 
social discontent' (Judt, 2007: 453). Writing at the beginning of the de-regulatory phase 
in America and Britain, Professor Lester Thurow, an American economist at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, presciently warned that there were `economic 
and political problems' for policymakers whom intended to reduce the rate of inflation, 
increase employment and economic growth all at the same time. As Thurow argued, 
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Inflation is the paradigm zero-sum game. Whenever a price goes up, two things happen. 
Whoever buys that particular commodity finds that his real income goes down. But someone also 
gets that higher price, and his income goes up. That someone may be that seller, but no income 
disappears. For every loser there is a winner. Inflation can redistribute income, but it does not 
lower the total amount to be divided. Everyone cannot be worse off. Some individuals win; some 
individuals lose. This is not an economic hypothesis but algebraic necessity. Everyone wants a 
government that stops inflation, but one that does so by inflating his income and deflating the 
income of everyone else. To stop inflation in the presence of upward price shocks, such as 
energy, governments must adopt policies that lower someone's income. The problem is not 
finding economic policies that will lower incomes, but being able to impose them (Thurow, 1980: 
42, my emphasis). 
Perhaps the political struggle was not as difficult as Thurow had predicted. As Hutton 
argued, in the 1980s, `Britain had become the laboratory for an extraordinary 
experiment in economic theory - and with a dominant party running a centralised state, 
there was no escape' (Hutton, 1996: 68). Thus, Britain's present-day monetary policy 
can be traced explicitly to a series of changes that took place from the outset of 
Thatcher's electoral victory. As Eichengreen argues, capital controls were axial to the 
inauguration of the Bretton Woods exchange rate mechanism (1996: 93-94). While they 
should not be exaggerated, `controls held back the flood [capital flows] because they 
were not just one rock in a swiftly flowing stream. They were part of the series of levees 
and locks with which the raging rapids were tamed' (ibid.: 94). Four such policies were 
introduced that changed matters (see Cameron, 2004: Hamilton, 1986: Hutton, 1996: 
56-81): (1) foreign exchange controls were abolished in 1979 (ibid. ); (2) during the 
post-war period banks were required to hold 30 percent of their assets in liquid form: 
this was abolished in 1980 (Cameron, 2004); (3) between 1973 and 1979, banks faced 
new limits on the growth of their interest-bearing eligible deposits, so that any excess 
would be placed into supplementary special deposits (ibid. ). This framework was 
eliminated in 1980 and replaced with an emphasis on `prudence' (ibid. ), banking 
surveillance or quite simply, self-regulation (Hutton, 1996: 71). 
Before moving onto the forth policy change, these three strands of post-war 
political economy were part of the apparatus of quantitative monetisation, a medium of 
banking sector control (Warburton, 2000: 14-16). To abandon such controls, was to 
hand the reigns over to a financial sector that would become increasingly competitive as 
a result, and which started to fracture and over-lap through de-compartmentalisation, 
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disintermediation and de-mutualisation; as banks and mutual societies entered into 
securities, insurance, mortgage and consumer lending markets (Cerny, 1993: 1994a/b: 
Martin and Turner, 1999: Warburton, 2000). Such policies were the beginning of a 
diversion 'from the inflation path along which [Western economies] had travelled for 
the previous 20 years. Instead of repeating the inflationary cycle.. . these countries 
embarked on a capital markets adventure holiday' (Warburton, 2000: 14). For example, 
the abandonment of foreign exchange controls encouraged British institutional investors 
to place their money overseas, so that by 1982, investors had just less than six times 
more capital invested abroad than what they had in 197835. In 1993,27 percent of all 
pension fund assets were held in international bonds and equities (Hirst and Thompson, 
2000: 247). After foreign exchange controls were scrapped, attention then turned to the 
'fat commissions' and 'the slow old methods of concluding each share deal' that kept 
the 'gentlemen' and City boys in their jobs (BBC, 2006). Having scrapped fixed 
commissions on domestic securities transactions, a more 'accessible' trading system to 
competitors was introduced (Leyson and Thrift, 1997: 133). After this, rules were 
dissolved preventing the foreign ownership of British financial institutions to the extent 
that 'continental European economies are now being 'Americanised' from within, not as 
a result of any 'deliberate strategy but simply through the constant search for equity 
investment opportunities that characterise a 'US model' capitalist economy' (Golding, 
2001: 33). 
Returning back to finish the fourth point. During the disembedding phase of 
financialisation, macroeconomic policy became subject to five-year plans of monetary 
growth. The so-called Medium Term Financial Strategy was introduced (MTFS); a 
fiction of monetary intentions, because public spending, public borrowing and the 
money supply (belonging to bank deposits), 'were all to fall in tandem - and with it a 
projected inflation rate', based on the assumption that the private sector would re- 
catalyse growth (Hutton, 1996: 69) or quite simply 'deindustrialise'. Professor Thurow 
was perhaps wrong to assert that it couldn't be done all at the same time; but while it 
existed on paper, it was illusive in practice36 (see below); and so the interest rate became 
the only real mechanism of adjusting the supply of money growth in the economy 
(Cameron, 2004), which, as we have suggested, was flawed precisely because financial 
institutions were able to tap the 'off-shore' capital market for extra competitive financial 
resources (see Palan, 2002). 
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Returning back to the theme of Thurow's zero-sum game, the most important 
question at this stage is this: who benefited? In his book entitled The Financial 
Revolution in 1986 Adrian Hamilton argued, 
The question now is whether the new world is safer than the old and whether it is conducive to 
economic welfare. The old structures directed funds from savings into employment and housing 
remarkably effectively, whatever the shortcomings in efficiency of old-style compartmentalised 
finance. The new world of finance is efficient. It has brought considerable advantages to the 
investor and the investing institution. What we have still to see is whether it will help to create 
jobs, to create growth and to develop trade (Hamilton, 1986: 29). 
It is interesting to sit back and study this record of history as it stands in its own time. It 
is between a post-war past and pre-embedded financialised future; it is the 
representation of disembedding, because while it contemplates the benefits of the future, 
it remains cautiously optimistic and yet already persuaded by the present course. Firstly, 
we should consider that interest rates were in double-digit figures throughout the 1980s 
and into the 1990s. The average annual change in prices on the year before between 
1974 and 1989 was over ten percent (House of Commons, 1999). Between 1988 and 
1998, prices rose 52 percent (ibid. ). To put this in perspective, every time the Central 
Bank exceeds the target for inflation of 2 percent, a letter is written from the Governor 
to the Chancellor to explain why37. Unlike the post-war period of full employment38, 
unemployment in the 1980s reached highs of 9 percent and lows of 6 percent, increasing 
again to 8 percent during the decade of negative equity in the 1990s (Guardian, 2002). 
The scrupulous process of bank lending and creditworthiness in the traditional 
intermediated bank based model, was replaced with a disintermediated approach that 
secured loans against the value of the asset that was being financed (Warburton, 2000: 
58). Such `efficient', competitive and deregulatory forces rested on the notion that 
people had an innate understanding of financial rationality (cf. Waine, 1995). But in 
effect, negative equity and the recession that resulted from it during the 1990s proved 
that people were `eating their own seed-corn' (Hutton, 1996: 72). 
But even while there was a credit squeeze during the 1980s, there was more 
wealth floating around than ever, or was there? If anything, the 1980s let open the cage 
that contained Marcuse's one-dimensional man (1964/2002); he became multi- 
dimensional in his pursuit of `conspicuous consumption'; except this was not an 
introverted display of moral scruples and class distinction (Veblen, 1925: 61-65), but an 
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extroverted display of competitive hedonism (see Marr, 2007). A little known 
publication entitled Where there is Greed by the Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown MP, soon to 
be Prime Minister of the British Government, demonstrated that the Thatcher years had 
increased wealth to the nation between 1979 and 1989 (see Douthwaite, 1999: 70). 
Except however, the top two percent of the income spectrum gained in equal terms to 
those of the bottom 50 percent (ibid. ). Such high interest rates to control money growth 
benefited those with assets and savings; and those who intended to borrow large 
amounts to keep up with rising house prices were deluded by the hidden (global) 
translation mechanism (Cornford, et al., 1994). In fact, the top 1 percent owned 53 
percent of company shares (Douthwaite, 1999: 70). At the other end of the spectrum, 1.8 
million home-owners suffered the effects of negative equity, mainly those unable to 
help themselves out of debt (Cornford et al., 1994), and in 1991 at the peak of the crisis, 
75,540 homes were repossessed (Guardian, 2003). Britain's popular campaign for a 
shareholding nation wasn't, it would seem, that popular or even that fair. For example, 
even the shares that were attained through privatisation and de-mutualisation served to 
`reinforce social and geographical inequalities in wealth and income' (Martin, 1999b: 
Martin and Turner, 2000) and further reiterated the belief especially in the early years of 
de-regulation, that the financial guardians of savings i. e. life assurance firms and 
pension funds, were a sure bet for people who could afford to save for retirement; but 
not afford to lose. 
What are we saying here precisely? Are we saying that inflation is a social good? 
Are we saying that people do not have a right to pursue their own wealth creation? Are 
we saying furthermore that the idea of popular capitalism was a bad idea? Not at all. To 
deduce these questions would be to miss the point; although, it is readily accepted that 
the analysis above draws parallels to the Marxist argument. For example, Dumenil and 
Levy (2001) argued that finance capital `reversed, in the straightforward sense of the 
word, these trends to its own advantage ... 
it defined, or rather re-established, rules 
guaranteeing its supremacy... In all countries, finance set up new strategies targeted to 
the control of any social forces that could impede its progress'; and secondly, `finance 
attracted huge amounts of income in a general environment of strong tensions on 
distribution' (ibid.: 596). In Marxist terms, whether class emanates from finance capital 
or the gentry class, it is not something that we can avoid; but it is something that can be 
harmonised with other interests and a wider set of goals, at the national and global level 
(at the very least). Thus, the further omission in this Marxist perspective is that finance 
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capital emerged not over social forces, but through social forces that were already 
embedded in the dispositions of the post-war context and the expectation towards what 
the future would bring, especially in the emerging neoliberal policy. As the historian 
Tony Judt argued, 
If the European state could no longer square the circle of full employment, high real wages and 
economic growth, then it was bound to face the wrath of those constituents who felt 
betrayed.. 
. The greatest 
beneficiaries of the modem welfare state, after all, were the middle 
classes. When the postwar system started to unravel in the 1970s it was those same middle 
classes who felt not so much threatened as cheated: by inflation, by tax financed subsidies to 
failing industries and by the reduction or elimination of public services to meet budgetary and 
monetary constraints (Judt, 2007: 462). 
From this, we can now begin to re-interpret the significance of the crisis decades of the 
1970s and the kind of political imagination, which would be used to satisfy this middle 
class politics. In the 1980s, the state had a pension promise to its citizens in the form of 
the Basic State Pension (BSP) and the State-Earnings Related Pension Scheme 
(SERPS). Both National Pension schemes were linked to earnings and not to prices, and 
secondly; SERPS was an additional scheme linked to the incentives of employment (and 
for those not belonging to an occupational scheme), so that a person would receive 25 
percent of his/her earnings, which was conditional on the duration of employment and 
the person's age i. e. a young person would have to work for a greater number of years 
than older people (see Blackburn, 2002a). As Waine argued, this creation of the 1975 
Social Security Pensions Act `was seen as a long-term framework within which earnings 
related pensions could develop' (Waine, 1995: 320). It provided for those who did not 
belong to a company pension scheme and it provided an additional pension income for 
those who could `top up' their own scheme. The Social Security Act of 1980 signified a 
reversal of embedded liberalism, because it introduced a whole host of pension related 
changes (as we shall explore). For simplicity's sake, perhaps the most obvious and most 
glaring one was this: the state pension became linked to prices rather than earnings 
(Blake, 2000: 226). `There was no redress, no discussion; it was taken as axiomatic that 
taxes should fall as a proportion of national output and that SERPS and the basic 
pension alike were too generous' (Hutton, 1996: 200). 
This was an era of fiscal rectitude, where the politician focused on the need for 
monetary discipline. The public deficit during this time was high at the beginning of the 
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1980s, but ironically; the fuss made over monetary targets does not stack up. For 
example, average net public sector borrowing between 1980 and 1985 was £2.3 billion, 
and between 1986 and 1990 it was £1.9 billion39. Not a great deal of difference when 
we consider it soared again to a staggering average of £34.1 billion between 1990 and 
1995 (ibid. ). The government deficit in 1983 was 4 percent of GDP (Guardian, 2001). 
Today, it is 2.7 percent40. Gross national debt was 43 percent of GDP in 1983 (please 
see Appendices, diagram two annex D). In nominal terms this was £143.9 billion. In 
2002, gross national debt was 42 percent and in nominal terms this figure was £434.5 
billion. In percentage terms, we would be splitting hairs to say there was a difference 
between then and now. But in nominal terms, today's public national debt is three times 
larger due to the financialisation- of the (cultural political) economy (financial industry 
worth 17 percent of GDP), which has grown larger and more tolerant of debt as a 
temporal fix for pension fund investment. 
When we begin to make these simple contrasts between then and now, it really 
becomes a wonderment why privatisation happened at all. But again, we may miss the 
point. Privatisation was inseparable from the kind of politics that was emerging out of 
the crisis decades of the 1970s, which balanced the threat of economic insecurity on the 
one hand and hope for a better future on the other. The new politics was an offering of 
freedom from insecurity linked to the simplicity of the `new right's diagnosis of crisis': 
, in its simplicity lay its persuasive capacity' (Hay, 2004: 509). This period of 
disembedding was what Colin Hay has described as the `rationalisation of normative 
neoliberalism ... Accept the assumptions, and neoliberalism was rationalised' (ibid: 514). 
As Hay summed up, 
... the neoliberal economic paradigm 
in Britain was publicly predicated upon public-choice 
inspired narration of the crisis of the 1970s as one of an over-extended state held to ransom by a 
combination of sectional interests (the unions) and the escalating expectations of the electorate. 
The Keynesian paradigm was pronounced obsolete and, with corporatism, held responsible for 
the pervasive and unsustainable condition of stagflation. It was replaced by a combination of 
monetarist macroeconomics and supply-side microeconomics (Hay, 2004: 514). 
So we begin to see, the middle classes, the beneficiaries of the welfare state (Judt, 2005: 
76,462) faced an economy in economic crisis; but this crisis was explained to the 
electorate not just in solutions, but through the assumptions of an economic theory that 
promised to rid the evil of positive liberty; its collective frameworks, institutions and 
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community structures. There `was no such thing as society', as Thatcher famously said; 
and this corresponded to a theory that is `always concerned with showing how the 
Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same' (Foucault, 1966/2002: 370). Perhaps 
the irony is that the middle classes were indeed part of the problem. `After twenty 
years ... a new generation 
had become adult ... they had adjusted their expectations to the 
only experience of their age group, that of full employment and continuous inflation' 
(Hobsbawm: 1995: 285). The very same catalyst that had motivated the post-war 
economy was now deemed to be a threat to people's expectations towards their 
standards of income; and those groups and institutions that attempted to maintain their 
standards of living in a high inflation economy through corporatist arrangements; in 
addition to those public institutions with public money, were identified as the source of 
the problem and a starting point for a solution. But as Thurow reminds us, 
This structure of our economy emanates from a simple human desire. Although falling wages 
and prices might be good for the economy, they are not good for the individuals or groups whose 
income falls along with these falling wages and prices. Each of us organises to avoid being 
subject to falling prices. But if we all succeed, we have an economy were inflation is endemic. 
To stop inflation someone's income must go down (Thurow, 1980: 61). 
Conservatism in the 1980s was therefore closely aligned to the kind of individualism 
propagated by Friedrich Hayek (1944), and we should, with some enlightenment, 
interpret this through Isaiah Berlin's (1969) famous distinction between negative and 
positive liberty. In contemporary economic literature, rhetoric and argument of all 
different kinds and persuasions, there is an inherent bias, with the exception of some (cf. 
Galbraith, 1999: 2004, Shut, 2005: Stiglitz, 2002: Warburton, 2000), towards negative 
liberty based on the pre-theoretical assertion that freedom is a function of Darwinian 
natural selection; as if man has been returned towards his original impulses of survival, 
where man must avoid the impassionate temptation to be emotional, visceral, 
sympathetic and `irrational' in his decision-making; for these are the fires that light 
positive freedom; the inclination to guide man to freedom and hence fuel what is 
abnormal in nature, distort what is naturally imbedded in man, who must learn to live 
once again through knowledge and experience, approach economic life as a cold 
calculating exercise without blame or guilt, to stand tall as an individual above the 
collective with a bond to what is owned - not what is owed, 
in an unchecked economic 
jungle presumed to perfect itself through evolution, regardless of the distortions to 
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negative and positive freedom that this might create. Is there any wonder, therefore, that 
the economy and its institutions were allowed to regulate themselves, as if economic 
nature were a foregone conclusion, as if the ends of economic life were also the means, 
without prior understanding, insight or foresight into the consequences that they create 
for society and politics as a whole, or the privatisation or even financialisation of 
positive liberty that they ironically promote? For example, Ericson et al. (2000) help us 
to understand the significance of this when they argue, 
Neo-liberalism conjures a view of civil society as a self-regulating mechanism of social 
solidarity. In fact, civil society requires massive intervention by the insurance institution in the 
absence of such solidarity. While state intervention itself has been reduced somewhat, at least in 
some areas of social insurance provision, governance is not diminished but rather changed and 
elaborated upon through the insurance institution. Insurance becomes the institution of 
governance, providing administrative and policing capacities for risk management, population 
management, social security and social cohesion. This is governance at-a-distance, embedding 
surveillance and power in centres of calculation and networks or risk communication between 
insurance and other institutions (Ericson et al., 2000: 550). 
Neo-liberalism does not therefore ameliorate or subjugate the potential malfeasance and 
unaccountability emerging from positive liberty. In fact, it amplifies it to a position 
beyond social comprehension, as the guardians of technical control take the core 
questions of our time and turn them into administrative procedures. But let's not get 
ahead of ourselves. There is a clear distinction between `expert-systems' operating 
within a clearly regulated public sphere whose goal it is to serve the many and not the 
few; and those `expert-systems' operating within the context of profit making. 
Delivering a paper to the Actuarial profession in 1968 entitled Social Security and 
Occupational Pension Schemes (before the 1975 Social Security Act cast a long-term 
vision for occupational pensions), C. S. Lyon, an actuary, stated: `I fail to see how those 
of us whose primary concern is with occupational pension schemes can afford to be 
unmindful of their place in a general pattern of social security. Nor can I see how a 
pension scheme can be properly thought out without some underlying knowledge of the 
needs of our people' (Lyon, 1967: 356). 
Following this path, it is now necessary to sum up and get some bearings. We 
have tried so far to examine the broad macro initiators of belief in the shareholder 
society, as well as some of the policies and assumptions informing disembedding 
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governmentality. We have also assessed in detail the legitimation of neoliberalism as an 
economic experiment in deductive theory. But now we must turn briefly to the micro 
changes in Pension legislation that created the stick and the carrot for an autonomous 
movement out of state subsidised and private collective pension schemes; and which led 
to the rise of life assurance as a private vehicle for protecting people's hard earned 
savings, through innovative actuarial and financial strategies designed to out-compete 
other firms in the market, creating expectations of performance that took on a life of 
their own. 
The Personal Pension: Freedom, Structures and Cultural Choices 
As we highlighted above, the Conservative government pledged an attack on all forms 
of collective control or positive liberty, and such institutions were to be unshackled by 
an economic policy that guaranteed monetary freedom and control both at the same 
time. As early as 1956 the British government introduced Retirement Annuity Contracts 
(RACs), a `tax favoured forerunner to today's personal pension plan' (Blackburn, 
2002b: 64). But in the post-war period, both Labour and the Conservatives gravitated 
towards a broad based consensus regarding the central purpose of the collective 
occupational pension fund (Waine, 1992). But in light of the new politics, this post-war 
institution conflicted with the broad aims of individual ownership (Waine, 1995). The 
notion of the Personal Pension managed to `kill two birds with one stone'; because 
while it could reduce the tax burden on the state, reaffirming the middle class belief in 
collective crisis, it also had the potential to devolve investment control from the 
auspices of occupational pension funds and their actuarial managers; so that the 
individual achieved a form of ownership and autonomy regarding the `choice' of 
investment scheme and the `flexibility' within it. 
What is glaringly obvious now, but which was hidden then, is the point that this 
policy represented more of a shift of responsibility from collective social institutions to 
competitive individualised companies. But we can go further. The financial risks and 
uncertainties that were covered by the insurance mechanism of occupational funds, was 
transferred to a relationship between the financial institution and the consumer, where it 
was assumed that the individual had a natural propensity to assess financial risk, and 
where it was assumed that this would take place more `efficiently' within a free-market 
exchange relationship. With the benefit of hindsight, a few questions arise here: (1) why 
were individuals attracted to the Personal Pension given the individual responsibilities 
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and risks that it created, and why did individuals contract out of an occupational pension 
fund with its links to the benefits of SERPS and insurance provision? Barbra Waine 
(1995) helps us to understand the significance of this change, 
The logic of its [personal pension] individualism required just a shift from collective to 
individual forms of ownership but, as corollary, the removal of the putative guarantees of income 
in retirement which were characteristic of collective ownership whether in the form of SERPS or 
occupational schemes (Waine, 1995: 322). 
To put this context, in 1996 7.5 million employees were part of SERPS and a further 1.2 
million employees were `contracted-in' to SERPS through their occupational pension 
(Blake, 2000: 225). At the other end of the spectrum, 3.5 million people (employed and 
self-employed) did not have a pension at all and so were part of the Basic State Pension 
(BSP). On the other hand, 9.3 million employees belonged to 40,000 `contracted-out' 
occupational schemes, which up to 75 percent, were salary related (ibid. ). In the 
personal domain, 7 million (both employed and self-employed) workers were part of a 
Personal Pension Scheme (PPS) (loc. cit. ). By this reasoning, 12.2 million or 42 percent 
of workers were eligible for the state subsidised pension scheme or indirectly through 
their contracted-in occupational scheme. In contrast, 16.3 million or 57.2 percent 
belonged to private occupational or personal pension schemes that did not have access 
to SERPS (Blake, 2000: 224)41. In 1996, it would seem that the private domain of 
personal pension provision had increased not only in relation to the state scheme, but in 
relation to collective schemes too. For example, while only 4 percent of the working 
population had access to SERPS through their occupational pensions, 32.4 percent of 
the working population had contracted-out of occupational schemes. This begs the 
question, what was so attractive about `contracting-out' into an occupational pension 
fund or a personal pension plan? 
It is here that we can begin to assess the micro level changes and incentives that 
rolled out a red carpet of belief in the promise of private pension provision. Arguably 
the most relevant changes (to this discussion) came in the form of four sticks and four 
carrots. Firstly, the Social Security Act of 1980 abolished the link between pensions and 
earnings, and linked them instead to prices (see Blackburn, 2002a: Waine, 1992/1995). 
Secondly, the 1995 Pensions Act introduced two measures that reduced the overall 
benefits and incentives of SERPS: (1) employees would receive a top-up of 20 percent 
instead of 25 percent of earnings from 1999, as we highlighted briefly above (Blake, 
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2000; 226); (2) the method used to calculate the entitlements from SERPS was reduced 
by 2 percent and according to Blake (ibid. ) this reduced the benefits of this scheme by 
about two thirds (loc. cit. )42; (3) the 1995 Pensions Act abolished the state's financial 
responsibility of maintaining an index between occupational schemes and inflation 
(ibid.; 227). Apart from anything, such changes dwindled the generosity of SERPS and 
arguably undermined the benefits of occupational provision (Blundell et al., 2002), 
which have proven, although not definitely, to encourage longevity in employment and 
early retirement (ibid., 2002: 165). 
On the other hand, there have also been a number of carrots. Firstly, what was 
lost as a tax disincentive through the medium of SERPS was gained through financial 
entitlements linked to either contracting out or personal pensions (Blackburn, 2002a: 
Waine, 1992). For example, all contracting out between 1989 and 1993 was rewarded 
with a2 percent National Insurance rebate (Waine, 1992: 323). A similar incentive was 
introduced `even' to discourage people moving back in the opposite direction (Blake, 
2000: 226). An interesting, yet subtle move that deserves out attention is this: under the 
SERPS arrangement, contracted-in schemes were eligible to a guaranteed benefit linked 
to the stated rules of the Social Security legislation of 1975. The Pensions legislation of 
the Major years replaced this guarantee with an emphasis on guaranteed minimum 
contributions (see Waine, 1995: 323). Effectively, this relaxed the rules of the 1975 
legislation and while there is no clear evidence to support the following claim, we could 
infer that this change made it easier and more logical (and probably cheaper) for 
companies to contract-out (Blake, 2000: 223). All these incentives and complex tax 
changes can be summed up by one single change. For example, up until 1988, 
membership of an occupational pension scheme was a compulsory condition of 
employment (Waine, 1992: 33). Pensions legislation, the financial incentives, the 
disincentives, all encouraged people and companies to switch to private forms of 
provision that lacked the benefits and the guarantees of the state system and the strict 
rules that made them possible. 
To put the brakes on this analysis slightly, sometimes we forget that behind the 
numbers and the legislation are people. Using some of the evidence attained from the 
questionnaire conducted in this research, let us briefly take into account the reasons why 
people were persuaded to take out private personal pensions. Firstly, as a cursory glance 
of events in the past, it would seem that the arrival of the personal pension offered both 
incentives and structural constraints for individuals, whom sometimes acted out of 
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convenience, preference for performance, or simply because the emerging field `made 
sense'. For example, let us consider the following responses, 
Respondent 15: 
The advice was from all directions, `your money is safe in pensions' (Q 15) 
Respondent 11: 
They were introduced by the company I was working for then ... 
I started with a company 
personal pension, and on redundancy I continued with Equitable Life as the most simple answer 
to my pension needs. I wouldn't need to change company. I wouldn't lose the benefits added to 
the previous policy.. .1 
didn't shop around. The company I worked for had done some research 
and selected them. On redundancy it just seemed easier to continue a personal pension with the 
same company (Q11). 
Respondent 14: 
When I changed my job in 1984 I found that my employer's pension arrangement were not 
compatible with my previous one. I was thus forced to find a fund into which I could transfer my 
pension fund. This was a `Transfer' policy (Q 14). 
Respondent 16: 
Occupational Pension Fund AVCs... offered by my previous employer as a method of enhancing 
pension (Q16). 
Generally speaking, these responses highlight how the private personal pension emerged 
silently into the lives of everyday people as commonplace practices. In some cases it 
was due to mass exposure to pension discourse and in others it was out of convenience 
and trust in the assurances of company Directors. In some cases it was because the 
government had opened `only' one door to the private sector, without as it were, 
resolving the flaws of occupational pensions. In the final example, we find that there 
begins to be an emphasis on `enhancing' pension `income', to which we now turn. But 
before we do, we must recognise that privatisation was latent in the post-war period and 
that this was associated with the dispositions of individuals. For example, 
Respondent 3: 
My first pensions policy was an Employees type savings plan... occasionally I topped these up 
these.. . with additional voluntary contributions ... 
as I earned larger business 
bonuses... Subsequently I took out an additional Directors Pension Savings Plan ... as a means of 
further tax efficient ways of saving (Q19,20). 
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Respondent 17 
My Father was unable to find work that enabled him to attain a pension. After enforced 
retirement he had no finances other than the state retirement pension. During the first 25 years of 
my working life I too was not able to make provisions other than contributions to a very poor 
insurance policy that my employer introduced. Unfortunately, at that time when one left the 
employer one was obliged to withdraw their contribution (Q26). 
As we can see, during the post-war period private methods of saving were already 
available and they offered a way of boosting saving income. But the attraction to private 
pension provision also seemed to depend on people's dispositions, their sense of 
memory linked to a monetary past, which wasn't cold, but emotive. The poor insurance 
schemes available during this latent period also contrast sharply to a new era that started 
to introduce the notion of financial performance. For example, 
Respondent 13: 
I was worried about inflation and looked for companies which provided some protection against 
it... the market for `inflation-busting' policies was narrow at the time ... I felt sure that I had a 
reasonable chance of counteracting inflation to some extent (Q7). 
Respondent 7: 
The government at that time was actively promoting the new concept of personal pension plans. 
As a young man forced to join a company pension plan where early leavers were subsidising the 
directors and the time-servers, I was particularly susceptible to the argument that at last, all my 
own savings would be applied to my own pension plan... I was aware that frozen final-salary 
benefits from previous employers could become virtually worthless over time in a high inflation 
economy. The opportunities to have a personal control over pension scheme was very attractive 
(Q 18). 
What we find here generally is that the emerging field of (disembedding) 
governmentality opened up channels of self-problem-solving; but these channels were 
guised as new freedoms, choices; to be achieved through individual motivations that 
would conspire and interact to force change upon the private sector, a demand for novel 
goods, where the supply was in its latent stages. What we also find (see respondent 3) is 
that privatisation already existed prior to personal pensions, that there was a certain 
degree of path-dependency about it all. But this did not mean that privatisation was an 
obvious next stage of evolution, because what we also 
find is that behind the extended 
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choices of privatisation were subtle, hidden, if not structural constraints upon which 
public policy failed to act; and so the only way forward was the light that crept beneath 
the door. We also find here the dispositions of people interested to resolve their own 
fears and concerns towards the high inflation economy, which is associated with the 
feeling of a lack of individual control and the necessity to pursue ideas of economic 
freedom, without consideration to what those experimental freedoms might bring. 
Conclusions 
One of the obvious points that stands out from this examination is the following: if the 
state was prepared to make such an effort to privatise and restructure the economy along 
the lines of low inflation, deindustrialisation and popular capitalism, why wasn't the 
same amount of effort used to resolve the issues that constricted the potential of social 
welfare institutions i. e. occupational pensions? Perhaps one of the reasons was because 
there was a genuine belief in the efficiencies of privatisation and of the financial 
markets to instil a culture of self-responsibility, which would, under the assumptions of 
neoliberalism, create a market of interacting economic identities within market 
exchange relations, completely devolved from the systemic influences of the state. As 
Andrew Marr's (see Costello, 2007) excellent television series of British politics 
suggested, Margaret Thatcher may have institutionalised a society quite contrary to her 
own personal objectives -a controversial issue to say the least. But what we have also 
gleaned here is that disembedding govermmentality opened up the idea of personal 
`choice', which satisfied the gurgling stomachs of middle class England, whose post- 
war expectations had heightened during the post-war boom. The future, it would seem, 
could not escape its past, despite a neoliberal philosophy that intended to wipe the slate 
of positive liberty clean. 
Furthermore, we partially addressed here the issue of embedded dispositions, the 
sense of self, which saw in the new economic ideas of personal freedom the `means' of 
increasing pecuniary control and wealth-management. Such incentives not only 
absolved the motivations and residues of post-war continuities, but enabled people to 
perform their own economic imaginations. While privatisation exploded out on to the 
scene during the 1980s, it also remained latent during the post-war phase of growth, 
especially in those pension schemes in the occupational sector, upon where individuals 
were encouraged to `top up' their private pension. On the other hand, it would seem that 
the life assurance market remained largely underdeveloped, and so the primary effect of 
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governmentality, in our case, was to create a significant, albeit opportunistic problem 
for private pension providers to `solve', in ways that would initiate the development of 
innovative ideas in finance, which would be applied performatively to the construction 
of new competitive markets and expert-systems, with new powers of moral authority 
and control, resulting not only from formal legislation, but from the rather obscure 
powers of the `unsaid'. 
One of the assumptions of economic theory is that, under conditions of full 
information, an individual can act rationally. In the shareholder model of capitalism, it 
would seem that the majority of the population was dissuaded from the vagaries of 
stocks and shares, and instead, gravitated towards what was perceived to be a safer 
channel of retirement intermediation. Because economics makes a simple distinction 
between rationality and irrationality, mind and body (see Palan, 2001b), neoliberalism 
was blind to the consequences of shifting the responsibility for welfare on to 
commercial companies that would increasingly radicalise their business strategies in 
order to keep pace with the reflexive logic of demand and competition. We therefore 
turn to an understanding of Equitable Life, a life assurance company that transformed its 
very being into a vehicle of imagined financial futures; which would further disembed 
the individual into entangled expectations of performance, and create new implications 
for the moral governance of financialisation. 
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Chapter Six 
Disembedding the Middle Class Saver: Equitable Life, 
Financial Futures and Sub-politics 
`Equitable is Britain's Enron, say policyholders' 
(Guardian, 2002c) 
`Outrage as Equitable cuts pension policies by 16%' 
(Guardian, 2001b) 
`Put them out of their misery' 
(Guardian, 2002a) 
`Treasury accused of Equitable cover-up' 
(Guardian, 2002d) 
`Even with hindsight, what could we do? 
(Observer, 2000) 
11 
`Equitable victims face a tough battle' 
(Guardian, 2002e) 
Introduction 
These are just some of the headline quotes reflecting the on-going saga that is Equitable 
Life. With parallels to Enron in the United States, Equitable Life is a cultural 
(economic) story that speaks of two very different stages of financialisation. Every end, 
we are told, has a beginning and just like every good story, there are always deeper 
meanings hidden in the narrative connecting two interwoven parts through more subtle, 
even poetic exchanges of meaning and symmetry. This is not to make light of Equitable 
Life or even to call the debacle `poetic', but to suggest that its toppling belongs to a 
stage in social history that we cannot forget and should not forget, because it represents 
a turning point in the unfolding drama of financialisation, where re-embedding is a 
natural consequence of its beginning - of `disembedding'; where financial identities 
have cast aside their contentment and charged forward with ethical questions, questions 
subsumed with an intolerance aimed towards the harbingers of the economic system, 
where financial identity takes on a politico-ethical purpose through years of legal 
wrangling transcending national institutions, finally, to attain acknowledgement and 
accountability at the supranational level. Like settling on new land, the pioneers hope 
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and fight for compensation and borders to satisfy their perturbed longings. What new 
future is this social force erecting and how does it differ qualitatively from what we 
already have? 
In order to understand where this social force is taking us, we must first of all 
understand its beginnings and the cultural context that initiated the momentum of this 
story. In particular, this chapter will seek to understand the vicissitudes of 
financialisation by exploring how Equitable Life transformed the provision and 
regulation of private pensions. Equitable Life was the oldest and most credible life 
assurance company in Britain. Dating back to 1762, Equitable had been at the forefront 
of modem actuarial techniques and in the post-war period was well known for its 
conservative reputation and upper class links. During the post-war period, Equitable 
Life's business was focused towards large public sector contracts with University 
teachers, but also, it had fostered early initiatives in an insurance approach to personal 
pensions from the 1950s onwards (Penrose, 2004). Like so many other financial 
institutions, Equitable Life would begin to restructure the focus of its business during 
the 1970s and 1980s (Morgan and Knights, 1992: Knights and Morgan, 1994). Its long 
running share of the AVC market, a particular approach to retirement funding that 
allowed employees to top up their pensions, continued and progressed Equitable's 
leading position as a private pension provider. The advent of the personal private 
pension in 1988 was a particular opportunity that Equitable Life embraced with popular 
support from its middle to upper middle class target market (Penrose, 2004: 683). In 
sum, the company had made strides in what was shaping up to be a highly competitive 
retail financial sector (see Clarke, 1999). 
Today however, Equitable Life has a much different reputation. Over the course 
of the last decade, up to one million policyholders have lost three billion pounds in 
aggregate (Penrose, 2004). This chapter does not intend to examine the changing 
fortunes of Equitable's reputation, nor is this chapter an historical analysis of how 
policyholders lost their savings with Equitable. This chapter is not about establishing 
blame - as this is achieved 
in countless magazines and independent reports (see 
Penrose, 2004, EP, 2007). Instead, this chapter intends to situate an understanding of 
Equitable Life in the context of financialisation - to understand Equitable Life as an 
`expert-system' with links to a reflexive consumer market in personal private pension 
provision. Due to the wider field of disembedding governmentality, the middle class 
saver became increasingly entangled 
in commercial relationships, and in the case of 
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Equitable Life, savers placed trust in an institution that revolutionised the notion of 
saving based on security with high returns. Equitable Life seemingly generated 
expectations of returns and this became a vital aspect that sustained the business over 
time. 
This chapter is organised as follows. In part one, it will be important to prepare 
the reader with some general background into the case, which will pick out central 
issues for digestion at a later stage. Specifically, we will briefly examine the crisis of 
Equitable Life and the decision by the House of Lords to force the company to uphold 
its pension guarantees. Secondly, we provide an examination of the life assurance sector 
and its contradictory stance to the moral continuities of the post-war economy. In this 
section, we want to explore the general underlying context of the life assurance sector 
and the contours that placed incentives on individuals to make long-term financial 
decisions. Importantly, the undercurrent of disembedding financialisation seemed to be 
an ethical contradiction, as the emerging orientation towards commercial self- 
responsibility rested upon a residue of welfare paternalism. In section four, we make 
tracks towards an investigation of Equitable Life as an expert-system. But before we 
make this leap, we firstly explore the historical significance of Equitable's decision to 
divine the future without sufficient financial resources as a failsafe -a key characteristic 
of financialisation. This historical comparison will give us a sense of Equitable Life's 
innovative nature in relation to others in the competitive field and allow us to 
understand how the institution was socially constructed. We will then use empirical 
information collected from an on-line questionnaire (Annex A, One) to understand why 
ordinary policyholders decided to save with Equitable Life and why their saving 
practices and perceptions made sense. Three general contributory factors mattered in the 
normalisation of Equitable's investment strategy: performance, emulation, 
representation and the post-war disposition. We then explore the regulatory nature and 
conditions surrounding Equitable Life and find that there was an attempt to separate 
cultural issues from economic ones. Lastly, we examine the policyholders' legal case 
against Equitable Life and the social consequences this may have had for re-embedding 
financialisation. 
Background to the case: Economic Fait or Unintended Consequences 
The controversy of Equitable Life began when it sold two different types of guaranteed 
`with-profit' annuity policies (WP) in between 1957 and 1988 (Baird, 2000: Penrose, 
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2004). Conventional WPs were an innovative personal pension product for the emerging 
retail market in private pensions that promised low risk and guaranteed investment 
returns over the contract of a pension cycle. A standard practice of the time was to offer 
a Guaranteed Annuity Rate (GAR) to be bought at the date of retirement. Other options 
included the Guaranteed Annuity Option (GAO), which allowed savers to buy into an 
annuity at current rates either from Equitable Life or from other life assurance 
companies in the business. The GAR was an attractive option because they fixed the 
pension's terminal bonus at an annuity rate so that if economic conditions changed or 
became more uncertain, policyholders could be safe in the knowledge that their annuity 
would not change. The GAR was also attractive because it gave policyholders the 
flexibility of deciding whether to take an annuity based on an assessment of Equitable 
Life's financial performance and external economic conditions, which policyholders 
assumed Equitable could protect against. The problem for Equitable Life was that 
economic conditions did change and its financial performance was prolific, but not in a 
way that was favourable to the viability of the business or the security of contributing 
policyholders (Baird, 2000: Penrose, 2004). The annuity rate that Equitable had offered 
to its policyholders was well below the headline rate, but as inflation and expectations 
towards interest rates began to fall, the GAR option became that much more valuable to 
savers planning for their retirement. In addition, current annuity rates declined in the 
1990s beneath GAR rates, which had been sold in between 1975 and 1998, making this 
a potential issue for the company as a whole. Whether the marketisation of private 
personal pensions in 1988 and the financialisation of Equitable Life's strategies 
coincided with this potential liability remains to be seen, but a key `turning point' seems 
to be the company's `risky decision in 1993 not to build up a reserve to cover the cost of 
GAR liabilities' (Baird, 2001: 5-6). 
For Equitable, due to the fact that so many GARS had been bought (116,000) 
under the `full and fair' distribution policy that it had sold to policyholders, it is 
apparent that the GARS became a tremendous financial burden for the company to 
honour. The Penrose (2004) report confirmed that the Society had sustained a cash- 
outflow to beneficiaries of over-inflated bonus policies creating a black hole in the 
accounts worth £4.4 billion by end of 2001 (Penrose, 2004). The question of when this 
black hole appeared to management is part of the mystery surrounding Equitable Life. 
Some commentators argue that the roots of this crises became apparent as far back as 
the 1970s and 1980s43. It is apparent from the Penrose report however, that a key 
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change occurred during the early 1990s a few years after the promotion of personal 
pensions in 1988. Key to an understanding of Equitable Life is the degree to which 
previous policyholders became the primary beneficiaries due to excessive and sustained 
payouts over the 1990s. This says something of the contradictory stance of the 
institution especially with regard to its policy of fair distribution. While the debacle of 
Equitable Life could be described as an accident, due to exogenous economic 
conditions, this argument tends not to understand how the company helped foster a 
consumer type market for lucrative financial products. Even the very notion of `with- 
profits' is inscribed with connotations of return without risk and while other companies 
competed in this market, Equitable Life took a leading position using its reputation, 
market position and moral authority over welfare related concerns. In this respect, 
`principally, the society was the author of its own demise' (Penrose, 2004), but it was 
also the author of an emerging space in retail finance that set a relationship between the 
actuarial control of investment risk and the expectations of ordinary middle class savers. 
In 1998, Equitable attempted to re-write the history books by reversing 
expectations as the managers came to realise that the fund's deficits were unsustainable 
(Baird, 2000). Equitable Life interpreted the GARs to be a threat to non-GAR 
policyholders. At which point, Equitable Life attempted to manipulate its finances so 
that GARS and non-GARS were treated equally under the policy of `full and fair' 
distribution. The problem was that the Insurance Companies Act of 1982 (see Baird, 
20000: Shelly, 2002) provided a loose and ad hoc framework for defining what 
constituted Policyholders Reasonable Expectations (PRE) within the life assurance 
business. This initially allowed Equitable to take a very broad perspective of what PRE 
meant. Equitable argued that it was within its rights to compensate non-GAR 
policyholders as a result of contingent economic conditions by massaging the bonus 
rate. Complaints began to emerge that Equitable had unfairly altered the returns given to 
GAR policyholders in 1998. Specifically, GAR holders were told that they must either 
drop the annuity option and retain the reversionary bonus or keep the annuity policy and 
accept a decrease in the terminal bonus (Baird, 2000). At which point Equitable Life 
decided to take legal proceedings, to firstly ensure that the reversionary bonus policy 
was lawfully accepted, and secondly, as a damage limitation exercise so that the matter 
was resolved collectively instead of case-by-case. Equitable Life represented the 
interests of non-GARs and the case of Mr. Hyman came to represent the interests of 
GAR policyholders. The case was overturned to the House of Lords after it had been 
223 
referred past two High Courts, from where the Law Lords found in favour of the GAR 
policyholders. 
In June of 2000, the House of Lords ruled against Equitable Life's decision to 
cut bonus rates on 90,000 guaranteed pension schemes, placing the oldest mutual life 
insurer on the brink of collapse and creating serious and sustained losses to the pension 
funds of Equitable's policyholders. The Law Lord's decision was interpreted by 
Equitable's managers that it must uphold the commitments that it had made to GAR 
policyholders. Due to the size of the liability, which was estimated to be over £1.5 
billion (at the time, Baird, 2000), Equitable argued that the firm was no longer 
operationally viable and could not under present financial conditions resolve the GAR 
liability under the circumstances of the business. Plans were therefore made to sell the 
business, but only those parts of the business that remained viable were sold to 
interested parties, leaving Equitable's WP business without a buyer. It was therefore 
forced to close to new business, locking in policyholders into the WP business with 
financial repercussions (Market Value Adjusters) for those who decided to terminate 
their policy. 
The problem with Equitable Life is that it reneged on its promise or guarantee of 
financial performance, which it believed it was within its right to adjust in order to make 
the company viable given its financial responsibilities to all mutual fund members. But 
in this we enter the grey area between what Equitable was legally allowed to do under 
its mutual `with profit' status and what the product guaranteed to do according to the 
`expectations' of policyholders. In this context, it becomes important to understand that 
Equitable's market position and its product range became endowed with economic 
meaning that made sense in the cultural economy of life assurance. Equitable attempted 
to manipulate or go back on the expectations that it had instilled in the product on the 
rather curious and ironic justification that it was protecting and upholding 
policyholder's reasonable expectations (PRE). The Law Lords did not find in favour of 
the small print or Equitable's full and faire distribution policy. It explicitly recognised 
Equitable's part in providing its policyholders with a guaranteed expectation of 
performance. 
This chapter examines the case of Equitable Life in the context of financial 
consumerism. While the GAR policies were an important material consideration 
impacting the financial strength of the firm, it is argued here that Equitable Life 
accelerated this problem because it had developed approaches to investment risk that 
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were designed for identifying a target market and raising the expectations of 
policyholders under the consumer discourse of risk and return. The GAR issue was not 
separate to this development. In fact, it provides an interesting question. Given that the 
GAR became an increasing issue, did Equitable Life believe in its actuarial approach to 
risk to the extent that it could beat the market and its uncertainties? While we will 
attempt to partly answer this question in later sections, for the time being, it will be 
important to understand the historical and social dimensions of Life Insurance from a 
critical and cultural perspective. 
Between Paternalism and Financial Consumerism: Situating Life Assurance 
In the previous chapter, we introduced the notion of the personal private pension within 
the context of popular capitalism. We then demonstrated the micro-strategies used to 
encourage the privatisation of pension provision, and following this, we illustrated the 
subtle practices and individual beliefs informing this normalisation. Now, we move 
gradually towards a focus on the expert-system of Equitable Life, but in order to fully 
appreciate this institution, we need to situate life assurance in the context of what 
seemed to be a contradictory relationship between post-war paternalism and financial 
consumerism. We begin this by constructing a traditional idea of what insurance is. 
In order to fully appreciate the political significance of Equitable's innovative 
approach to saving and investment, it will be important to draw upon a definition of 
insurance from a critical perspective. Ewald (1991) helps us to answer this question by 
arguing that insurance is an abstract technology `that makes possible a range of 
insurance combinations shaped to suit their assigned function and utility effect' (Ewald, 
1991: 197). What is relevant for Ewald is the insurance `form' or the social contexts that 
necessitate for the idiosyncratic employment of insurance technology (loc. cit. ). Ewald 
does not conceive of changes in the nature of insurance as part of a transhistorical 
development, but as discursive shifts in the cultural constitution or the 'insurantial 
imaginary': `that is to say, on the ways in which, in a given social context, profitable, 
useful and necessary uses can be found for insurantial technology' (Ewald, 1991: 198). 
Key to all such developments is the employment of risk as a `technology of insurance' 
(loc. cit). The significance of risk for Ewald is how it is first identified in synch with a 
specific purpose or interest, and secondly, how it is represented as a tangible danger 
amenable to the objective and calculative methods of probability (Knights and 
Vurdubakis, 1993: 731). `By objectivising certain events as risks. .. 
it can make what 
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was previously an obstacle into possibility' (Ewald, 1991: 200); but while risk is 
considered to be a technology of insurance, the calculation of risk does not define 
insurance. The identification of risk through probability calculus alone takes us into the 
realm of speculation and limits Ewald's wider treatment of risk in the context of 
insurance`. While the application of probability calculus to statistics determines the 
chance event in relation to the individual, `strictly speaking there is no such thing as an 
individual risk; otherwise insurance would be no more than a wager. Risk only becomes 
something calculable when it is spread over a population' (Ewald, 1991: p. 203). 
As we can plainly understand, collective insurance is something completely 
different to insurance achieved through individual risk-management strategies. And yet, 
the latter compels individuals into thinking that uncertainties can be calculated, through 
responsible methods of calculation. While this is more strongly associated with the re- 
embedding phase of financialisation, disembedding encouraged its movement. For 
example, the differentiation of tax advantages connected to certain sectors and products 
encouraged institutional investors to expand and diversify, placing an emphasis on 
saving as a performance based product to be sold by a competitive mass retail market 
(HM Treasury, 2002b). According to the Sandler report (ibid. ), the tax system helped 
shape the class contours of Britain's privileged private saving system45. The 
combination of a regressive tax system and the state's hand in setting the priorities of 
performance criteria influenced the development of the cultural economy of life 
assurance. 
By placing tax advantages as the central criteria towards how savers understood 
`performance', providers used this to their marketing advantage. The complexity of tax 
differentiation also increased the need for savers to rely on expert knowledge, from the 
advise of sales experts and independent financial advisors on how best to channel 
savings in order to receive the best tax advantages (HM Treasury, 2002b: 136-140). 
Disembedding encouraged a scrupulous tendency on behalf of savers to look for product 
advantages that give better returns (ibid. ). As the Sandler report admitted, `clearly, 
given product providers' need to sell products in a competitive market place, they have 
to respond to the consumer and adviser preferences identified above, though it can be 
argued that providers contribute to the shaping of these preferences through their 
marketing strategies' (HM Treasury, 2002b: 141). This has contributed towards the idea 
of performance as being related to the provision of individual `needs' (Knights et al, 
1994), creating `expectations of performance' mimicking in many ways, the `Great 
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Expectation Machine' of the financial system (Golding, 2001). Knight et al. (1994: 51) 
help us to understand the relationship between expectations and needs in a more critical 
context. While Knight et al. (1994) do not deny the importance attached to individual 
expectations towards financial products, `such a view neglects the way in which needs 
are as much a consequence as a condition of marketing and other supplier activities 
rather than a property of individuals which is identifiable prior to consumption' (Knight 
et al., 1994: 51). Knight et al. 's central argument is that financial marketing had become 
a useful framing device `for identifying the pattern and content of consumer `needs' and 
(re-)designing products and targeting their distribution so as to exploit this knowledge 
profitably' (Knight et al., 1994: 43). As Michael Clarke captured the issue, in one of the 
only academic books describing retail financial regulation, 
To put the problem simply, a free competitive market in the provision of products affecting long- 
term financial security involves an expectation that they will perform well. Consumers however, 
really only have one chance to get it right' (Clarke, 1999: 15). 
One of the important consequences of situating life assurance in financial consumption 
has been to frame Policyholders Reasonable Expectations (PRE) as a paternalistic issue 
linked to the moral governance of private self-regulation. In simple terms, life assurance 
creates the potential for savers to benefit from investment performance. As we will 
become familiar with in later sections, contributors progressively gain from with-profits 
over the lifetime of a pensions cycle, because of the technical ability of retail investors, 
through fund management and actuarial calculations, to `smooth' past the peaks and 
troughs of financial cycles. PRE is therefore defined by a relationship between 
policyholders and life assurance firms. What actually defines the relationship is 
governed by the particular aims of the life assurance company, which based on tacit 
assumptions, will deliver what present and future policyholders expect. In the 
disembedding phase, it was assumed that policyholders had a `reasonable expectation' 
of their investment performance achieved on the basis of trust between the expert- 
system and the individual. In the re-embedding phase, there have been calls for `greater 
transparency about the performance of the with profits fund in any given year [which] 
would give policyholders a `reasonable expectation' that they would receive whatever 
return was reported that year' (HM Treasury, 2001: 140). In the re-embedding phase, 
it 
is assumed that `more' information can absolve financial risk, but we should also notice 
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here how the responsibility, as a natural consequence of transparency, becomes 
individualised. 
As a statutory concept, PRE first came to light in the political domain as a result 
of the Sir Hilary Scott Committee report on Linked Life Assurance, which led to the 
Insurance Companies Amendment Act in 1973 (Baird, 2000: Shelly et al., 2002). These 
changes led to the creation of state powers to intervene in any occasion where PRE had 
not been met. The powers were residual and confined to understanding solvency and 
prudent management and intervention depended on certain circumstances arising. 
Significantly, the Insurance Companies Act in 1982 placed a greater emphasis on the 
`continual monitoring by the appointed actuary' (Shelly, 2002). While PRE was a 
statutory concept, the political vacuum that it created enabled life assurance companies 
to take up the reins of self-regulation. As Shelly (2002) argued, `because the 1982 Act 
does not contain any definition of policyholders' reasonable expectations, the regulators 
and the actuarial profession have built up an informal framework over the years to 
determine what are policyholder's reasonable expectations' (Shelly, 2002)46. Morgan 
and Knights (1992) help us to understand the significance of this when they argue, 
... the making 
for life assurance products was embedded in a set of social relationships which 
was principally controlled by the companies, in conjunction with the state. Clients were 
considered as suffering from a moral deficit; demands for immediate gratification displaced their 
moral responsibilities (Morgan and Knights, 1992: 43). 
To define Policyholders Reasonable Expectations (PRE) would be to make the rules 
regarding the regulation of life assurance during the disembedding phase explicit. Often, 
events are shaped by what is said and what is done; but equally events are also shaped 
by what is `not' said or done. In this case, the `unsaid', the silence of inaction stabilised 
the market for private pension provision to develop according to its own competitive 
and pecuniary motivations. However, in transferring responsibility to the life assurance 
sector and private pension providers, the state's moral interest was to thwart the natural 
desires of private investors, appealing to the expert knowledge of financial practitioners 
to guarantee this stability. Afterall, the shareholder society envisioned by the 
Conservative government failed to produce popular capitalism. Instead, there was an 
interest to sew the seeds of financial intermediation as an alternative channel to self- 
ownership, which satisfied savers and compelled investors to act upon the demand that 
had been catapulted their way. But by encouraging the opacity of retail products such as 
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`with-profits' and by legitimating the autonomy of expert decision-making in retail 
finance, the state underestimated how the commodification of knowledge would lead to 
processes of marketisation, which in turn, would force a momentum of competitive 
forces on expert-systems to keep up with the `needs' of the saver. This contradiction 
between post-war paternalism and financial consumerism even became explicit at the 
level of public policy. As Barbra Waine (1995) argues, 
The difficulty with such caveats and concessions to traditional concerns was that they were 
inconsistent with the chosen policy instrument and legislative framework which was to be put in 
place. Conservative ministers were, in effect, reinvoläng paternalism by suggesting that personal 
pensions were inappropriate for certain groups and that far from being a mechanism for the 
promotion of individual ownership with universally positive effects, personal pensions could be 
highly problematic for a number of potential participants. At the same time, their commitment to 
anti-paternalism required them to abdicate any responsibility for controlling who moved out of 
SERPS or occupational pensions (Waine, 1995: 324). 
To sum up, disembedding governmentality opened up a series of choices for the 
individual, which would present as a series of problems to be solved, so that the 
individual could individualise the solutions and tailor them to personal needs. During 
this phase, the individual became indirectly tied to the performance of high-risk 
financial markets, where the state protected the integrity of institutional practices both 
explicitly, through legal restraints and tax incentives, but also implicitly: through the 
`unsaid'. Disembedding governmentality augmented the organisation of the cultural 
economy around the alert interests of high-income earners and marketing experts, 
towards performance criteria that contradicted the residues of the post-war moral 
economy. As a consequence, life assurance began to move away from humanitarian 
forms of insurance towards pension insurance based on investment style returns, as life 
assurance companies began to foster a relationship between individual consumers and 
investment risk based on the quality of investment returns. At the same time, the state in 
this deregulatory climate shifted the responsibility for paternalism on to the business 
interests of competitive companies. Finally, disembedding opened the floodgates to a 
new kind of saver interested in satisfying the very same performance expectations that 
expert-systems began to adopt. We will now furnish this concern with the expert-system 
through an understanding of Equitable Life. 
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The Expert-System: Equitable Life, Innovation and the Missing Estate 
Lest we forget: the Estate 
Before we can appreciate the significance of Equitable Life's innovative approach to 
financial consumerism, it is important to go back to 1952 when Redington (1952), an 
actuary, wrote a seminal paper that would attempt to tackle some of the self-regulatory 
dilemmas of life assurance as a whole. Central to Redington's ideas was his observation 
that market conditions had become more uncertain and unstable, and that it was possible 
to begin thinking of ways to make events more `probable' (Redington, 1952: 286-287). 
Redington proposed that market uncertainties could be overcome through 
`immunisation', which signifies `the investment of the assets in such a way that the 
existing business is immune to a general change in the rate of interest' (ibid.: 289). 
Redington proposed that it was possible to calculate the probability of long-term asset 
streams so that any change in the level of interest would not effect the solvency of the 
liabilities. While Redington believed that `physical determinism' had `given way to a 
more flexible philosophy with probability and statistics' to help cope with uncertainty, 
Redington argued that assumptions governing long term yield owed their respect to an 
`expanding funnel of doubt' (Redington, 1952: 287). While Redington believed that it 
was possible to match liabilities with assumptions towards yield, the problem particular 
to life assurance was `presentational' (Redington, 1952: 298). 
Redington recognised that a life assurance company had two central objectives 
which seemed to be at complete odds with each other (Redinton, 1952: 289). The first 
was to ensure that the fund was solvent, that liabilities were matched on the basis of 
market values. Secondly, as life assurance firms generated business on the basis of 
producing surplus for policyholders, life companies had to ensure that investment 
surplus was fairly distributed and presented for public scrutiny. This created a dilemma 
because an active valuation policy was essential in order to ensure solvency, but on the 
other hand, surplus could only be realised on the basis of a passive valuation policy 
(Redington, 1952: 304). The significance of the passive valuation policy was 
contradictory to the active policy, because it depended on long-term discounted 
assumptions of yield to realise surplus, which if notional, could not be defined as a true 
picture of `solvency' (Redington, 1952: 304). As Redington argued, `it is this conflict 
between solvency demand for an active policy and the equity demand for a passive 
policy which is the core of our problem' (loc. cit. ). 
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Due to the nature of this contradiction and the demands of the business, the 
leaning towards a passive valuation policy underlined the importance of an `Estate' to 
deal with this problem in times of market uncertainty. The Estate as defined by 
Redington was an important notional part of the business for setting aside capital 
reserves in order to cushion the impact of volatility. Redington argued that capital 
reserves could be held in: (1) the liabilities (through a valuation basis): (2) in the assets 
(considering the margin between book and discount rates) or: (3) in a central reserve. 
Redington's caution was that the value of liabilities were `not of fact but of opinion' 
because the `liability cushion cannot be used except by changing the valuation basis' 
(Redington, 1952: 305). While the liability cushion had been vital for life offices in the 
past, Redington warned that `that there was a danger of going to far the other way' 
(Redington, 1952: 305). Relying on an asset cushion from derived assumptions of 
investment returns and similarly, adjusting the valuation basis for liabilities, seemed to 
be out of touch with creating a fair and consistent distribution framework. As Redington 
summarised his feelings, 
The broad picture, which emerges from these considerations, is that a passive valuation policy is 
desirable in the interests of equity, and the maintenance of central reserve funds at a reasonable 
level is an economical way of holding the additional reserves, which may be required to 
demonstrate solvency in changing conditions (Redington, 1952: 306, my emphasis). 
Since Redington (1952) wrote his paper in 1952, the business of life assurance and of 
the financial sector has become increasingly consumer orientated. What Redington 
probably could not have anticipated was the growth of life assurance as a highly 
competitive `retail' activity where the focus seemed to be increasingly mass `market-led 
rather than product-led' (Knights et al., 1994: 42). From the mid 1960s, Equitable Life 
was a relatively insular and conservative life office serving a `narrow market' (Penrose, 
2003: 683). The change seemed to occur during the 1970s when Equitable began to 
loose its primary business due to a decline in demand from the Federated 
Superannuation Scheme for Universities (FSSU), due to legislative changes (Penrose, 
2004: 683). From this point on, Equitable Life was spurred on to re-invent itself and 
`elected on active marketing, and adopted a series of strategies aimed at 
increasing 
market penetration' (Penrose, 2004: 683). 
At the end of 1988, Equitable Life changed 
track towards the mass-consumer market in personal pensions, and 
developed various 
innovative practices designed to facilitate competitiveness and growth (Penrose, 2004: 
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683-692). This move was characterised as `legitimate business' taking on board public 
welfare functions. 
The Performativity of Finance and Marketing 
You may also like to reflect that while Ranson was an experienced and forceful man coming near 
to retirement, Headdon was his very much younger acolyte. His lack of experience of the world 
may have prevented him from understanding Sod's Law, to wit 'If anything can go wrong then 
sooner or later it will'. It is the sort of thing which actuaries should imbibe with their mother's 
milk, but Headdon may have been fed Formula instead. 47 
In 1989, two actuaries of Equitable Life, one of which is today now at the centre of 
public controversy, presented a paper called `With Profits Without Mystery' to the 
actuarial profession describing their new and innovative approach to with-profit policies 
(Ranson and Headdon, 1989). Part of establishing the mass-market for private pensions 
was the claim to originality, which required the novel construction of financial 
knowledge, which would effectively raise Equitable Life's social position in the 
competitive field of life assurance. Before Equitable Life earned its place in the 
hierarchy of representation, the central concern of making a private investment was the 
risk of losing the value of savings from unpredictable cycles in the market. 
Conventional firms that offered private investment schemes such as Unit-linked firms 
were limited in catering to this demand as they could not promise increasing guarantees 
over the long-term (HM Treasury, 2001). Furthermore, investment volatility and fees 
were transparent and so they were framed as unsuitable for retirement savings and lower 
to middles class earners (Ranson and Headdon, 1989: see HM Treasury 2001/2002b). 
Conventional retail saving accounts could also not build up sustainable funds for 
retirement (Ranson and Headdon, 1989). The case was put forward that Equitable's 
`with profit managed fund' concept did everything that typical Unit-linked or Friendly 
Societies did, except Equitable insured against investment risk and guaranteed `security 
with returns' (ibid.: 307-308). The argument by Ranson and Headdon was that `the 
combination of performance based on a diversified portfolio, a 
degree of smoothing to 
iron out peaks and troughs of asset performance, and increasing guarantees over a policy 
term is not seen in any mass-marketed investment product' (ibid.: 303). 
Typical with-profit policies smoothed out investment performance, but what was 
particular to this strategy was the guaranteed nature of 
investment performance. WP 
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policies were unlike any other product offered to savers, as contributions towards the 
fund were collectively pooled and invested in a number of different performing assets 
(Ranson and Headdon, 1989: HM Treasury, 2002b). Such assets had, according to 
actuarial logic, different time horizons in their economic cycles, therefore producing 
diverse risk return ratios over a period of investment. For example, stock market shares 
produced greater returns, but were riskier investments, which is why investment was to 
be spread across a number of safer assets (property, government bonds), albeit with 
lesser premiums attached. However, the WP concept meant that up until the maturity of 
the policyholder's pension scheme, investment would be constantly `smoothed' out and 
distributed according to the contracts of individual schemes. The WP policy sold by 
Equitable was therefore an engineered contract designed to protect policyholders from 
the risks attached to the short-term movements in market values, but also to guarantee 
financial security by increasing returns over the pension cycle. One actuary commenting 
on Equitable's initiatives described smoothing as `the insurance of investment risk' 
(Jenkins in Ranson and Headdon, 1989: 326). 
During the post-war period, deterministic actuarial techniques were traditionally 
used to make valuation assumptions of assets and liabilities (cf. Ren and Stewart, 1981). 
In both cases, the actuary could make assumptions regarding the value of liabilities, for 
example, in allowing for new entrants or for re-adjusting asset streams for new entrants 
(cf. Redington, 1952: Erza, 1980). In other words, the calculation of investment risk was 
not an exact science and it was based on underlying assumptions of probable investment 
returns and considerations towards liabilities. In the context of the pension fund, 
solvency valuation had to meet the consideration of clients. But in the context of the life 
assurance company and referring back to Redington's thoughts (1952: 304), there was a 
tension between solvency demands for regulators and equity demands for savers. This 
tension became grossly exaggerated in the context of Equitable's financial strategy, 
which was supplanted by its relationship to financial consumers and the products it had 
previously sold. 
Thus, Equitable Life was unlike other firms selling WP policies. The authors 
argued that the `Estate' had become an outdated and redundant policy of older life 
assurance firms (Ranson and Headdon, 1989: 317). It was a company intent on 
expanding and diversifying. The practitioners that designed Equitable's 
investment 
strategy believed that holding spare assets into an Estate for a rainy day constrained the 
ability of the company to grow, which was inconsistent with the company's policy of 
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`Full and Fair' distribution (Ranson and Headdon, 1989). The argument by Headdon 
and Ranson (1989: 317) was that an Estate constrained growth and the ability of 
policyholders to participate in the fruits of investment strategy. But more importantly, 
this was wrapped up in the language of Policyholders Reasonable Expectations (PRE). 
Equitable Life introduced the notion that an Estate for financial safety was no longer 
needed, because the calculation of risk could be employed to ensure smoothing would 
meet PRE. As Ranson and Headdon argued, `it would appear to be particularly difficult, 
for example, to explain to product disclosure that not all of the investment return on a 
policyholder's savings will be retuned to him because some will be retained to build up 
the `estate" (Ranson and Headdon, 1989: 318). Unlike Redington's suggestion of 
holding spare assets into a central reserve, the authors argued that market uncertainties 
could be controlled through actuarial smoothing. This meant ultimately that Equitable's 
solvency was based on its ability to create investment surplus, but also to re-calculate 
assumptions towards assets and liabilities. As the authors argued, `for our office we 
would regard it as reasonable to take the assets not required to cover the liabilities as 
essentially equal to the `investment reserve' - i. e. the difference between market value 
and written-up book value of assets' (Ranson and Headdon, 1989: 317). 
While actuarial smoothing was an important part of smoothing, `moral 
governance' also played a key role in what Equitable described as a `full and faire' 
distribution policy. The insurance of investment risk, in one sense, transcended 
generations and time. By instilling the notion that time was of no consequence, that 
investment performance was based on the technical ability to smooth past peaks and 
troughs, Equitable created trust through the concept by appealing to the immorality, 
insecurity and selfish tendencies embodied in the speculative tendencies of the `other' 
(Morgan and Knight, 1992). While this is not to be overplayed, it is important in the 
sense that Equitable was represented as the antithesis to financial institutions and other 
developments in the consumer driven society. But Equitable Life and its authors 
contradicted this representation, because they had already dispelled the `myth of an 
estate', something that Redington feared would happen (1952: 305). The success of 
conventional WP policies were in some sense predicated on the notion that capital 
would be spared, possibly into an estate when market values were rising, in order to 
provide cover for when markets became depressed (Redington, 1952). Redington had 
observed that life assurance companies had access to a three-cushion system from which 
to absorb and smooth investment volatility. Equitable Life, it would seem, believed in 
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its financialising powers to combine asset-management and marketisation; and the two 
were inextricable. 
The notion underpinning this was the promise that all policyholders, as part of 
the family mutual fund, would benefit equally from the institution's entire investment 
strategy. Therefore, as the ratio of contributors and beneficiaries changed over different 
cycles of the market, WP policies sold by Equitable Life promised that no generation of 
policyholder would be advantaged or disadvantaged by these uncertainties. But this had 
a further dimension to it. As without the guarantee of full and fair distribution, 
policyholders might be protected from exogenous financial risks, but not necessarily 
against the indigenous interests of other policyholders. With no estate, policyholders 
were gaining in the surplus fruits of investment strategy, which was to be presented to 
policyholders in the form of bonus information so that the `present value of their 
contractual benefits including declared bonuses was shown on bonus notices together 
with the amount of final bonus which would apply if benefits were payable 
immediately' (Ranson and Headdon, 1989: 312). With this assurance made in the 
contract, policyholders were assured by the guarantee of Equitable's WP policies that 
there was to be no unfair advantage given to one set of policyholders in comparison to 
another. This was a highly marketable claim and it legitimated the notion that in order to 
provide security and stability in the long-term, all policyholders must be equally 
controlled under the moral integrity of Equitable's particular approach to actuarial risk. 
Technical knowledge was therefore making a moral claim over the economy, which was 
guarded by the statutory ambiguity of PRE. But this undoubtedly gave producers 
unaccountable and unhinged authority to determine how particular investment strategies 
were employed, which did not explicitly prioritise or protect the collective interests of 
all policyholders. 
Equitable Life promoted itself as a company that could create superior returns 
with the added bonus of security from smoothing investment risk. Two main elements 
contributed to this notion. Firstly, actuarial valuations of assets and liabilities set higher 
than average terminal and reversionary bonus information, which were entirely notional 
in practice. Secondly, the bonus was an important part of Equitable Life's marketing 
campaign. As Equitable Life made a switch into the market for personal pensions, `a 
highly competitive market dictated the level of bonus allocation. The surplus published 
by the Society became a function of the desired level of bonus' (Penrose, 2004: 689). 
The implication was that as bonus levels were set too high, and especially for older 
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generations of policyholders, their projected bonus levels became inflated as interest 
rates fell below guaranteed rates. As beneficiaries dipped into their savings, the cash- 
outflow was not represented by changes in the re-valuation of liabilities. In fact, in some 
respects, the appointed actuary took into consideration anticipated asset streams, from 
equities for example, to correct the books. As one expert argued, there was `no 
relationship between predicting the future value of assets and underlying liabilities48. As 
guaranteed levels were high, policyholders were also able to top up their funds in order 
to make gains from the economic conditions. The other implication was that high bonus 
information became important to the marketing of Equitable Life's personal pension 
plans. As cash-out flows increased and as investment conditions fluctuated, cash- 
inflows from new contributors helped revive the valuation of liabilities49. The ease of 
valuation was also made possible due to the nature of the `recurrent single premium' 
contracts sold to policyholders. If policyholders took out a pension plan and wanted to 
contribute more to their pension, this was represented as another plan. In other words, 
lots of little mini policies made up one large liability from which the actuary department 
would have to calculate5o 
Equitable Life ran the marketing strategy in-house so that there was no 
commission payable to third parties such as Independent Financial Advisors (IFAs). Not 
only were expenses kept low; there were also no shareholders. This was also a 
favourable characteristic that differentiated Equitable from other providers and products, 
which built upon its historical credibility as the world's oldest life assurance firm with 
reputable public institutions and law firms as the main clients. From an outside analysis 
looking in, it appears as if there was a deliberate nexus between finance and marketing. 
In fact, the links or cross reporting between the marketing, actuarial and the investment 
departments of Equitable Life were ambiguous and strained. This produced a difficult 
exchange between marketing colleagues and the actuarial department. `When things 
went well, marketing took the credit', `when things went bad, actuaries took the blame' 
51. While Equitable Life was split into three different departments, it is clear that the 
`managed fund' concept was at the centre of actuarial control just as Ranson and 
Headdon said it was. `It is fair to say that, once accepted, the concept permeates all 
areas of the financial and actuarial management of the office and plays a 
fundamental 
role in the product design' (Ranson and Headdon, 
1989: 305). The actuaries had put 
forward a `with profits managed fund approach' which was to be firmly rooted in 
consumer discourse and secondly, as the appointed actuary was also the 
`whistle- 
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blower' under the Insurance Companies Act (Shelly, 2002), marketing flowed from the 
actuary's valuations. Ranson and Headdon proposed that they could maximise the 
business of WPs in the interests of their financial institution and of their policyholders in 
such a way as to link the performance of investment with the expectations of 
policyholders. `Surely a more realistic approach, as is necessarily used with linked 
policies, is to define the rate of future growth which the client (and his lender) are happy 
to anticipate' (Ranson and Headdon, 1989: 319). 
This was all in the interests of creating full and faire distribution and 
constructing policyholders' reasonable expectations (PRE). As Ranson and Headdon 
argued, `in practice, policyholders tend to want reversionary bonuses to be as high as 
possible to avoid the potential volatility of too great a concentration on final bonus' 
(Ranson and Headdon, 1989: 308). Did this not also demonstrate that Equitable Life 
was acting in the interests of consumers, who demanded certain levels of financial 
performance? We will explore this below, but for now, it is implicit that financial 
knowledge and marketing knowledge reaffirmed each other. For example, smoothing in 
Equitable's terms depended on the actuarial calculations of long-term investment 
performance, which meant that there had to be a close relationship between the actual 
investment strategy, managed by specialist investment practitioners, and the predicted 
value of those investments, which depended on the fundamental advice of actuaries 
(Ranson and Headdon, 1989). For Equitable's WPs to live up to their own progressive 
performance guarantees, low levels of capitalisation or reserve funds required an even 
greater emphasis on predicting the market. But to do so, it also had to take 
`expectations' along with it, which seemed to make perfect sense in the cultural 
economy of life assurance. 
For example, Equitable Life presented a reversionary bonus rate and a final 
bonus rate. The reversionary bonus rate reflected, in simple terms, the percentage 
increases and decreases of declared returns from investment. The final bonus was the 
expected amount based on current contributions and investment. As market values 
declined, this created implications for the declaration of bonus. It is apparent that the 
notional values in the unconsolidated part of the final bonus were increased in order to 
make up for disparaging investment returns (Penrose, 2004: 130). As they were 
notional, they did not have to be honoured in practice and such practices were legitimate 
under `smoothing'. As the appointed actuary demonstrates this point, `in technical 
terms, any presentational problems created by declaring a bonus can almost certainly be 
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mitigated by weakening the valuation basis' (Headdon in Penrose, 2004: 130). Such 
actuarial practices in their commodified form misrepresented solvency and bonus 
information for savers at the same time. While economic conditions were slumped, the 
practice of smoothing enabled Equitable Life to present a surplus at the same time that it 
had suffered negative investment returns at book value52 (Penrose, 2004: 127-138). At 
successive stages of Equitable's business from the 1970s up to the late 1990s, actuarial 
smoothing was used as a device to maintain high bonus levels and the appearance of 
solvency (Penrose, 2004: 683-692). In other words, Equitable Life, contrary to 
Redington's feelings, did not adequately save financial resources into an Estate, because 
the insurance of investment risk enabled Equitable Life to create favourable bonus 
information for savers through manipulation of its assets and calculations towards 
uncertainty. This bonus information became important, because as long as it could 
attract new customers through favourable bonus information, the business could survive. 
For example, in the mid 1990s, the President of the Society made this praising statement 
of his company and his financial directors, 
The bonuses which are added to policies are of the greatest importance to all our members. This 
year we have seen the benefit of the with-profit system in smoothing out fluctuations in 
investment returns. Most fund managers with balanced portfolios, including ourselves, suffered 
negative investment returns last year. However, your Directors have been able to maintain the 
bonus rates at the levels established at the beginning of 1994. Our philosophy is, as ever, to 
produce consistently fair and attractive across the full range of our policies (John Slater in 
Penrose, 2004: 149-150). 
Again the notion of security with returns was something that depended on Equitable's 
approach to financial smoothing, which meant that uncertainties could be tamed by 
liquidity and returns through the full expertise of novel financial and actuarial 
calculations. Depending on the projected cycles of the market and the broad investment 
strategy across different classes of assets, Equitable could manipulate its finances across 
the pool of the firm. This meant that policyholder's investments were pooled into a 
common investment strategy despite whether or not the class of investor was a GAR or 
a non-GAR, an early or a late contributor. This placed an emphasis on the autonomy and 
discretion of Equitable to fairly distribute bonuses according to the performance of the 
firm over the short and long-term. The Insurance Act of 1982 (Shelly, 2002) allowed 
this approach to take place, which effectively meant that distribution policy, or 
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presentation policy, was up to the discretion of management, overseen of course, by the 
appointed actuary. As the authors of Equitable Life's financial and marketing strategy 
put it, 
It is felt that such a presentation gives clients a helpful insight into how their policy benefits, 
both consolidated and unconsolidated, are building up. For new contracts, such as personal 
pensions, the present value presentation will be the only one used (Ranson and Headdon, 1989: 
321). 
The implications on bonus distribution were irrelevant, because as long as the expected 
bonus was maintained, the reversionary bonus could go up or down without complaint. 
`In our view the reasonable expectations of policyholders are that an office will conduct 
its affairs so as to produce the best return in the conditions that prevail, and will 
distribute those returns fairly between different participatory policyholders in such a 
way which smoothes the emergence of the earnings' (Headdon and Ranson, 1989: 320). 
The product's performance strategy was maintained by an active bonus strategy 
designed to protect and uphold the integrity of Equitable's `expert knowledge'. The 
organisation of the cultural economy around bonus levels provided the calculative 
context for Equitable's unique bonus policy, which incorporated the expected maturity 
value of each policy into annual statements, something that was quite idiosyncratic to 
the company's strategy. Raising policyholders expectations through `hope' estimates 
was therefore an implicit strategy in order to tie down or seduce savers under the 
presentational device of bonus information which created incentives for policyholders to 
maintain their policy or buy new ones. There was no reason to suspect anything other 
and even if there were, it would have been difficult to access. For Equitable's financial 
position made sense, given its own unique stance towards WPs. If bonus levels had 
changed, this made sense under the context of Equitable's WP policy. 
What is in fact surprising is that under the `with profits' managed fund concept, 
there was no way of understanding the effectiveness or safety of Equitable Life's 
investment strategy. Unless one was an economist or financier, there was no way of 
slipping past the social technologies that gave economic meaning to Equitable's 
financial strategy. The reason, as the peer review of Ranson and Headdon's paper made 
clear in 1989, was that Equitable's bonus policy seemed to 
be based on the vital 
assumption that financial conditions would remain constant and within a stable 
bandwidth (see Ranson and Headdon, 1989: 326-345). This was probably consistent 
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with the deterministic assumptions that the actuaries were relying on. In particular, 
rising share values, high inflation conditions, life expectancy and the level of 
contributors etc., were all conditions that the peer review team expected to be part of the 
assumptions underpinning the conceptual design of the paradigm (see Ranson and 
Headdon, 1989). In fact, heavy warnings emerged in the peer review of Ranson and 
Headdon's paper. One actuary, in particular, seemed not only to describe what actually 
did happen in prescient detail ten years earlier, but openly criticised the proposed 
method, which seemed less about `the myth of an estate', and more about a business 
proposal, justified in public, for expanding the size of the institution's market share. As 
J. H. R. Tonks put it; 
The estate is not a myth to us, and I am sure that that is true of many other companies. One of 
our problems arises from trying to manage this estate. I think the authors' fund has given the 
right amount to the right amount of policyholders in the past. My fund, and I suspect many 
others, has a considerable estate, which has been built up by past decisions which have resulted 
in policyholders receiving less than their asset shares on average. 
Assuming that the fund continues to accept new business, we could endeavour to reach 
the simplicity of the authors' situation by considerably increasing the bonus paid to the current 
generation of policyholders. To my mind there are two major objections to this course. First, it is 
inequitable to pay the present generation considerably more than they have earned. Secondly, if 
bonuses are artificially increased in this way the fund will attract more new with-profits business 
and so hasten the time when bonus distribution returns to normality. At that time the new 
policyholders will become disenfranchised with the situation, because they have received less 
than their expectation. Thus I believe that, in practice, the estate will continue in being for the 
foreseeable future. 
I regard an estate as a disadvantage only in so far that it adds to the difficulties of the 
Appointed Actuary. In my view the estate is lent to the present generation of policyholders and 
adds considerably to their security while their policies remain in force. When their policies 
become claims they pass on their share of the estate to the next generation of policyholders. It is 
extremely valuable to have a sizable estate for the reasons Mr. Scurfield set out, to provide 
security and to help in smoothing the bonus declaration in erratic financial conditions. 
If these 
remain adverse for an appreciable time the authors' 
fund must reduce bonuses. Others with an 
estate will have at least a choice in what they do (Tonks, 
in Ranson and Headdon, 1989: 331). 
In the aftermath of Equitable's crisis, the evidence against the assumptions underpinning 
the conceptual design of the bonus policy are so strong that it 
becomes reasonable to ask 
the question; did the authors of this policy believe that their 
financialised strategy would 
overcome the volatilities of the market? The recent 
Penrose enquiry supports the notion 
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that for a time, Equitable was using its investment strategy to facilitate favourable bonus 
information to savers and to the market. Between 1985 and 1990, when it is apparent 
that Equitable's financial problems were rippling beneath the surface, Equitable moved 
into equities from 47.5 percent in 1985 to 63.7 percent in 1989 (Penrose, 2004: 136- 
140). As the appointed actuary in charge made the case in 1990, 
In recent years we have had to rely increasingly on transfers of capital revenue to support the 
annual declarations of bonus. That is a natural consequence of changing investment conditions 
and out changing asset mix... if we are to maintain declared rates at relatively high levels and 
wish to avoid sharp fluctuations in the level of those rates from year to year, we are dependent on 
there being adequate capital appreciation available at the end of each year to the required 
transfer... (Penrose, 2004: 138). 
As the Penrose report argued `the Society's dependence on capital appreciation to 
sustain distribution policy could not have been more clearly stated' (Penrose, 2004: 
138). Even before the Law Lords case, it is evident to some that Equitable still believed 
it could beat the market. On of the important questions to ask is whether Equitable Life 
is a story of the `triumph of risk over uncertainty' (Reddy, 1996). In the post-war period, 
deterministic methods for calculating asset streams was an important part of the 
collective nature of pension funds. In the Equitable Life case, it would seem that 
deterministic approaches were also employed to calculate investment risk, but they were 
used in the context of sustaining bonus statements for policyholders. While occupational 
pension funds operated in the context of social insurance, Equitable Life operated within 
a free-market context. 
To sum up, Equitable Life marked out its `social position' in the competitive 
field of private pensions, and it did this clearly, with an eye on attracting savers into 
their private pension scheme. Not only did financial knowledge help construct Equitable 
Life as a competitive institution, it laid down the framework that made it possible, and 
thereby helped structure and determine the representations of other firms acting in the 
marketplace. Thus, Equitable Life clearly highlights the performativity of 
financial 
knowledge. Without it, it is doubtful that `marketing' as a separate discourse, could have 
played such a significant role as it 
did; and yet it is intriguing that such a clear 
separation was marked out between hard and soft 
forms of knowledge production. For 
example, the number crunching that made 
Equitable Life governable was separated 
from the marketing department that arguably made the company so successful. 
And yet, 
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the marketing campaign seemed to reaffirm Equitable's investment strategy in such a 
way as to intensify its urgency and to bring uncertainty under control, which again, 
turned in on itself, to the extent that savers saw Equitable as the best performing 
institution in the sector. In other words, finance and marketing looked each other in the 
eye. But now we shall try to look at these issues in a little more detail by examining the 
evidence collected from the questionnaire. We are particularly interested in this next 
section to understand why people decided to save with Equitable Life, why their 
expectations were stabilised and thirdly, how and why they became destabilised. The 
intriguing and possibly controversial idea here, is that `savers' were not necessarily 
independent or separate from the logic that contained them and this is a particular 
feature of the phase of disembedding, because Equitable Life seems to have been a stage 
of financialisation that savers, especially those burned by Equitable Life, have not 
forgotten about. 
Why it all made sense, why it all made non-sense 
Like all financial crises, they either disappear very quickly to the tune of economic 
euphemisms, or else they linger in the hearts and minds of those effected by crisis. 
`People' are normally forgotten in this process, both in commentary and in research, and 
so the following will draw our attention to three core questions: (1) why did people save 
with Equitable Life; (2) how were their expectations stabilised and; (3) how did an 
institutional expert-system make sense in one phase and non-sense in the next. To this 
endeavour we focus on three main criteria: performance, emulation, representation. 
Emulation 
As an article in the Financial Times claimed in 1999: `over the past two decades 
Equitable has turned itself into a jewel in the crown of British life assurance. It has done 
so by pursuing a singular strategy and serving a client base to die for: solicitors, 
accountants, doctors - the backbone of professional middle England' (FT, 1999: 2). 
From the evidence, it would seem that emulation played an initial role for saver's 
making a calculation towards the type of provider they would choose. There is a sense 
of `like-mindedness' about it; which really draws us back to Bourdieu's 
(1998) notion 
of cultural and economic capital. For example, it would seem that people or `savers' 
interact economically with people in `like-minded' professions, and in turn, this is also a 
cultural relation that reaffirms the goals and objectives of pursuing certain 
forms of 
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provision or value creation. With regard to Equitable Life, it formed an important part of 
creating a sense of security; and it is also interesting that in each of the following 
responses, the respondents associate their decision to save with Equitable based on the 
recommendation of professionals or people associated to finance. 
Respondent One 
All my research indicated that it was well run, highly recommended and reputable company used 
by many professional people... highly recommended... used by educated people (Q9,10). 
Respondent Eight 
Probably that many professional people used them and that their advertisement conveyed quality 
such as could be equated with the Bank of England (Q 10). 
Respondent Seven 
Personal recommendation by fellow policy-holder. A chartered accountant was also finance 
director of a stock exchange-listed UK Plc. (Q7). 
Respondent Nine 
My initial decision to save with EL was based on a recommendation from a solicitor regarding 
an endowment mortgage (Q26). 
Representation 
While emulation formed part of an ineffable structure of knowledge and belief, it would 
seem that Equitable's social position and `representation' in the competitive 
marketplace played an equally important role. For example, in what follows are 
examples where the respondents are clearly delineating between Equitable and its 
competitors. What we find here is that emulation overlaps with representation, because 
it would seem that Equitable Life had a reserved approach in relation to other 
institutions acting in the market. For example, it had low commission rates and it did not 
rely on intermediaries to push sales. We must also remember that between 1988 and 
1993,500,000 people were persuaded by over-zealous commission-led sales staff to 
contract out of their occupational pensions into lower value private pensions. 90 percent 
of people were affected by mis-selling (Blake, 2000). 
243 
Respondent 10 
The rep appeared articulate and knowledgeable; more so than the insurance agents that I 
saw. I continually felt very satisfied that I had made the correct choice. As the bonus 
statements cam in I had an increasing assurance of the financial future (Q 10). 
Respondent 12 
I know that nothing is life is risk-free, but I did not consider the risk with EL to be 
significantly different from that elsewhere. I reckoned the risk with EL to be 
significantly different from that elsewhere. I reckoned that the risk of a poor deal was 
greater with the Pru - and I still have that view (Q 12). 
Respondent 4 
Bad experience with my employer's AVC company Prudential - VERY amateurish, 
could not understand simple instructions, fear that I could not face going through 
retirement to deal with such a bunch of incompetents ... Contact with intelligent, able 
people as opposed to the cretins I had to deal with at Prudential. In contrast to 
Prudential could not understand the very simplest instructions and the prospect of 
getting stuck with them for the rest of my retirement was too much to bear - wanted to 
deal with professional people who knew what they were doing. ELAS were good at 
conveying this superficial message (Q4). 
Respondent 3 
Their reputation and the fact that they did not make an admin charge on regular savings 
amounts - unlike Legal and General who charged 5 percent on all contributions for 
administrative purposes. This meant that all the contributions to Equitable were going 
into the investment fund and would therefore become more valuable (Q 12). 
Knowledge was structured both inside and outside the institution. Not only did 
Equitable have an administrative relationship to its customers, but the press and media 
generally reiterated the belief in Equitable from the outside. 
Respondent l 
I thought it was a fundamentally sound institution where my savings would be safe and 
would grow comfortably if not spectacularly. This was the image portrayed by the 
media and the company... Annual reports from the company and total of adverse 
information from press or regulators (Q 18) 
Respondent 17 
The company's publicity in the national press, particularly the Financial Times (Q14). 
244 
Performance 
While emulation and representation were important, `performance' criteria played a 
crucial role in initiating a credible belief in the product of Equitable Life; but also in 
stabilising the meaning of Equitable Life as a high performing institution. Here, we find 
that effable and ineffable forms of knowledge production formed the basis of the 
company's strategy. For example, if we look at the adverts produced by Equitable in 
Annex El (see appendices), we can see that the adverts of the time clearly depict 
Equitable Life as a high performing institution amongst a market of lower performing 
funds. The tables and billboard adverts are all signifying the high performance of 
Equitable Life and this represents an important part of the tacit dimension of knowledge 
construction outside of the institution. Inside of the expert-system, there was an 
administrative relationship, where each year, savers received an annual statement of 
their financial progress (Annex E2). This even in some cases encouraged people to save 
more. 
Respondent 3 
The annual bonus statements showing the bonuses and growth and growth of the fund 
were most attractive... when we cashed in the Directors policies 10 years after ... they 
had grown by a factor of 8 i. e. the fund in 1985 was valued at £5000 and this had grown 
to £40,000 10 years later without any further contributions during that time. That was 
the cumulative effect of attractive bonuses (Q21). 
Respondent 5 
By mid 1990's starting to have a very warm feeling about my financial future - so 
much so that I started making projections (based on average growth) forward to 
possible retirement dates (Q21). 
Respondent 1 
Yes. I saved as much I could afford and increased contributions as my salary 
increased... I could see a steady increase in my policy values and felt secure about the 
future... Annual reports from the company and the total lack adverse information from 
the press or regulators (Q 19,21,23). 
Respondent 2 
As an academic economist I researched the whole of the industry [seven months Q11] 
for the (then) best suppliers of above products e. g. Money Management magazine I then 
interviewed three short listed companies and chose Equitable based on its historical 
record and stated performances...! felt I had made a fully informed and safe 
investment 
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and was pleased with my own valuation of this company and its products. I was very 
optimistic about my financial future especially for several years the results above 
average and appeared to be very secure (Q7,18). 
Stability 
Stability seemed to be a simple consequence of everything in the cultural economy 
coming together to make sense. The media, the regulators, bonus information, the 
obscurity of Life accounting and the administration of the company itself, all produced 
stable information conditions, or at least contained contradictions adequately, even 
while, behind the scenes, the company faced obvious financial difficulties. But what we 
find below is a mixed pattern of responses, where individuals placed too much faith and 
trust in a commercial institution to deliver what was promised. In all such examples, 
there is however, a common strand. Equitable Life, it would seem, gained a privileged 
position of power and power was expressed through the constitution and make-up of 
ordinary decisions and indecisions to save with the company in a wider field of 
governance that reiterated a belief in the company's progress. Not only does the post- 
war attitude towards paternalistic institutions shine through, but the complete 
ordinariness with which people became seduced by the routinisation of financial 
performance. Again, stability was assessed and reaffirmed through the tacit dimension, 
where complexity was reduced and understood through marketable, media driven 
relationships, which seemed for a time to blot out contradictory messages. 
Respondent 10 
Have you looked at Life company accounts. They are Byzantine.. . 
(Equitable) was 
showing best results in media e. g. Planned Savings, etc... It was an acknowledged 
premier pension company of large resources. I believed that there was a competent 
government regulator. 
Respondent l 
Annual reports from the company and the total lack of adverse information from the 
press or regulators...! assumed the regulators were doing this and would inform me if 
there was a problem. I do not believe an untrained layman could undertake such an 
enquiry. Who would I ask? The company, or the regulators? They would both have lied. 
Respondent 12 
I read the figures and they seemed ok... there were many favourable press comments at 
the time so I was comfortable with the situation. 
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Respondent 13 
My annuity arrived on time. What's to worry about? 
Respondent 8 
One of the problems of living a busy life is that one does not have time to enquire but 
rather rely on what believes is quality. 
Respondent 16 
... great reviews every year 
in pension reports from pension schemes annually. 
Instability 
Instability seemed to occur when information conditions inside and outside the expert- 
system contradicted one another. Things that seemed to make sense in the past, now, did 
not make sense. Now that `performance' was under threat, the cultural constitution of 
calculation fell apart. 
Respondent 3 
I had WP annuity since 1985 and for the first 5 years the annuity grew and had 
increased by about 13% by that time. I became concerned at this time as the growth in 
the annuity was related to a final `discretionary' bonus and this 'discretionary' amount 
was become a very large percentage of the total payment. Having been lulled into a 
complacent feeling of security I had however not really understood how this worked 
and I became increasingly concerned as the 'discretion' level grew to such a significant 
level. 
Respondent5 
Yes -I became concerned about the performance of the unit trusts I held with 
Equitable. I could not understand why the unit trusts were performing poorly when it 
was the same company. I became so concerned I asked Equitable for an explanation. 
Their salesman became very 'hurt' at my daring to question the Equitable's 
performance. They tried to claim their unit trusts were top performers but I knew that 
wasn't true. Alarm bells rang but not loud enough. 
Respondent 17 
The only information available to me was from the national press. I believe the press 
caused E/L to produce the letters to policyholders which they otherwise may not have 
been so forthright in producing. 
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Performance and Regulation 
In a very interesting cultural perspective of Indonesia's relationship with finance capital, 
Tsing refers to her examination as looking `inside the economy of appearances' where 
`performance' is `simultaneously economic performance and dramatic performance' 
(Tsing, 2004: p. 84). The economy of appearances in Tsing's study refers to how the 
`self-conscious making of a spectacle is a necessary aid to gathering investment funds' 
(Tsing, 2004, p. 84). In a similar light, the life assurance industry has tried to out- 
compete each other on the bonus level in order to entangle savers into long-term dreams 
of performance. Specifically, the reversionary bonus refers to the additional returns 
made from investment that works into the overall terminal or final bonus through 
accumulated assets over the pension period (HM-Treasury, 2001). As the Sandler 
(2002) report into retail savings made the case: 
The main basis for competition between with-profits products has been payouts to maturity and 
financial strength. But these give only a very partial picture at best of the true performance of the 
fund. Important issues such as the actual investment returns of the with-profits fund and the cost 
efficiency of the provider are obscured (Sandler, 2002: p. 123). 
The bonus policy is an example of how opposing interests between consumers and 
producers have been culturally organised around a central performance indicator. It is 
indicative of a framing process, whereby actuarial smoothing attempts to construct 
performance and `hope' at the same time as delivering publicly available information in 
order to de-politicise any form of scepticism. But when we look at this interaction more 
carefully, it would seem that the promises of progressive returns through bonus 
information in with profit policies, have succumbed to the rational desire for need and 
want of financial gain and guaranteed returns, without any real idea of how they have 
been created. This has at the same time redirected attention away from the performance 
of fund managers, of actuaries, of their skill and competence, to the extent that public 
scrutiny of the investment process has been obscured 
by the focus on bonus information 
(Penrose, 2004). 
The orientation towards bonus information has been supplanted right down to 
the capillaries of the industry. For example, independent financial advisors 
(IFA's) have 
typically advised savers on how historical returns have been created 
in comparison to 
others in the industry (HM Treasury, 2001). 
Part of the process of advice and persuasion 
in the sales process has been to soften fear into faith, by reading producers through the 
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text (Leyshon and Thrift, 1998). Tables of risk have been used to create assurances in 
the capacity of certain products to deliver lifestyle demands (Sandler, 2001). Once risk 
has been put to one side, the importance of the product's quality and worth has therefore 
stepped into the balance, typically focusing on the `returns' of bonus levels over a 
period (HM Treasury, 2001). The risk-reward ratio has been further obscured based on 
the extent to which IFAs have been linked to commission, which has generally 
differentiated between different products and providers (Morgan and Knights, 1992: 
Aldridge, 1997: Hutton, 1995). Due to the costs of administration and investment 
procedures, the level of savings that is contributed towards the fund has also been a 
factor that life assurance firms have wanted to control (HM Treasury, 2001). 
Commission has not only included the implication of advisor bias towards certain 
products, but the incentive structures have also been in place to attract those that can 
contribute a greater amount towards their personal pension, which has usually included 
higher-income consumers. What seems important is how commission mechanisms, risk 
tables, persuasive techniques, class identities have all formed part of the wider discourse 
that has arranged consumers and producers around bonus information. As a result of 
this, the entire industry has been politically cocooned to protect and compete with one 
another on the bonus level. As a result of competition based around performance for the 
saver, the assumption has followed that there is a direct relationship between the bonus 
level and the performance of the investment strategy (HM Treasury, 2001). Performance 
for savers is therefore not determined by the pure economics of the firm, nor by 
marketing interests, but a combination of the two signifying that in the past "retail 
products have been sold not bought; ' (HM Treasury, 2001). 
The implication has been what kind of other information has been available that 
translates economic meaning beyond the focus on performance? Under liability 
valuation rules (HM Treasury, 2001), with profit firms have been forced to use income 
generated from investment either towards increasing reversionary bonuses or reducing 
liabilities (HM Treasury, 2001). Under the investment strategy, high performing assets 
have tended to increase the reversionary bonus and lower the free asset ratio (FAR), 
which has become important for marketing. This had become significant during the bull 
market, as life assurance firms bought into the high performing assets in the stock 
market. It was also especially important at a time when the balance between contributors 
and beneficiaries became under most demographic stress, particularly for a firm such as 
Equitable Life considering the size of its GAR liabilities. The bull market would have 
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given some leverage to the marketing strategies of such highly geared firms. Part of 
reason for this does not strictly come down to how with profit firms such as Equitable 
were able to massage their finances, because they were allowed to do that anyway. But 
how there were few inroads into looking inside the black box of finance. For example, 
consider how the FAR was originally intended as a regulatory device for understanding 
how financially strong a life assurance company was. 
Just as Life Assures have competed on reversionary bonuses, they have also 
competed on the level of FARs, as it simply translates how much free capital is 
available for smoothing bonuses and paying final bonuses (Sandler, 2001; HM 
Treasury; Baird, 2001). It is interesting therefore how the social technologies that have 
been developed for interpreting the regulatory dynamic of life assurance firms, have 
also been used as criteria for measuring performance and competition. As a government 
report on institutional investment argued, "whatever its merits for regulation, the FARs 
use as an indicator of investment flexibility gives it much greater and wider impact than 
originally intended by those who framed it" (HM Treasury, 2001: 139). Social imitation 
of regulatory devices (McKenzie, 2002) for creating marketable information in the life 
assurance sector illustrates how all social mechanisms for providing public scrutiny 
have eventually become monopolised and commodified, creating a smoke and mirrors 
economy, which `utilises the weapons of the weak' (Thrift, 2002). In sum, the 
economics made sense according to the specific cultural economy it had helped to 
create. All economic information in the cultural economy of life assurance was therefore 
culturally packaged and mediated through divergent processes of marketisation 
supporting a life assurance market built on expectations of performance. 
Given the problems at Equitable Life that came into force as a result of the 
growing GAR liabilities, why did the regulatory authorities, which became aware of the 
GAR problem in early part of 1994 allow Equitable's business strategy to continue 
throughout the 1990s? Financial regulation of the life assurance sector comprised of two 
regulatory channels: the conduct of business and the prudential regulator. As the Baird 
report makes clear, "prior to January 1999 the two regulators were, and operated as, 
entirely separate entities and there was no formal or structural channel of 
communication between them" (Baird, 2001, p. 35). The `conduct of business' was a 
regulatory regime that related "primarily to the marketing and sale of retail 
investment 
products and advising investors on their rights 
in relation to such products" (Baird, 
2001, p. 196). Central to this regime was therefore the marketing of financial products, 
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which as a business strategy had an overall influence on creating new policyholder 
contracts and influencing existing policyholders to make further investments. Equitable 
Life was a company that was growing and intended to expand. Important to this process 
was therefore the creation of new members to the stability of the business as the balance 
between contributors and beneficiaries fell out of favour. Marketing was therefore a 
deliberate policy that had a direct influence in augmenting not only the expectations of 
existing policyholders, but also those of potential consumers. The Personal Investment 
Authority (PIA) was responsible as the self-regulatory organisation when the GAR issue 
came to the fore. The PIA defined financial marketing as `selling and procuring the sale 
of packaged products and advising persons on such products and on the exercise of the 
rights conferred by them' (Baird, 2001: 28). However, as the Baird (2001) report made 
clear, that rule applied only to `information provided in the context of selling and 
advising' (Baird, 2001: 28), which excluded the administrative means of communication 
between policyholders and the firm. Selecting and presenting financial information 
through the administrative avenue to policyholders was therefore a legitimate practice 
that was embedded in the life assurance market, but one considered in the eyes of PIA 
not to be one of marketing. 
As the Baird (2001) report made clear, an emphasis was placed with prudential 
regulation and underestimated the importance of the conduct of business, which had 
become ineffective in overseeing the construction of expectations. The premise was that 
if Equitable was solvent, then there was no reason why the regulator should restrain its 
business. It seems ironic that the government directly and indirectly facilitated 
expectations, without providing a regulatory institution that was capable of overseeing 
their management. This does not emanate out of neglect, but from a regulatory 
environment geared towards encouraging market innovations in finance, despite the 
strong links between consumption and financial exposure to investment uncertainty. 
Aldridge (1998) made a very interesting point about the Consumer's Association when 
he argued that the `nature of financial products and services poses far-reaching problems 
for the Consumer's Association, whose methodology has been predicated on a mature 
Fordist system of production' (Aldridge, 1998). In a very similar light, the same can be 
said about the organisational arrangements in the regulatory climate that led up to the 
Equitable Life affair. Clear analytical differences were made between the regulation of 
hard knowledge (prudential) and soft knowledge forms (marketing), when in fact what 
has been demonstrated in this paper, is how they have been inextricably linked in the 
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cultural economy of retail finance. This separation is also indicative of those who see a 
difference between economy, on the one hand and culture on the other (Ray and Sayer, 
1999). 
By focusing too much on the prudential levels of capital, the regulatory 
authorities including the FSA, excluded the importance of how `expectations' had been 
constructed by Equitable Life and the life assurance sector as a whole. The generation of 
expectations and their economic meaning in the context of life assurance arguably 
contributed towards the downfall of Equitable, as it could not guarantee the promises it 
had made. Had the regulator been able to understand how expectations had been 
created, regulatory enforcement could have at least altered Equitable's bonus strategy 
that remained unrecognised under the de-regulated climate. However, if the regulatory 
institutions of the time had enforced the regulatory concern with how bonus information 
was translated to policyholders, it could have undermined confidence in the entire with- 
profits industry, creating a flight to quality from Equitable and from the stock market 
from where the entire life assurance sector had extensively invested. By focusing on the 
`solvency' of Equitable Life and undermining the soft and highly relevant implications 
of policyholders expectations, this form of regulatory triage happened to place a ring- 
fence around Equitable, dampening the wider implications of miss-selling and 
compensation to the life assurance sector as a whole. While prudential regulation has 
claimed ignorance and waited until the court case to determine the fait of GAR policy- 
holders, it has certainly limited political instability, where it seems convenient that only 
after the Equitable Life affair has there been any strong motivation to fully integrate 
prudential regulation with the conduct of business into a more risk-preventative 
framework. 
Conclusion: Transnationalising the politico-Financial subject: a double movement? 
Respondent 7 
The Equitable scandal would have been buried by the authorities without pressure from the 
action groups. However, regulators still seem unable to accept that the regulatory regime is 
inadequate. 
Respondent 15 
ELAS have tried to cover their backsides, and without EMAG the truth of the total 
mismanagement would not have been revealed. 
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There are a number of points to be made in relation to Equitable Life and the social and 
political consequences of its crisis. In the aftermath of the Equitable Life crisis we have 
seen the transformation of financial identities into politico-financial identities. This has 
been an interesting development, because Equitable Life members invested their savings 
into the company based on their reasonable expectation that the fund would fulfill these 
expectations. As a result of the crisis of Equitable Life, the same financial identities 
have politicised their expectations through the creation of collective pressure groups 
(e. g. Equitable Life Members Action Group), transforming their benign passive, 
imaginary financial identities into proactive, practical politico-financial identities. For 
example, there are now a number of campaign groups fighting for compensation (e. g. 
Equitable Life Trapped Annuitants). 
Firstly, the campaign groups have successfully launched two appeals, one to the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman, but one also to the European Commission, which in 2006, 
set up a committee of enquiry into the crisis of the Equitable Life Assurance Society 
(EP, 2007). There are a number of implications that have come out of the second 
petition to the European Union. Firstly, the commission does indeed find that the UK 
government should take responsibility and should set up a compensation scheme on the 
basis that it failed to implement the Commission's third life directive effectively (ibid. ). 
This would not have occurred if the groups had not filed their petitions. Secondly, the 
committee found it highly important that there should be stringent regulations that force 
insurance companies to create financial reserves. This could be seen as a positive 
development in many ways. By relinquishing its reserves, Equitable Life devolved its 
responsibility from its members on various assumptions. Cross-border regulations that 
insist on reserves i. e. an Estate, ensure that the individuals are not exposed to global 
financial markets or excessive innovations. 
What we are effectively seeing here is grass-roots pressure emerging from 
broken promises, which have translated into political pressure at the transnational level. 
Transnational pressure, at this stage, appears to be a more effective mechanism of grass- 
roots pressure than that attained through national institutions such as the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman. This would demonstrate to an extent the lack of an effective system of 
accountability for national citizens. However, 
it would also appear that this has not 
changed the minds of the Committee against the premise of 
financial innovation or 
consumerism in the private world of pensions, which would tend to 
demonstrate the 
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limits of individualised politics or a politics based on commercial intentions. For 
example as the Committee reported: 
The committee strongly requests that any financial services legislation duly recognizes the 
priority of consumer and investor protection issues, while at the same time ensuring a dynamic 
and competitive environment for financial services providers that minimizes red tape and does 
not stifle commercial flexibility and innovation. In this regard, the committee supports the 
emphasis on risk and principle-based regulation in financial services legislation. Furthermore, as 
investments in pension products are to play an increasingly important role in the European 
economy in view of demographic imbalances and ageing populations, the committee emphasizes 
the need to foster consumer confidence in pension products by ensuring for them the highest 
standards of information, security and investor protection throughout the internal market (EP: 
2007: 361) 
In effect, it appears that the reflexivity of financialisation in the case of the Equitable 
Life case has worked in one particular way. It has encouraged a transnational 
strengthening of juridical legislation of financial services regulations that encourages 
institutions to reform so that individuals know that they are responsible for their future 
investment decision-making, because effectively, things have been taken care of in 
institutional terms. The nature of this reflexivity is placing a direct emphasis on the 
individual to take care of his/her financial risk. You could say, risk-based regulation is 
another way of cleaning rationality of irrationality in order to create safety in rational 
decision-making. It does not propose a form of collective responsibility i. e. alternative 
forms of saving's institutions outside of the framework of financial consumerism. This 
is a type of consumerism that encourages accuracy in its information. On the other hand, 
the development since the Equitable Life case is that legislation and regulators have 
woken up, implicitly, to the notion that that the economy is not separate from the culture 
of economy. This is an interesting development and is seen by a more robust FSA that 
has fined in recent times companies for mis-selling inappropriate financial products to 
consumers. Criticism of the FSA is an interesting part of this development, because in 
recent times, it has been argued that the FSA has too much teeth. 
To sum up, Equitable Life is a clear example of how financialisation has 
transformed markets and the social relations within those markets towards an emphasis 
on speculative practices linked to the capital market. While Equitable Life did this under 
the veil of moral governance, it increasingly used its innovative or `unshackled' 
administrative powers to re-construct an expert-system that would reiterate and enable 
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the very institution it intended to be. Financial knowledge played a central role in the 
systemic construction of Equitable Life as a high-performing mutual company that 
could deliver security with returns. It did this to the extent that finance and marketing 
conspired to entangle a middle class saver interested to maximise pension income at the 
least possible cost. In the aftermath of the crisis, Equitable Life, very much like Enron, 
has been stuck with the representation of an irrational firm, directed by arrogant and 
dismissive executive managers, whose intent was to lie about the nature of its `black 
holes' (see Penrose, 2004). On the contrary, Equitable Life demonstrates something 
more meaningful. It demonstrated the inherent problem of shifting the responsibility for 
welfare onto companies with a pecuniary motive in self-maximisation. Secondly, 
Equitable Life demonstrates how `people' have been transformed too; from passive 
financial identities into politico-financial identities, with interests that have reached the 
higher stages of transnational governance - not because financialisation influenced this 
effect as if it was outside of the self, but because people were motivated by their own 
imagined financial futures. 
There are two restless questions that arise from this study. Firstly, this study of 
Equitable Life partially demonstrated a contrast between a post-war actuarial science 
and a post-Bretton woods actuarial science. Why and how did the history of the actuary 
move away from questions of social insurance towards questions of speculative 
management? Secondly, this case-study also brought to light a very subtle intervention. 
The Sandler report on Medium and Long Term Retail Savings in the UK (2002b) 
introduced the idea that `savings have been bought and not sold'. To an extent this is 
quite true. Equitable Life, for example, did not make people fully aware of the increases 
and decreases in monetary surplus. But if the company did do this, it would have 
bankrupted its own business. And this is the problem. Companies depend on a degree of 
secrecy in order to compete. This is why the implication of Sandler's argument is so 
impressive, because if savings have been sold and not bought, then this would suggest 
that people have traditionally lacked full information - that things failed because 
expectations were not `rational'. So we see, the consequence of Equitable Life 
is that it 
has furthered the problem-solving debate on how to fix pensions so that it banishes the 
responsibility of the system and the relation between structure and cultural practice. 
In 
simple terms, the system is irrational, because rationality - the 
light, has not gone far 
enough into the darkness. With this philosophy as our guide, we are meant to 
believe 
that better systems and better technology will help create conditions of full information 
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so that the individual can make a more rational decision. But this approach is based on 
an assumption. It too easily assumes that market exchange relations can become 
`clinical' and `articulate', when people depend on ineffable means of self-justification. 
It too easily assumes that the market can be organised around pure information 
conditions, when this emerging policy also relies on commercial competition to supply 
products to a consumer market, which in turn, relies on the powers of persuasion to 
drive competition. Perhaps this is the most obvious and most powerful contradiction of 
all: the notion that ethical questions can be resolved through commercial market 
relations. 
These two restless questions that we have unearthed here will be the object of 
the next two chapters. We deal firstly with the transformation of actuarial science and 
then we will move onto an understanding of its rationalisation in society. Specifically, 
we will examine the fluid debates and changes within actuarial science as a discursive 
expert-system. In addition, we will try to outline the trend towards commercialising 
retail financial regulation in private pension provision, the policies and developments 
that have helped this along, and the inner contradictions and fortuitous circumstances 
that have further facilitated and deepened the financialisation of pensions. 
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Chapter Seven 
Disembedding the Actuarial Scientist, Re-embedding the 
(Global) Financier? 
Introduction 
This chapter is an attempt to understand the final salary pension crises and its re- 
regulatory aftermath as a process of disembedding and re-embedding. Recent trends 
suggest that the occupational pension scheme is in terminal decline. In the year 2000, 
there were 17,900 defined benefit schemes open to new employees in the private sector 
and in 2006 this number had reduced to 6,200. Just under 70 percent of all defined 
benefit pension schemes that existed in the year 2000 have disappeared53. One might 
believe that an alternative has been created in order to replace these schemes. To an 
extent this is true. In the year 2000, there were 43,700 defined contribution schemes 
open to the public, but in 2006 there had only been a marginal increase of just three 
percent54. We should also consider that there is an unnerving difference between 
defined benefit and defined contribution schemes. In the former, benefits are clearly 
related to average or final salary earnings, where the benefits are guaranteed; whereas in 
the latter, the benefits are determined by the amount of contributions, which is linked to 
the personal preferences of the individual. Moreover, while defined benefit schemes are 
a form of social insurance linked to the continuities of the post-war moral economy; the 
latter are linked not only to the responsibility (or irresponsibility) of the individual, but 
to the uncertainties of the stock market, which in the context of financialisation, become 
a felicitous medium of risk-management. 
Far from being an inevitable outcome of economic change, we suggest in this 
chapter that the crisis in occupational pension schemes is due, in part, to the 
disembedding of the actuarial scientist and the `momentum of epistemic history' 
(Lengwiler, 2003) that has facilitated this path-dependent course. It is therefore argued 
that the final salary pensions crises has its roots in the history of actuarial science. The 
proposal of this chapter is that actuarial practices have changed course throughout the 
20th century, from traditional actuarial techniques supplanted in epistemological 
uncertainty, towards financial economics and probability calculus with leanings towards 
ontological uncertainty (Reddy, 1996). This is an understated empirical point, because 
as we suggest in this chapter, the move towards financial economics and its take-up by 
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ordinary trustees within pension funds, arguably made pension calculation more 
efficient and simple, augmenting a systemic pension fund shift in favour of equity 
investment in the 1990s. As we suggest, this transmutation of actuarial knowledge was 
to have a performative effect on the pension fund industry helping to organise relations 
and opportunities that would lead to the tech-stock crash of 2000. Thus, we find that 
behind the move out of privately managed social insurance funds was a historical cause 
initiated by long-running debates and influences that would redefine the role and pursuit 
of the actuarial scientist. In the aftermath of the tech-stock crash, we have seen at least 
three broad trends. Firstly and most importantly, the closure of final salary pension 
schemes to new members due to the expense of this approach, in addition to the cost of 
making up for lost time by funding liabilities. As we try to make clear in this chapter, 
funding collective pension schemes has been a long-running approach. Cost has never 
quite been an issue until after the tech-stock crash. Secondly, there has been an 
expansion in the size of the coupon pool to asset-match the liabilities of pension funds. 
Governments and financial services firms have been consulting to resolve the liability 
structures of pension funds. Thirdly, financialisation has occurred through a process of 
crisis-management, where commercial solutions have expanded the competitive market 
for financial services. Actuarial knowledge and the role of the actuary have been 
discredited and an emerging market for pension or liability solutions has been initiated. 
In effect, the tech-stock crash could be seen as an event that has moved us even further 
towards financialised solutions, where the disembedding of traditional post-war 
actuarial knowledge has been replaced by a more innovative and competitive approach 
to pension progress that completely by-passes the need for a debate about the purpose 
and value of collective social insurance. 
The bubble and the crash: the great pensions debate 
Since the end of the tech-stock equity bubble, the debate over the UK pensions crises 
has placed an even greater emphasis on reform. The debate has always been how the 
state could subsidise pension regimes in the future given the assumptions towards 
demographic changes in the economy. The development of the new economy and the 
experiments with the capital market did, for a considerable time, reduce the political 
interest in pensions reform as the stock market created consistent returns for savers, 
while hiding the extent of pension liabilities built into corporate accounts, creating the 
perception that equity investment over the long-term was guaranteed (Blackburn, 2002: 
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Brenner, 2002: Froud, et al., 2000: 2001). However, the corporate burden on defined 
benefit pension schemes that has increased as a result of regulatory changes to corporate 
balance sheets and falling equity markets has fuelled a debate as to whether the 
privatisation of fully funded regimes should be accelerated (Clarke, 2003a/b: Engelen, 
2003a/b). It has also fuelled a debate as to the problematic nature of promoting equity 
investment in society (Aglietta, 2000: Blackburn, 2002: Clarke, 1999,2003a: Cutler and 
Wainne, 2002: Engelen, 2003a: Froud et al, 2001: Harmes, 1998,2002). The 
problematic nature of promoting equity investment in society has been recently debated 
by Clarke (2003a/b), Engelen (2003a/b) and Tickell (2003). The common ground 
established in this debate is the understanding that developing a fully privatised pension 
system that is linked to the performance of the stock market establishes uncertain 
challenges and implications that must be dealt with at the public policy level. However, 
the main contributors to this debate (Clarke, 2003a/b: Engelen, 2003a/b) have 
contrasting notions of what the problem is, how it has been created and how it can be 
dealt with. 
Engelen (2003a/b) refutes the idea that the trend towards fully funded regimes 
resolves the current problems associated with State guaranteed pension provision 
(Engelen, 2003a/b). In fact, Engelen illustrates how the privatisation of equity 
investment in society will maintain and possibly accelerate the adverse tendencies of 
financialisation in the economy (Engelen, 2003a: 1369). Engelen argues that many of 
the factors that caused the TMT equity bubble were associated with the contemporary 
logic of pension fund investment (2003a: 1363). He argues that the contemporary 
maturation phase of pension funds is linked to the logic of pension investment in 
present-day capitalism. In this period there is a greater pressure to increase returns, not 
only from beneficiaries but from the nature of competition in the asset-management 
industry itself (2003a: 1365). In this context, there is an `increasing preference for liquid 
assets' without maturation limits, which have turned `corporations into corporate 
rentiers who increasingly face an incentive structure that rewards equity 
investments - 
for portfolio building reasons' (Engelen, 2003a: 1368). The speculative and short-term 
logic of pension investment therefore becomes an embodied part of financialisation, 
helping to transform the `finance industry from a facilitator of other firms' economic 
growth into a growth industry in its own right' 
(ibid.: 1367). For Engelen, this `discrete 
regime of accumulation' incrementally replaces the priorities of 
fixed capital investment 
and patient capital needed for the long-term commitment of productivity growth and 
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national income. As he argues, 'a growing financialisation of the economy, driven by 
the logic of funding and pushing the case of shareholderism, will reverse this order and 
will hence endanger the long-term wealth-generating capabilities of firms' (ibid.: 1369) 
In effect, the problem for Engelen is that the move towards fully funded regimes will 
expand the amount of savings in the capital market, helping to sustain the contemporary 
logic of funding, the tendency for `capital market inflation' (ibid.: 1368) and the 
`corrosive effects of financialisation' (ibid.: 1370). 
Whereas Engelen emphasises the long-term social and economic consequences 
of financialisation that need not be inevitable, Clarke emphasises how `pension security 
has been redefined in the face of global financial imperatives' (Clarke, 2003a: 1354). 
For Clarke, the issue is the extent to which the increasingly privatised and individualised 
nature of pensions security has been progressively tied to the performance of the stock 
market. As Clarke argues, `just as nation-states have found capital markets to be severe 
constraints on their discretion, employers and individuals have found the market risks of 
such provision much more significant than ever anticipated' (Clarke, 2003a: 1340). The 
`gathering forces of global financial integration' as Clarke sees it, has therefore 
undermined the ability of states and employer-sponsored pension schemes in the UK, to 
`guarantee' a level of pensions security that is consistent with the four goals (predicable, 
stable, lasting, comprehensive) of benefit provision (2003a: 1341). Clarke argues that 
even though there has been a greater emphasis on individual pension provision, due to 
how pensions security has been related to the dynamics of the stock market, there is still 
`no commitment about the final value of any derived pension' (ibid.: 1353). Therefore 
the issue of stock market risk `with respect to the current and final value of accumulated 
assets' means that the `protection of the integrity of the pension and retirement income 
institutions is an essential aspect of any comprehensive commitment to pensions 
security' (ibid.: 1352) In terms of Clarke's analysis, there are greater implications of 
financial insecurity related to performance bound pensions at all levels in present day 
capitalism. Clarke therefore understands how personal financial security is dependent on 
the institutional integrity of capital market institutions and the reliance on the state to 
adapt its role of provision under new circumstances to become the `ultimate guarantor 
of pension security' (Clarke, 2003: 1353). 
Clarke and Engelen (2003) converge on the problem that individualising 
pensions security presents uncertain challenges, but they diverge on the causes. Whereas 
Clarke is more concerned with understanding how state-societies face the new realities 
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of financial change, Engelen examines the political construction of ideological 
arguments supporting pensions reform that are entirely tautological in practice. For 
Engelen, the assumptions in the script are exclusively written in support of financial 
institutions, which have a hand in wielding the very narrative they have helped to create. 
For Clarke, the reverse is almost opposite, where it is assumed that financial institutions 
react to the world around them. For example, the debate between Engelen and Clarke 
comes to an interesting contrast in their view towards the causes of the equity bubble. 
Whereas Engelen emphasises how unstable assumptions of equity performance created 
an investment logic that was unable to cope with demographic stress (2003a: 1363- 
1366), Clarke emphasises the irrationality of institutions in a unique period of change 
that has since returned to fundamental levels (2003a: 1346-1347). Therefore, for Clarke 
the forces of financial integration have placed a greater emphasis on the `integrity' of 
financial institutions and on the state to ensure this. Whereas Engelen examines how the 
political is built into the reasons for financialisation at the epistemic level, Clarke is 
therefore more pragmatic in his assessment of financial change and how it must be dealt 
with post hoc. For Engelen, exposing assumptions and their fragility from the 
underbelly of rational logic, challenges the inevitability of financial change from 
Clarke's perspective. Placing trust in the `integrity of institutions' to create pensions 
security for Engelen is a passive line of contestability against the throes of politically 
induced capitalist change. Engelen therefore presents the antipathy to Clarke who 
imagines that there is `no shelter from the hegemony of finance' (2003a: 1340). 
Although both authors have different ideas towards how the economy functions, 
both rely on economic evidence and economic links to support their diverging notions. 
Whereas Clarke (Clarke, 2003a/b) focuses on the concern that financial developments 
create implications of pensions security, Engelen's (2003a/b) concern is how financial 
security is placed in the context of the logic of pensions funding and how political 
arrangements construct the adverse tendencies of financialisation. Whereas Clarke 
(2003a/b) argues that the problematic nature of pensions security is inevitable and 
structurally inbuilt into economic changes, Engelen (2003a/b) disagrees suggesting that 
the logic of funding and nature of equity investment is unsustainable, where its 
foundations are not produced from inevitable trends but are themselves politically 
manifested. Although both converge on the concern with the nature and future of 
pensions security, both make economic assumptions towards the uncertainty of this. 
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In contrast to both Clarke and Engelen, this chapter will suggest that the 
discursive construction of actuarial knowledge also played a significant part in the 
creation of the tech-stock crash and the trend out of collective pension funds towards 
individualised pension provision. Drawing upon our ideas set out in the first chapter, 
this chapter will explore the academic struggle to construct a particular kind of 
economic value and how this struggle, in many ways, accelerated the turn towards 
equities and asset-price inflation. Demographic factors were not the sole constitution 
underpinning conditions of financialisation, contrary to Engelen, and nor was the tech- 
stock crash and its consequences due entirely to the integration of global financial 
forces. Rather, this chapter demonstrates that the unfolding reality was due to the 
fortuitous nature of knowledge construction in the actuarial profession, which helped 
structure and organise pension fund practices at the micro and macro levels. 
Chapter seven will be organised as follows. In the first section, we will outline 
the traditional approach to actuarial funding in the early part of the 20th century. In the 
second section, it will be important to set out the academic debates within the actuarial 
profession that defined the essential problems of actuarial science, giving way to a more 
sophisticated need to manage and calculate uncertainty. We will then highlight the 
differences in actuarial methods and examine the effect of financial economics on the 
discipline. It will then be important to understand how this helped initiate the stock 
market boom and bust in pension fund assets. In the final section, we will explore how 
all of this has encouraged a further financialisation of the economy, as commercial 
institutions and ideas construct new pension solutions to the crisis. 
Framing pension fund valuations: the actuary and the long view 
To a certain extent, actuarial techniques have mirrored developments in the natural 
sciences (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1993). Determinism was born out of the idea that the 
laws of nature were out there waiting to be discovered and that uncertainty, the 
unknown, was the product of a deficiency in knowledge (Reddy, 1996: 226). Reflecting 
developments in the natural sciences and Newtonian approaches to the physical world, 
the actuarial scientist was endowed with discovering the unknown (Knights et al., 
1993). While this argument of a parallel universe between actuarial techniques and 
science is a convincing one, it often overlooks the very practical business side to 
knowledge that life assurance has acquired throughout its history (Storr-Best, 1962: 
Clarke, 2002: Lenwile, 2003). While early 20th century physics began to assess causality 
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in stochastic behaviour in an attempt to model reality (Hickman, 2004: 843), it would 
seem that classical actuarial techniques persistently erred on the side of caution and 
preferred to test the model against reality. Ryder (1975) referred to classical actuarial 
techniques as a form of `adaptive control', an engineering concept that `tests its models 
by such methods as `impulse response analysis" (Ryder, 1975: 60). Drawing on the 
work of Karl Popper, Ryder argued that the classical approach was typically 
`Hypothetical-Deductive', where `a statement is derived (deducted) from the hypothesis 
and faced with reality' (Ryder, 1975: 62). Ryder's complaint was against the influences 
of Bayesian methodology, which typically `induced' hypotheses or `prior probability 
distributions' from statistical data. As Ryder complained, `the Bayesian concept of the 
`probability of hypothesis' should not be used because it is unscientific; there is no way 
of testing it, no way of falsifying it' (1970: 62). Ryder's work was written at a time in 
the 1970s when the Bayesian rediscovery of statistics to actuarial work began to gain 
ground because of the growing popularity of stochastic approaches and the development 
of computer simulation models during this time. Ryder's defence of the classical 
(objective) approach against the subjective influences of Bayesian methods reveals 
something of the continuity of the classical approach. As Hickman argued, `the 
exploration of ideas about stochastic processes that occurred in the first decade of the 
twentieth century was not used in practice for several decades' (2004: 838). It therefore 
becomes interesting to understand that the methodology of actuarial science changes 
during the 20th century from the classical approach embedded in life assurance, towards 
the more inductive and subjective treatment of stochastic approaches emerging from 
natural science. The question that is most pressing is how this occurred and how it 
related to emerging economic conditions and changes in pension fund capitalism. 
Before we assess how the classical approach applied to pension funds, we must 
firstly understand that knowledge and experience of novel investment practices 
originated in the life assurance sector (Simons, 1942: Heywood and Lander, 1961: 
p. 316: Cox and Storr-Best, 1962). Within this sector, the classical approach was 
important in terms of its pragmatic initiative and flexibility. For example, while 
longevity and fatality were calculated on a deterministic basis, investment in the early 
part of the 20`h century was a new and uncertain area and relied mostly upon 
assumptions of economic trends (Scott, 2002). Life assurance was also subject to an 
underlying morality that constrained speculative practices, which 
had been instilled as a 
result of transformations in the 19`h century (Clarke, 
2002). It could therefore be argued 
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that the moral history and governance of life assurance began to unravel, especially in 
the early part of the 20th century, as life offices developed consumer type relations with 
clients (Clarke, 2002: 93), but also as life offices increasingly indulged in unknown 
areas of investment practice in order to create favourable bonus returns for savers (Scott, 
2002). While the moral fabric was certainly undermined by such developments, it is also 
the case that the business of life assurance was legitimated through the `scientific' 
representation of the actuary (Ewald, 1991: Clarke, 2002: see Cramer, 1963: see also 
Gilley, 1973). 
For Peter Scott (2002), the `cult of equity' was born in the inter-war years, as life 
assurance firms transcended depreciation through experiments with equity 
diversification. Investment philosophy was beginning to face the twin pressures of 
changing economic conditions and market competition (Scott, 2002: 80). It must be said 
at this point that economic conditions were relatively stable before the First World War 
(Redington, 1953) and that events after this and during the inter-war years created 
market fluctuations, which threatened life assurance business and individual savings 
(Scott, 2002). Equity investment techniques created security with returns and they 
satisfied a select market of savers. This demonstrates the extent to which life assurance 
was now governed, not by moral considerations, but by investment considerations, 
which were forced to change as a result of economic conditions with the actuarial 
scientist at the helm. It would appear that the moral constraints of 19`h century life 
assurance had been lifted towards an embrace of new economic freedoms associated 
with consumerism (Scott, 2002). But this shift also represented something of the 
classical actuarial approach and its move into unknown investment areas. It theorised 
solutions from out of conditions, modelled future events based on fixed assumptions and 
applied solutions to actuarial practice. That life assurance was moving away from 
deterministic models associated with moral governance (Ewald, 1991: Clarke, 2002) 
towards a much more concerted effort to control for `imponderables' associated with 
market uncertainties (Redington, 1953) and consumerism (Scott, 2002), classical 
actuarial methods were well positioned to take advantage of these developments and all 
the business opportunities that actuarial `science' could exploit (Gilley, 1973). 
In the early days of occupational pension funds, employers and trustees relied on 
actuarial direction, which either came directly from life offices or by independent 
consultants (Gilley, 1973). The growth of pension funds was paralleled by the growth of 
independent actuarial advice. The upsurge in pension funds approved in the Finance Act 
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of 1921 approached 1000 and this figure grew to 28,000 by 1981 due to various tax 
concessions from government (Gilley, 1973: 73). The number of full time actuarial 
consultants rose from 1,521 to 1,857 during a five year assessment by the 
Government's Actuary Department in the 1960s (Gilley, 1973: 75). As actuaries had 
typically gained their experience from life assurance and as most practical knowledge 
came from life assurance, many of the techniques in this sector were extended to 
pension funds (Heywood and Lander, 1961). 
However, the pension fund concept was different from life assurance. For a life 
assurance firm, income streams from investment were smoothed across the population 
of policyholders setting aside capital for a rainy day (Redington, 1953). For a pension 
fund, the central objective was to ensure fund solvency (Erza, 1980). Any benefit that 
accrued needed to be covered by contributions from the employer and asset streams 
from investment sources. The actuary's purpose was not only to assess fund value, but 
also to suggest a funding rate for the employer at the least possible cost (Erza, 1980). 
Any particular choice of asset-allocation that would reduce the cost to the employer was 
extremely beneficial. While fund solvency was imperative, it was not so simple to 
ensure. The actuarial solution to the pension fund problem was called the discounted 
cash flow method, which otherwise became known as the `long view' due to how 
liabilities and assets were valued, discounting for long-term assumptions (Puckridge, 
1947: Heywood and Lander, 1961: Day and McKelvey, 1963: Erza, 1980: Booth et al., 
1999: 488-502: Day, 2003: Gordon and Jarvis, 2003: Lillevold and Eyland, 2004). This 
method would become widely used in the valuation of pension funds for most the 
twentieth century (Ren and Stewart, 1982), before it became widely criticised for its 
cautious assumptions. Before understanding what effect this method was to have on 
pension funds and before understanding how it unravelled, it will be important to 
understand the reasons for this method and the debates surrounding it. But before that, it 
will be important to describe what the long-view or discounted cash flow approach 
didss 
Since their invention, pension funds created a number of imponderables for 
actuaries to deal with. In simple terms, the inclusion of an employee in a pension fund 
meant that benefits had to be paid out at a particular time. This time was unknown and 
the actuary could not predict with any certainty when an employee might either die or 
terminate employment (except through deterministic methods). Many solutions 
developed to resolve this problem56, but the solution typically relied on fixing the time 
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of the benefits at a future date, with certain assumptions regarding salary increases. This 
built caution into the value of the liabilities, because actuaries essentially prepared for 
much greater cash out-flow. Under cautious assumptions with regard to the final payout, 
terminations and deaths therefore became a nice little surprise for the actuarial 
valuation. The problem however, was that liabilities were long-term and so the next 
problem for the actuary became one of how to provide a source of income from 
investment when conditions were uncertain. As market trends and interest levels could 
not be predicted with any precision from observations of the short-term due to volatility, 
it was proposed that an income level could be derived from the expected value of future 
investment streams by assuming low long term rates of interest. In other words, the 
actuary built pessimism into the values of future asset streams. Any rise in the short- 
term market rate or book value would come as a nice surprise and any fall would be 
covered by the long-term actuarial valuation. In the assessment of fund solvency, 
expected asset values (accruing from securities, property, shares etc) minus liabilities 
(administration costs and benefits) would create a picture of solvency, from which point 
the actuary could determine whether the fund was in surplus or in deficit. By assessing 
fund solvency, the actuary could then suggest a pace of funding, which could be reduced 
in times of surplus and increased in times of deficit. 
Mystical calculations and actuarial dilemmas: the need for certainty 
The long view was not without its flaws and it is important to piece together some of the 
key elements that would sew the seeds of its demise through the rationalisation of its 
inadequacies. At the date of valuation, the actuary determined whether the fund was in 
surplus or in deficit according to further investment assumptions and made suggestions 
on the pace of funding to the company according to various investment assumptions. 
Companies depended on consistent results and the typical criticism of the long view was 
that it was far from consistent. Writing in 1947, Puckridge (1947) outlined the long view 
approach and argued that a single long-term discount rate for all members and new 
entrants, known as the indirect method, could potentially undermine the solvency of the 
fund. For example, the actuary could determine the size of the deficit and suggest a 
course of funding to create solvency, but without recalculating assumptions 
for new 
entrants under new contingent economic conditions, the actuary could potentially 
undermine the size of the deficit. In more simple terms, while 
Puckridge (ibid. ) 
supported the long view, he warned that the 
influx of new entrants created the potential 
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to accentuate surplus or deficit by maintaining the same discounted assumptions for all 
existing members and new entrants. Puckridge believed that the discount rate on 
investments would have to be reconfigured for new entrants in order that they be `self- 
supporting' so that the `influx of new entrants in excess of expectations will not create a 
further deficiency' (ibid.: 8). Puckridge also believed that the revaluation rate for new 
entrants, in terms of the surplus or deficit, would have to be presented in the actuarial 
report so that the assumptions of solvency could be `understood by trustees and 
employers' (ibid.: 2). This was a seminal paper presented to the actuarial profession, 
because the long-view approach, while recalculated for new entrants, provoked a 
number of concerns from practitioners at the time. What is significant is the extent to 
which the issues debated resound in the unfolding narratives of the final salary pension 
crises. 
The first major concern was whether actuaries and trustees would really be able 
to understand the proposal that Puckridge was advocating. In defence of his own 
proposal Puckridge argued: 
The suggestion has been made by the opener that an employer might not accept with confidence 
an actuary's valuation of assets, while regarding the valuation of liabilities as something rather 
mystic with which the actuary could deal. Personally, he thought that if an employer was 
presented with an actuary's report in which the liabilities had been valued in some mystic 
manner which he did not understand, and in which credit had been taken for existing investments 
at a book value which he knew to be materially less than the market values, he would say to 
himself. `There is a nice little margin here; I do not think that I need do anything about this, or at 
any rate I can bring in this margin for which no credit has been taken'. The employer would not 
easily be made to understand that the actuary, by his mystic processes, has already taken that 
margin into account. He himself had in practice adopted the method of revaluing existing 
investments and had explained to employers what he had done; they had seen without difficulty 
that the margins had already been used and that the deficiency was real and should be dealt with. 
He knew of at least two cases where an indirect method of valuation had shown a large 
deficiency and no action had been taken. The accountants had told the employer: `You need not 
worry about this deficiency; we have in hand the difference between the market value of the 
assets and the value for which credit has been taken by the actuary' (Puckridge, 1947: 26). 
As we will understand later, Puckridge's concern to the profession in 1947 would come 
alive as a consequence in the 1990s when corporate firms took `contribution holidays'. 
In the mean time, Puckridge's proposal was for the furtherance of transparency and for a 
more efficient methodological treatment of liabilities in the balance sheet. For 
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Puckridge, it seemed to be a question of responsibility, in the sense that he intended to 
begin a process whereby responsibility was given back to managers and accountants to 
treat actuarial valuations seriously and to prevent the perception of mystical 
calculations, which would invariably meet company interests from time and to time. 
While Puckridge had the good intention of dealing with this mysticism, the question was 
whether Puckridge was naively throwing water on to a flaming pan. For example, in the 
context of the long view, it seemed untenable for some actuaries listening to Puckridge's 
proposals to suggest that the fund's pension scheme, while in surplus at time A, could 
only ensure solvency at time B by recalculating the long term discount rate for new and 
existing members entering the fund. While there is a sense in which Puckridge was 
trying to shatter complacency, the actuarial valuation on the other hand, could 
potentially deliver `too much information'. In the Institute's discussion of Puckridge's 
paper, one actuary named Marples struck a cord that chimes quite loud today: 
I feel that to place in the balance-sheet the capital value of the strain of new entrants in perpetuity 
would, when the full explanation was appreciated by the management, seriously strain their 
acceptance of actuarial theory. Would not the just conclusion of the managers be that the only 
course of action to save the fund is to cease to start a series of funds and close them at regular 
intervals which would be absurd (Marples, quoted in Puckridge, 1947: 28). 
It could be said that the appointed actuary was in between a rock and hard place. By 
valuing liabilities and expected liabilities too cautiously, it was proposed that the 
actuary could damage actuarial reputations by having to explain their deterministic 
assumptions, which could by default, harm the collective interest underpinning the 
continual support of pension funds. Worse still, it was thought, was the orthodox 
approach to balance sheet accounting, where the value of long-term liabilities was 
determined at book value when it came to presenting the actuarial valuation. As market 
rates fluctuated, so did the value of liabilities. In this context, how could the actuary 
suggest `that no action be taken to liquidate the deficiency in view of the margin 
between the current yield and the assumed valuation rate of interest'57. As Heywood 
and Lander argued, `such an approach would tend to confirm the view held in some 
quarters that the actuary lives in some strange world divorced from reality. He carries 
out a valuation, finds a so-called deficiency, and then says it doesn't really matter, 
nothing needs to be done about it! In fact the deficiency does not exist, the fund its in 
surplus' (Heywoord and Lander, 1961: 336). At the same time, presenting notional 
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values of surplus or deficit to trustees, managers and accountants, the actuarial valuation 
under weak assumptions (or best guesses) could persuade a course of action that was 
antithetical to the long-term interests of companies and their beneficiaries. Therefore, 
the reverse of Heywood and Lander was true. What was believed to be a surplus under 
assumptions of future investment considerations could also turn out to be deficit. In 
sum, there seemed to be an intractable problem for actuaries valuing long-term 
liabilities on present assumptions of expected income yields, which was further 
complicated by the presentation of assets and liabilities in the balance sheet. 
Furthermore, transparency was not the answer that anyone was looking for. 
Lengwiler described `actuarial science as a technology of trust' (2003: 145). 
From inside the profession looking out, the construction of trust through actuarial 
calculations served the wider social and economic purpose of pension funds and their 
commercial sponsors. But it also protected the actuary profession from critical interests 
outside the profession that could take away their historical mantra. From the outside 
looking in, actuarial techniques seemed to represent a credible yet malleable lever 
subject to the eyes and ears of adoring sceptics, whose priorities and choices were 
regulated, not through essential relations of trust, but through the discourses of optimal 
rationality, commercial control, union power and social insurance. In an examination of 
the historical emergence of actuarial theory in the contextual rise of social welfare 
institutions, Lengwiler (2003) hit upon something quite insightful that is helpful to this 
discussion. `The interesting point with actuarial theory is its epistemological ambiguity: 
it is oscillating between the practical interests of the insurance business and the 
theoretical purposes of the academics-or as we have seen above: between the anti- 
scientific position of insurance companies and the scientific interests of social insurance 
institutions' (ibid: 139). Most practical knowledge of valuation originated in life 
assurance under the classical actuarial method, but pension funds, because of their links 
to commerce and social insurance, required a more precise or scientific treatment of 
pension valuation, which needed to be more accountable to public scrutiny, yet safe 
from lay criticism. That life assurance and occupational pensions were both private did 
not matter. The former was seen as outside and alternative to social insurance, whereas 
the latter was seen as an extended version (ibid. ). So much as trust was a factor, the 
transparency of classical actuarial techniques to the cold light of day threatened its 
scientific representation and the construction of social and occupational welfare. 
For 
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making sense of the uncertain future without any sense or control of stochastic variables 
was truly a contradictory position to hold. 
It became quite clear that the prerequisite of transparency was scientific 
rationalisation and while immediate post-war uncertainties seemed to threaten the long - 
term approach to funding, the surface of actuarial science would face the shifting sands 
of post-war conditions. At the time that Puckridge wrote his paper in 1947, actuaries 
were valuing pension funds under the conditions of cheap credit (2 percent). This 
represented a problem. For market rates to be below expected long-term discount rates, 
liabilities would be inflated. But economic conditions were beginning to change as the 
muscle of the post-war economy pump primed a demand led momentum. The era of 
cheap money was soon over and interest rates continued to rise and fluctuate, re-creating 
market uncertainties. During this time, another seminal contribution emerged to hit the 
actuarial headlights to become a milestone in the historical progression of actuarial 
techniques. As Redington wrote in 1952, 
Before 1914 there was promise of uninterrupted stability in economics and social affairs, and 
there was apparently much justification for faith in the unlimited progress of science and the 
ultimate conquest of all our problems. To-day, what then seemed most certain has in many ways 
proved to be most uncertain, and in science the rigid and somewhat and area of physical 
determinism has given way to a more flexible philosophy with probability and statistics as the 
prominent factors. 
In our sphere this growth in uncertainty has been emphasised by the different financial 
consequences of two world wars, the first of which was accompanied by a rise in the long-term 
gilt-edged rates of interest from 3% to 6% and the second by a fall from 3% to less than 2.5%. In 
our early literature it was mortality only that demanded treatment by the methods of probability. 
Now, mortality is perhaps the least of the actuary's uncertainties; interest, taxation and expense, 
though not susceptible to formal treatment by the methods of probability, are nevertheless factors 
about which probability must decide the shape of our thinking. We are less concerned about the 
technique of valuing at 2.5% than at the significance and the consequences of the 2.5% itself 
(Redington, 1953: 286, my emphasis). 
Puckridge's (1947) paper was important in opening a space of necessity for 
understanding probable investment conditions and their significance to valuation and 
funding on a long-term basis. In the context of pension funding, actuaries needed to 
regain control of market uncertainties. Redington's (1953) contribution attempted to fill 
this space, because he advocated a mechanism of `immunisation', by which liabilities 
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could be theoretically protected from interest rate changes through investment in fixed 
securities. Whether short-term discount rates went up or down, Redington (ibid. ) 
theorised that it was possible to match liabilities with assets over the long term making 
speculative conditions irrelevant. That Redington's (ibid. ) ideas applied to life assurance 
and `with profits policies' didn't matter, because they were a milestone for a number of 
reasons. For Redington (ibid. ) put forward a case that would attempt to deal with market 
uncertainties and ultimately instigated a process by which traditional actuarial methods, 
such as Ryder's (1976) deductive theory of adaptive control, would begin to listen to the 
insights provided by the neo-Bayesians and their statistical methods of induction. As we 
will understand later, Redington (1953) no doubt influenced the creation of asset- 
liability models (ALMS), a socio-technology for calculating future probabilities, which 
would create serious consequences for asset-allocation decisions in the late 20th century. 
For pension funds, it would seem that Redington's (ibid. ) ideas have probably become 
more relevant today as asset-management firms promote their `liability driven 
investment' strategies to pension trustees. But while pension funds today strive to asset- 
match their liabilities against short-term fluctuations and market values, the pension 
funds of the late 1950s and early 60s still intended to fund their ongoing liabilities over 
the long-term. While earlier methods of pension funding relied on the long view 
approach and as pension funds today increasingly focus on the short-term and market 
values, this would suggest that something has gone on in between. This leads to an 
interesting question. How is it, for example, that the long view of pension funding 
associated with long-term liabilities and the continual support of occupational pensions, 
even despite contribution problems in the early 1970s, has been replaced by a short-term 
perspective that is linked to the demise of occupational pensions in their post-war 
constitution? 
Equities and the long view: a technology of pension funds 
While we should keep this question in mind, we should also get back on track to the 
story of continuities, and this story requires an examination of the relationship between 
the development of actuarial practices and the pension fund experiment with equities. 
For the particular case of pension funds, Redington's (1953) contribution resonated with 
the profession in a debate over what particular asset was most appropriate for matching 
long-term liabilities. As Redington (ibid. ) argued, it was less about the technique and 
more about the significance and consequence of investing in one particular asset as 
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opposed to another. While Redington's views were heard loudly throughout the 
actuarial profession, subsequent developments in the emerging post-war conditions 
detracted from Redington's concept of immunisation. In the context of market 
uncertainties, the debate unearthed the proposals that Puckridge (1947) had put forward 
with regard to long term funding and focused on how and in what way liabilities were to 
be recorded on the balance sheet. In what was wholly consistent with Redington's 
(1953) thoughts on the consequences of investment decisions, the actuary profession 
began to question the benefits of valuing liabilities at book value during a solvency test. 
In what resonates with contemporary problems with current accountancy rules (FRS 
17), Heywood and Lender (1961) raised the criticism that it was almost pointless to 
place value on assets at book value at time A when they could vary substantially at time 
B. For Maxwell and Lender (ibid. ), this could potentially harm the pension fund. At time 
A market values may inflate the asset streams minus liabilities producing a surplus, but 
at time B market values may depress asset streams minus liabilities producing a deficit. 
In between all this, the firm would decide if the course of funding needed to be reduced 
or increased. Representing liabilities at book value, Heywood and Lender's (1961) point 
was how could the trustee or accountant possibly know whether long-term liabilities 
were truly covered by asset streams? As Heywood and Lender argued, 
The orthodox method, therefore, can have an adverse effect on investment policy, 
because the trustee of a fund may refuse to carry out a switch which is to the long term 
advantage of the fund merely because of its adverse effect on the next succeeding valuation. This 
seems to leave the orthodox basis of valuing assets subject to severe criticism because obviously 
the trustees should adopt the best investment policy for the fund and the valuation techniques 
must be such that the results brought out are not disadvantageously affected. It is quite wrong 
that a valuation method should ever be the cause of a bad investment policy. 
This discussion leads to the conclusion that the value placed upon the assets of the fund 
must be consistent with that placed upon the liabilities and that book or market values are of 
little relevance. Again, since the process of valuation is to estimate the future income and outgo 
of the fund and then to discount such income and outgo at the valuation rate, there seems to be 
no reason why the interest income should be treated on any other basis (Heywood and Lander, 
1961: 329, my emphasis). 
The attack on book values does however have to be understood in the context of an 
emerging interest in the opportunities of equities for pension fund valuation in the post- 
war environment. The focus on equities as a source of long-term funding to match long- 
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term liabilities was a particularly exciting development for pension funds. Over the 
long-term, equities outperformed bonds and diversification of equities created safety 
with returns as the life assurance sector had worked out. The trouble with equities was 
that they were considerably more volatile, but the advantage of equities was that they 
generated income from dividends and also share value. Calculating the expected income 
yields from such investments and discounting them for pessimistic rates meant that 
volatilities became of `little relevance'. To put them on-balance sheet therefore seemed 
to be absurd in such circumstances. The further point was that the post-war economy 
was producing inflation as a side-effect and as pension benefits were linked to salary 
rises and wage increases, equities also provided, it was believed, a hedge against 
inflation. The reasons for this were twofold. As the economy expanded, corporate firms 
became increasingly interested in the fruits of alternative sources of funding that arose 
from stock market participation (Mitchie, 1999). For pension funds, increased 
capitalisation heightened share values. As corporate firms usually made investments 
from retained earnings and borrowings and as economic growth increased, dividend 
yields would not only provide a source of income, but an indication of future expected 
performance if it could be modelled with inflation. In this sense, it was anticipated that 
equities would provide a suitable match for wage related liabilities. While equities were 
seen to be historically more volatile and `risky', it was expected that the economy would 
continue to grow and over the long-term, pension funds would be rewarded for 
sustained investment. While the expected rate of inflation opened up new areas of 
statistical research, the promises of equities seemed exciting. But this emerging 
fascination with equities still troubled the actuary profession. 
As we have already discussed, actuaries believed that equities had an important 
role to play in off-setting long-term liabilities in an inflationary economy. Such a 
perspective was supported by two in particular papers on the matter. As Heywood and 
Lander argued, `If one could be certain that inflation would continue as a long-term 
trend, and that equity investments would always operate as a hedge in this way, then it 
follows that the proportion invested should be 100%' (Heywood and Lander, 1961). 
While this was said provocatively, it did reflect the particular attitude towards the fruits 
of equity investment for long-term requirements. One actuary, taking this prevarication 
seriously believed that the hype contained some worrying truths. In the discussion of 
Heywood and Lander's paper, Fison, an actuary, believed that equity shares should only 
be bought on `yield considerations' and that any type of allocation skewed towards 
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equities would bid up the prices of assets due to the `activities of institutional and other 
investors' to levels where `shares would be overvalued and gilt-edged stocks should 
certainly be bought' (1961: 351). That actuaries were taking an interest in equities at 
this time is significantly related to events that led the government to allow trustees the 
power to invest in equities in 1961 as a result of the Trustee Investment Act. The 
government in its White Paper, the `powers of investment of trustees', had also 
recommended an appropriate asset-allocation, 50 percent for equities and 50 percent for 
fixed securities. Some years later, George Ross Goobey was described as the `father of 
the cult of equity' because he persuaded Imperial Tobacco Pension Fund, one of the 
first, to abandon their 80 percent allocation of gilts in favour of equities, presumably in 
the 1960s when it became authorised (Pensions and Investment, 1998). Due to their 
superior performance over bonds during this time, Goobey likened himself to a `child in 
a sweetshop who discovers that everything is for sale at knock down prices' (quote 
taken from Golding, 2001: 50). That Goobey was barred from the Institute of Actuaries 
for teaching the relative merits of equity investment said something of the Institute's 
touchiness with regard to proposals that were looked upon as speculative rather than 
scientific. 
The Trustee Investment Act was to create an upsurge in equities and produced 
an equity premium of 160 percent using gilt-edge securities as a benchmark (Jones, 
1993: 274). The Transport and General Worker's Union described the pension fund 
demand for equity investment as `blood transfusion for private enterprises' (quoted in 
Shragge, 1984: 92). The point is that Goobey was right, based on yield factors alone, 
equities represented an appropriate long-term hedge and superior performing asset 
above bonds (Golding, 2001: 49-63). The problem for the actuary profession was that 
there seemed to be no scientific justification for this or proof that the long-term 
performance would continue, other than a causal and expected understanding that future 
economic trends may produce favourable results. The actuary's traditional job was to 
assess expected asset streams from present investment sources, but the actuary could 
hardly ignore the relative merits of equity investment for the benefit of companies. As it 
was not the decision of the actuary to make asset-allocation decisions, the seemingly 
`suitable' match of equities for long-term liabilities could neither be held to sway the 
actuary profession into a relatively uncertain area, nor persuade companies into thinking 
this was scientifically approved. It had to be based on a choice of asset-allocation, or a 
consideration of allocation consequences. But this required the actuary to become more 
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deeply involved in matters of impartial investment advice to clients and consequently, to 
have a better understanding of risk in relation to liabilities. As Day and McKelvy 
argued, 
It is pleasing to observe that, although perhaps more slowly than one could wish, actuaries are 
gaining acceptance as one of the natural sources of expert advice on pension fund investment 
policy. To continue to enjoy and deserve this we suggest that the actuary must resist all 
temptation to let the basis and technique of valuation determine the investment policy. The 
actuary who as investment adviser advocates a determined and appreciable entry into equity 
investment must when he comes to prepare his actuarial valuations (unless of course there has 
been a fundamental change in the long-term outlook) present a valuation result which is no less 
favourable than that which would have emerged had the trustees adhered to fixed-interest 
investments. It takes a particular combination of circumstances to make this point of practical 
importance, such a combination has materialized over the last two years or so in the case of 
pension funds... (Day and McKelvey, 1963: 121). 
While the prospect of equity investment was met with caution from the profession, 
Michie's (1999) history of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) would support the 
perspective that the increasing corporate participation of the stock exchange and the 
gradual dominance of insurance companies and pension funds in the 1950s and 1960s 
made domestic equity trading the heart and sole of stock exchange business. Arguably, 
equities saved Stock Exchange business making pension funds and other institutional 
investors an important source of demand beyond the 1960s (Michie, 1999: 363-479). 
For example, although gilt-edged trading dominated turnover from £16 billion in 1965 
to £19.5 billion in 1969, UK equities were growing at a faster pace, from £3.5 billion in 
1965 to £8.7 billion in 1969 (Michie, 1999: 474). Right up to the 1970s and beyond the 
crash, the LSE became ever more dependent `upon the business generated by 
institutional investors buying and selling UK government debt and stocks and shares of 
large and established British companies' (Michie, 1999: 536). The issuance of new 
shares by converted British companies was a major factor in propelling the nominal 
value of securities by £16 billion or by 51 per cent (Michie, 1999: 472). The market 
value of these securities grew by 138 percent or £62.4 billion `reflecting their 
revaluation by investors in the face of inflation' (ibid. ). As the market value of all 
securities issued by British companies increased to 55 percent in 1970, Michie (1999) 
argued later `more than ever the LSE was now dominated by UK equities despite the 
expansion of British government debt' during this time (Michie, 1999: 520). During the 
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1960s, it must also be pointed out that most commission income (85%) was generated 
by equity sales in the LSE. Michie (ibid. ) documents the sustained power of institutional 
investors in relation to the LSE, and particularly pension funds, which not only applied 
downward pressure on commission rates, but also increased their total weighting of UK 
equities which had grown from 26.7 percent in 1981 to 34.2 percent in 1993 (Michie, 
1999: 630). For this kind of sustainable and growing investment in equities, something 
was happening between the actuary, the trustee and the fund-manager. If it was possible, 
for example, that alternative asset-allocations could be made as Day and McKelvey 
argued (1963: 121) in the sense that less volatile alternatives were open to the trustee `to 
do the job', why was asset-allocation becoming increasingly weighted towards equities? 
In order to answer this question it is first of all important to consider equity 
investment as part of the discursive and insurantial technology of occupational pension 
funds (Ewald, 1991). We have become all too familiar with associating equity 
investment in IPE as form of speculation and this is quite understandable. But when we 
consider equity investment in the context of occupational pensions and the kind of 
cautionary methods that were used to frame actuarial valuations, equities fulfilled a 
purpose under the framing of the discount method and the insurantial collective that 
occupational pensions had constructed. It is thus proposed that there is a distinction to 
be made between equity investment in the context of insurance and equity investment as 
an individualised practice. Firstly, the benefits of occupational pensions were typically 
defined benefit (DB), which either applied to a final salary pension scheme, providing 
benefits based on a percentage of final earnings at or close to retirement, or a career 
average scheme providing benefits on each year's earnings. The final benefits, while 
notional on paper, were fixed in terms of financial guarantees once they accrued. As 
benefits were salary related, the liabilities also increased pace with inflation. Inflation 
posed a threat to economic freedom and equities were represented at this time, not only 
as an economic hedge for pension funds, but a political hedge for individuals and their 
freedom. For example; in support of equity investment, one actuary wrote that `the 
alternative to a free-society is a state-run society - forced direction of the economic 
activity of the individual and collective responsibility for the welfare of its members. As 
title to all the instruments of production and distribution would then be vested in the 
State, equity investment as a hedge against inflation would obviously be abortive' 
58 
(Thompson, 195 8: 241). 
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Secondly, equities were part of the collective nature of occupational pensions. 
For Life Assurance firms and particularly `with profit' policies, members were (are) 
typically shielded from volatility through capital reserves and from the spreading of risk 
throughout the population of policyholders. Unlike life assurance firms, pension funds 
did not build up capital reserves. But individual members were shielded from volatility 
through the smoothing of investment risk across time. While equities were considered 
to be a volatile and risky investment, the long-term approach to funding and valuation 
spread the volatility over the lifetime of an employees membership through the 
discounted cash flow approach. Financial volatilities were shouldered, not by the 
individual, but by the employer who increased or decreased the pace of funding to 
maintain fund solvency according to actuarial calculations. Financial volatility, wage 
increases, inflation and longevity were all factors that heightened the financial 
expectations of benefits and their accumulating liabilities. In actuarial terms, this 
problem was sometimes solved through the `equalisation of the burdens between 
successive generations' (Scholey, 1969). The actuary was in a position to make 
assumptions about new entrants, for example, so that liabilities could be smoothed 
between the generations. `In actuarial parlance, it would be secured by paying each year 
an actuarially assessed new entrant-contribution, plus a sum equal to interest on the 
discounted uncovered liability'. Scholey went on to say that 'if initial income did exceed 
outgo, a fund would be accumulated; the aim would, however, not be the accumulation 
of funds, but the equalisation of charges'59. This kind of smoothing process equally 
applied to investment. In essence, new valuations on asset streams were continuously re- 
assessed for new entrants according to new investment conditions. It is noticeable that 
the traditional UK approach to actuarial calculations tended to take this long view 
approach to funding in order to iron out the fluctuations. This long-term approach to 
funding frustrated accounting and fund-manager interests which tended to be more 
short-term. In contrast, the US approach relied on funding approaches that were more 
rigid and transparent so that liabilities pleased the interests of accountants and their 
accrual concerns (Erza, 1989). The smoothing process that the actuary was responsible 
for and the different layers of control that needed to be accounted for helped constitute 
occupational pensions as a discursive form of insurance and shouldered the 
burden of 
financial uncertainties. While the smoothing process was sound in practice, it was 
vulnerable to a number of flaws and the place of equities, while 
important as a 
technology of occupational pensions, also created many ponzi like implications. This is 
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not because equities are inherently speculative or dangerous. But because certain 
frameworks of rationality attempted to measure and control equity performance 
according to inductive mentalities of rule, which did not consider the socio-financial 
consequences of heightened equity exposure. 
From epistemological uncertainty to ontological uncertainty: towards risk and 
return 
Before we examine how this took place, it is necessary to understand how, within the 
actuarial profession, a concerted effort began to shed the inefficiencies of uncertainty in 
search of an understanding of stochastic processes. But before we examine this, we need 
to understand that the post-war arrangement of occupational pensions was governed, not 
by risk, but by uncertainty. When Ewald (1991) examined the constitution of 19`h 
century insurance, he argued that risk was a technology of insurance. It could be argued 
that Ewald's (1991) theoretical treatment of insurance was related to the techniques of 
this period, which relied on deterministic methods of probability and control. In this 
sense, risk was produced and it was calculated through the statistical application of 
probability calculus to populations. As we have already hinted, as life assurance and 
pension funds entered into the investment field it opened up the space of investment 
chance and probability, but the concept of risk, especially in debates over pension funds 
remained on the theoretical periphery, separate from practical concerns up until the 
1970s when actuaries began to take a keener interest in financial economics. In the 
practical domain however, the calculation of risk did not govern asset-allocation 
decisions without allowing for the uncertain. Redington (1952) had confirmed the need 
for a reserve `estate' in life assurance to act as rainy day money and the discounting 
cash flow technique used by pension funds wrote pessimism into the value of the assets. 
Both approaches allowed for a capital cushion and smoothed away uncertain investment 
conditions. While 19`h century insurance calculated risk through deterministic methods, 
early pension fund methods calculated assets taking uncertainty and volatility into 
account. 
Reddy (1996) helps us to understand the critical distinction between risk and 
uncertainty through his reading of Frank Knight's Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921). 
Knight made a distinction between `predictable and unpredictable' or `probabilizable 
and non-probabilizable' forms of indeterminacy (Reddy, 1996). As Reddy's reading of 
Knight makes clear, `one could go further than this to add that Knightian uncertainty 
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includes situations in which probabilities are not known not only because there are 
barriers to their calculation but because the context is such that it is not meaningful to 
speak in terms of the assigning of probabilities, real or hypothetical, to the potential 
event-alternatives' (Reddy, 1996: 227). This is significant to the classical treatment of 
uncertainty in traditional actuarial thinking because the actuary approached investment 
decision making with caution due to the contingent nature of economic history and its 
`multiple time horizons'. As investment conditions changed, so did actuarial 
assumptions. In contrast, actuarial projections, 
... cannot be precise 
forecasts. The bases used for the calculations are derived from observations 
of past experience but they also incorporate some allowance for likely developments. The 
observations provide measures of past wastage rates from one year to another. Nevertheless, 
expectations are not likely to be fulfilled exactly: history rarely, if ever, repeats itself. The past is 
a guide, but never an exact blueprint for the future-which has been described as a funnel of 
uncertainty which steadily widens as the future years unroll (Benjamin and Cox, 1973: 2). 
This reading is slightly out of touch for our discussion of pension fund valuations, 
because the statistical application of probability calculus to stochastic investment 
behaviour only became an emerging area in the 1970s. But it does illustrate the point 
that uncertain (actuarial) calculation defined the limited context and time frame from 
which risks were identified, as opposed to the more ambitious project of calculating 
risks from assumed certainties in economic nature. Furthermore, actuarial calculation 
was governed by a `funnel of doubt', which opens up probability distributions to the 
criticism of unfolding uncertainties. The point about traditional actuarial methods and 
particularly the long view approach to funding is that it relied on caution to account for 
uncertainty, but at the same time made recalculations to account for contingent 
conditions of uncertainty. As we have suggested throughout this chapter, this 
conventional actuarial technique in relation to pension funds suffered, because its 
transparency exposed the fragility of scientific techniques, which were held to be 
mystical and `unscientific' outside of the profession. Demonstrating this viewpoint, 
Cairns (2004) argued, a problem with the traditional approach `is that there is no 
rationale behind the level of caution in the valuation basis, that is, no attempt has ever 
been made to link the level of caution in the individual assumptions to the level of risk' 
(Cairns, 2004: 1264). 
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In very simple terms, the discount method produced surpluses and it produced 
deficits. Under deterministic assumptions of investment conditions, there was no 
attempt to match liabilities with assets in the short-term on a long-term basis. Creeping 
into the debate was the concept of `risk' and central to this question was the 
interdependence between efficiency and solvency. Focusing on the efficiencies of 
different funding approaches, Colbran demonstrated the criticisms of the traditional 
method and rational space it left open when he argued, 
Although there is a lack of published information, it appears that, in general, directly invested 
final salary schemes have weathered the storms of recent years remarkably well. Sometimes 
resources have been sufficient to go a long way towards maintaining the real value of pensions 
without injection of extra funds. 
Can the consulting actuary claim that this success is due to his good judgement and 
foresight? Or would it be truer to say that he was overcautious at the time but by accident the 
over provision proved to be necessary? Or yet again that he has been lucky as there have been 
gains as well as losses? More important is to ask whether we are still justified in encouraging 
employers to think we can well them how much to set aside for the future. 
For the actuary of my generation, many of the basic principles we learned as students 
have been undermined. There is much disillusionment among scheme members about final 
salary schemes on account of the rights of early leavers, highlighted by so many redundancies. I 
believe this feeling is spreading amongst employers too. 
One might think that employers have enough trouble in keeping their business in 
financial balance year by year. To add to this uncertainty of a possible extra liability for the past 
is hard to justify on a commercial basis. We should at least make sure that we show employers 
the nature and extent of their risk (Colbran, 1982: 380, my emphasis). 
As Colbran (ibid. ) was demonstrating there was a rational requirement to understand the 
dynamics between assets and liabilities, not over the long term, because this produced 
solvency risks and financial inefficiencies, but in the short-term because financial risk 
was increasingly calculable and transparent to the accounting eye. Taking Colbran's 
hopes into account, imagine a method that could determine the probable income value 
of certain investments so that they could directly match fixed liabilities as they accrued 
on the balance sheet. Whether or not discount rates went up or down, a precise asset- 
allocation strategy could be determined to cushion short-term changes and to reduce the 
period of amortization. Redington's (1952) ideas had already proposed a method, but it 
could not be strictly related to pension funds because of their investment in equities. In 
order to match liabilities with asset streams, it was therefore important to understand the 
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dynamic behaviour of market values so that fixed liabilities could be insured against 
market fluctuations. Two particular developments inspired the course of events: the 
introduction of financial economics to actuarial techniques and the statistical application 
of probability calculus to stochastic processes. 
`Statistical physics blossomed in the first decade of the 20`h century' giving rise 
to Louis Bachelier's novel dissertation named the `The Theory of Speculation' 
(Bernstein, 1992: 18), which modelled stock market prices as if they were suspended 
particles in motion (Hickman, 2004: 843). Bachelier's ideas essentially developed an 
understanding of stochastic processes or the analysis of random movements among 
statistical variables (Berstein, 1992). Bachlier's ideas were to change the course of 
financial history, but `sixty years were to pass before anyone took the slightest notice of 
his work' (Berstein, 1992: 20). Financial economists gained most from Bachlier's ideas 
because they provided an empirical understanding of random stock movements, which 
inferred general causality and probability to certain movements at particular times. 
Stock movements, while they moved randomly, also appeared to be `market clearing', 
which led to the notion that market efficiency is a factor of information. For the actuary 
profession, financial economists modelled the world on flimsy assumptions, but its 
theoretical search for market efficiency and optimal rationality led to many ideas that 
actuaries eventually became interested in. The discipline of financial economics, which 
had contributed to this debate as early as 1950 (and taking inspiration from Bachelier's 
modelling of speculative prices in 1900), had been sidelined as irrelevant up until the 
1970s when it received the eyes and ears of the actuary community. This is probably 
because under the discount cash flow method, volatility was irrelevant to the smoothing 
approach that actuaries had relied on. Financial events in the 1970s, decreasing 
participation in DB schemes during this time, the development of IT and statistics 
software, in addition to the growing impatience with mystical actuarial techniques, all 
opened the door to financial economics and the application of probability calculus to 
stochastic understanding. In 1972, twenty years after financial economists had first 
developed the idea, Moore's (1972) paper represented a milestone to the actuary 
profession for introducing the ideas of two renowned financial economists; Markowitz 
(Portfolio Theory) and Sharpe (The Capital Asset Pricing Model). 
For the actuary profession, the calculation of financial risk and the determination 
of market values was the most relevant feature of financial economics. In basic terms, 
while risk is the danger of investing in one particular asset over another, risk is also 
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represented as the cost of investing in one particular asset over another. The calculation 
of risk therefore determines the risk-reward ratio. Those assets that have the potential to 
create greater costs also create the potential for higher returns. Similarly, those assets 
that have the potential for creating the least cost also have the potential for creating the 
least return. Financial economics does not assume that different assets have inherent 
features. For if equities, for example, were guaranteed to produce a particular return as a 
reward for risk, then by this assumption, all investors would take up equities. Financial 
economics proposes that there is no such thing as a riskless or costless asset. 
Conversely, risk is a simple matter of demand and supply in an efficient market and a 
variable of information. For example, different flavours and brands of wine are sold in 
the supermarket. Price is not a reflection of quality, but of taste. The quality of wine can 
only be assessed in relation to others and by gaining information through tasting. There 
is a risk that tasting will produce unsatisfactory results for the consumer. But tasting 
determines supply and demand in an efficient market of full availability (information). 
As all consumers are risk-averse (an assumption of financial economics), consumers 
will choose wine that tends to be more popular and consequently cheaper so that the risk 
of financial loss and disappointment is less. Known products will produce a certain level 
of demand, which should, under efficient market conditions, be reflected in the price. In 
an efficient financial market, economists are not concerned with price, but with the risk 
and reward ratio. Known assets will produce known returns through statistical analysis, 
which will represent information conditions at the time. The statistical application of 
probability calculus to stochastic investment values will essentially work out the 
variance and covariance of returns within a certain performance range. As financial 
investors aim for the highest reward for the least risk, investors will diversify 
investments according to the minimum variation of return across assets of different 
categories and of assets of the same category. For example, a wholesale merchant 
intending to buy wine for retail purposes, will on risk averse assumptions, buy a range 
of popular wines from different parts of the world and may specialise by investing in 
one popular brand of wine, diversifying for different areas. In both cases, the wine 
merchant is intending to minimise risk for the greatest possible return by keeping close 
to popular market demand. 
While this is a simplified treatment of financial economics and the ideas that 
Moore (1972) presented on portfolio theory, it not only posited that risk could be 
calculated, it posited that a precise return could be generated from a particular portfolio 
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of investments. The problem for the actuary profession was that the ideas only solved 
one half of the story, which was how to value assets with the least possible risk. Some 
years later, actuaries debated whether financial economics had anything to contribute to 
actuarial practice in 1993. As Professor A. D. Wilkie said of financial economics during 
a proposal to establish it within the actuarial profession; 
Our proposition is that it is worth listening to what financial economists have to say, not 
just because financial economics is widespread, but because financial economists approach 
investment with what, we believe, are sound actuarial principles. They are on the same side as 
we are; and I deeply regret that we have, for too long, treated them as opposition... Why have 
actuaries been so reluctant to apply good statistical methods in investment? Why have we 
allowed others to steal our clothes? In 1952, Frank Redington, a distinguished British actuary, 
presented a paper entitled 'Review of the Principles of Life Office Valuations', which introduced 
his concepts of matching and immunisation. His paper as not a statistical one, and was rather like 
the Cutty Sark, one of the last great sailing ships in an age that was already being taken over by 
steamships. 
In the same year, 1952, a young student, Harry Markowitz, published his paper on 
portfolio selection. It is surprising that an actuary had not written that paper sooner. It looks at 
the reduction in risk, as measured by variance, in a portfolio that contains a number of 
investments whose returns are correlated. Actuaries, for years, had been looking at the reduction 
in risk of a portfolio of insurance liabilities, and how that liability could be reduced by 
reinsurance, but they had never explicitly spelt out what happened when the results of the 
liabilities or the assets were correlated. Markowitz did (Wilkie, 1993: 399). 
One of the main criticisms was that financial economics determined practical solutions 
to problems from one single time frame, rational time. This was in contrast to the 
history of actuarial practice, which tended to make a distinction between risk and 
uncertainty due to the funnel of doubt. Within this ahistorical time frame, it was 
proposed that all investors operate under the same assumptions, again with no regard for 
the idiosyncratic structure of pension fund liabilities. Despite the criticisms of Moore's 
(1972) proposals and of financial economics generally, portfolio theory as well as other 
proposals such as options pricing, created great potential for a profession that was 
leaning more and more towards an endeavour to understand the outputs of market 
values. While market values were a short-term phenomenon, actuaries were still 
primarily motivated with the long term and particularly of valuing short term assets in 
relation to long term liabilities. Moore's (ibid. ) paper and its introduction of financial 
economics presented a challenge to the profession. The consequence was that the 
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problem-solving pendulum seemed to swing away from traditional deterministic 
methods. In commenting on Moore's paper, a visiting actuary raised the relevant 
objection that struck a cord with recent developments that seemed to be taking a 
departure from the long view, 
The concept of variability was not necessarily synonymous with risk and it would be most 
appropriate to distinguish between uncertainty, which was perhaps more directly related to 
volatility and variability, and risk, which might be better defined as the chance or probability of 
missing a target and by how much (Melnikoff in Moore, 1972: 142). 
The distinctive boundaries between risk and uncertainty that had been maintained by 
traditional actuarial techniques and the 'hypothetical-deductive' employment of 
actuarial science were becoming increasingly blurred. In order for the ideas of portfolio 
theory to have any relevance, there needed to be a certain element of probability 
attached to future asset streams. As stochastic modelling of investment was gaining 
interest within the profession, the emergence of portfolio theory and its implications for 
stochastic modelling therefore marked an epistemic change in relation to the history of 
the actuary profession. Under the traditional approach to pension valuation and funding, 
financial uncertainties opened up the probable risks of insolvency if identified deficits 
were not acted upon. Under this traditional perspective, 'uncertainty' was framed 
epistemologically and accorded to a 'deep limitation of our knowledge of the world'. 
Increasingly, risk was becoming a variable of uncertainty and such an ontological shift 
was beginning to frame the notion that the 'surplus of volatility' was 'inhering in the 
fabric of the world'. 
Increasingly, the macro economy became seen as a stochastic interaction which 
produced various causal outputs, which if modelled, could give guidance on the future 
trajectory of events based on linear functions of statistical (historical) correlations60. 
One particular model known famously in the profession as the 'Wilkie model' 
correlated the statistical significance of different investment variables. For example, the 
price index, share dividend yields, share dividends and consol yields (as well as other 
indicators which became added to the model) all became part of the model, statistically 
correlated under assumptions of inflation (see Both, 1999: 98-103). The Wilkie model is 
a typical example of an asset-liability model and one that had been suggested by 
Redington as early as 1952. The main difference was that this kind of model made 
yield(s) a function of inflation and included the ideas of portfolio theory, which had 
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three immediate implications. Firstly, an analysis of stochastic interactions in the 
economy made possible the probable trajectory of future investment conditions in 
alignment with historical experience with inflation as a controlling function of yield. 
The assumptions on yield were figured as variables of inflation, which in essence, made 
`linear' model asset-liability models, such as Wilkie's, susceptible to random shocks. As 
Ryder complained against the neo-Bayesian influence made clear, `the method has the 
appearance of objectivity, but it should be clear that it is very likely to be inaccurate if 
the time series is experiencing trends, cycles or discontinuities' (Ryder, 1975: 64). 
Secondly, this type of asset-liability model `provided scientific justification for the 
inclusion of equities in a pension fund' (Booth, 1999: 100). As equities normally had a 
high variance of yield, portfolio theory allowed for the calculation and control of 
variation. Thirdly, the introduction of portfolio theory to liability modelling provided a 
`three-dimensional' mechanism of expectation and control so that scheme trustees could 
`choose one of the points on the efficient frontiers which provides them with their 
preferred balance between initial surplus, expected ultimate surplus and variance of 
ultimate surplus' (Booth, 1999: 100). While there were nuances between different 
models, this was the type of end product that produced a portfolio interpretation of long- 
term asset-liability modelling. Asset-liabilities and their fixed assumptions allowed 
actuaries to present a scientifically justified case to trustees, who could then base their 
rational preferences and asset-allocation decisions based on divergent and fantailed 
options of stochastic processes. While ALMs increasingly became part of the socio- 
technology of actuarial science, one actuary chairing a paper that presented on the 
application of stochastic techniques made the following comments, 
I know of no pension funds which use the stochastic model for valuing assets and liabilities. 
They may do so in the future, as the author points out. Nevertheless, I see a major difficulty in 
presenting the results on this basis to the client. I dread to think what kind of response we would 
get from the typical pension fund trustee if we presented our valuation reports on this basis. 
Nevertheless, if this method is used in actuarial valuations I am sure that we must disclose what 
we are doing. We are entering a period of change in society's attitude towards pension funds. 
Disclosure is the order of the day. With the role of the actuary becoming more important and 
increasingly under scrutiny, it is a mistake to distinguish between the actuarial and disclosed 
valuation basis (Wise, 1984: 488). 
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Gravitating towards a Pensions Crises: the socio-financial context of investment 
decision-making 
In the section above we explored how actuarial science took an epistemological turn 
towards ontological uncertainty. We must keep in mind however that the asset-liability 
models were primarily an assisting socio-technology developed out of a sense of 
scientific progression, away from deterministic methods and towards what was 
perceived to be a more `objective' approach. In this section, it is important to examine 
the consequences of this scientific turn in the broader commercial environment with 
which trustees, fund-managers and actuarial advisors determined asset-allocation 
decisions. 
We begin this examination in the context of an emerging debate that seemed to 
be gaining in prominence between actuaries and investors/financial economists (Wilkie, 
1993). In essence, financial economists and investors were increasingly questioning the 
actuarial justification for an asset-allocation deployed mainly in equities. This concern 
was presented directly to the actuary profession in 1993 and represented a reflective 
moment made all the more poignant due to Jones' position as a trustee (Jones: 1993). 
From the viewpoint of investors and financial economists, actuaries seemed to believe 
in the superior performance of equities based on a historical understanding of yield in 
relation to inflation. On the other hand, if gilt-edge securities were used as a benchmark 
to compare the relative performance of equities, based on Jones' suggestion, then 
historically, it became clear to see that the equity premium was fantastically high in the 
1960s due to the cult of equity and was fantastically low in the early 1990s compared to 
gilt-edge securities (Jones, 1993). Jones was essentially arguing that short-term 
indicators, such as the equity relationship to gilt-edge securities, were vital because they 
represented investment fundamentals in the short term (ibid. ). In contrast, actuaries 
lambasted this paper because it discredited the fundamental use of long-term 
assumptions, such as inflation (Jones, 1993). As one actuary put it, 
I agree that many pension funds are too heavily invested in equities. Equities may not be a 
perfect hedge against inflation, and I am concerned that many pensions actuaries may be over- 
valuing them. Some actuaries are valuing equities on dividend yields that have only been seen 
about twice in the last 70 years for the purposes of a bulk transfer payment, the terms of which 
are not negotiable. I am also concerned that some pensions actuaries may be overestimating 
future expected returns on equities and underestimating risks. If actuaries allow for high assumed 
returns on equities, and fail to differentiate between expected and guaranteed cash flows in the 
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calculation of individual transfer payments, then the situation moves from one of financial play 
between corporate wheeler dealers to the realms of iniquity (Shucksmith, 1993: 298). 
This paper represented a much wider debate on the relative performance of equities 
versus bonds and thus became a challenge to actuaries and their assumptions of the long 
term. The equities/bonds debate, which otherwise became known as the long view 
versus short view, had come into play at the time of the ERM crises, which questioned 
the dominant role of equities in pension funds. For the actuary profession commenting 
on this paper, the concern was not that yield or equity premium was falling in relation to 
securities (and could stay there), but that exposure to equities was `increasing' and 
based on long-term assumptions, it was expected to continually increase. For example, 
the average pension exposure to equities had increased from 52 percent in 1982 to 86 
percent in 1992 (Jones, 1993). Something therefore seemed to be going on which was 
consistent with the scientific turn, but inconsistent with the general perspective of 
actuaries that the models and their assumptions were essentially sound. 
From the 1970s onwards, there was a surge in the commodification of actuarial 
knowledge. The consulting actuary, traditionally employed for valuation work, became 
a commercial phenomenon as actuarial business advised on valuation, funding, software 
and investment. In the early days of pension funds, fund management was exercised in- 
house due to the manageable size of the assets. As pension funds matured, plan sponsors 
increasingly delegated control of asset-allocation decisions to independent fund- 
managers on a cost-cutting basis. It was also due in part to the sensitive role of the 
trustee and legal standing of trusteeship that separated `the control of wealth from the 
right to benefit from it'. In comparison to investment practitioners, trustees lacked the 
investment know-how and this was especially significant under the prudent man rule. 
Not only were trustees responsible for maximising the potential of the fund and making 
the final asset-allocation decision, they were also potentially liable from beneficiaries if 
things went wrong. As we have already argued, the actuary became more heavily 
involved in constructing the consequences of different asset-allocation strategies. But 
increasingly, the consulting actuary also provided different methods of examining the 
performance of fund-managers. Actuaries therefore consolidated their role as pension 
fund consultants and acted as a bridge between trustees and fund-managers. 
In the wake of Equitable Life, the Morris (2005) report provided a critical insight 
into the role and concentration of actuarial advice. As the Morris report made clear, the 
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market `is characterized by high levels of full-service appointments - the joint supply of 
actuarial, strategic investment and fund-manager selection advice to pension scheme 
trustees - which may restrict competition from other non-actuarial professionals' 
(Morris, 2005: 3). Morris, as well Myners, pointed to the degree of concentration in 
actuarial advice and the extent to which advice had become `bundled'. In the former, the 
market for multi-service provision for large DB schemes was concentrated to the extent 
that the top four firms controlled 70 percent of the market for statutory appointments 
with assets over 25 million (Myners, 2001). For the actuarial profession defending 
multi-service provision it was seen as important `given the need to consider assets and 
liabilities together in the context of a pension fund' (Morris, 2005: 27). For those in the 
business of consultation, multi-service provision created cost-efficiencies for plan 
sponsors and avoided market testing (of alternatives) and switching (to alternatives) so 
that sustainable relationships were built. This level of concentration had the effect of 
limiting the ideas of novel investment advice from the industry and especially from 
financial practitioners with alternative asset-management experience. As Golding 
(2001) pointed out, the actuarial consultant became the gatekeeper of investment 
knowledge and constrained the ability of new financial ideas or investment techniques 
from entering the fray. As one investment consultant was to complain, `What the 
consultants have done over the past 10 years in this country is to deskill everybody. You 
want individuals to be armed with swords and with guns. But we've gone into a world 
where, below the rank of general, you're given a pencil in our financial army' (FTfm, 
2005: 4). 
Considering the commodification of actuarial advice in the context of the 
scientific turn, to what extent was the trustee's role `disciplined'? As we began to see in 
the unfolding episteme of pension valuation discourse, there seemed to be a turn 
towards presenting more transparent and scientific information to the trustee. As 
Clarke's (1999a) research demonstrated, not only was the world of the trustee governed 
by `risk and uncertainty', but the language of `risk and return' was consistent with the 
employment of portfolio theory. The Myners (2001) review commissioned a survey of 
trustees in pension funds, which included interview with 266 trustees and 75 scheme 
administrators. The survey found that consultants depended on asset-liability models as 
a financial planning tool to assist trustees in their investment decisions. In only 30 
percent of cases did trustees determine the underlying assumptions of the models, which 
would support the view that trustees relied on this socio-technology and the strictures of 
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truth that they and their accompanying actuarial advice presented (Myerns, 2005). As 
the ALM's quantitatively modelled long term data, the Myners review argued that the 
`reliance on quantitative modelling' created `an inherent bias in favour of asset classes 
with long-term time series' (Myners, 2001: 58). Research by the Myners review also 
supports the notion that in the majority of cases trustees relied on advice and what Preda 
(2001a) has elsewhere called teleoaffective frameworks of reference61. In other words, 
thinking through the model had real material effects and this reliance on `the data' was 
supported by actuarial advice. As the Myner's report argued `that in most cases, 
consultants are currently the sole source of qualitative input. They therefore have a 
significant impact on investment decisions in practice - yet in law they are not taking 
the decisions and, indeed, are not permitted to take them' (Myners, 2001: 59). Clarke's 
(1999a) sociological examination of trustee decision-making helps us to understand the 
disciplinary environment with which trustees made decisions. Clarke emphasised the 
trustee's sensitive fiduciary responsibilities and the context of uncertainty which 
`encouraged the formation of ad hoc habits and norms to cope with uncertainty and 
decision making' (Clarke, 2000: 142). Clarke went on to say that `convention dominates 
decisions; habits, rules and norms conspire to narrow the scope of asset-allocation, 
investment products, and managers' (Clarke, 2000: 148). As Clarke argued, trustees 
were governed by `risk and uncertainty' and did not want to stray too far from 
convention and so imitation, caution, reliance on advice and a general preference for 
certainty all seemed to be factors that disciplined the trustees role. 
The Trustee was positioned within a regulatory relationship with fund-managers 
and actuarial consultants, which tended to create a skew towards financial imitation. As 
Golding (2001) argues, fund-managers became managed not by how much they made, 
but by how consistent their investment approach was. The Myner's (2001) review on 
institutional investment supported this when it argued, `fund-managers have an 
incentive to stick closely to their benchmark, since underperformance is much more 
likely to level to mandate termination the outperformance is to winning a new mandate' 
(Myners, 2001: 55). It was not prudent investment philosophy to outperform the market, 
because of the high risks attached to such an approach. Pension funds have normally 
taken on the perception of quite a sleepy area of institutional investment from the point 
of view of asset-managers. This is quite an interesting representation, but for the most 
part underpins the discourse of pension fund management, which seemed to be 
disciplined into `beating the average' (Golding, 2001). What Golding (2001) refers to in 
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this instance is how pension funds mostly took on a passive investment style as opposed 
to an active management style. This refers to how there is a tendency for pension funds 
to track the index, in order to avoid financial losses. Such firms are referred to as 
indexers, but Golding (2001) hints at the possibility that some fund managers dressed 
themselves up as active managers in an attempt to bump up their fees, when really they 
were closet indexers. While fund-managers were disciplined by criteria, trustees also 
reiterated the views of consultation, making indexation or closet tracking the 
mainstream investment strategy. The significance of index tracking is that it literally 
tracks the index. The emerging problem that became overlooked during asset-price 
inflation was however, that investment became attracted to share price performance, 
creating a double-market double standard (Feng, 2001). But this was surely because the 
`peer group benchmarks create[d[ powerful herding incentives for asset allocation' 
(Myners, 2001: 56). It is therefore suggested that peer group benchmarks have actually 
contributed towards average investment returns precisely because of the disciplinary 
environment exacted on fund managers. `An investment strategy based on the median or 
the average pension fund does not relate to a pension true objective: to meet its 
liabilities' (Myners, 2001: 55). 
The collapse of Final Salary Pensions: Crises-management 
Having examined the emergence of the final salary pensions crises, it will now be the 
task to understand the constituent parts of crises-management. The central argument 
here is that actuarial risk embedded in collective forms of insurance has hit a crises 
point, which has opened up a space for new financial techniques to develop in the area 
of pensions, which is more individualised and reflexively orientated. 
FRS 17, financial theory and its performative effects: 
The accelerated collapse in asset prices due to the herding on equities opened up 
actuarial valuations and deficits to public and media scrutiny. The introduction of FRS 
17 to corporate balance sheets has called on the performative nature of financial 
economics to describe the crises. John Ralph who was once the finance director of 
Boots divested out of equities and with £2.3 billion of assets invested the entire fund in 
bonds in 2001 (Ralphe et al., 2003: 2). Just as Goobey had become the father of the cult 
of equity, Ralph became the father of a new `potential' cult on bonds, which was 
supported by financial economic theory. In this theory, the underlying financial value of 
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the firm does not necessarily relate to its capital structure. The introduction of FRS 17 
has called on this perspective, which has fundamentally changed the notion and 
perception of the pension fund. Under the long view, the pension fund was understood 
to be a segregated concept and an off-balance sheet vehicle independent of the firm. 
Under new accounting rules, pension liabilities are marked to market and on-balance 
sheet, which means that investment in equities looks inherently risky from this 
accounting perspective, because it creates the notion that the company is highly 
leveraged. Rating agencies for example, now include the pension fund's liabilities in a 
consideration of the rating. While deficits were notional under the long view, they have 
now become tangible under market values. As Ralphe et al. (2003) argue, from a 
financial view of things, a pension fund exposed to equities in this way creates the 
notion that firms are sponsoring the view that it is acceptable to borrow cheaply in order 
to invest. As Ralphe et al argued, `the equity risk premium is a reward for risk, "not a 
free lunch"' (Ralphe et al., 2003: 18). Under the long view, the actuarial profession 
protected this kind of speculation on actuarial techniques. The exposure of liabilities 
under the lens of financial theory and FRS 17 has made the size of pension fund 
liabilities a standing joke. To quote from Ralphe et al. 's paper: 
Following an article in the Financial Times it has become a joke in the UK that British Airways, 
which has a market capitalisation of £1.4 billion and pension liabilities of over £10 billion, is a 
badly run hedge fund that happens to own a few aircraft (Ralphe et al., 2003: 5). 
FRS 17 and its accompanying financial theory is having a performative effect on the 
financial environment that has not been helpful to the sustainability of DB schemes. Of 
284 schemes surveyed in a leading report, the survey showed how contributions had 
increased from £5.5 billion to £8.5 from 2004 to 2005 (FT, 2005: 7). A study of the 
FTSE 350 companies showed that £15 billion had been injected into plug the deficits of 
final salary pension schemes, but it found that only a minority had managed to cover 
deficits due to adjusted assumptions in longevity. As a recent report put forward, 
adjustments in longevity has added £10 billion to liabilities of the FTSE 100 companies 
(FT: 2004: 5). This has added a further dimension of pressure on actuaries for their 
`deluded assumptions' on investment and funding. It has been suggested that company 
pension funds are sill holding on to equities to dig deficits out of a pension crises. As 
former finance director to Boots argued, `they must be clear that holding equities is not 
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a substitute for increasing contributions' (FT, 2004: 6). The implications of catch-up 
mean that the added costs of today will impact the added costs later down the road, 
making it harder and more unlikely that final salary pensions will continue for new 
entrants (FT, 2005: 7). The further problem is that while contributions have gone up in 
the short term to reduce deficits, it is likely also that DB schemes will be closed to 
existing DB contributors (FT, 2005: 2). Evidence of this nature was supported by the 
figure that out of the 284 schemes surveyed, only 123 were final salary and still open to 
new entrants (FT, 2005: 7). A report by the Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development found that only 18 percent of members in the private sector still have a 
DB scheme in comparison to 78 percent in the public sector (FT, 2005: 7). While final 
salary pensions are closing due to the size of the costs and pressure to reduce deficits, 
firms are turning to the less expensive defined contribution option. For example, 56 out 
of 284 schemes surveyed reported that they had switched to DC schemes (FT, 2005: 7). 
It is also important to understand that the take up of DC schemes is likely to be the 
Stakeholder pension due to the low administrative expenses involved62. The paradox is 
that contributions in DC schemes have risen in recent times, but the point is that the 
benefits will not be as generous. 
New risks emerging from final salary closures 
The closure of final salary pension schemes to new members has opened up new areas 
of risk. One of these areas is `longevity risk'. As the shadow secretary for work and 
pensions put it, `in the old days, life expectancy improved `from the bottom' as more 
children and young adults survived to old age', whereas now `it is improving from the 
top' as people who have survived to old age live longer still'. Under final salary 
arrangements, increases in life-expectancy have usually been handled by increasing 
contributions from the next generation of workers. However, the closure of final salary 
schemes to new members and the likeliness that this trend will continue has created 
pressures on pension funds and government officials to look for alternative solutions of 
funding. Without fresh contributions, alternative solutions have called on financial 
channels of investment to asset-match liabilities. This has pointed to the inadequacies of 
the UK coupon pool to match pending pension liabilities. For example, it was once 
estimated that the demand for deferred bulk annuities came to as much as £100 billion 
in a market that could only potentially supply £1 billion a year. Longevity risk, in this 
sense, became posed not so much as a problem of underfunding in DB schemes, but as a 
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deficiency in the relative diversity of the coupon pool to meet wholesale requirements 
for pension fund deficit demand. As former shadow secretary of work and pensions put 
the case forward, `when the state itself requires the private sector to cover these risks, 
can it really just stand aside when private groups are unable to do so? ' 
The importance of this is that closure creates something of a new `risk': 
longevity risk. The significance of this is that this new risk brought above by final salary 
closures actually depolitices DB to DC. In a paper by Mervyn King, the governor of the 
Bank of England, he argues that because there has not been a market developed for 
longevity bonds, final salary closures have increased because of the potential 
implication of longevity risk. `What has happened in Britain over the past two years has 
been that the impossibility of obtaining longevity risk insurance has been a contributory 
factors to the sharp decline in private sector provision of defined benefit provision'. But 
it is precisely because of closures that longevity risk has become an incumbent problem 
and hence a risk to be solved. This illustrates the point that final salary closures have 
opened up new areas of risk, which has necessitated for the management of risk, which 
in fact depoliticses the process and the softly described `transition' from DB to DC. 
The Pension Protection Fund (PPF) was designed by the government to 
safeguard insolvent companies from default on their pension promises, but it operates 
on a risk levy, which means that firms with greater deficits pay more to the PPF. There 
is evidence to suggest that while the PPF operates to protect guarantees, there is no 
guarantee that final salary arrangements will persist as companies and consultants 
increasingly agree `to get DC right'. Then we have the Pensions Act, which creates the 
Pension Protection Fund as well as simplification measures. The PPF does not invest in 
equities, but rather invests in other diversified asset categories, including property, 
bonds and derivatives. Key to this argument is also that the PPF is devolved from any 
kind of government responsibility. It is a private insurance fund that subsidises 
protection through a risk-levy, which in effect applies greater pressure on smaller firms 
to sustain final salary deficits and costs of new members. In effect, the argument is that 
the PPF acts to gently wind down final salary pensions creating a gentle shift towards 
the take up of DC schemes. This is ensured by the revitalisation of the bond market. 
The opening up of pension fund deficits has opened up many critical reflections 
into the notion equity premium. On the one hand, deficits have increased pressure on 
plan sponsors and trustees to reduce deficits through recoveries in equity performance. 
This has largely increased pressure on fund-managers to increase short-term 
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performance by focusing on quarterly performance criteria. On the other hand, pension 
consultants are looking to divest out of UK equities over the next ten years in order to 
reduce their exposure to risk, but also to match investment performance to liabilities 
more carefully. This is not because exposure to equity risk has necessarily increased, it 
is more to do with a realisation that the older methods of benchmarking performance are 
more risky when liabilities are at stake. In other words, anything that isn't working to 
reduce liabilities in absolute terms is judged to be a risk. Benchmarking performance 
doesn't work under the same principle, because it isn't acting to reduce risks, that is, 
reducing anything that is a threat to asset-matching liabilities. 
Meeting the guarantees of pension fund deficits in the long-term has required a 
suitable asset class to soak up demand for pending pension liabilities without asking the 
state to intervene and socialise risk. The issue at heart has been how to meet the 
concentrated level of demand for an appropriate asset class that matches such liabilities 
without burdening the fiscal pressures of the state. But bonds are an asset class that have 
been missing from the UK coupon pool. This is until the UK government provided the 
its first 50 year ultra bond in July 2005 since 1960 (when equities took off). This was 
the result of a consultation process between the Debt Management Office (DMO) and 
the investment industry which preferred the concept of a rolling liquid supply of gilt- 
edged bonds. Before the government introduced the 50 ultra-bond, it had a consultation 
period with pension funds, actuaries, insurance companies and asset-managers. As the 
National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) recognised, the identifiable market for 
the ultra-bond is liability driven, meaning that there is a demand from pension funds 
asset-match their liabilities. One of the important questions asked by the DMO during 
its consultation period was whether an annuity product could be built into bond issuance 
so that pension funds could lock in their investment to match their liabilities. One of the 
issues was that annuitising the bond issue would make bonds much more illiquid. As the 
NAFP argued, `the NAFP does not think this is significant since pension funds would 
need to take such securities in the same quantities because of the closer link with 
liability matching'. Despite confirmed demand for a specialist issuance, it was 
concluded by the DMO that `independently of the merits of one format or another in 
particular, the DMO does not believe that it would be sensible to issue instruments that 
its direct counterparties would currently be reluctant to buy'. Despite the size of 
company pension deficits and despite the clear demand coming from pension funds, the 
DMO found in favour of the asset-managers and the need to retain liquidity. One could 
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posit that this demonstrates the fears of inflation or damaging expectations. But it is 
more significant than this. In fact, what this effectively does is limit the alternative 
market initiatives that would contribute towards reducing deficits. Importantly it would 
place certainty in the need to honour annuities. What liquidity does is to open the realm 
of uncertainty opening up the field of risk. 
Commodification of crises 
The turn to bonds represents a fundamental shift in how pension funds manage their 
assets. Whereas bonds were once seen to be the boring asset class in comparison to 
equities, bonds have now taken on this image of sex appeal (equities were always seen 
to be more `sexy'), which suggests that `bonds have more fun'. The unintended 
consequence of deepening the bond market is that it introduces new risk factors, risk 
factors that become commodified and require the knowledge of tailored investment 
practices. Inflation, for example, creates the risk of increasing deficits over the long- 
term and so inflation protected instruments such as swaps become important. As interest 
rates go up to stall inflation, the price of bonds falls and so increasingly, the discourse is 
becoming ever more accepting of hedge funds to reduce the income parities between 
low and high performing assets so that the risks to deficits are managed. In sum, bonds 
brings with it the need for new hedging instruments and techniques such as `liability 
driven investment', a new buzz word of the industry that justifies and reiterates the 
importance of global finance. The significance of this is that the need to asset match 
liabilities is opening up investment discourse to allow for alternative techniques of 
asset-management and especially other areas of risk premium besides equity premium. 
As head of Watson Wyatt's European Business argued, 
'As pension funds start to think differently, they are beginning to identify other sources of risk to 
exploit besides the equity risk premium - credit risk, liquidity risk, and manager risk. All this is 
opening up a whole new world of managers and strategies for pension funds. Many of our clients 
are moving a portion of their assets away from benchmark-sensitive investments and into 
absolute return products which are benchmarked not against the performance of other fund 
managers but against liabilities or cash' (FTfm, 2005: 5). 
`The days of simplistic investment approaches are over. The pension fund industry needs to 
move away from the asset allocation notions of the past. There are tremendous opportunities for 
enhanced returns from a broader, more modem spread of asset classes and investment products, 
emphasizing absolute returns' (FTfm, 2005: 6) 
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All this is happening just as pensions become increasingly linked to individual 
responsibility and risk-taking. This is seen in the final salary crises as companies 
increasingly wind up Defined Benefit schemes or shift pension management from DB to 
Defined Contribution. Unlike DB schemes where pension income is linked to final 
salary guarantee, DC schemes have no such guarantee as retirement income is linked to 
individual contributions, the rate of consistency in contributions and annuity rates. New 
simplification rules on pensions proposed by the Pension Act 2004 means that savers 
will have much more flexibility in where they place their savings. One of the 
implications of this is that it helps collapse the boundaries between saving and 
consumption. This places a greater emphasis on financial self-regulation and 
responsibility, which legitimates private welfare arrangements as an acceptable and 
necessary practice. In the last argument, the turn to bonds as a measure of safety and as 
a device of reducing deficits accelerates the financialisation of the everyday. This is 
because it locks the economy into an environment that necessitates for a more 
sophisticated market approach to create competitive and financial solutions to pension 
issues. Situating the individual in a competitive market for private pension provision 
creates great strains between financial self-discipline and the risk-preventative financial 
environment. The second aspect of crises-management is increasing attempts to 
revitalise pensions through market-based approaches. A-Day or the new measures on 
simplification rules harmonises tax concessions and alters the incentives for investment. 
It represents a form of crises-management because it tries to revitalise pensions through 
a more flexible approach to saving. The media have become important in stirring up a 
new discourse on the advantages as well as the risks involved in A-Day. It is a further 
example of placing responsibility on the individual to understand risk. As Langley 
(2004d) argues, the individual is being called upon as an investor subject. This is surely 
the case and one which must be understood in the context of crises-management in the 
context of bond finance. This aspect is significant, because as markets are depressed and 
as interest rates are locked-in it also places emphasis on the inadequate level of annuity 
rates to set retirement income. A-Day essentially changes or collapses the boundaries 
between consumption and investment, but it also alters the nature of space and financial 
self-discipline. Under the new rules, a house could also be your investment, so that the 
ability to save literally covers the ability to spend and consume. This moves us closer to 
what Boyer (2001) called the wealth based patrimonial regime or what could be 
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described more simply as Americanisation. One of the answers here of course is that is 
forces people to become more responsible for investment. But this creates the illusion or 
false hope that re-regulation creates more transparency and that individuals can 
calculate certainty for their financial future. 
Conclusions 
The argument of this chapter could be interpreted as the replacement of one framing 
process with another, which may lead to the following conclusions. Either, the 
traditional actuarial method or the long view was capable of handling demographic and 
financial uncertainties, or that its technique was simply one of luck. There is no way to 
verify either sentiment, but it must be remembered that equities were an important part 
of the collective nature of occupational pensions and this was the feeling of the actuarial 
community. Actuaries seemed to be well aware of the dangers of an over-exposure to 
equity investment due to the potential illusions of notional surplus created from equity 
price hikes. What must be kept in mind is that equity exposure did increase from the 
1980s onwards in an unprecedented rise in share values creating Ponzi like tendencies. 
It is those factors that encouraged and facilitated this process that is of most significance 
to the augmentation of the final salary pension crises. Firstly, the replacement of 
traditional actuarial techniques with neo-Bayesian methods of calculation. Secondly, the 
commodification of actuarial knowledge. Thirdly, the disciplinary conditions of the 
trustee in relation to actuarial advice and the disciplinary treatment of fund-management 
in relation to actuarial advice. Fourthly, Government tinkering with dividend tax and the 
Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR), which set minimum levels of assets to be held 
in order to fund promised benefits. 
As we examined, the history of actuarial science reveals that it employed 
financial economics to understand the interaction between market values and liabilities. 
This did not replace the long view. In fact, it tended to accentuate its potential flaws in a 
socio-financial context. However, as we have seen, the employment of FRS 17 
represents the final coup d'etat for financial economists and investment practitioners. 
This coincides with a revisionist financial discourse relating to capital structure, which 
tends to understand traditional actuarial thought as quite simply barmy and irrational. 
Both perspectives have tended to reaffirm the notion that final salary occupational cover 
is too expensive and risky, because it has made it much more difficult to account for the 
long view. Taking into consideration the effects of final salary closures and the creation 
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of individualised pensions under the vale of occupational cover, new risks have been 
born. All these factors have had a performative effect on the nature of crises- 
management. For example, the government's introduction of the ultra-bond has satisfied 
the interests of asset-management firms in comparison to pension funds. In the former, 
new risks associated with inflation have required alternative asset-management practices 
such as the take up of derivatives to hedge inflation. In the latter, pension funds were 
denied their request for a annuity linked gilt edged security from the DM0 which had 
the potential to create absolute matching, which may have avoided the commodification 
of crises. In effect, the market for pension control has opened up, away from the control 
of consulting actuaries towards a much more diverse market for alternative asset- 
management methods. This has also occurred at a time when retail investment has been 
promoted as another crises-management solution. It is also interesting to observe that 
for young actuaries entering the fray, the long view approach to funding is an irrelevant 
and obscure method taken over by market value approaches. 
298 
Chapter Eight 
Re-embedding Financialisation: Uncertainty, Inclusion and 
Stakeholder Pensions 
Introduction 
In the last three chapters we have illustrated the processes that have facilitated the 
financialisation of pension provision through disembedding, and to some extent, re- 
embedding. Disembedding is a series of subtle, yet interlinking historical changes that 
have built cumulatively over time to alter the perceptions and problems facing both 
individuals and experts. Disembedding in many ways has been an innovative phase of 
hope, problem-solving and expectation. Its progress and evolution has encouraged a 
fundamental change in the nature of pension provision as the collective way of 
organising and calculating pensions has been gradually phased out and abandoned, 
where individuals have been encouraged to find their own tailored solutions as 
consumers of finance. But this subtle passing from disembedding to re-embedding has a 
further edge to it. 
In this chapter, we hope to illustrate the extent to which the financialisation of 
private pension provision has been extended through re-embedding -a process that 
attempts to facilitate and stabilise the conventions of commercial market regulation or 
cultural economic regulation, between consumers and producers of financial products. 
In the late 1990s, the `stakeholder' model of capitalism became a fashionable political 
concept for the sceptics and critics of free-market radicalism. The New Labour 
government introduced this concept in relation to their policy on pensions. Rhetorically 
at least, the introduction of the Stakeholder pension was designed to increase the amount 
of people saving for a pension, through a much more accessible or socially inclusive 
format, driven by commercial pension providers. The Stakeholder pension was aimed at 
addressing young professionals and lower income groups particularly, who face greater 
uncertainty, risk and financial difficulties in saving for a pension. In this chapter, we 
hope to show that the introduction of the Stakeholder pension is a further illustration of 
the financialisation of pension provision. We will examine the qualitative nature of re- 
embedding financialisation and the attempt to socialise and stabilise market exchange 
relations through `inclusive' strategies. In addition, we will 
highlight the difficulties 
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posed by re-embedding and the reasons why the Stakeholder pension has largely failed 
in its objectives. 
Robert Boyer (2002) supposed that the Anglo-American model would develop 
towards a financialised growth regime. Boyer (2000) considered present-day capitalism 
as a `transitional period towards one where if financial bubbles disappear, what would 
be the dominant characteristics of an economy where finance had imposed its logic' 
(Boyer 2000: 118). This considered there to be a deep social relationship between stock 
market expectations and consumption/saving patterns. Boyer (ibid. ) imagined that state, 
market and civil society would become financialised, to the extent that developments in 
real time and expectations of financial behaviour would become a motivating force of 
economic behaviour at all levels of political economy. For example, as demand for 
profitability heightened in the financial markets, pressures on corporate performance 
would be offset by consumption patterns as monetary returns from savings increased. 
Financialisation for Boyer (ibid. ) would be altogether more flexible. But his insight was 
to suggest that the consumer society would be fully in tune with the financial markets. 
However, the invisible hand of the finance-led growth regime would depend on 
stabilising information flows and creating what Knights (1997) has elsewhere called 
`financial self-discipline'. Like Boyer, Knights (1997) also regarded the current period 
to be one of transition, where welfare increasingly relied on individual responsibility of 
saving/consumption decision-making. Financial self-discipline not only applied to 
individuals, but to institutions. As individuals regulated themselves, self-regulation 
translated into wider macroeconomic regulation. In this sense, financial bubbles in the 
finance-led growth regime or upsets in the financial welfare contract would therefore be 
overcome, at least speculatively, through financial self-discipline and pure information 
conditions. In this model, the uncertain is apprehended through an approach to the self. 
If this captures the current flavour of financial discourse that represents the 
future of financial (retail) regulation, then it is questionable on two main grounds: (1) 
that Anglo-American economies are on a `transition' towards the finance-led growth 
regime (2) that the uncertain and dangerous financial future can be overcome through an 
approach to the self. While these approaches are important, this chapter wishes to 
examine the flip side of the coin or the social consequences that are attached to this kind 
of regulatory transition. Firstly, this chapter begins by plotting how uncertainty and 
financialisation have evolved together. The major point of this section is to examine 
how the private welfare contract has changed normatively towards financial `necessity', 
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so that there is a more engaging relationship between private welfare provision and 
individual responsibility. The importance of this is to understand how developments 
since the return of financialisation have encouraged risk-taking. Following on from this 
section, it is important that risk is judged differently in terms of positive and negative 
risks. Negative risks are constructed as objective dangers devoid of politics or social 
change. It is therefore important in this chapter to examine what characterises `negative 
risks' in the establishments of a private welfare contract between individuals and market 
providers. Whereas negative risks are objective and dangerous, positive risks are 
subjective and socially beneficial. 
Through the case of Stakeholder pensions, it is important to show how the 
government has written rationality or rational expectations into the market for long-term 
savings in order to apprehend uncertainty. This focuses on how the Stakeholder market 
has been constructed and how the contours of this discourse instill a normative role for 
the individual, which cannot be a level playing field, because the role of the individual 
or the cultural make-up of `financial self-discipline' depends on prior material factors. 
Initially, we understand what motivated the original idea of the Stakeholder pension and 
secondly, we understand what assumptions this idea was based on. Within this section, 
the enquiry is interested to understand the differences between the original Stakeholder 
idea, which was advocated in opposition and the actual implementation of Labour's 
flagship policy towards Stakeholder pensions. This section is important because it is 
necessary to make a distinction between the Stakeholder pension that the Labour 
government proposed in opposition and the commercial promotion of the Stakeholder 
pension product sold today. This provides a crucial sub-text to an examination of 
Stakeholder products as part of a financialised regime of accumulation. 
We then go on to assess the constitution or `streamlining' of financial self- 
discipline through the production of consumer financial discourse. While this has been 
important to the creation of the financial consumer, Stakeholder pensions have generally 
not taken off the ground. It is proposed here that this is because consumer finance is 
based on rationalist assumptions of demand and supply. We then go on to examine the 
barriers to Stakeholder provision and look at the roll back of consumer discourse in 
favour of marketing discourse, which is needed to sell the product. Based on these 
developments, it is argued that the financial self-discipline inscribes class, gender and 
exclusion into the provision of Stakeholder pensions. From this point on, the chapter 
focuses on why `apprehending uncertainty' is flawed under the market model, which is 
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inherently geared towards risk-taking and pooling risks from consumers. This chapter 
therefore challenges the extent to which social inclusion through stakeholder pensions 
can be facilitated through `empowerment' and rational approaches to economic 
decision-making. This chapter examines Stakeholder pensions as an `economy of 
qualities' and argues that empowerment and social inclusion is challenged by the social 
configuration of calculation, which focuses on (1) the inherent problems of the pension 
product (2) inter-generational contingencies and (3) the return of reflexive markets. The 
main point of this is to show that calculation is not something that is determined 
rationally, or something that is socially constructed, but calculation is a cultural practice 
and it is underpinned through the historical contours of the cultural economy and the 
discourses that it projects. This therefore opens up the debate about whether the 
government could afford to make private pensions `compulsory' given its reluctance to 
accept responsibility. Secondly, it re-opens up the case for reform as inclusion for low to 
mid income earners is an impossibility when `businesses' control aspects of welfare. 
Financialisation and Uncertainty 
One of the key points to emerge from the Parisian school of regulation was their notion 
that Fordism provided for a social mode of regulation (Aglietta, 1998). Given their 
assumption that capitalism falls naturally towards selfish pursuits of individualism, part 
of the wonder of Fordism under this perspective was its ability to apprehend the 
uncertain (inbid.: 1998). Capitalist relations overcame the contradictions of capitalism 
because the uncertain future was regulated based on consistencies in the present. Under 
the Fordist model, anxieties over the future were repressed through stable certainties in 
the present (Harvey 1990). The emergence and reflexive stabilisation of the welfare 
state in this era was in important in this respect and was in congruence with the demand- 
led economy that augmented surplus capital from productivity (Havey, 1990: Aglietta, 
1999). As the Parisian school of regulation theory demonstrated, a social mode of 
regulation apprehended uncertainty because it limited the potential of risk to disrupt the 
economic order that characterised the welfare-warfare state. In this model, certainties in 
the present regulated social relations and ideas towards the guarantees of the future. 
This model was continually maintained up until the point when the hegemonic 
status of the US became threatened by inflationary pressures on domestic enterprise and 
on the dollar (Arrighi, 1996: 2003). Great lengths were made to maintain the challenge 
of fixed exchange rates despite the pure dollar standard and the proliferation of capital 
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flight. It was only when risk became privatised as a necessity of economic conditions in 
an increasingly transnational setting did the imperatives of risk-management and 
prudential regulation outweigh the national ability to harness the negative impacts of 
capital flight (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000). Due to a combined process of inflation, 
stagnation in inter-capitalist competition and a general crises in profitability, capital 
redeployed out of productive investments and into financial channels of profitability 
(Arrighi, 2001: 2003). The consequential growth of securitisation and risk-management 
has inflated the role of the capital market for commanding control of domestic and 
international capital (Budd, 1999), but has also expounded the ideological muscle of the 
Anglo-American model as `necessary' choice of growth and efficiency (Langley, 2004). 
Financialisation has thus returned as a process of control and as a politics of domination 
in everyday life (Martin, 2002). 
In this sense, the privatisation of risk enshrined in the processes of 
financialisation has gradually returned the uncertainty of the future to the unfolding 
present (Martin, 2002). The emphasis on gradual is important, because the re-emergence 
of insurance as an acceptable and necessary form of speculation has gone hand in hand 
with the implicit privatisation of welfare and regulatory responsibility (Baker and 
Simon, 2002). The influx of savings from occupational and personal pensions schemes, 
which have emanated from middle class savers (Froud, 2001), has made an important 
contribution to the growth of the capital market and subsequent innovations in personal 
financial services (Clarke, 1999). In this sense, uncertainty has only returned on the 
combined basis that guaranteed forms of welfare have come unstuck, which has gone 
hand in hand with the gradual encouragement of private forms of welfare cover. The 
demise of welfare has been posed as a risk (danger), at the same time that private risk 
has been posed as a guaranteed benefit (Baker and Simon, 2002). 
In the demise of Fordism, the authors have argued that the self-interested nature 
of capitalism has returned (Aglietta, 1998). The social mode of regulation that ensured 
social progress in the Fordist model and which mitigated the uncertainty of the future 
has all but collapsed because the unstable and uncertain future has returned to the 
present. In the demise of Fordism, a new mode of government, described as a discursive 
practice of government, has become self-evident in the reformulation of a more private 
welfare contract between individuals, state and market (Dean, 1999). Unstable risks in 
the present have expanded the realm of anxiety that characterises the future. The 
uncertain future has brought back risks to the present and to the everyday. This provides 
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an interesting proposition that the uncertain is important not just because it is significant 
to the ongoing pursuit of capitalist processes, but because uncertainty, expectations of 
the future regulate social practices in the present. 
The further point is that a greater emphasis has been placed on the individual not 
only to regulate the self, but also to regulate uncertainty through an approach to the self 
(Amoore, 2004). This has become part of the new private welfare model. In this model, 
uncertainty is only managed through an approach to the self and the regulation of the 
self requires the apprehension of uncertainty. In this model, risk is not something 
dangerous as it once was. But something that is to be embraced as a model of welfare 
(Giddens, 1990: 116), of enterprise (du Guay, 2002) and of individual responsibility 
(Amoore, 2004). It is characteristic of financialisation as a process of crises- 
management because it represents an attempt to continue, maintain and reiterate the 
material expansion and legitimation of securitised credit practices in the global and 
everyday setting. The privatisation of pensions is an instance of how social welfare is 
beginning to deepen or popularise processes of financialisation (Langley, 2004). But 
risk in the market setting continues to rest on a normative contradiction. The uncertain 
future does not regulate social relations towards social cohesion and solidarity and 
therefore provides limited scope as a model of `inclusive' economic prosperity and 
welfare (Aglietta, 1998). In fact, the uncertain future returns individualism to the 
unfolding present as market institutions clearly induce the differentiation of identities as 
an important consumption pattern underpinning competitive businesses (Leyshon and 
Thrift, 1998). 
The shift from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution schemes has been an 
important development in the popuralisation of risk, but also socialising the notion that 
`embracing risk' is good for you and your future (Baker and Simon 2002). This is 
significant in the decline of state pensions and the implicit privatisation policies of the 
Conservative and Labour parties (Blackburn, 2002). Here, Blackburn (2002) argues that 
there has been successive policies that have made state subsidised pensions unattractive, 
making private forms more attractive. In a period where shareholder value is everything, 
cost-recovery has also become important to firms that have been encouraged to close 
DB schemes to new members and to take up less costly DC schemes (Cutler and Waine, 
2001). Here, the emphasis is on the individual to take on the responsibility of pension 
investment. A non-guarantee type of personal pension, the value of which in many ways 
is determined by how far and to what extent the `individual' can afford to pursue risks. 
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Whichever is the case, the individual is `included' based on the extent to which he or 
she makes a decision to include him/herself. In the emerging private welfare society, 
knowledge is empowerment and individual freedom is based on the extent to which one 
embraces risk (Baker and Simon, 2002). 
In a period of uncertainty, insurance as a form of providing security has often 
been an imaginary way of apprehending uncertainty. `Because the primary benefit of 
insurance is a sense of security that for most people is never tested by a catastrophic 
loss, the value of insurance rests, in an important sense, in the imagination' (Baker and 
Simon, 2002: 9). The rise of personal pensions as a result of implicit privatisation 
policies is a case in hand. In this sense, imagining insurance of a particular kind i. e. the 
current era of security and gain, has been important both to the growth of private 
retirement security and legitimate use of this to cut welfare spending as a way of 
targeting fiscal spending policies (Blackburn, 2002). The problem in recent times is that 
imagining insurance in a period of uncertainty has not altogether apprehended 
uncertainty and private forms of welfare provision. Cases of mis-selling in private 
pensions, stock market shocks mean that the market has not altogether ameliorated the 
problem of expectations. The consequence has been to dismantle solidarity and 
legitimacy with the unquestionable implementation of private forms of welfare. The 
consequence has also been to expose the complicity of the state in the encouragement of 
private forms of welfare, resistance to which has often placed the state in an awkward 
position to private welfare lobbyists and consumer groups affected by the return of 
uncertainty. But while the state has often been pushed and pulled in various directions, it 
has not led to a radical restructuring of welfare arrangements and state commitments to 
welfare in favour of a more traditional post-war paternalistic compromise. Instead, 
many would argue that current emphasis on private welfare arrangements has been 
encouraged through more precautionary approaches to regulation. The emphasis here on 
precaution is important because negative welfare risks are often perceived as intangible 
so that regulation cannot fully be responsible for when things go wrong. This is in 
contrast to prevention, where risks are more tangible and the failure to prevent them 
from happening would be seen as a failure of regulation. Precautionary approaches to 
economic regulation in the insurance world legitimates itself on the grounds that it 
avoids the problems of moral hazard. Private welfare institutions have an obligation to 
serve the public and this is further emphasised on the basis that there is no public safety 
net to bail out institutions and their customer base. For some this precautionary 
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approach could be described as moving towards a form of `financial self-discipline' 
where regulation of the self also performs the regulation of finance (Knights, 1997). 
We also have to understand that the responsibility to take on board risk is often 
based on the assumption the individuals are risk-averse. Failure to understand risk and 
take responsibility is often seen as a problem of information. This eschews a problem- 
solving approach to risk, which often reiterates the dichotomy between negative and 
positive risks in welfare. But the return of uncertainty and anxiety has often been framed 
as divided between negative and positive risks in a new welfare contract. Negative risks 
are understood as objective related to an external environment and can be avoided. 
Whereas positive risks are much more subjectively related to the enterprise of the self. 
As Giddens argues, 
Welfare reform should recognise the points about risk made earlier in the discussion: effective 
risk-management (individual and collective) doesn't just mean minimising or protecting against 
those risks; it also means harnessing the positive or energetic side of risk and providing resources 
for risk taking. Active risk taking is recognised as inherent in entrepreneurial activity, but the 
same applies to the labour force. (Giddens, 1998: 116). 
There therefore needs to be an account that is `less interested in what is a risk than' what 
`is done in the name of risk' (Baker and Simon, 2002: 18). In this sense, risk today is 
not only about bad risks, but also about opportunity. Many of the phenomena we 
describe as `embracing risk proceed from an implicit belief that risk is a positive force 
that can be directed towards socially useful ends' (Baker and Simon, 2002: 20). The 
consequence of shifting welfare responsibility onto the market is that the individual, is 
not judged in terms of a citizen eligible for welfare, but judged in terms of what he/she 
can offer the business of private welfare provision. Within the discursive context of 
private welfare provision, the individual is more subject to the constant scrutiny of 
behaviour models. Such behaviour models are more likely to target specific identities 
and to gain new ones from competitors. Underpinning welfare products are often narrow 
assumptions of what captures or incentivises individuals into performing often expected 
behaviour. Driven by rational assumptions, as Taylor-Gooby (2002) argues, `policies 
designed on the assumption that social actors are primarily motivated by individualised 
and immediate self-interest ignore the various moral rationalities which govern many 
aspects of behaviour and may damage the benign motivations that inform welfare state 
citizenship' (inbid, 2000: 2). 
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Negative risks and the new private pensions model: the return of uncertainty 
Flexibility Risk 
Flexibility risk refers to the risks and uncertainties that individuals now face with regard 
to their employment and welfare responsibilities. It is now the case that the government 
is intent on transferring welfare provision and responsibility to the market place and the 
individual respectively. From the beginning of the 1980s, Neoconservative proposals 
have significantly reduced the level of state intervention in the marketplace. The 
emphasis on flexible labour markets has been a priority of the competition state in order 
to attract incoming capital as national industries have declined. The increasing 
composition of the service sector employment and the declining share of manufacturing 
has meant that jobs are more flexible and part-time. Flexible labour markets and the 
risks attached to them have to a certain extent become routinised (Amoore, 2004). As 
Ford (2000) has understood, for unskilled workers, the question is now less focused on 
the supply of employment opportunities, for there are many around, but the degree to 
which it will involve `lower pay/irregular hours/unsocial hours/nominal self- 
employment' (Ford, 2000: 107). Employment has also become more focused towards 
`defensive decisions', so that more parents prefer dual employment roles increasing the 
need for flexible working practices. Employment becomes defensive. What we really 
see here is the individual calculating risks attached to uncertainty, especially in relation 
to flexible labour market risks (ibid: 110). 
The commuting lifestyle has been important to flexible labour conditions based 
on individual choice. Even flexible working practices have become important to the 
government's work-life balance policy, which has promoted flexible working practices 
as a way to enhance the sustainability of full time employment and productivity. Such 
flexible risks also risk individual welfare. The promotion of flexible working practices 
has in some cases become part of a working benefits package. Uncertainty has arisen 
due to the flexibility of labour market conditions, but also down to unawareness. The 
uncertainty of labour market conditions has disrupted savings due to a distrust and lack 
of understanding of how to get it back once it has been invested. Someone who changes 
their job six times in their life loses 25-30 percent of their full service benefits of final 
salary scheme in Britain (Economist, 2002c). And this is important because employees 
are now expected to change jobs eight times in a career. Employees under DC schemes 
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do not lose out on such things (Economist, 2002c). Women also make-up a healthy 
majority of the labour force, with the increasing share of part-time employment making 
up precarious employment. The state pension has tended to be exclusionary in the sense 
that it is means tested. Means testing does not provide an incentive for mothers and 
working families on lower wages because it is contradicted by benefits. Flexible labour 
markets and precarious forms of employment for part-time workers has made labour 
market flexibility a risk to savers. 
Investment risk 
The restructuring of the pensions model from Defined Benefit (DC) to Defined 
Contribution (DC) means that investment risk increasingly falls on the individual. Under 
the final salary pensions model, employers are responsible for pension liabilities that 
accrue from investment downturns. Under the DC scheme, the individual is responsible 
for shouldering the burden of market volatilities. Some have called this the 
individualisation of risk, which has become relevant in recent times. The three year 
downswing in equity prices from the beginning of 1998 to 2001, which became known 
as the tech-stock crash was significant to savers, because for most insurance firms, the 
greater share of private pensions was invested in equities. 
It is interesting during this time to understand that insurance companies over the 
course of the 1990s became more exposed to equity prices. Insurance companies are 
more associated with private style pensions despite the misnomer that applies to 
insurance. Such companies invested a lot in equities to sustain high performance for 
beneficiaries due to changes in economic conditions where lower real interest rates 
prevailed, but also to attract new contributors to the expansion of business. This lies in 
contrast to pension funds, linked more to final salary pension funds, which have been 
less risky to the individual than insurance companies. We therefore hit upon an 
interesting debate. Engelen (2003) has argued that the market model of fully funded 
pensions also suffers from the fallacy of sustainability because of how demographic 
factors are associated with the nature and composition of financial techniques. As the 
demographic balance between beneficiaries outweighs contributors then there will be a 
tendency to enact high performance financial techniques. The unintended implication 
that Engelen (2003) raises is that this imbalance may become more structurally 
uncertain with insurance companies than with pension funds suggesting that there is 
something in particular to the configuration of insurance funds. The difference between 
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pension funds and insurance funds is important because in the former, pension funds 
which operate on the final salary model is based on the safety of investments due to the 
implicit ties that relate between contributors and fund-managers. Such pension funds 
tend to be more passive based on an emphasis of average tracking investments in zones 
of safety. Whereas insurance firms have tended to be more active to investment 
decisions in order to attract a consumer base, but also to compete against other 
institutional investors for revenue. The different prioritises of risk are arranged 
according to different ethical priorities. 
Marketing risk 
The private pensions model is based on a save and forget investment model that places 
particular emphasis on the relationship between consumer savers and financial 
producers. In particular, financial producers are said to operate in a black box that 
separates society from the continuing legitimation of financial techniques. Due to how 
material interests secure this legitimacy through `performance' then this also tends to 
depoliticise how performance is created and for whom. This has caused a significant 
debate on the role of institutional investors in the privatisation of pensions. The retail 
financial model has been increasingly called upon to take up the role of intermediary for 
channelling savings into securisited credit practices that are supposed to achieve safety 
with performance. But investment risk has increasingly called this into question and 
placed emphasis on the role of trust between lay individuals and expert systems. What 
needs to be further considered is how investment risk in private pension models is also 
coupled to marketing risk. What we have to consider is the role of marketing in the 
make-up of institutional investment practices in the everyday context and their 
increasing significance to the privatisation of pensions. For example, due to the 
promotion of retail financial services, the boundaries between marketing and finance, 
the technical means by which investment or credit is securitised is also dependent on 
how it is marketed to the consuming public. If there is investment risk, then how it is 
dispelled in the current model and why do consumers save if they don't know where 
money is going? 
Leyshon and Thrift (1998) have provided an excellent explanation for this grey 
area that exists between consumer savers and financial producers. As they argue, the 
systems of trust underlying the economy of expectations has changed the relationship 
between consumers and producers of financial services at the level of the everyday. The 
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thrust of this financial restructuring as they argue elsewhere was based on a `flight to 
quality'. From the crises of accumulation that characterised the early 1970s, financial 
services have moved increasingly towards `valorisation the consumer'. This process has 
become important to the discursive regulation of the financial system that is held 
together through everyday practices. Such practices are responsible for an `economy of 
expectations' that 'surrounds any regulatory system as well as the often unspoken 
conventions that act both to underpin regulation and... to mangle it' (Leyshon and 
Thrift, 1998: 30). For the authors, trust in the financial system is held together by an 
economy of expectations, which constructs, reiterates and maintains the financial system 
at the everyday level. The point that the authors make is that the nature of trust has 
changed in the financial system placing emphasis on different kinds of knowledge to 
inform trust. The restructuring of trust has placed less emphasis on practical knowledge 
of financial practices and the historical means by which this is recorded. While process 
based trust is important for the networks of finance, the authors want to make the point 
that there is less emphasis on relational models of financing. In the emerging financial 
system, more emphasis is placed on characteristic and institutional based trust. As banks 
and financial institutions have increasingly taken on a flight to quality, finance is based 
increasingly on a reading of the social character of financial identities and secondly, this 
is informed by a closer reading of the consumer as text (Leyshon and Thrift, 1998) 
Market competition depends on the ability to know the consumer saver. In this 
understanding, the business of investing cannot progress without an empirical 
knowledge of the consumer base that can adequately contribute towards the investment 
strategy. Identifying the niche of the market depends on knowing the consumer in 
relation to others. The low risk saver happened to be those that could contribute the 
most to financial income. Aldridge (1998) is important because as he argues marketing 
risk has affected all types of consumers. Even those high-income consumers with 
`cultural capital' have tended to be effected by the rise of the mass marketed financial 
products. The private model, `the solution' is therefore part of the problem. The Sandler 
report (2002) was important in how it argued that the consumer retail market had led the 
consumer. Products were sold to consumers rather than being bought. But the Sandler 
(ibid. ) report implicitly argued that part of the problem was a lack of financial 
knowledge on the part of the individual, implying that there was a need to `empower the 
individual consumer'. 
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The origins of the Stakeholder pension 
The Stakeholder pension was introduced as part of New Labour's attempt to re-regulate 
the private pensions market in order to set a level playing field for consumers and to 
encourage low-income earners to save for a pension. It was also intended to resolve the 
new financial uncertainties facing individuals and the negative risks associated with 
labour market flexibility, investment and marketing. The introduction of the Stakeholder 
pension product has not been a straight forward story. It was originally inspired by New 
Left thinking that grew out of a contempt towards Conservative policies and economic 
changes that produced great uncertainty with regard to welfare arrangements. The 
progression of the emerging private welfare contract seemed to be producing 
inconsistencies and contradictions that created overall distrust of the relationship 
between privatisation and neo-Conservatism. The cases of pension mis-selling in the 
1980s and 1990s created public distrust not only towards the Conservatives and its 
explicit backing of private pensions, but also of financial providers. The financial sector 
was heavily criticised for short-termism and for the speculative excesses that 
represented the generation of wealth during the 1980s. The creation of free-markets 
through de-regulation and privatisation challenged the political principles that 
underlined these two developments. At the same time however, there was a material 
interest in the continuity of free-markets and the consumer society. While Margaret 
Thatcher had famously stated that `there was no such thing as society', the 1990s were a 
period of stunted reflection on the significance of politics in a society that became 
apathetic to big ideas and ideology. Will Hutton's (1995) book The State We're In 
represented an important challenge to the unfolding of de-regulated markets in a 
political vacuum. Hutton (ibid. ) advocated a `Stakeholder Capitalism' and while it was 
similar in principle to the Conservative ideas of popular capitalism, it had quite a 
different representation. As Hutton advocated, `the great challenge of the twentieth 
century, after the experience of state socialism and of unfettered markets is to create a 
new financial architecture in which private decisions produce a less degenerate 
capitalism' (Hutton, 1995: 298). Hutton called this the `republicationisation of finance' 
(Hutton, 1995: 298) and this notion of a more democratic involvement in private matters 
seemed to underlie a point at which left and right could debate in a `Third Way' 
approach to social democracy and free-markets (Giddens, 1998: 47). 
New Labour initially represented a political party that had reflected on free- 
market capitalism and seemed to embrace the ideas of the Third Way of combining free- 
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markets with responsible governance. These were the broad developments that 
influenced the conception and design of Labour's first Stakeholder pension idea. In 
opposition, the Labour Government and particularly Frank Field, the front-bench 
spokesman and specialist on welfare, advocated a radical overhaul of the pension 
system (see Annex F). In opposition, Field used the Stakeholder concept as a `warm 
phrase to entice the collective view', `to recognise older generations' and to `pick up the 
ears' of those reflecting on the role of social democracy in order to `signify that this was 
not a one-way process', but one that had to be `based on a partnership in a new welfare 
contract' 63. The Stakeholder concept repackaged `old ideas in a new form'. One of the 
interesting things about Field's vision towards the Stakeholder concept was the degree 
to which it could overcome `uncertainty' and `insecurity' (Making Welfare Work, 2001: 
150), both of which had been facilitated by the Conservative years. Reminiscent of 
Labour's National Superannuation Scheme (see Shragge, 1984), Field's vision was to 
guarantee universal coverage through mandatory saving, which would be controlled 
through the proposed Stakeholder's Private Pension Corporation. In recent times, Field 
has been criticised as an advocate of privatisation due to his proposal to further the 
relationship between public/saving and private/stock market investment (Blackburn, 
2002). In some respects, this criticism has some merit. The stock market is notorious for 
its `uncertain' performance and financial institutions have raised the level of `insecurity' 
from mis-selling. It therefore becomes interesting to ask what assumptions/variables 
were factored into Field's ideas over the Stakeholder model so that it was implemented 
with the assurance of creating `security' and `certainty'? 
The original Stakeholder pension was based on a model of social insurance and 
took inspiration from late 19th and early 20th century Friendly Societies (see Clarke, G.: 
2002). As the level of job insecurity and uncertainty had increased, Field argued that the 
side effects of modern living could be challenged through principles of social insurance 
e. g. a Collective Funded Pension System. Field intimated that the collective pooling and 
sharing of risk resolves the `luck' factor involved in today's individualised pension 
provision (see Annex F). The further advantage of the Stakeholder Corporation was that 
it could provide a considered approach to investment allocation in an accountable public 
domain. Just as Labour's original proposal was to create a National Superannuation 
Scheme in order to create distributional and collective benefits, Field's ideas to create a 
Stakeholder Private Pension Corporation were rejected not by opposition, but by the 
Treasury 64. While Field was in office as Social Security Minister, the Treasury was 
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responsible for rejecting Field's ideas on immediate cost-implications and due to a sense 
that the ideas were not pragmatic. While Tony Blair considered good ideas, he did not 
or could not follow them through (see Annex F). Given Field's expertise in the matter, it 
is also surprising to learn that his office was not asked to press ahead with the issue of 
pensions until his last months in office. From Field's perspective, the Treasury and 
particularly his reference to Gordon Brown had a short-term and one-dimensional view 
towards dealing with pensions and welfare. For example, despite all the evidence 
against the constraints of mean-tested pension benefits, the Government maintained this 
system under the pension credit. Conversely, Field has consistently argued against 
providing short-term relief and has encouraged an approach that creates distributional 
incentives between rich and poor. 
In sum, while the Third Way discourse has tried to resolve the tensions between 
left and right, the public/private dichotomy continues to signify the political 
representation of collective approaches on the one hand and individualist approaches on 
the other. That Field was advocating a private collective model in the tradition of 
Friendly Societies seems to be overlooked. Field should not be seen as a `privatiser'65, 
but a reforming politician operating within the context of financialisation. The reasons 
why Field's ideas were not implemented from Treasury view remain open. But it is 
clear that Field's collective approach to private matters were abandoned in favour of a 
cheaper Stakeholder plan with individuals and private providers in the driving seat. The 
further significance is that the original principles of Stakeholder Capitalism have also 
been abandoned, but the glossy surface of the Stakeholder pension has remained in tact, 
providing a fresh surface to the meaning of individual responsibility and financial self- 
discipline. 
Apprehending Uncertainty through Stakeholder Pensions 
The creation of Stakeholder pensions are an attempt to apprehend uncertainty so that 
economic practices in the present are regulated and stabilised into natural existence. The 
construction of stakeholder pensions is underpinned through a behavioural approach to 
economic rationality and it has in many ways been constructed in such a way as to 
combine individual knowledge with financial options. There is therefore a tendency to 
see that the negative risks attached to `flexibility, investment and marketing' have been 
mitigated in favour of `portability, simplicity and transparency' as rationalist 
assumptions have been written into the design of Stakeholder pensions. In this view, 
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information is clearly a prerequisite of an efficient market with an invisible regulatory 
hand. Negative risks associated with financial investing have been identified as a 
problem of economic asymmetries between consumers and producers. Abnormal 
behaviour committed both by consumers buying risky products and producers mis- 
selling high-risk products is based on the view that there is a lack of clear information 
between market participants. Stakeholder pensions have been constructed in large part 
on the basis of this economic understanding so that information clearly passes between 
market participants. 
Rational Expectations, Transparency and Inclusion 
In economic theory, an understanding of the variables that construct rational 
expectations in a particular time frame understand expectations as the culmination and 
calculation of expectant values from available information. Patrick Minford, a world 
economic authority on rational expectations argues, `by definition the future is 
unknown. Economics, the study of economic decision-making therefore is concerned 
with how people deal with the unknowable' (Minford, 1992: 2). To understand 
expectations and how they are formed becomes important, because they are seen as an 
important regulator of economic activity. For example, Minford (1992) argues that 
`expectations are fundamental in economics' and `therefore completely integrated into 
behaviour' (Minford, 1992: 3). To increase information, to make information more 
accessible through an examination of econometric relationships is to strive for fairer 
expectations and greater stability. The economic view of expectations and calculation of 
expectations relates the actions of rational man to information conditions. In this sense, 
expectations are important in the implicit regulation of the invisible hand, where 
information is the source of all economic certainty. The importance of understanding 
rational expectations is to understand the specific economic conditions that affect 
behaviour in certain ways, allowing for the importance of economic change to be 
figured into the recasting of predictive behaviour. While economic change is a constant 
feature of renegotiating rationality that there are non-economic factors, rational 
expectations suggests that there are other non-economic or in the words of regulation 
theory `extra-economic' factors that contribute towards expectations that are irrational. 
In essence this programme understands the constancy of change as a reason for its 
continuation as a valid research project. `Rational expectations is a programme for 
pushing econometrics to the limits of its possibilities in the prediction of behaviour', 
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`for it will be the case that econometric relationships can at best only be useful in 
restricted circumstances where the environment shows considerable stability' (Minford, 
1992). 
While rational expectations realises the limitations of its methodological 
practices, we can understand how rational expectations as a discipline has contributed to 
how regulators and financial practitioners understand individual rationality and 
consumption. We can also understand the extent to which the design of the Stakeholder 
product is built upon the assumption that the consumer can be empowered through 
simplification. The Sandler Review (HM Treasury, 2002b) commissioned by the 
Government into Medium and Long Term Savings is based on the clear assumption that 
rationality can be returned to the consumer. As the review argued, `simplification is the 
dominant theme of the Review because it is the key to delivering effective competition 
and to empowering the consumer' (HM Treasury, 2002b: IV). It is interesting therefore 
to understand the representation of the individual buying financial services as a 
`financial consumer' who has been confused by asymmetries and complexities of the 
market. `The prize is a demystified model in which the interests of providers and 
customers are much better defined, in which performance is transparent, unnecessary 
jargon removed, and on which effective competitive pressures, for the first time, can 
properly operate' (HM Treasury, 2002b: IV). The Sandler review is appealing to the 
notion that the consumer can be empowered to the extent that financial products become 
like any other product sold in the supermarket. The supermarket identifies a product to 
buy and then decides through preference, which is the most suitable form. This is an 
individualistic decision-making process and one that relies on simple information, 
which is based upon the notion of `caveat emptor', or let the buyer beware. `Unlike 
other complex high value-added goods such as cars or computers, it is not only the 
means of delivering the benefit that is complicated. The benefit itself - the potential for 
higher income in future through the foregoing of consumption now plus the taking of 
risk - is complex. This complexity leads to consumer confusion' (ibid.: 2002: 4). 
Empowering the consumer will therefore facilitate greater transparency and competition 
between financial institutions providing Stakeholder pensions, so that fees and 
commission are reduced through supply and demand processes in an efficient market. 
Transparency of the consumer market in personal finance can therefore create 
expectations that stabilise behaviour so that the economic unknown can be controlled 
and anticipated, and so that financial institutions self-regulate their services in the 
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interests of consumers. Based on these assumptions, the Sandler review therefore comes 
to a problems-solving conclusion in relation to saving: 
Furthermore because the benefits of savings products are deferred for so long, consumers are 
often reluctant to purchase them, even when confronted with information, which suggests that 
they should. If consumers are inherently reluctant to engage in the savings process, they are less 
likely to exert pressure on providers and switching is dissatisfied. The response is more likely to 
be to forego further saving altogether, in favour of consumption (R M Treasury, 2005: 4). 
Transparency: the Stakeholder suite of financial products 
At the heart of the Stakeholder product and its position in the market place is the level 
of transparency that is attached to charges, commission and financial risk. In this sense, 
a prerequisite of consumer empowerment is information transparency. In accordance 
with this notion the Sandler Review stated that it `recommends the introduction of a 
suite of simple and comprehensible products. The features of these would be sufficiently 
tightly regulated to ensure that, with certain additional safeguards, a consumer could be 
sold these products safely without regulated advice' (Sandler, 2002). There are three 
further important elements to the Sandler review which provide an insight into the 
discourse of financial consumption. Firstly, the Sandler Review proposed that regulation 
should be written into the design of financial products and the sale of products as 
opposed to the regulation of advice, which was the conventional regulatory standard. As 
savings take a while before they reach maturity and start producing cash flows for 
providers (it is argued), providers have normally applied an initial charge to the sale of 
financial products, whether they be with-profit policies or personal pensions. Important 
to an understanding of the Sandler review is its assumption that rational individuals will 
only buy products that are fairly priced in the market place. If there is transparency, then 
there it is logical to think that initial fees and charges will dissuade savers from financial 
consumption. In order to create incentives to save, the assumption has been to remove 
completely or to at least lessen the initial fees to a1 percent cap on charges in order to 
persuade savers to save (HM Treasury, 2002: 182). Secondly, the `Review believes that 
ruling out particular asset classes as inherently `too risky' would be a serious mistake' 
(Sandler, 2002: 183). In financial economic theory, due the random walk theory, all 
asset prices are inherently risky. Ruling any out would suppose that some asset prices 
create greater risk-rewards than others. Instead, acceptable risks can be taken into 
consideration as long as the consumer is aware of the `risks' 
involved (Sanlder, 2002: 
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182). Thirdly, one of the most important assumptions of the Sandler review is that by 
writing regulation into the design of the products and at point of sale, financial 
consumption becomes `self-regulatory': 
The review is confident that the features above would create a class of products which could be 
sold without regulated advice as safely as existing products can be sold within the present 
regulated advice regime (Sandler, 2002: 185). 
Portability has become a feature of the Stakeholder product and it attempt to absolve the 
uncertainties of providing for a long-term pension attached to employment over a 
lifetime. One of the important problems that the Stakeholder product deals with is the 
individual financial insecurity attached to changing jobs. For example, someone who 
changes work six times in their life loses 25-30 percent of their full service benefits of a 
final salary scheme. This is important because employees are now expected to change 
jobs eight times in a career (Economist, 2002). The uncertainty of labour market 
conditions has disrupted savings due to a distrust and lack of understanding of how to 
get it back once it has been invested. In order to restore trust in the notion of long-term 
savings or private pension provision, it has been important for the government to create 
continuity in persistent self-provision. Two policies have facilitated this process. Firstly, 
the government has introduced a pension tracing service and secondly, portability has 
been inbuilt to the stakeholder product so that an employee can transfer the Stakeholder 
from job to job. Portability therefore facilitates individual confidence in providing for a 
long-term pension in an era of employment insecurity. 
However, portability is less about meeting individual needs than it is about 
promoting and meeting the needs of labour flexibility. In the past, occupational pension 
schemes encouraged `jobs for life' and rewarded employees for commitment and hard 
work. Labour flexibility and inconsistent labour conditions actually represented a 
problem for actuarial valuations and pension fund solvency. A degree of labour 
inflexibility during the post-war period was a social benefit to the long-term success of 
industries. In contrast, the emphasis on flexible labour markets has been a priority of the 
competition state in order to attract incoming capital as national industries have 
declined. The increasing composition of the service sector employment and the 
declining share of manufacturing have meant that jobs are more flexible and part-time 
creating flexible employment risks (see chapter two). The Stakeholder pension therefore 
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cushions the calculation of risk attached to flexible market decisions made by the 
individual. It also makes the decision for employers easier to terminate final salary 
provision and move to a cheaper Stakeholder option with less administrate charges. 
Simplicity: Risk-return 
In more recent times, financial economics has been responsible for promoting the idea 
that high returns are a reward for investing in higher risks associated with equity 
investment. Work carried out as a result of the equity premium puzzle demonstrated that 
it is quite likely that equity returns will continue over the long-term. Personal pensions 
sold today sell pension products with a default or life-style component, which means 
that over the course of an individual's lifetime, contributions will be invested in equities 
before automatically divesting into safer assets such as bonds when retirement 
approaches. The default option is automatic to the sale of stakeholder pensions and it 
regulates the allocation of equities up to 60 percent. Such schemes are known as defined 
contribution (DC) or money purchase schemes and they rely on the individual to make 
informed decisions with regard to pension contributions. Secondly, they rely on the 
individual to shoulder the burden of risk emanating from stock market volatilities. 
Thirdly, individuals are also responsible for taking out an annuity to lock in income at a 
guaranteed rate at retirement. The implicit backing from the government suggests that 
stock market investment is an acceptable measure to safeguard individual savings 
through sustained equity investment. It is underpinned by the notion that while an 
appropriately diversified portfolio of equity investments is maintained over the long- 
term, an individual's savings will turn out, in the majority of cases, to be of greater 
value had an individual invested in bonds or safer assets. This has tended to naturalise 
equities and stock market investment as fundamental to social security provision. In 
contrast to the notion of insurance, all the risk factors associated with external economic 
conditions are dependent on individual self-mastery. In this sense, inclusion is not 
facilitated through collective approaches to risk, but through consumer paternalism, a 
contradiction, because it proposes that equity investment is the best reward for risk over 
the long-term under the veil of caveat emptor, let the buyer beware. 
Flexibility: Financial Knowledge 
While the notion of `lifestyle' is built into the product as an automatic provision setting, 
this does not necessarily guard against financial volatility. As final income cannot be 
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guaranteed from Stakeholder pensions, the individual is responsible for making the 
economy work in his/her own favour. While Stakeholders have a default or lifestyle 
option, the individual also has alternative investment choices at hand. For example, the 
individual can select from a range of different asset-management institutions that the 
Stakeholder provider sponsors. The performance of such firms is freely available 
through administrative links, web information and media. While the default option 
promotes the service provision in a paternalistic sense, the individual is also free to gain 
from financial risk based on free choice. This creates the notion that risk is subject to 
constraint and normalises the depiction that the default is set at an appropriate level of 
risk. Underpinning this assumption is the notion that rational individuals are risk-averse. 
Failure to appreciate risk and take responsibility for its control is not seen as an external 
condition of economic volatility, but a problem of self-motivation. This eschews a 
problem-solving approach to risk, which often reiterates the dichotomy between 
negative and positive risks in welfare. Negative risks are understood as objective, 
related to an external environment and can be avoided. Conversely, positive risks are 
much more subjectively related to the `enterprise of the self. 
It is of less significance to be interested in `what is a risk than' what `is done in 
the name of risk' (Baker and Simon, 2002: 18). In this sense, `risk today is not only 
about bad risks, but also about opportunities. Many of the phenomena we describe as 
embracing risk proceed from an implicit belief that risk is a positive force that can be 
directed towards socially useful ends' (Baker and Simon, 2002: 20). Financial 
economics has been responsible for the idea that asset prices have no inherent value 
because they are subject to random walks. Only through knowledge of market values 
and their average fluctuations can one understand how to calculate and control for risk. 
Under financial theory, financial economics is responsible for the idea that risk is a 
factor of information. Under the efficient market hypothesis, stock price changes are a 
representation of institutions acting on full information under bounded rationality. 
Further information and transparency can therefore lead to a more efficient market as 
prices rise and fall, not as a result of speculative tendencies, but as a result of rational 
agents adjusting to market values. In this sense, negative financial risks associated with 
investing are associated with economic asymmetries between consumers and producers. 
In a similar way, the individual is a financial actor and can only gain from investment 
through a considered approach to probability distributions. Influenced through portfolio 
theory, financial risk from diversified investment becomes an opportunity because it is 
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no longer a `negative risk', but a positive risk attached associated with financial self- 
discipline. For example, the Stakeholder product has been designed so that an individual 
can choose from a portfolio of different asset-management firms from the financial 
provider. This is not a selection of different assets, but rather a selection of asset- 
management firms with different investment philosophies. While history is no guide to 
the future, it is often promoted as the only and best way to apply knowledge to saving 
and investment decisions in order to rate financial performance. While personal 
pensions can be seen as the embrace of risk over uncertainty as part of a normative shift 
towards neoliberalism, Stakeholder pensions represent an attempt to apprehend 
uncertainty through the mitigation of negative risks. Stakeholder pensions can be seen 
as a rationalist consolidation of a Third Way approach to private welfare and social 
inclusion. 
Asset-based welfare 
Stakeholder pensions form an important part of a new government taking influence from 
the United States called `asset-based welfare'. Sherraden (2002) refers to this as a shift 
from the `social welfare state to a social investment state'. As Sharraden argues in this 
report, the accumulation of assets over the long-term has `many positive benefits for 
individuals and families. These positive effects include greater long-term thinking and 
planning for the future, increased participation in the community and investment in 
oneself, financial products, property, and enterprise for greater returns. Widespread 
asset holding promotes engagement in economy and society' (Sherraden, 2002: 5). The 
Stakeholder product encourages asset-based welfare from the ground up. The child tax 
credit, the baby bond as well as options to buy stakeholders for children is a new 
initiative designed to encourage long-term saving. Financial education initiatives are 
also an important dimension of asset-based welfare and the regulation of the self in a 
consumer driven market. Only by coupling long-term saving measures with financial 
education can the government hope to instill self-regulation without responsibilities. 
Froud et al made the point that the top 40 percent of earners save in the financial 
markets and they also propose that this has had an effect on the institutional pressures of 
performance. As most personal assets are held in the cash economy, the market for 
Stakeholders has intended expand the level of saving in lower income quintiles through 
free-market inclusion measures. The policy proposal to reduce the cap to 1 percent is 
important to this social investment state. It is legitimated on the grounds that between 
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25-30 percent of individual's pension fund for a low-income earner would be taken 
away through charges. As Harmes explains, `familiarity and constant interaction with 
the workings of financial markets may help naturalise investing and self-reliance as a 
way of life and, more indirectly, cause individuals to evaluate the world around them 
through the lens of an investor (rather than worker or citizen)' (Harmers, 2002: 15). 
Technologies of financial self-discipline: risking the self 
The stakeholder discourse has been based on the idea of promoting free choice in a 
consumer market. However, as all government self-help brochures warns `whether a 
stakeholder pension is the best choice for you will depend on your particular 
circumstances'. The consumer discourse underpinning the Sandler suite does not 
account for the individual complexities that are involved. It isn't just about the 
uncertainties attached to the products. It is how they apply to individuals specifically. 
Individuals buying into a stakeholder pensions face particular choices. It is assumed that 
choices can be assessed on individual circumstances. For example, a government 
brochure advises individuals to seek advice on a number of issues pertaining to 
`contracting out'. The simplicity that is promoted as part of the stakeholder package 
`draws attention away from the difficulty individuals have negotiating their way through 
the pensions maze if they wish to find the most suitable financial solution to meet their 
needs' (Ring, 2002: 564). The problem here is that the rationalist assumptions that are 
built into stakeholders are often quite contradictory. They are, for example, offered to a 
target market of low to mid income consumers and employees. But contracting out of 
the state second pension into a stakeholder may not be the most rational choice because 
a stakeholder after minimum contributions may not lead to a better pension fund than if 
individuals decided to stick with the state pension. Contracting out may also depend on 
costly advice from an Independent Financial Advisor (IFA). This is why Stakeholder 
pensions are further problematised in relation to means testing. Those that contract out 
of S2P may in some cases be penalised by low contribution levels. For self-employed, 
those making up a healthy portion of the working population, individuals are not 
covered by SERPS or the State Second Pension. The Stakeholder is about assessing the 
risks to the self. 
The consequence of shifting welfare responsibility onto the market is that the 
individual, is not judged in terms of a citizen eligible for welfare, but judged in terms of 
what he/she can offer the business of private welfare provision. Within the discursive 
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context of private welfare provision, the individual is more subject to the constant 
scrutiny of behaviour models. Such behaviour models are more likely to target specific 
identities and to gain new ones from competitors. Underpinning welfare products are 
often narrow assumptions of what captures or incentives individuals into performing 
often expected behaviour. Driven by rational assumptions, as Taylor-Gooby (2002) 
argues, `policies designed on the assumption that social actors are primarily motivated 
by individualised and immediate self-interest ignore the various moral rationalities 
which govern many aspects of behaviour and may damage the benign motivations that 
inform welfare state citizenship' (ibid, 2000: 2). 
Freedom of choice and self-help have been encouraged by the creation of what 
the FSA has described as `decision trees', which are framed as an objective tool to help 
individuals decide the most appropriate form of saving. Langley (2004) examines 
decision trees as a calculative tool that `constructs saving for retirement as a technical 
problem to be solved through logical individualised financial management' (Langley, 
2002: 6). Such decision trees encourage self-help without responsibility for individual 
choice of saving, because they are designed by purpose to translate rational information 
into common sense options and solutions. This kind of self-help represents the 
neoliberal dilemma of appealing to voluntary and rational behaviour without explicit 
government intervention. This has been complicated to the extent that such forms of 
governmental self-help have been designed for the more vulnerable saver as part of the 
overall cultural project to include individuals into positive financial risks. 
With respect to Stakeholder pensions, the low income and vulnerable saver is 
written into the logic of decision trees with respect to how rational incentives are 
correlated to necessary economic behaviour. Firstly, the FSA's decision trees are 
designed to create certainties, not of the future, because the future is unknowable, but of 
the self. By plotting the relevant information into the decision tree, an individual learns 
that the negative risk is actually created by the degree to which one cares for the self. 
For example, individuals are encouraged to increase their contributions based on 
common sense tax incentives. As contributions rise, tax incentives rise too. We know 
that the vulnerable identity is prefigured into the decision trees because such tax 
incentives are fixed for low-income earners. For every £1 that is contributed the 
government will contribute an extra 28p. This means that for every £100 that it 
contributed; most providers will accept a contribution of £78 making the tax return of 
£22 an automatic condition of contribution. Therefore, monetary return accrued from 
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fixed tax incentives is only augmented by the level of monthly contributions that 
individuals determine on a voluntary basis. For example, an individual (in the targeted 
age bracket without a pension) that pays the minimum Stakeholder contribution of £20 
is calculated to receive £86 retiring at the age of 65 and £69 at the age of 60. If 
individuals contribute £200 per month individuals will receive a pension of £860 at age 
65 and £595 at the age of 60. As we can see, individuals are reminded of the benefits of 
working longer up to the age of 65 where sustainable contributions in addition to tax 
incentives create financial certainties, not as a result of financial markets or government 
developments, but of certainties determined by the self. Such technologies of the self are 
based on the assumption that individuals will react to financial incentives positively, as 
opposed to creating feelings of anxiety that may arise from such responsibility. But we 
have to remember that such tax incentives are automatically built into the sale of the 
product, emphasising that the only concern for individuals is their level of contribution. 
We can be sure that identity is built into the calculation and sale of stakeholder 
products because tax is not variable by the level of contribution, it is based on the level 
of earnings. For high earners, the benefits of tax relief on Stakeholder pensions are 
greater, but less automatic. For example, a high earning individual that contributes £ 100 
will receive up to 40 percent tax relief creating an incentive for earners with a salary 
over £30,000. Despite providers making this feature a marketable, this has not been 
written into the sale of Stakeholder products due to regulations, which means that the 
financial incentives through the sale of Stakeholders are acquired manually. In effect, 
rebates on tax are only honoured through self-assessment. The contrast between 
automatic and manual is an important yet subtle process of the market. For lower 
income earners, incentives are based purely on their level of contributions towards their 
pension. For higher earners the risk of the self is greatest, because it not only depends on 
their level of earnings, it also depends on their will to know the market and their 
financial ability to make knowledge work. In other words, higher income earners are 
encouraged to know the market because this pays particular dividends, but requires a 
discipline of self-management, which usually requires additional financial advice. 
While Stakeholders offer greater tax advantages for higher earners, the 
government has tried to prevent higher earners gaining from a form of pensions 
arbitrage. For example, specific exemptions are made on individuals if they belong to an 
occupational fund and if their income is above £30,000. But this has often been 
contradicted by the provision of stakeholder pensions for children and the caveat that 
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allows for the provision of female partners. It has now become well known that 
Stakeholders have benefited high earners, who have contracted out of other pensions or 
set up new schemes for family members. The market for stakeholders has tended 
reiterate the gender and class bias of pensions, by creating an opportunity for `pensions 
arbitrage', so that rational man can avoid the tax man from surplus funds, but at the 
same time provide a pension for a spouse or partner. While all individual circumstances 
are accounted for in Stakeholder pensions, a recent report pointed out the different 
between the target market and the market target. Of the 600,000 contracts sold between 
2001 and 2002,200,000 were know by the ABI to have been acquired for such 
purposes (Financial Management, 2002: 5). In essence, Stakeholders have been taken up 
away from their intended target market of low to mid income savers. Research by the 
ABI also encouraged the view that this maybe implicit in provider's lack of surveillance 
of the intended market. For example, of the 1,151,371 contracts sold, the ABI could 
only account for 18 percent of contracts whereby information was known regarding the 
relationship between take-up and earnings (ABI, 2002: 7). This is quite puzzling 
because a condition of sale of Stakeholder pensions is premised on the knowledge that 
consumers are within the targeted threshold. But most Stakeholders have been sold by 
IFA's suggesting that the role of advice has actually played a part in making money 
work on the basis of a kind of regulatory or pensions arbitrage. Instead of Stakeholders 
providing for social inclusion, the market has ensured the `super-inclusion' of a more 
exclusive kind (Leyshon and Thrift, 1998). 
In sum, the implication of this is that the individual is not so much at risk from 
external and objective financial risks, because these are uncertain and inherent. But the 
individuals is at risk from the self, the notion that self-harm is the result of an ineptitude 
not to know the market and secondly not to care for oneself. In effect, the problem is 
down to no one but the self. Only by making oneself aware and by making greater 
contributions, will the individual overcome ignorance. Stakeholder pensions are an 
attempt to revamp long-term savings and to re-suture the individual as an `investor 
subject' so that stock market processes are tied up the everyday practices of 
financialisation. While we have attempted to outline the streamlines of financial self- 
discipline and the assumptions that underpin it, it is important to consider the 
relationship between financial self-discipline and the 
low take up of Stakeholder 
pensions. The market for stakeholder pensions 
is estimated to be as large as 12.1 
million, yet the take-up of stakeholders has so far been extremely small 
in comparison. 
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From their inception in 2001, an approximated 1.5 million stakeholder pensions have 
been sold. In order to understand the contradictions underlying the notion of inclusion 
and financial discipline, it will be important to examine three different areas that could 
help us understand the priorities of the Stakeholder market. In the next section, we 
examine the barriers to inclusion in the context of an inter-generational conflict and we 
try to understand how financial self-discipline has been reconstructed in order to resolve 
a low take up of Stakeholders and an engagement with asset-based welfare. 
The commercial market for Stakeholder pensions: An economy of qualities? 
Callon et al. (2004) make an important contribution to our knowledge of the micro- 
politics and performativity of consumption in the marketplace. They begin by 
differentiating between an economic good and a product. An economic good implies a 
`degree of stabilization of the characteristics that are associated with it' (ibid: 61), 
whereas a product `is an economic good seen from the point of view of its production, 
circulation and consumption' (ibid: 61). This is an important contrast because the 
authors identify that the economic good excludes its cultural, political and 
individualised contexts. The good has no history and no expectation. It is coupled only 
to rational information conditions and therefore omits choices based on emotions and 
symbols, those seemingly irrational characteristics that disentangle the mind/body 
distinction (Amin and Palan, 2000). Conventional economics tends to bracket `product 
definitions' and `market structures' so that the `cultural composition of demand, tastes, 
preferences and all other aspects of consumption' are `taken as given rather than treated 
as dynamic or needing explanation; they are frameworks within which rational choice 
can be carried out' (Slater, 2002: 69). Unlike the economic good which focuses on the 
single moment in time as a prerequisite of rational calculation, the product is conceived 
as a `process' and as a `sequence of transformations' (Slater, 2002). It `describes, in 
both senses of the term, the different networks of co-ordinating actors involved in its 
design, production, distribution and consumption. The product singles out the agents 
and binds them together and, reciprocally, it is the agents that, by adjustment, iteration 
and transformation, define its characteristics' (Callon et al., 2004: 61). 
Callon et al. (2004) defined this service relation as an `economy of qualities' 
because the concept of a product is defined as a process and a reflexive cultural practice 
between consumers and producers, which persistently gages and adjusts the quality of 
products in relation to others. It is a continuous process because the product is not only 
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assessed in terms of its qualities, it is defined by its relation to the assemblage of 
interests that constitute the service-consumption relation. In many ways, the product is 
assessed through expectations of its qualities before and after its consumption, which 
raises the question of how individuals make decisions towards certain products if they 
are constantly in process. Transhistorical interpretations of culture pose the view that 
whereas once authority dominated over individuals, the post-traditional culture has 
encouraged self-expression and a self-awareness of individual identity. At least on the 
surface of things, the consumer culture encourages reflexivity as identities engage in a 
democracy of tastes. 
While this post-modern interpretation of identity and consumer reflexivity is at 
first compelling, it falls on a rather discursive expression of identity, without 
understanding how and why identity is subjectively entangled in the continual 
reflexivity of consumption and production. This is not an attempt to take as given the 
role that identity plays in the discursive choice of products and their consequential 
evolution. This is because the economy of qualities is also a framing process of what 
Callon (1998) has called `performation'. Here, economic discourses are important in 
framing the organisation of markets and by their nature, the calculative tools that enable 
individuals to make product choices. In once sense, the economy of qualities is a 
progression of this thesis, because it recognises that markets and products are not just 
framed into existence by economics, they are also judged by the reflexive assessment of 
individuals consumers. What this lacks however is an understanding of how identity 
constitutes the reflexivity of markets. We can therefore improve this understanding by 
referring to Hall's ideas that identities too are reflexive because they are `sutured' 
through the continual development of discursive practices. This is significant to the 
economy of qualities because it attempts to explain reflexive consumption by taking into 
consideration how life and therefore consumer experiences (or discursive events or even 
practices) become `sutured' into the living memories of individuals, so that identity is 
expressed through the continual attachment to and assessment of experiences that raise 
and satisfy expectations. As Storey (1999) explains, `cultural consumption is perhaps 
one of the most significant ways we perform our sense of self 
66 (Storey, 1999: 136). 
This does not place undue emphasis on identity and consumption, because in the 
economy of qualities, consumption and production centre on 
identity and its `boundary 
maintenance' (Jackson, 2004). As Callon et al (2004) explain, 
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Markets evolve and, like species, become differentiated and diversified. But this evolution is 
grounded in no pre-established logic. Nor is it simply the consequence of a natural tendency to 
adapt. Economic markets are caught in a reflexive activity: the actors explicitly question their 
organisation and, based on an analysis of their functioning, try to conceive and establish new 
rules for the game (Callon, 2004: 58). 
We therefore have to ask the question. Is the Stakeholder market an economy of 
qualities? The answer to this question is obviously complex and needs to consider three 
factors: (1) a consideration of Stakeholder pensions as a consumer product (2) 
regulatory barriers to reflexivity (3) the inter-generational contingency of two opposing 
financial identities. Once we consider these issues, we can understand how individual 
calculation in the context of pensions is constituted not only by the inherent uncertainty 
of `pension products', but the interests of financial institutions interested in the reflexive 
nature of markets. Unlike twenty years ago, where reflexivity was orientated towards 
persuading the saver into private welfare provision, reflexivity is underpinned through 
the generational divergence that sets the vulnerable financial consumer apart from the 
older middle income investor subject. The generational divergence is important because 
it underpins the priorities of the retail market, which are orientated more towards 
immediate financial security than long-term financial security. Understanding these 
factors can enhance our view as to why apprehending uncertainty while retaining 
priority for positive risks in private welfare is flawed. It also provides an understanding 
of the government's current regulatory dilemma, which is to go back on the 
requirements that it made towards Stakeholder pensions and its market. We see here that 
the government is lifting charges making the market more reflexive to encourage long- 
term saving in the economy. But this as we shall see creates two implications for social 
welfare. Firstly, it means that the market is used once again to frame calculation, which 
raises the issue of mis-selling once again and secondly there are serious questions as to 
whether social inclusion can be framed through the private welfare model based on its 
tendency to be `reflexive'. 
The Stakeholder Pension: A Financial Product? 
To deal with the first issue, the provision of private insurance whether for life or for 
retirement has been a deeply intractable problem in history (O'Malley, 2002). Yet, in 
the contemporary context, the expansion of private pension provision based on the 
consumption of an investment `product' with a service relation is a relatively new 
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phenomenon, which began only as a marginal activity in the 1960s and grew in 
importance as a result of implicit privatisation agendas and financial deregulation. 
While this is the case, pensions products are unlike any other consumer product 
considered by the Callon et al., (2004) in the economy of qualities. The length of 
entanglement is much longer and uncertain because the contributory contracts are 
binding between expert systems and lay individuals. Individuals have the choice of 
divesting, but at the expense of charges and greater uncertainty. For example, Market 
Value Adjusters (MVAs) are a form of financial discipline enacted on individuals who 
decide to divest from schemes early. Stakeholders as we have suggested entice 
individuals into the positive benefits of risk through welfare inclusion. But Stakeholders 
have no history. There is no evidence of failure unlike other forms of private pensions, 
i. e. with-profits. Stakeholders have attempted to resolve this problem through 
differentiation. Stakeholders are different because they are `simple, flexible and 
transparent'. But even though the initial establishment of the Stakeholder is built on 
differentiation, the product relies on expectations of its performance, rather than a prior 
experience of its use-value. At the everyday level, pensions are inherently forward 
looking and `imaginary' (Baker and Simon, 2002). 
Barriers to reflexivity 
Due to the imaginary imperatives of pensions to be forward looking, consumption can 
only be attained through trust of expert systems. In the past this has been secured 
through mass marketing, which has tended to undermine high risks as low risks. The 
reconstruction of Stakeholder pensions has been an attempt to distinguish negative risks 
from positive risks as rational expectations have been written into the design of the 
product and its supporting infrastructure. The initial cap of 1 percent as outlined by the 
government and favoured by independent reviews had the effect of limiting the 
marketing role of providers and their ability to create marketable trust. The initial cap 
was favoured because it was based on the assumption that self-help, the market for 
independent financial advice, in addition to the role of the FSA would foster a moral 
imperative on the nation as a whole to lead market demand. This did not happen. IFAs 
have concentrated on the top scale of the market where fees and commissions have been 
highest, meaning that the bottom end of the market, the target market, has consumed 
necessities such as endowment mortgages (another form of pension), while the top end 
of the market benefited from pensions arbitrage. As a result, Stakeholders aimed at their 
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target market have been mainly been sold through branch networks or on the high street, 
which explains the elusive figures for earnings and take-up. In their defence, providers 
have argued that it has not been in their interests to make the product work because 
regulations have been costly, not only in terms of the consequences of miss-selling, but 
also in terms of the financial resources that would be used to pool investments on behalf 
of market participants with a record of poor contribution and persistency levels. At least 
75 percent of the total explicit cost of providing a pension under the current regime is 
incurred as an upfront cost. As the Pensions Commission report on long-term savings 
has made clear (PC, 2004), this is independent of the size of premium, which means that 
it is also because there are strict regulations on mis-selling in the initial stages of selling. 
In effect, the apprehension of uncertainty has effectively asked providers to go against 
the grain of valorising consumers as either high risk and useless and low risk and middle 
class (Leyshon and Thrift, 1998: Alferoff, 2004). As a result, social inclusion has been 
ineffectual to financialisation. 
One of the arguments for a lack of provision is that the financial services sector 
will not market the long-term stakeholder product because it is based on the argument of 
`cost-recovery'. Under such a premise, the financial services sector would only begin to 
make margins on its investment in stakeholder consumers when the market was 
sufficient enough and when it matured so that returns on capital created income for the 
firm. This maturation phase would happen in approximately within 10-20 years or so on 
the basis that the captured market was large enough and that contributions were 
persistent. While the argument of cost-recovery provided by the industry is no doubt 
important, it is not entirely persuasive. This is partly informed by the successful take-up 
of personal pensions in the early 1990s. In between 1992 and 1993, personal pension 
sales multiplied the government's estimated figure of take-up by a factor of 10 (Waine, 
1995: 324). By the end of 1993,5 million people owned a personal pension due in large 
part to the transference out of SERPS. This was not only supported by tax advantages, 
but it was facilitated by an interested private sector willing to acquire new business and 
leverage for growth and expansion of new areas of business. What is particularly 
informative about this period is that the financial industry made no bones or complaints 
over having to increase their leverage. As was the case with Equitable Life, this firm 
leveraged itself to the extent that it made promises to honour beneficiaries based on 
none-existent contributors and excessive assumptions towards the performance of 
equities and risk-management. This personal pension business was lucrative given that 
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there was an incentivised market to invest in long-term investments. In comparison, 
although the market for stakeholders is large, there is not the level of incentive for 
consumers or producers. 
What a difference a generation makes 
However, it is necessary not to understand this purely on the basis of cost and interest. 
Stakeholder pensions should be seen as a cultural project of re-emergence designed to 
re-suture the vulnerable consumer into long-term private pensions. To understand why 
Stakeholder pensions have disappointed expectations, it is proposed that this product 
market has to be seen in relation to other investment products and in the context of an 
inter-generational tension between two opposing financial identities with different 
reflexive stakes in the processes of financialisation. As Ferguson argues, 
Redistribution between generations is not new, of course. Large public debts and unfounded 
public pensions have always meant a transfer from the young and unborn to the old, just as 
public spending on education transfers resources from old to young. However, the current scale 
of generational imbalances is unprecedented. The old are substantial net beneficiaries of most 
first world fiscal systems, not only because of pensions but because they are the biggest 
consumers of subsidized health care; they are therefore the obvious targets for policies aimed 
reducing spending. But unlike the young and unborn, they also have votes. The question this 
raises is how far objective conflicts of interest between generations could become subjective 
political conflicts. (Ferguson, 2001: 219). 
Stakeholders are a long-term pension investment designed for younger, low to mid 
income savers. Based on the notion that these products are `bought and not sold' (under 
Sandler), then the emphasis of their provision has been on the individual to make a 
responsible financial decision towards the future. In the current climate, the concern for 
the low to mid income consumer has been immediate and short-term financial security 
of the self. The young vulnerable consumer has been sutured in the ephemeral economy 
of qualities that exchanges credit for consumption. The young have been sutured in the 
consumer society and face the prospect of living longer, working harder and risking 
financially more than older generations due to how financial assets are encouraged to 
work harder in order to maintain the standard of living. Flexible mortgages tied to the 
stock market are an example of how consumption and saving are linked to a younger, 
more flexible generation. Most IFAs are focused on selling more profitable products in 
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relation to personal pensions which have been in decline. Personal pensions have 
therefore been a low priority, where the front end of the business has been focused on 
`protected products, such as single premium products, income draw down and annuity 
related products such as mortgages' (Pensions Commission, 2004: p. 220). 
Whereas Stakeholder pensions are long-term and uncertain, designed for young 
low to mid income savers, (non-pension) investment products have shorter time 
horizons, the risks are more explicit and the gains are more substantial. The leveraging 
of such products tends to be greater and the fee and commission structure is also greater. 
As mid to high income earners have the capital and the will to know the market, this is 
becoming a more lucrative business for financial institutions in comparison to the costly 
and unreflexive demands of long-term pensions67. Greater returns can be earned through 
more highly leveraged portfolios where the emphasis on performance is higher and 
probably more `active'. In comparison to the stakeholder model, which tends to be more 
passive. This provides this business with more ways of differentiating and developing 
financial products in relation to long-term savings which are not as dynamic. This 
market has also become significant to a generation of post-war savers, whose incomes 
and surplus capital has significantly risen and which has experienced the failures of 
expert systems and the interventions of government to make random pensions steals. 
Whereas the younger, more vulnerable saver is disciplined to save for the future, the 
financial services industry has diversified, reflecting upon a more financially paranoid 
generation who feel more financially secure knowing that investments are short-term, 
actively managed and more able to fulfil the patrimonial relationship that Boyer talks of 
between consumption and investment. This parity of financialisation, between saving 
and investment is also at the same time its central contradiction, and drives a wedge at 
hear of long-term saving. 
The implication is that the market has reflexively adjusted towards the needs of 
consumer savers and away from the distrusted long-term investment product. This is not 
just based on an account of cost, because it is also related to the contingent emergence 
between vulnerable consumers on the one hand and baby boomers on the latter. This can 
seen fully in relation to how the market for Stakeholders has slumped in relation to other 
short-term savings. As a result, Stakeholders have been positioned alongside a more 
vibrant dynamic and reflexive market for consumer savers that have taken 
into account 
historical circumstances and fears of pension short-falls. This is significant for three 
reasons. This market is more short-term and locks in savings for shorter periods of time. 
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There is therefore less risk from financial markets and random government grabs. 
Secondly, such markets are actively encouraged from governments. Efficient tax 
savings have been allowed on ISAs for example. This has been an important market for 
the financial services market, which intensely lobbied the government to keep this 
market open. Thirdly, this market is performance led and makes no bones about whether 
there could be or might not be risk involved. Investment within these schemes is based 
on the premise of risk. Fourthly, such products are designed to be open to all. But only 
those who can afford to take risks and those who can afford to take pension breaks are 
encouraged to do so. 
We therefore have a long-term savings market in the form of Stakeholder 
Pensions which is limited in its reflexive nature to reconfigure the structure of its 
products. This seems to be the contradiction of Stakeholders. They try to apprehend 
uncertainty by stabilising expectations towards the future. But in limiting the market in 
its capacity to sell the positive benefits of financial risk, the financial services market 
relies on the individual to make a financial choice over the most appropriate financial 
decision. This places emphasis on the individual to make responsible decisions towards 
investment, not solely based on the monetary incentives of investment itself, because 
this is inherently uncertain and an objective reality of the economy. Rather, there is a 
responsibility to the self to make the most monetary gain from a clear understanding of 
the market and its complexities. Risk does not come investment, it is attributed to the 
self and the extent to which individuals reduce uncertainty through a clear reading of the 
financial services market and its networks of reliance. As Martin explains, 
Financialisation, far from being the other side of the norm, establishes the rountinisation of risk. 
Risk becomes normative not so much because it rewards its adepts with success but more 
because the embrace of risk means one is embedded in the reality of the present. A risk taker is 
one who lives for the moment - the historical moment in which risk management ascends to the 
status of common sense. To be risk averse is to have one's life managed by others, to be subject 
to their miscalculations, and therefore to be unaccountable to oneself. (Martin, 2002: 106) 
In this regard, the market for stakeholder pensions has been apathetic because there are 
contingent and regulatory dilemmas preventing insurance from raising the imaginary 
scope of expectations to instil certainties in the future and stability in saving practices. 
Callon's implicit suggestion was that individuals calculate uncertainty, not through a 
rational approach because this was impossible, but through a calculative network that 
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gave meaning to certain forms of economic behaviour. This is emphasised even more in 
the pensions world due to how calculation and reflexivity is focused on the initial 
processes of choice and consumption. Pensions are forward looking and depend on 
positive expectations for their sale. What seems to be happening is that commercial 
financial institutions have been limited in their marketing role to raise individual 
expectations towards stakeholder products. The regulatory environment runs a tight 
risk-preventative framework which makes sure that institutions do not overly influence 
individuals decisions. This means that there is a reliance on the point on individual 
knowledge and free-choice to decide. The reflexive nature of the stakeholder market is 
therefore limited in its ability to adapt the nature of the product in relation to other 
competitors who face the same the problem. Stakeholder pensions may have been 
differentiated from their past, but they are easily differentiated from other providers in 
the market. By limiting the charging structure, the government effectively provided a 
legitimate reason to diversify business towards areas of `business sense'. 
The return of reflexive markets 
In the wider political environment of the financial services industry, Stakeholders have 
not represented a competitive product for the industry to make money out of. It is an 
irony that the government has passed this product onto the private market to sell on the 
basis that these products are consumer demand driven. This is so because the financial 
industry won its case to increase the charge cap from 1 percent to 1.5 percent, so that the 
industry effectively raised the level of flexibility to contribute towards the marketing of 
the product and the necessity of pooled resources. The industry has complained that the 
Stakeholder product is dead in the water because the government's cap on charges has 
been too excessive. Whereas private pensions have usually been sold through 
Independent Financial Advisers (IFAs), Stakeholders have been mainly sold through 
branch networks. This has tended to limit the exposure of Stakeholders sold as a 
personal pension. Powerful lobbying by the financial industry on this issue even raised 
the eyebrows of senior government advisors. The preferred benchmark was 2 percent 
for the financial industry set at a compromise, but this lay in direct challenge to groups 
such as the Consumer Group, which produced evidence that this would damage or at 
least depress the sail of stakeholders. After four years since its initial inception in 2004, 
the government has since raised the cap to 1.5 percent, which the industry argues is not 
enough. It is interesting that this increase has largely been legitimated on necessary and 
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technical grounds. The argument is that the 1.5 percent cap makes it more flexible for 
the market. It is based on the assumption that the 1.5 percent cap will be in place for the 
first 10 years and then return after 10 year, but this will still create a median of 1.2 
percent. It would seem that making it more expensive for the consumer, increases the 
incentives to sell the product, making it more likely that the framing of stakeholder 
pensions will become more reflexive. The increase in the cap to 1.5 percent means that 
it could be inherently expensive for low to middle income savers to save based on the 
rational model of expectations. Once the total costs have been calculated for an 
individual contributing over a 30 year period and achieving a4 percent return, then it is 
estimated that 30 percent of the fund would be absorbed through total costs. During the 
period when Frank Field proposed the stakeholder model the equity market was 
delivering unpredicted returns in historical context. In essence, what is clear is that in a 
rational economic understanding of saving, then it would be damn right foolish to 
expect the vulnerable saver to save under this model and accounting for such charges. 
But under cultural economy model, it makes sense, because the market is far more able 
to frame the saver persuasively into entanglement when calculation secures the inherent 
nature of ignorance towards the imagination of the future. Even the Pensions 
Commission was sceptical that financialised inclusion could be attained, 
The issue which therefore needs to be debated.. . is whether this implies that there is a segment of 
the pension market, comprised of lower income savers and people working for small firms, to 
which a free market will never be able to sell pension products profitably except at RIYs which 
make saving unattractive' (PC, 2004: 224). 
It is crucially important that the Financial Services Consumer Panel saw that the 
relaxation of the regulatory panel was a real threat to returning `miss-selling' to the 
public. This is very important because it shows from a cultural economy point of view 
why the stakeholder product has failed. The product is unlike a good because it is a 
dynamic and unfinished project. Government regulations prevented the market from 
developing along competitive and reflexive lines. From its initial inception providers 
have wrangled over the sale of Stakeholder pensions. The media and the financial 
industry acted as the voice for squashing the perception of this product and its use. Since 
Sandler, Stakeholders have tended back towards the reflexive nature of the market for 
334 
controlling the product, which means that the old problems have returned except in a 
regulatory context of greater awareness towards the issues of mis-selling. The industry 
has therefore allowed the product to be reflexive process once again. This is where it 
becomes important to understand that the government tried to apprehend uncertainty by 
delivering inclusive welfare through positive risks. The question is, how is regulatory 
environment managing uncertainty, while at the same time maintaining risk. This is 
where it become vitally important to get the views of the Financial Services Consumer 
Panel (FSCP), because they have argued that `any relaxation of the current regulatory 
regime would result in a real risk of miss-selling'. But the FSCP argues that the model 
or the sale of simplified investment products can only be done through direct advice to 
achieve security. Except this model is also costly to those cannot afford it. There is 
therefore the dilemma of a popularised campaign on pensions. 
Lessons form history 
It is important here to say that there are remarkable parallels between the de-regulatory 
debate on stakeholder pensions and the rise of industrial life assurance in the 18`h 
century (O'Malley, 2002). As O'Malley (ibid.: 2002) makes clear, the government 
encouraged the rise of Friendly Societies to provide `life, burial, and sickness insurance 
for the working class' to alleviate pressure on the poor rates. Friendly Societies had 
been encouraged by government to `replace their traditional emphasis on fraternalism 
and benevolence with actuarially based principles of fund management' (O'Malley, 
2002: 98-101). The actuarial principle was encouraged because it made more sense to 
business, but the consequence was that `members became divided and ordered 
according to their levels of contributions and risk categories'. Friendly Societies were 
soon to be taken over by Industrial Life insurance companies, which became the 
principle `institution for governing working class thrift'. But more accurately, the sale of 
insurance policies to the working classes was based on the `disciplinary nature of the 
collecting strategies of industrial life insurance'. Very much like the sale of personal 
pensions or the much vaunted need of IFAs for the sale of Stakeholders to the excluded, 
the sale of policies was characterised 'by the deployment of an army of agents' with 
rather intrusive strategies of ensuring sales. Such sales tactics were perceived as 
absolutely necessary because `it was claimed that they did not have the social and moral 
resources to sustain, unassisted, the long-term commitment required to maintain 
insurance policies' (O'Malley, 2002: 101). William Beverage made an interesting 
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comment with regard to the commodification of insurance when he argued that `life 
assurance among people of limited means, is so different from most other commodities 
that it cannot be safely treated as an article of commerce' (quoted from O'Malley, 2002: 
105). 
Very much like the current political concern as expressed by the Sandler (2002) 
report etc., the role of industrial life assurance was criticised for its `expense ratio', 
which in today's terms means that that a percentage of as a high as 25 to 50 percent of 
an individual's premiums were taken away through commission. While for stakeholders 
this represents an estimate of up 30 percent, the Pensions Commission has still remarked 
that this, just like the 19`h century debates over industrial life assurance, was a 
disincentive to `instil a moral virtue -a free-willed embracing - of thrift' (O'Malley, 
2002). Just as then, the issue of mis-selling was an issue or `overselling' as pressure on 
sales increased. To resolve this issue, the Gladstone government introduced in 1865 a 
`state-run fully contributory life insurance system designed to drive the industrial 
insurance companies from the market' (O'Malley, 2002: 102). Very much like the 
introduction of the Stakeholder product, it was anticipated that this would resolve both 
problems of cost-efficiency and provide greater returns, while at the same time persuade 
people to save in an impartial scheme that would not be threatened as a result of 
overselling. Just like Stakeholders, O'Malley argued that the scheme within a couple of 
years had failed `with few people entering the scheme'. It was concluded that the system 
would only work given that poor people were invited or persuaded to save by 
government-led insurance collectors. This system was not put in place because of fears 
of a public contrivance of the thrift and free-will, which the liberal government 
supported. As O'Malley argued, this created a serious dilemma at the time. 
Available technologies of insurance for the poor thus appeared to be compromised: first because 
of the volitional basis of moral virtues such as Thrift (which, under the regime of moral virtue, 
had to be exercised freely and habitually) was compromised by the necessity for some form of 
compulsion; and second because the apparent impossibility of avoiding high collection costs 
meant that the institution of industrial life insurance wasted thrift' (O'Malley, 2002: 101-102). 
It is odd and intriguing that the precise way that O'Mally describes the political 
dilemma of life assurance in the mid 19th century mirrors almost exactly the current 
dilemma with Stakeholder pensions. In similar terms, stakeholder pensions have not 
been sold to the public because people have not been persuaded to buy into them. Only 
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by making them more expensive initially, then lifting the cap from 1 percent to 1.5 
percent, has the government been able to encourage the financial industry to promote 
stakeholder pensions. But this returns the issue back again. Inclusion is paid at a price of 
individual ignorance. Ron Sander, responsible for an independent review of long-terms 
savings made a revealing comment reflective of O'Malley's analysis of Industrial Life 
Assurance: 
I come back to the fundamental point that a system which has weak consumers, conflicted 
advisers, inherently complex products and a commission-led incentive process for sales is almost 
certain to produce at the margins the sale of unsuitable products. The more the system is 
tightened up -which is in many respects a desirable thing - the more cost is added to the process 
and more saving is made uneconomic for the smaller saver. 
We therefore have to come to a conclusion. The notion that the individual can in some 
sense be empowered, generically, without material consideration is a false premise and 
should be consigned to the dustbin. As Callon et al. (2004) makes clear, calculation 
during uncertainty only occurs in the context of a suitable framing process that interacts 
with individuals and gains feedback in an economy of qualities. The sale of stakeholders 
or their lack of sale, just like the failure to centralise the post-office life insurance in the 
19th century, has failed due to a lack of reflexive framing, which is intent on regulating 
the imaginations of individuals into the idea that they acted with free-will and 
responsibility. 
The Progressive Risk Regime and the Care of the Self 
The FSA has argued that it has taken `no steps over the differentiated regulatory regime 
to govern the face-to-face selling of lower investment products' (FSA, 2003). There is 
the proposal of a streamlined approach to selling products for improving access and 
competition, but there is the fear of miss-selling to the public. We should take into 
account the key argument that those who have an occupational pension and can benefit 
from the new Stakeholder suite probably require consultation, leading them into 
medium term investment products as outlined by Sandler specifications. This means that 
the target range for low to mid income earners who are more vulnerable invest in the 
conventional stakeholder with a less equity stake, or not at all, 
because they do not rely 
on consultation (FSA, 2003). 
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Rather than creating the notion of a market free for all, the stakeholder market is 
setting up implicit regulatory contours that differentiate between different financial 
identities. To look at what seems to be happening. Financial services firms and IFAs 
will benefit from middle income earners who are wanting to contract out of 
occupational pensions. This is more likely to be reliant on advice. The commission 
charges are greater for these products because the risks are conducive to the products. 
This is in contrast to low to mid income earners who are more likely to be a first time 
buyer of a pension and reliant either on their firm to provide information, or the high 
street. In essence, the regulatory environment is controlling for risk by differentiating 
between financial identities. It would seem apparent that the creation of the Sandler 
suite is building a consumers hierarchy of risk for different financial identities. In 
passing pensions and their marketing over to the marketplace, the government is making 
an assumption that the market can fairly distribute and include the vulnerable consumer 
saver. It is therefore useful to examine how the introduction of stakeholder pensions 
attempts to apprehend uncertainty, yet at the same time control for risk. This seems to 
be key problem. The risk comes not from the systemic nature of the financial system, 
but from the risk of the self. 
What has happened it would seem is that the industry and government have 
realised that they cannot use the market to sell stakeholder products based on a 
simplicity, flexibility and fairness. In effect, the Sandler report was a damning report 
against the inherent nature of industry as unfair. The government has come to a 
compromise. They have recognised that for the Stakeholder to be a flagship pensions 
product it has to be differentiated and moulded to the contours of the consumer savings 
market. In a progressive tax regime system, revenue collected rises more than 
proportionally to income. In a progressive risk regime, risk exposure rises more than 
proportionally to awareness and affordability. At the lower income levels, savers are 
dissuaded from saving in pension schemes or investment vehicles where the risk is 
greatest. But such risks are not primarily based on investment losses, but also from the 
erosion of contributions from fees and commission. As the ladder increases, so does the 
commission and fees structure, which goes up in accordance with the particular 
financial practices of the firm. This progressive risk regime would be constructed 
through `filter questions' in the industry and at the grass roots level. The notion of a 
progressive risk regime is seen quite fundamentally in the FSA's 
discussion papers with 
the financial industry. Important to this was how the financial services sector agreed that 
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the specifications of the products included in the Sandler suite, including the `level and 
application of capped management charges, would shape the level of risk' (FSA, 2003: 
9). As it was argued, `a one size fits all' approach to the regulation of simplified 
products was seen to be a risk in itself. This partly relates to other side of the coin. Firms 
marketing products to consumers with little chance of recovering their cost of capital 
investment would also meet prudential requirements of risk (FSA, 2003,9). Managing 
not to match the appropriate risks to the appropriate consumers `risks' mis-selling 
certain products to the consuming public. This seems to be a strange irony. The risk in 
this sense is not the same for all. Risk is fully individualised to the personal conditions 
of the self. What is more, it is still under consideration of whether signing up to the 
progressive risk regime means that you are also eligible to complain to the Financial 
Ombudsman if you have received advice and then complain (FSA, 2003: 13) This 
aspect of risk is also based on `knowing your consumer' (FSA, 2003: 14). In simple 
terms, this means, know the level at which the individual can afford to take risks and the 
level of awareness that an individual has towards financial risks. 
Conclusion 
While personal pensions can be seen as the embrace of risk over uncertainty as part of a 
normative shift towards neoliberalism, Stakeholder pensions represent an attempt to 
apprehend uncertainty through the mitigation of negative risks. Stakeholder pensions 
can be seen as a rationalist consolidation of a Third Way approach to private welfare 
and social inclusion. The first point about Stakeholders is that they are a form of 
defined contribution pension. This effectively means that all contributions are flexibly 
invested by the individual who has investment autonomy. The second aspect to this is 
that there is no level of guarantee. Stakeholders, either in the form of personal pensions 
or in their occupational variety do not guarantee contributions or returns from 
investment. Thirdly, Stakeholders are invested in the stock market with a maximum cap 
on equities of 60 percent. This is precisely why Stakeholders have become a flagship 
initiative of the Labour government, because it is an initiative which is attempting to 
promote the wealth generating capacities of financialised forms of accumulation, which 
incorporates the Third Way thesis to `socially include' the masses. An important part of 
this is the creation of market transparency by limiting the amount of commission 
providers earn on selling Stakeholder pensions. It is legitimated on the grounds that 
between 25-30 percent of an individual's pension fund for a low-income earner would 
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be taken away through charges. Transparency is also encouraged through simplicity and 
the creation of the `default' lifestyle option for savers. This facilitates the notion of save 
and forget, but it also means that investment is taken out of equities and into bonds for 
safety approaching retirement. The final dimension to Stakeholder pensions is that they 
are intended to revamp long-term savings and to re-suture the individual as an `investor 
subject' so that stock market processes are tied up in the everyday practices of 
financialisation. In this sense, building asset-based welfare and encouraging 
stakeholders for children is a governmental policy designed to foster the `mass 
investment culture'. 
In this chapter, we have demonstrated that the introduction of the Stakeholder 
pension has been part of a governmental framework and strategy to determine self- 
regulation in the market for private pension provision. Re-embedding financialisation 
has been underpinned by a reflexive governmentality that has meant to stabilise and 
foster normal consumer relations between pension providers and paying customers. This 
has been based on the economic theory of `rational expectations', which begins from the 
rather ambitious notion that rationality can be achieved through pure information 
conditions. Conversely, the notion that the individual can gain empowerment through 
access to simplified information is a misnomer. This is because the introduction of the 
Stakeholder pension has been built upon a prior history that has taken flight. In other 
words, it isn't the target market that have gained from Stakeholder pensions and it will 
not be low income earners or young professionals who will gain from the new 
information conditions. The aim to create rational expectations goes against the grain of 
material factors, which seem to be underpinned by the nature of demographic factors. 
For example, low-income earners and young professionals have different priorities to 
older generations. While the former are concerned with their own credit conditions, 
older generations, usually higher income groups want to know where to place their 
money and how to avoid death and taxes. Producers seem to arrange their own priorities 
accordingly. 
Secondly, the commercial market is a business and cannot persuade savers 
without firstly marketing the product or secondly making profit from custom. As Callon 
(1998) makes clear, calculation of uncertainty only occurs in the context of a suitable 
framing process that interacts with individuals and gains feedback in an `economy of 
qualities'. The implication of this however is that individuals become entangled in 
economic discourses, the intentions of which are questionable if we are to assess their 
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welfare interests. Additionally, it is illogical to ask commercial providers to persuade 
people to save and not to make profit from their competitive actions. Perhaps this even 
demonstrates the ethical difficulties and tensions of re-embedding financialisation. In 
essence, any attempt to implement inclusive strategies through commercial options, 
especially based upon prior historical forces, will be subject to counter-forces making 
any such policy `rhetorical' rather than practical. For example, providers and 
intermediaries acting in the market do not go out of their way to sell this product or even 
persuade individuals to use this product68. Providers compete for high net worth 
individuals instead. This therefore opens up a space as how to re-include individuals, 
not through consumer discourse, but through a re-distributional approach that provides 
incentives for the rich and poor in order to build social solidarity through political 
economy. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusions: Re-politicising Financialisation 
Theoretical reflections 
We have attempted in this thesis to contribute an approach towards a cultural 
understanding of IPE that examines the past as a series of episodes that cannot be 
separated or undone from the present. It was argued that we can begin to understand our 
world better by understanding how and why we believe in the representations that make 
sense to us and which compel us to act. In this sense, we intended to provide an 
understanding of how knowledge, belief and disposition are related to one other. We 
arranged each of the concepts into the following framework of analytical tools: 
governmentality, expert-systems and reflexive economic practices. In many ways, the 
past is regulatory over the future not just because it is path-dependent, but because the 
present remains consistently unreflective of how to change the world in a way that is 
beneficial for the public sphere as a whole. 
If one thing is certain about cultural economy, it is a method that strips away the 
superficial layers of realism and positivism that hold up a mirror image to the 
representations of economy, power and rationality. By unwinding the surface layers of 
political economy, cultural economy provides a much wider scope of causality that 
examines the interrelated intricacies and subtleties between behaviour, knowledge, 
language, practices and habits within a specific historical context that is constantly 
adapting and changing in uncertain ways. Cultural economy also represents an 
ontological change in the nature of capitalist economy. Karl Marx looked at the 
mechanistic relationships that governed the structures of capitalist logic and intimated at 
the ways in which the capitalist economy functioned. What this led to, in many respects 
was a paradigm shift in how we understand the economy, because from this moment on 
it was gradually recognised that capitalism was reproduced socially, that it was a 
normative output produced by people, symbols, beliefs, language etc., and that the 
nature of capitalism itself, like any species in dynamic conditions, adapts and changes 
not because of the external effects of the system, but because of the internal interactions 
and consequences of agents reacting to and `within' the social spaces of capitalism. 
Cultural economy is therefore a general recognition that society and the elements that 
342 
give society meaning, such as institutions, beliefs, perception, visualization etc., are also 
the incremental and subtle ingredients that compose the economy. 
Incorporating culture into political economy provides first and foremost a 
method of demystification to historical and social enquiry. But how is there a 
reaffirmation of reality and why is it so easily accepted and depoliticised? Essentially, 
cultural economy moves away from the hermeneutics of suspicion and looks more 
carefully at how and why seemingly non-political habits can have a direct political 
contribution through their unchallenged natural proclivities. The notion of habit, as 
presented by Bourdieu, is important because it is an amalgamation of perception, 
practices and routines that all come together to create a seemingly innocuous way of 
behaviour. Veblen is quite important here also because there is a sense in which social 
change, especially today, occurs as a result of non-insightful tastes and fashions. Veblen 
argued for example that the consumption of the rich effected the behaviours of the rest 
of society. This theory is important in the sense that it places an emphasis on the factors 
that explain the commodification and popularity of certain `exchange values'. It is also 
important because it places an emphasis on the importance of desire and seduction. 
Global Limbo Economy and Reflexivity 
If one of the points about reflexivity is that the direction and nature of social change is 
based on new information and knowledge of present conditions, then it should also be 
added that every present contains a social organisation, attitude, language that not only 
structures the present, but also influences how the present, by nature of its organisation 
and competing discourses, determines the future or the path of social change. Since the 
break up of the postwar post-liberal consensus in the 1970s, the pattern of thought and 
behaviour has become multi-dimensional and has progressed the bounds, directions and 
inhibitions of free-market order and culture to more sophisticated globalising heights. 
Anthony Giddens captured this quite perfectly when he argued that late modernity, the 
contemporary period, has been `radicalized' due to the consequences of modernity. 
Giddens as well as his German colleague Ulrich Beck observed that the character of late 
modernity is captured by a new phase of modernisation described as `reflexive'. As 
Giddens argued, `the reflexivity of modern life consists in the fact that social practices 
are constantly examined and reformed in light of incoming information about these very 
practices, thus constitutively altering their character' (Giddens, 1990: 38). The reflexive 
nature of radicalized modernity is captured by the notion of choice or the notion that 
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knowledge is power. All around individuals are tailoring their personal identities to an 
exploration of private or personal solutions that are forever in motion. The recalibration 
of institutions, whether private or public, to this reflexive process is what makes the 
political so frustrating and uncertain. It is frustrating principally because the ethical 
becomes privatized, contestable and malleable, so that the public sphere is shaped and 
determined by the novelties, opportunities and threats of the ever-expanding spectrum of 
economic culture. From this, there is at the least the concern that the political becomes 
delimited as a result of the endless choices and opportunities that the spectrum of 
economy opens up. If indeed we have moved from a period of one-dimensional thought 
to a period of multi-dimensional thought, this raises the question of whether the range of 
the political has been widened beyond its technicalisation and whether once again, the 
political can bring together rather than divide, or whether individualization inspires a 
new and effective kind of political action. Both Giddens and Beck remain optimistic on 
this question, but both authors warn that late modernity contains many opportunities, but 
also many dangers. But once we begin to think of the immediate context of reflexive 
modernisation, it contains many dispiriting implications for the range and effectiveness 
of the political and the cultural economy that supports it. 
For example, it has long been the normative concern in the discipline of 
International Political Economy that transnational markets have risen like a `phoenix 
from the ashes' transcending the boundaries of the state, eroding the postwar 
relationship between state and civil society and juxtaposing the imperatives of the 
international economy against the normative and practical concerns of domestic society. 
In many ways, contemporary times contain parallels with Hobbes' argument, that in 
order to ward off the unnecessary consequences of the free-market, there has to be 
strong state, a leviathan. It has always been a puzzle in IPE, why scholars of the 
discipline lamented over the `retreat of the state'. In terms of one-dimensional thought, 
was this afterall, not a good thing? For the state, far from losing its power, gained its 
power by helping to swing the pendulum of history in the direction of decentralized 
globalisation. Far from a retreat, the state has become a conundrum of global economic 
transformation. In one of the most discerning concepts of the discipline, the state was 
managing quite universally to transform itself, based on the emerging global structures 
of post-communism, from a welfare-nation state into a `competition state'. If we draw 
upon the liberal sentiments of the Enlightenment period, the authors of this period 
thought it necessary that a distinction be made between public affairs and private life, or 
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the affairs of the state and those of civil society. But in comparison to the period of 
nationalising modernity when this distinction was finally (if not superficially) achieved, 
the period of globalising modernity as we call it in this thesis, has increasingly blurred 
the boundaries between public and private through policies of privatisation, de- 
regulation and liberalization. In short, there has been a privatisation and decentralization 
of the public sphere of order and control, where the internalized self manages to thrive 
and find cursory meaning. 
What comes to light here especially is the seemingly obvious point or normative 
concern that our exploration of self, our internalisation of modern culture is part of and 
inextricably linked to the radicalisation of the economic sphere and its total suffusion 
and inclusion of all areas of politics, art, culture, society, community, globality and 
individuality. One may expect to find as a prognosis to this brief digestion of historical 
thought that the political has been lost, that we have arrived at what Cox describes as 
post-modem non-politics, or what Habermas describes as `post-histoire'. Not 
necessarily so, nor even is it worthwhile to lament on this point for too long, because it 
may only lead to its tautological affirmation. Instead, we could argue that our global 
political economy is in a state of limbo. 
If Limbo is a political and historical condition, is it a passing phase or something 
more lasting? This is where the analytical and unassuming significance of Limbo makes 
its mark. The concept of Limbo denotes that there has been a suspension of purpose of 
some kind and secondly an uncertain reliance or dependence on something external, 
something uncontrollable and uncertain, which can in many ways re-instate purpose. 
This would tend to characterise and diagnose the political condition of the global 
economy quite well, because it would seem that our politics has reached somewhat of a 
stalemate. As the tripartite system of corporate and collective government known better 
as Welfare-Fordism came under attack in the 1970s, Western governments and 
especially those states most influenced by Anglo-American policies, sought to confront 
the threat to globalising hegemony through an embrace of neoliberal policies and 
rational choice models that would take advantage of the international economic 
arbitrage that was well under way in the post-war period. The consequence of this is that 
there has been a return of the self-regulating market and of market society, except this 
time on a more sophisticated globalising scale and this has been fuelled and socially 
accepted in part by a growing financial services sector that has become a regime of 
accumulation in its own right. It is as if we 
have become accepting of this technical 
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reality and all of its social and economic implications and consequences, without really 
understanding what effect this has had on our political freedom, control and 
accountability of unchecked economic logic and tendencies. What's more is that we are 
somehow caught up, mesmerized and intimidated by its omnipotent character and 
intellectual infrastructure and believe somehow that we can tinker our normative 
concerns towards the nature of the good society to suit its structural priorities. Some 
may think that this is a radical perspective that fits well with the anti-globalisation 
movement and that this perspective has no practical contribution because it does not 
believe in the profitability motive. On the contrary, the point is that the economy and 
especially the global financial economy has become so far removed from non-economic 
priorities, such as society, community and culture, that the tail now wags the dog. What 
is worrying, especially from a historical perspective, is that there seems to be some sort 
of structural continuity to this and from this point of view Limbo maybe a historical 
stage difficult to overcome, if not dangerous left to its own anti-Islamic tendencies. 
The puzzle of course is what has caused this political condition of globalising 
modernity and what regulates this political condition as a seemingly sustainable, if not 
repetitive process? This is a puzzle in political terms because political Limbo has 
become an accepted and normalised way of life despite the Polanyian notion that a self- 
regulating economy creates spontaneous bouts of social protection. In other words, 
transnational governance without effective government seems to be a sustainable aspect 
of the global political economy. Some have argued that the undercutting of modernity 
through reflexive modernisation has brought about this in-between stage in political 
culture, while others still point to the irony that this political culture is unable to 
transform itself politically because of its dynamic character. For example, some have 
argued that the solid modernity has been replaced by liquid modernity, or that organized 
capitalism has been replaced by disorganized capitalism, or that Fordism has been 
replaced by `flexible accumulation'. There is however scope for another explanation, 
which would not only explain the causes of political limbo, to a certain extent, but 
would also explain the synchronic nature of politics and its repetition. The interesting 
explanation offered here is called `Financialisation', a process that apparently gives with 
one hand, while taking away with the other, something that offers a regime of 
accumulation by dispossession. Here, the scope of the political and its effective 
subversion is located in the area of political culture, which is inseparable form cultural 
economy. It is in this thesis that we have attempted to understand the cultural political 
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economy of Financialisation. The Politics of the Global Economy is not missing, it is in 
Limbo, caught between a vice of opportunity and potential neglect. 
Re-thinking Financialisation 
Contemporary financialisation, as we experience it today, is actually the estranged and 
teenage son of modernity. It is estranged because unlike modern financialisation, 
precipitated under the British, it has outgrown its national and familial ties to become 
global and corporate in scope, more experimental in its development of global finance 
as a regime of accumulation in its own right. It is a teenager because it is relatively 
young, but not quite a child anymore. Protected by the vanguards of the postwar 
multilateral economy, this child of the late 19th century was only really let out to play in 
the 1970s, in response to a crisis in corporate profitability that encouraged accumulation 
onto a financial track. But financialisation today is not quite an adult either. It's future is 
still coerced by its drunken parentage in the form of the US, which has acquired and 
encouraged global debt proliferation so that the solution is more drink or careful rehab, 
and while this is a genuine threat to the continuation of financialisation and everything 
that underpins it, it is also a promise that the estrangement between parent and son will 
continue. Like a teenager, it avoids strict parental constraints, nor does it listen to 
wisdom or others with a purchase on its regular flagrance, even from its national suitors; 
and while it continues to experiment globally in its perpetual and volatile promotion of 
the good times, it anxiously yearns for belonging, stability and acceptance from all those 
who despise its capriciousness and inequalities; even by those who don't know him by 
name. Finally, it is male because it is aggressive in its nature, make-up and 
representation, yet to be rounded into an adult of all global sensitivities. 
Financialisation, in essence, amounts to finance becoming a regime of 
productive accumulation in its own right: where there is debt, there is interest, where 
debt is fungible and can be commodified, it can be sold, where it can be sold, it can be 
traded, where it can be traded, it can be hedged through the purchase and sale of its 
notional values. The fact that we call this type of financial accumulation `an industry' is 
not out of touch with the impressionism described here. As an industrial exploit, 
financialisation promises to contribute directly towards Gross National Product through 
taxation and employment, even if it does not do so indirectly through the allocation of 
national investment, because financial accumulation feeds off the productive 
fetishism, 
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management and circulation of global financial assets/liabilities, and this is legitimated 
- seemingly, through the containment of its own contradictions below `fever-pitch'. 
But financialisation is not just economic. Just walk into any newspaper agents 
and look at the plethora of financial papers and magazines that have emerged in the last 
decade to help us understand the physical knowns and unknowns of this financial jungle 
and how we can effectively calculate its charms and dangers. For example, Investors 
Chronicle, Shares magazine, Money Week and Moneywise are all magazines that have 
grown out of the 1990s bull market. Such magazines inform, advise and provide 
solutions for people interested in improving their technical management of personal 
finance. If there is any indication that this kind of `wealth management' has become 
`more' important then just buy the Economist or the Financial Times on a Monday. 
Since 2006, the Economist now provides a specific column called `Buttonwood', like its 
regular columns `Bagehot' and `Lexington', dedicated to when New York's Walls 
Street traders signed the agreement under the Buttonwood tree that led to the creation of 
the New York Stock Exchange. Since 2002, the Financial Times has printed a weekly 
paper called FTfm that deals with newsworthy events in the asset-management industry. 
It is often said that art is an imitation of life, but in this case it would seem that 
knowledge is an imitation of financial necessity; and this is what financialisation 
essentially provides, an indisputable relationship between liquid finance and liquid 
knowledge. In other words, the creation of money out of money requires its expertise: 
flexible knowledge is a function of liquid capital. How financial reality becomes known, 
used and in what way is all part of making our indebtedness to credit and debt 
dependent on the knowledge that perceives and understands its known technical 
dimensions, to the extent that our dependence on finance, is not just quantitative, but 
qualitative, how finance is managed personally and professionally. The `how' question 
seems especially important in this, because it omits the more important and 
philosophical question of the why. It is noticeable for example that taxi drivers, known 
for their openness and infinite knowledge of everything provide an indication here, 
because they are always able to talk financial shop with grumbling punters: the price of 
houses, the sustainability of house values, rises in interest rates, anecdotes of financial 
success and pension provision. It is possible that the economy reduced to its banality is 
the substance of daily minutia devoid of personal or philosophical reflection. It raises 
the possibility that the substance of technical argument is the subject of human 
conversation, ingenuity, identity and imagination, and the two bend in on against each 
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other. In other words, the financial reality that we experience daily is underpinned and 
constructed not just by financial practices and institutions, but through methods of 
calculation, financial knowledge - professional or otherwise, which garners perception, 
initiates language and discussion, conversation and representation, reinforcing ideas by 
excluding others. Once we begin to think of financialisation this way, it isn't just an 
economic phenomenon of rational significance, but it is also sociological informed and 
culturally dynamic, which raises a certain curiosity towards its unchallenged supremacy 
in addition to the ontological and teleological arguments that reinforce its 
depoliticisation. 
One of the conclusions of this thesis is that financial institutions will continue to 
find high yielding investment for a generally more expectational and unequal society of 
saver-investors. Secondly, on this basis, it is important to consider that the banality of 
the social organisation of society cannot be written out of financialisation. For example, 
Veblen argued that the consumption of the rich have an effect on the consumption of the 
poor. Finance is no different in the sense that it provides and facilitates conspicuous 
consumption, in fact, it can be interpreted as a source of conspicuous consumption in 
itself. The point here of course is that we cannot ignore from our investigation of 
repetition the notion that the culture of financial investment at the level of everyday 
saver facilitates the ongoing sophistication of retail finance and investment at the 
highest levels of global finance. In other words, the high income class of saver is 
helping to shape the entire structure of the retail investment world, how it is regulated 
etc., so that society moves reflexively deeper down the channels of stock-market 
inspired investment, but in a way that is thoroughly unequal, incongruous and 
contradictory. 
The problem with fmancialisation, to put it simply, begins and ends with 
thinking of the `future as an autonomous space'. Placing too much faith in a perceived 
epoch that we see as outside of us, jettisons our responsibility to the nature of change 
and the nature of our own thoughts towards its present make-up. In the financialised era, 
history is allowed to proceed in its essence as individual `right', not as collective 
responsibility. Placing emphasis on collective `responsibility' brings modernity back to 
a place where past, present and future becomes re-coupled. The reason for this 
is mainly 
and simply because it acknowledges subjectivity and its relationship to actuality not as 
an individual voyeur of life, but as a relational agent of change. Tuning 
into collective 
responsibility, it should be noticed, immediately acknowledges the agent as an 
historical 
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being or actor, an agent ascribing historical circumstances, experiences and identity - 
and secondly, it acknowledges the agent as a cultural being or actor, an agent of 
belonging that forms the specific input-outputs of a complex and discursive social order. 
An attempt that separates the subject from the specificities of modem history as it 
unfolds, affords the subject (limited) choices that precede existence - and decision- 
making, devoid of its social manifestations, which can only abnormalise or excuse 
behaviour in their specific contexts. 
We can therefore differentiate between two different types of responsibility. 
Firstly, decoupling the agent from history and the hermeneutics of culture forces a 
quasi juridical responsibility that is post hoc. Choices are determinable by autonomous 
decision-making that are made responsible only after the event has taken place. While 
quasi juridical responsibility is founded upon the illusion of historical and cultural 
separation, responsibility or irresponsibility directly corresponds and is susceptible to 
the specific input-outputs of culture. In contrast, collective responsibility accepts that we 
cannot avoid the inherent flaws of the subject `inside modernity' or `without 
modernity'. Some might argue that this is an explicit form of moral relativism. On the 
contrary, it merely states that the ad hoc nature of collective responsibility should 
precede the post hoc maintenance of juridical responsibility. Replacing individual 
`right' for `collective responsibility' refashions the problem of self-assurance: the 
question becomes not `why' we should construct normativity, but how we can 
`legitimate' normativity. The former anxiously clambers for rational correction based on 
the essence of life as it appears continuously in its contestable form. On the other hand, 
by acknowledging the agent as a historical and sensitive cultural subject of experience, 
collective responsibility asks us to confront our own inner curiosities towards the future- 
past and the internal/external contradictions that belie the compulsive methods of our 
means-ends relationships and juridical responsibilities. In this sense, the collective 
becomes the social reference of subjective imaginations enabling a method of political 
navigation that plots the waves of history like a silent revolution. As Newton eloquently 
demonstrates the point, `... revolution must be something that keeps the space of the 
universal open to the possibilities of the particular, and keeps the space of the particular 
open to the possibilities of the universal (Newton, 2004: 152). 
In order to re-politicise financialisation, it is perhaps more fruitful to think how 
we can restructure and re-organise the circuits and incentives that direct and channel 
savings. One proposal could be to establish regional pension funds where local savings 
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are tied to the allocation of regional investment projects. Such funds would function like 
social insurance institutions, but their performance would be explicitly tied not just to 
monetary criteria, but to the performance and growth of regional economies. Under this 
proposal, it would be mandatory for people to save with their regional pension fund. 
Accountability would be a natural consequence of this arrangement, because the 
performance of regional pension funds and their investment projects would be carefully 
watched and overseen by people in the locality. This proposal might even replace the 
Private Finance Initiatives that allocate investment efficiently, but at the cost of 
accountability, transparency and long-term costs to the public tax payer. Regional 
pension funds would force people to become involved in the politics of the region, 
because their savings would be directly tied to the visible effects of investment. Let us 
cut the anonymous cords of fmancialisation and tie them, once again, to the 
communities that define and enable our belonging. 
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Annex A: Web Questionnaire 
Background: 
After lots of correspondence between myself and trapped Equitable Life policyholders, 
and those effected by the crisis generally, I decided that a questionnaire would be good 
idea. I asked Michael Nassim, a professional working on the case how I could distribute 
the questionnaires. I think it was Mr. Nassim who came up with the idea between us. I 
received all of the responses I have now in my possession within the first three or four 
months. I made a drastic mistake of placing two addresses on the questionnaire. The 
University address on the front and my home address inside. More than a few, 
admittedly, got lost in the process. Due to a low participation rate thereafter, I decided I 
did not want my details exposed on the web so I asked for them to be removed. 
However, the information I received proved invaluable. It steered my research in new 
directions that I otherwise would not have taken. 
Title: 
Thinking of an Equitable Life? An Assessment of Policyholder's (Reasonable) 
Expectations and their Origins 
Responses: 
Twenty full responses 
Website: 
Equitable Life Members Support Group 
www. cookham. com/community/equitable/questesrc. doc 
Equitable Life Trapped Annuitants 
www. elta. org/uk 
Time: 
Est. May 2005 - May 2006 
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Newcastle 
University 
1 
1 
Questionnaire 
Title: 
Thinking of an Equitable Life? An Assessment of Policyholder's 
(Reasonable) Expectations and their Origins 
Private and Confidential 
Please send completed questionnaire to: 
Author: Adam M. Stephenson 
School of Geography, Politics and Sociology 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE I 7RU 
UK 
or 
M. A. Stephenson(a ncl. ac. uk 
(0191) 222 6000 
+44 191 222 6000 
Research Associate 
Small Enterprise Research Unit 
First Floor, Porter Building 
St Thomas Street 
University of Newcastle 
(0191) 222 5664 
ESRC Reference number: R42200134428 
C onde°nsced F'c't-, cion 
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Aims and Objectives 
This independent research has been sponsored by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC). The ESRC is an independent organisation, established by the Royal 
Charter and funds research and training in social and economic issues. It has an 
international reputation both for providing high quality research on issues of importance 
to business, the public sector and government. The ESRC's budget of more than £100 
million, received mostly through the Office of Science and Technology, funds over 2, 
500 researchers in academic institutions and policy research institutes throughout the 
UK. The quality of life and economic well-being of the UK and its citizens are just two 
of the many, policy-relevant issues addressed by the ESRC's portfolio of research and 
training activities. 
This particular research (ESRC reference number: R42200134428) is aligned to the 
broad aims and objectives of the ESRC. In the wider context of global finance and 
everyday economic practices, this research critically examines the privatisation of 
pensions in the UK. Research on Equitable Life is placed alongside two other 
investigations into Stakeholder pensions and Final Salary pensions. Of particular 
concern to this project as a whole, is the notion that privatised pensions and pro-market 
regulation can avoid cases of miss-selling, while at the same time facilitate social 
inclusion and fairness through the marketisation of various saving practices (short, 
medium and long). The Sandler suite of simplified investment products is an 
endorsement of this pro-market approach, which is an attempt to popularise saving 
practices in accordance with the views of the Turner report. Current economic and 
regulatory debates tend to view Equitable Life as an abnormal blip in the development 
of a much more sophisticated approach to risk-preventative regulation. Therefore, the 
trend towards privatised pensions tends to be de-politicised without any real 
understanding or debate with regard to how financial institutions (such as Equitable 
Life) have sustained their investment practices or how this has had social consequences. 
In contrast, this research takes the view that Equitable Life and the processes that 
sustained this institution over time, can contribute a great deal of understanding with 
regard to how financial institutions relate to savers and how regulation can prevent cases 
of malfeasance and miss-selling. 
The intention of this research is to investigate the origins and impacts of Policyholder's 
(Reasonable) Expectations (PRE) in relation to Equitable Life. PRE refers to a statutory 
concept provided by the Insurance Companies Act of 1982 which provided a loose and 
ad hoc framework for defining what constituted Policyholder Reasonable Expectations. 
This allowed companies such as Equitable Life to provide a unique approach to bonus 
information, allowing investment strategies to be underpinned by loose approaches to 
regulatory capital. PRE is not only important because it benefited Equitable's approach 
to marketing, it was actually pivotal to its core financial and business strategy for the 
time. Set in this context, this research explores the institutional relationship between 
Policyholders and Equitable Life in the wider economic and political context of 
deregulation and privatisation. This will consider the reasons for saving with Equitable 
Life within different contexts, but it will also consider how and why Policyholders 
sustained their saving practices with Equitable over time. There is therefore an attempt 
to understand how Policyholder's Reasonable Expectations were constructed, how 
expectations were sustained and how this had an impact on Equitable's financial and 
marketing strategies. 
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The emphasis on PRE is important to this study because it demonstrates the importance 
of taking seriously an aspect of regulation called `Conduct of Business'. The Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) has recently made this an important part of its regulatory 
strategy. But there is a danger that Conduct of Business regulation becomes undermined 
by attempts to popularise sophisticated retail financial products to the public through 
innovation and de-polarisation. A critical examination of Equitable Life that will 
consider the importance of PRE is an important aspect of challenging de-regulation and 
the philosophy that underpins it. 
All of the questions in this enquiry are broad and qualitative. They are designed to be 
open to the interpretation of individuals, who are free to disclose as much or as little 
information as they feel necessary. Most of the questions rely heavily on memory and in 
particular, this questionnaire is unique in asking individuals to remember how they `felt 
at the time'. The author of this research asks that participants try to consider why they 
had particular feelings or opinions towards their financial decision-making in relation to 
Equitable Life. The `why' question is important because it asks participants to consider 
how their expectations were derived and how their expectations influenced their 
individual economic decision-making in relation to particular information conditions. 
Participants may feel that their expectations drew upon the following: (1) information 
from Independent Financial Advice (IFAs); (2) adverts on TV; (3) marketing 
campaigns; (4) the direct administrative relationship with Equitable Life; (5) tax 
concessions and implicit government backing; (6); feelings of trust. 
This questionnaire is anonymous for all participants. It is highly confidential and 
independent research. However, participants must be aware that all of the information 
will be used in the publication of research, which follows the broad directive set out 
above. This research is aimed for publication within Economy and Society, a peer 
reviewed journal that is at the top of its class in research and excellence. 
As the author will be working at home over the summer period, could all participants 
please send their completed questionnaires to the personal address below. Any queries 
or problems, please do not hesitate to call or e-mail using the contact information 
provided below: 
Personal Address: Personal Contact E-mail: 
Adam M. Stephenson (01661) 827262 M. A. Stephenson@ncl. ac. uk 
67 Runnymede Road 07736113823 
Damas Hall, 
Ponteland, 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE20 9HJ 
Thank you for your participation, 
Adam M. Stephenson 
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Section A: Background information 
1. Could you please specify your Age, Gender, Occupation or Previous Occupation? 
a. Age: ........................................................... 
b. Gender: ........................................................... 
c. Occupation: ........................................................... 
d. Previous occupation: ........................................................... 
2. Could you please indicate the nature of your current involvement and interest in 
Equitable Life? Please tick or specify your interest and involvement. 
a. Litigant (go to question three): 
.............................................................................................. 
b. Complainant (go to question three): 
............................................................................................... 
c. Non-complainant (go to question four): 
............................................................................................... 
3. If you describe yourself as either a litigant or a complainant could you please indicate 
the nature of your case and its current status? 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
4. Are you currently a member of an action group or organisation that represents the 
concerns or interests of Equitable Life's policyholders? If so, can you specify the 
organisation and your involvement in this organisation? (If you are a member please see 
question five. If not, please go to section B). 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
5. With regard to question four, to what extent have Equitable Life's Action Groups 
made an impact on current regulatory policy in relation to private pensions? 
......................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................ 
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Section B: Saving with Equitable Life: the origins 
Brief. 
This section is designed to understand the reasons why individuals were attracted to 
Equitable Life. It is understood that many of the questions in this section rely on long- 
term memory. If it is possible, please try to answer the questions with an understanding 
of how you felt at the time and what factors influenced your decision to save with 
Equitable. 
6. What particular policy or policies did you take out with Equitable Life? 
....................................................................................................... 
7. How did you find out about it/them? 
.......................................................................................................... 
8. On what date did you take out your policy or policies with Equitable Life? 
........................................................................................................... 
9. Why did you save with Equitable Life? 
........................................................................................................... 
10. As far as you can remember, what specific factors influenced your decision to save 
with Equitable Life? 
......................................................................................................... 
11. Did you shop around before making a financial decision to save with Equitable? If 
not why? 
...................................................................................................... 
12. What was remarkable or unique about Equitable Life that made this financial 
institution so attractive to you? 
......................................................................................................... 
13. How did you differentiate between Equitable and other financial institutions? What 
factors informed this differentiation? 
........................................................................................................... 
14 Did you receive help before making your decision to save with Equitable? If so, what 
organisation was it and what kind of advice was given? 
......................................................................................................... 
15. Did you assess the level of financial risk attached to your policy with Equitable Life 
before you confirmed your policy? If so, how did you assess financial risk? 
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...................................................................................................... 
...................................................................................................... 
16. Were you aware that there were risks attached to saving with Equitable Life? If not, 
why not? If yes, why did you save with Equitable? 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
17. In your experience with Equitable Life, did you ever come across or learn of 
Equitable's Free Asset Ratio (FAR) or their policy of `full distribution' without the 
backing of an estate? If so, how did this effect your perception of/reaction to Equitable 
Life? 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
Section C: Equitable Life, Information and Expectations 
Brief 
This section is designed to understand the relationship that operated between 
policyholders and Equitable Life. The wider aim is to understand how Equitable Life 
maintained expectations and what affect this was to have on its financial and marketing 
strategies. The following questions therefore try to understand how Equitable Life made 
policyholders feel, but also try to understand how the wider commercial environment 
influenced individuals in their relationship with Equitable. This section is intended to 
understand events before Equitable Life's financial situation became fully exposed. 
18. When you took out your policy with Equitable, can you sum up how you felt about 
it and what expectations you had towards your financial future? Secondly, what were 
your feelings based on? 
......................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................ 
19. Did you make regular contributions to Equitable Life or were there instances when 
you saved more or less? (If there were, please indicate any possible connection with 
your answer to question 12). 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
20. What other factors influenced you to increase or decrease your contributions? 
......................................................................................................... 
....................................................................................................... 
21. Can you please describe or sum up how your policy values and/or bonus information 
made you feel about your financial future? 
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......................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................ 
22. What particular bonus information did you focus on and why? 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
23. Can you describe any instances where you felt assured that your decision to save 
with Equitable Life was the right one? What in particular assured you? 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
24. In the time that you held your policy with Equitable and before news of Equitable's 
troubled status, was there any time when you double-checked the security of your 
finances with Equitable Life? 
......................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................ 
25. If not, can you please explain why you didn't make an enquiry? If yes, can you 
please explain why you made such an enquiry, what information/advice you drew upon 
and what the outcome of this was? 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
26. In line with the brief outlined above, can you contribute anything else that would 
help an understanding of how Equitable Life and the wider commercial environment 
influenced, firstly, your `initial' decision to save with Equitable Life and secondly, your 
decision to maintain contributions to Equitable Life? 
.......................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................... 
Section D: Learning of Equitable Life's financial situation 
Brief: 
This section is concerned with the asymmetry between policyholder's expectations and 
Equitable Life's real financial situation. The aim is to assess how policyholders became 
aware of Equitable Life's financial situation and how policyholders reacted to it, what 
advice they received during this time, and what final decisions were made based on 
information conditions at the time. 
27. When did you first become concerned towards Equitable Life and what in particular 
concerned you? 
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......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
28. What information specifically did you draw upon and where did this information 
come from? 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
29. How did this make you feel? 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
30. How did you react to your concerns? 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
31. What was your final decision towards your relationship with Equitable Life? How 
was this decision informed and why did you make this decision? 
......................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................... 
Section E: Other 
Brief 
You are invited to comment on anything extra that has not been taken into account and 
which is significant to the overall `Aims and Objectives' set out on page two above. 
32. Additional Comments: 
........................................................................................................ 
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Annex B- Literature Map 
One: Literature Map of Financialisation 
363 
y c `O, 
ö ö"ý $ "E m ýy. 9 
e g T°T 
& ö. '.. o my m E 3a s" g E pý 
ý' 
- "- 7 
Eý ý$ "y c 'c' g J'" äS5 1 e 3 
p 
ß uü E 
E 
E 
ý ° 
ü vöä g .ö "°° ý "E 
ý 
E "g m 
F 
@ ý 's 
ý' a o _ '- 
E !? 
@ 
oe 5 
e 8 _ E 
o ys ö ä 
"3 ö 
; 3 $ 
e 
" 
+ .a ý öp 
° 
° 
y 
.5 
ag 
`ý g g äö 
.gcö 
E 
3 $ 
° 
C 
ý` 
ra y y 
ä 
c 
ö 
üo 
" 
ý ,V 
nv- 
$ 
ýý 
_$ 
"c v 
° ^ 
ü 
"e S :a 
ABs ý eE ° ° 
3e 
o oý x' 
.ý 
u. b' 
ýET 
;^ . 
ý. 
T ý° 
= "ýý 
"e 
a ° 
'' c " Eey e ä+ "ý c 
° 
a  Y. 
w °. 
9 
@ >, ýý 
QQ E 
5 vö ° 
- v üS 
° 
äm 
c¬: ý 
" 
s 
°6'ý e 
a= 
ä =; g L Q$ 
ie ý&Y 
ä 
,ý 
;ä gge 
= EE 
ü 
ýE 
mm 
E 
me Eý 
c 'ý 
& 
i  c o .ý e 
w ä ü S, E 
INA .p o > @c QQ 
, 
'ýwüc 
" 
_ öa vý 
? ._ mü 
5 13 
'63p `E3c ö"Öäý- 
. -. S 
E ýe°ý 2 -i 
E°ý 
O 
3 
"e "ö "O C 
e° 
O sit 
g 
mw$ 
' 
- 
= 
§gr 
>wü 
I :g5 
Em d 
C9 
v'mý 
" Y 
>oE`@' 
g& 
gr 
T 2.1 
ýý'3$ý 
O 
'eý3ý 
j 
c 33 
.OY 
cý 
cv y E"e öE1 .1Y 
Cý 
N Y C 
5^5 
= Ä2. ýig u 
rb 
ö 
jý 
O 
ý 
C a .c 
3W 
'J b 9. _ OO 
sG x3 
L 
ý 
w 
yC 
$ý' 
l: 
ý' 
k 
H 
Ö 
"g ý{e 
eüyge O '$ 
. 
ýJ b 
Y; 
ü 
E ß 
ý m tl 
l 
ýýoe 
mO {ý ._ 
ö 
[ 
L eýi Y m e='g " 
a 
ý 
wE 
g 
jS Öi 
g 3; 
S 
3 
v 
ý 
cý g ý,, ý @v s 
öv 
S 
of `i 
° t. co 
SývE 
g 
g yy ü 
s üw 
`5qü 
$ ö ay 
3 
m'"ý: HI- ö 
ää 
Of 
° 
> ý 
E 
' 
,` =e 
g . =g"° 
ý 
ýc @ s 
ö v 
c 
rý" 3"$ 
v y 
t_. ý LS E. 
v 
° öv; 
o^., 
. E"O 
=SHv 
ß 
, 
ýý + ä`äo 
e 
v°e 
a" 
ö. 'ýuE ä iY AP 
v 
e_ý g gs öc at . 
5ý 
= 
°@> 
ý 
°e ü 
öoýQ ° -^ äP`, Vo 
`s Evün= 
ü "= 
PAZ 
ä ý y 
Sco °c'g 
.9 
,eE ý Ey 
ö1. ýö 
o r', ý., ý icý' 
e 
"' 
Ya=isy 
"5 ý; > 
ý.? °"56'oä ýü 
' `ý ý@ .+ 
c ä- g 
ý_ 
ü°ýý 
ýý°" 
`o° 
ffi 
_ 'ä 
, o 
c " 
ug 
Y '" ;? 3 
p 
m 
_ 5 a 
yy 
g 
s "ý 
3 
c_ e = 
'ý & -1 s 
-Ö 
ý 
Sý ý ý 
s a; 
r 
q% EE 
ý 
ýy 
= .Oa8 
ö 
! IIIJ J; h 
"5 "ý 
b 
1Iil 
@ a 
O 'O 
Öi 
c 
v 
ý 
ý 
. " ... ä 
E l 
E 
3 3 
. 
aýS. _5@ cm "A g=u 
ýý 
.. 
ý >ýg nU c= aý ow e ö 
eo ýt c `c ý 
Y _ sü `ý .ý 
IHr 
; co gb> °. ý y= e3 g Q 3ý o 
uýý. _ aa 9- o^ 
l ft 
ý 
g 
.g+ 
u 
ý i .. iEýu 4ü X W=Säý ctýýc o 
aýe w 
Y 
ý ý`ý 
.g '^9 
$, "5 
ý 3ö 
p 
fJ ^ P1 . -i fV n1 ^^ fV 
ýN 
p 
w tV M1 fV ý lV H1 
m 6ý 
fY ýi (`j 
y 
M "O 
g 
.ýC ý'I 
c 
ý; 
om ec 
wý . 
5. ý !' 
x3ä 
SE gý 
}ý 
FýEv 
K mý 
' 
i5ýl 
a-y 
°-ä 
ie 
mE Ecý. Sg w 
d°ý 
`' ý'ä Eý aW=OE 
'Sýý=cý "3 
öl ýsý 
ý 
ýw 
ý 
'3 
ý 
ý 
4 
3Te E a üc pý 
`ý' 
G° e0 
3g 3 
ö 
s 
5 
3 ýý 
g 
ý 
8ý e SýS 
a 'i 
a K ýE ý ý 
E3 
° ýýý 
ý+5 
xe 
E5 
r rc & 
ýü 
g3+ ;ý Sýý 
$ 
p 
ý 
äö 5v ü q 
x° 
ý 
" X ý "g ý 
3 öc 
5'ýý 
g &$ 
Ä° >, `"' g 5 
ý 
°ý 
ý= 
ý 
m3 os 'Oy 
ý'u.. y- U" gg°cc 
$ 
° 
Eý 
$ 
ý° 
a"O"= 3r 
E 
C 
E ý 
H°oT 
ý9 E 
Üý 
, 'J 
c"ý° 
, ý. s ýy ý 
Y °'CE 
g 
'°ý e o"tt=;; 
ý . 
e°rý ýc 
gg 
'ý vý? ý ýý 
fiq°, ' 'r'3-'F. y? ý 
' 
y 
3 
4 
uSiö 
5ýý 
g; 
v$ 
äý 
výý 
. o 
öýäýi 
ý E C S 
'O =äö 
y 
l l 
ý 
ýý '. 
ä_ET 
ý "ýýý 
äu 
ý m"$" 
ý 
gý 
"S 
+>3 ý " + 
g 
i a 
a 5g m"S g '-4 
99I ago of 
4 
111 1e- M 'e 
ý 
$ 
`3 
_ ý 
ä 
3 
Oa 
ý 
ý 'ý 
S 
"ý 'a s oö 
ry 
"R 
TC 
ö 
ý 1ý Ow 
f"+ 
ý 
SC 
qt` 
 ÖC t, Ný 
rr,, ýý a 
Ee E'6'o 
G "_ ýü FJ_' ý9 
tt11 
w> Y S 
9 
. y 
pý 
X. 
I 
S aY. o 
'g 
uu 
V _ ýL 
" 
ý 
$f ü 
ý 
'ýkjý{ 
p 
'J" 
sý 
? 
" 
"g ý wý 
"-ö 
mö 
ü 5 
p; ý 
äöö 
3g 5 
T. Y 4 
w3cüö 
°¬ 0-4 = a $5 
L. ý 
3ý v 
._ ö wa 5'ý cS a gý I 
ü a= 103 p IV 
9 °a 
g 
_ 
11-m 
2 e110 " = =b 11 ý. _. ý ="ý O ý 
13 
, ý$"5 Ey 
,ýE R°ä 'ý ý gaý`° 
'o a= 
ä&r 3ö°w 
. er'a, _ öý Eö"ör "ý ä, ý a 2 
$ 
"ý ma 3° 
$ý_ý 
vc 
ý 3 ," °aý @ 
E`, 
eýy;, 
O': 
"gü . "5 
ý_ 
ul"Oä+? 
' G. ^ 
S. k y> 
3cE ý" 
'i2 
rac Yý 
9= 
ek g. C"O 
CC 
.. vý 
E 
Y 
ý. cS 
'J GYS qY= 
E A 
Jim 
'O ý "ý 
q 
f 
'J 
Og 
Cý= 
. 
2 ý 
5 
T"O "p 
5O 
' Cp 
_ 
V 
° 
V ýj 
ýý 
äee 
u 
G . 
ýJ' 
wFS Eý 
c. e. ý ý oý 
0Y 
> 
"O üS $ gY 
9mg 
r3. 
-. m 
YýE L`ý ,N 
gy uýs c 
"ai 
ý 
ý e? 
CGýg 
its 
ý9 
ü 'O 
ý `JA 1.. 
ýj 
ýÖ 3ý "ý 
i4dý3 
F"° ö 
FäC 
F° 
40 g .v 
k-° 
EEE1. 
C-. 
I-° t? 
ö 
9 S, 
GC 
t-° 
S 
F5ü F-° ü Y, 1- .d 
's 
ý 
ý. 
gg 
5 
`ý-'ý y 
ý 
w 
cS 
ý ý 
ý 
ýY 
ý 
ýý ýý 
ýý 
.] 
"ý 
ý 
s2 
N 
ý 
ý 
.E Y 
' 
.ä 
E 
" T Q$ ý l 1 `o 
ý 
gý ö 
d °u Ü = i 
E wa U 
6o 
FcE 
c 
u: 
ýý 
^ 
EýJ 
e 
acd 
.vö : tU 
Y $ ý°u7 
it 
7b1 
w ä 
CC7"5 ý G o. . . t ! 
qNq 
>g 
m 
^ ö 
Q$ 
} 
N 
00ä. 
C, 
pü 
FF 
I OO 
N 
p 
ýO 
N 
QpQ grý 
N p 
O ý. 
. 
$ paý T. 
8.. 
ý 
y 
8 
ýf 
N 
NV 
ýý9Yýý " Any fVp 
Q 
^ 
p 
Gj 
1 
N 
pry 
p 
8 
^ N 
p 
p 
O 
IY 
, 
N`! 
O °`8 
O 
pý 
^ 1A 
p. 
ý . { 
ýý 
ý ° ppq R 
a` ry O` 
ý 
ýp' ts 
ry 
ý 
H5 
N 
r" 'O . 
iN 
y 
d¬ 
10 
41 j 
1 
Ü 
o j" 
~ 
ý 
ýý 
YG 
=m ýS 
ýý8ýg 
N ' ° ý ' 
7 
ý 
U Qý ýV{ü 
O 
xN N ýý G 
p 
Y'ý, 
F 
N 
ý 
Q (J . L Nr C i N 
ry 
r °ý tö o g d g ö 
sg` Fg ý g ` c 4 ý ý 
ý ý ý 
c öý ö0 
?w 
'ýü 
1a 
' ö 
e 
u 
ý O 
ý 
üö 
c 
Vö 
Ape P 
ý 
y°-ý ý 
Y 
k°- k 
ý 
t 
o 
y 
F 
4 
ý 
ycW ý. 4 
. 
ý, W C K Üü Z ` y y 
Annex C- Table 
One. A Brief History of Financialisation: Crisis, Re-invention and Stability 
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Annex D- Diagrams 
One: The Structural Circuits of Financialisation 
Two: Gross National Debt (source: DMO) 
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To export the information from this report click on one of the buttons at the end of this page. 
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National Debt since 1855 
Year Nominal Amount 
(£ billion) 
°h of GDP 
1855 0.805 107% 
1856 0.834 109% 
1857 0.836 108% 
1858 0.830 105% 
1859 0.827 103% 
1860 0.822 101 % 
1861 0.821 97% 
1862 0.824 93% 
1863 0.825 89% 
1864 0.821 86% 
1865 0.816 83% 
1866 0.807 80% 
1867 0.805 78% 
1868 0.806 76% 
1869 0.805 75% 
1870 0.801 73% 
1871 0.796 66% 
1872 0.793 63% 
1873 0.785 61% 
1874 0.779 59% 
1875 0.775 60% 
1876 0.777 61 % 
1877 0.770 61 % 
1878 0.772 62% 
1879 0.773 66% 
1880 0.772 59% 
M 01 
Co 01 
Wý 
ýý 
°,  £ billion 
C) -% of GDP G 
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Annex E- Equitable Life information 
One: Examples of Equitable Life's media and advertising campaign 
Two: Example of annual bonus statement for with-profit annuity policy 
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Number of top ten appearances 
Source- Plen xd Sevinp supers a(«tuler eenuibudaI wilh. plofw penowd peadon pleee 1974.199t 
Many people put good investment 
performance high on their list of prionttes 
when choosing a pension plan Making 
sense of competing claims can, however, 
he a difficult business 
V&P1 our simple able shove should give 
them the facts they need to make an 
informed choice 
The table shows the number of times 
it company has appeared in the top 
ten investment performance results 
for regular contribution with-profits 
personal pension plans across all durations 
measured " according to annual sutveys by 
the industry journal Planned Savings 
The Equitable ble has had a top ten 
placing in such surveys every year since 
records began in 1974 
In fact, no other company comes close to 
The Equitable's tally of 43 placings out 
of a possible 52 over that 22 year history 
Scoring highly one year is laudable, but it 
n consistency of results yesr"m year-out 
But remember; past performance does 
not guarantee future performance 
HEADSTART 
One good reason prhy The Equitable has 
given its investors such great 
performance over the years is because 
their money gets " headsart The 
Equitable has commendably low 
expenses end so our with-profits pension 
plans have the lowest charges on the 
market Source Macey Management, 
Oclober I996 not mesas that more 
money is invested on your behalf 
Indeed, The Equitable received a 
Five Star rating for ns personal 
pcntion plans in a recent survey by 
Money Management magasine So, 
if you want to NO confident in 
your choice of pension plan, ask for 
more information today by calling 
(0990) 38 48 58, or by completing the 
13 
coupon below 
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THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY 
FOUNDED 1762 
Private and confidential 
n 
ONNEW 
ON -----WW WAMMMM&AWO 
28 June 2005 
Dear 
With-Profits Annuity Policy - Annual Statement 
Annuitant 
Policy number 
The anticipated bonus rate on your policy is 5.5% 
Our ref: CSCIANSTWPA 
Please find over the page the new_level of payment on your with-profits annuity policy for the 
year starting 1 July 2005. 
Following feedback from a number of our policyholders about how we work out payments, 
we enclose a leaflet `How your with-profits annuity works'. 
If you have any questions about your annuity, please telephone us on 0870 9010052 or write 
to our Client Servicing Centre at the address shown. 
Yours sincerely 
Dave Pearce 
Head of Customer Service 
-continued overleaf- 
Walton Street, Aylesbury, Bucks, HP21 7QW Telephone 0870 901 0052 
For security and training purposes, telephone calls may be recorded. Authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority. 
The Equitable Life Assurance Society is a mutual society registered in England No. 37038. Registered Office: 20.22 Bedford Row, London, WC1 R 4JS, United Kingdom 
The Equitable group comprises: The Equitable Life Assurance Society, University Life Assurance Society. 
At 1/ANN0065405/BATCB/C/NCL/E/01.39: 46/28.06.2005/ 
V 
Payment details 
Annuitant 
Policy number ANNO065405 
The anticipated bonus rate on your policy is 5.5% 
For the year starting 1 July 2005, the gross annual amount of annuity payable (whiff 
annuitant survives and subject to the policy provisions) will be £863.92. This is made up 
as follows: 
Basic annuity £836.32 p. a. 
Declared bonus annuity £21.05 p. a. 
Final bonus annuity £6.55 p. a. 
Total gross annual annuity payable £863.92 p. a. 
4an3T. am" 
We will pay your annuity in monthly inst 2005. We will make 
each payment after taking off income tax under the PA'Aboý 
Your monthly net payment, based on your tax code and current tax rates is £56.15. 
rystaf 
Murk 
Clarity 
approved by 
I Plaln English Campaign j 
Annex F: Interview 
One: Interview with Rt. Hon Frank Field MP 
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Interview Questions prepared for Rt. Hon. Frank Field by Adam Stephenson 
Interview conducted May 2005 
Italic: Frank Field 
Non-Italic: Adam Stephenson 
Interview Brief 
I have set out below my questions for the interview. The brief is to understand what 
motivated the notion of a Stakeholder pension and what assumptions it was based on. 
Secondly, the enquiry is interested to understand the differences between the original 
Stakeholder idea, which was advocated in opposition and in the first few years of office, 
and the actual implementation of Labour's flagship policy towards Stakeholder 
pensions. Not only do I have interests in understanding `why' there is a difference 
between theory and practice, I am interested to know how this relates to the financial 
sector and what role the financial community has had in altering the original vision. I 
then go on to ask some specific questions with regard to social inclusion and private 
pensions and whether it is achievable to sustain a relationship between them. Lastly, I 
ask for general opinions on the current state of the Stakeholder pension and how it has 
lived up to the intended vision. 
I wish to thank you very much for this opportunity and I look forward to our discussion. 
I will not be recording the conversation. 
Theme One: The Stakeholder Pension and its Origins 
1. Briefly, what was the purpose of the Stakeholder approach to Pensions 
(specifically) and Welfare (Generally)? 
Old ideas in new form. The Stakeholder concept was used to 
pick up the ears. To signify that this was not a one-way process, but that it was 
based on a partnership or new welfare contract. 
2. To what extent was the Stakeholder notion (and specifically the original 
Stakeholder pension idea) a reaction to the free-market philosophy and 
deregulatory developments of the 1980s? How did the Stakeholder approach 
differ from the idea of Popular or Shareholder Capitalism advocated by the 
Conservatives? 
Popular capitalism - home ownership. Sale of conservative houses. Own 
individual wealth. Darrendorf commission (?? ). Will Hutton was important 
here. 
3. Why was there a need, in your view, for a Stakeholder approach to capitalism 
and why was it necessary to include the private sector within this approach? 
I think what Mr Field was saying was that the private model could decentralise 
away from government, making things more cost-competitive. Instead of being 
cajoled by commission-led agencies, which would have a monopoly on prices. 
The private sector could be brought into make things work more efficient. This 
did not mean that governance would be privatised. This relates to the second 
368 
important factor here. State bureaucracy could contribute towards treating 
welfare as a means of giving out money to the poor, which is something that Mr 
Field has tried resist. Instead, people need to be able to fend for themselves in 
a collective way. In this way, the private sector could be brought in to create a 
much more efficient delivery system on a collective basis, that would limit the 
bureaucracy of the state, while holding or maintaining the democratic 
emphasis. In other words, Mr Field provides a different view of how to combine 
the private and public sector in to a collective sense of the world, which is 
being knocked down by the current privatisation scheme. Trying to create 
collective values. 
4. The new Labour emphasis on the utilisation of the private sector has been 
described as a Third Way approach to capitalism, combining free-markets with 
responsible governance. But to what extent was this change in philosophy based 
on the necessity to restructure New Labour towards the expectations of the 
middle class electorate and the consumer culture that had proliferated? 
Recognition of older generation. Warm phrases in order to entice the collective 
view. 
5. One of the interesting things about your Stakeholder concept was how there was, 
in your view, a pressing need to overcome `uncertainty' and `insecurity' 
(Making Welfare Work, 2001: p. 150), both of which had been facilitated by the 
Conservative years. One of the things which is interesting, is how your ideas 
linked universal private coverage to the performance of government bonds and 
equities. The stock market is notorious for its `uncertain' performance and 
financial institutions have generally raised the level of `insecurity' with regard to 
personal pensions (e. g. mis-selling). The question, therefore, is what 
assumptions/variables were factored into your ideas of a Stakeholder model so 
that it was implemented with the assurance of creating `security' and `certainty'? 
Was this mostly based on the function of the `Stakeholder' Private Pension 
Corporation? 
The level of insecurity heightened as job insecurity increased. Uncertainty on 
the other hand would be challenged by PA YGO and Collective Funded Pension 
System alongside. The advantages of the collective scheme are that risks are 
shared between different backgrounds and over time. Share risk and pooling 
risk in a collective sense. Key question of Pension Reform Group: How do you 
recreate the sense of collective partnership. 
Mr Field also suggested that it was one of luck whether one would be in a 
favourable position or not, regarding the investment of pensions. This is 
precisely why collective fund was supposed to deal with this level of 
uncertainty, because it would invest on a considered approach of the future 
investment choices, which is completely antithetical to what is happening now. 
Another important point is that we talked of privatisation'. People have 
accused Field of further privatising pensions. But that is not true. Field 
advocated to have the private sector play a role under a highly accountable 
public body that would limit uncertainty. 
369 
Theme Two: Theory versus practice 
6. Why is it that your particular ideas towards Stakeholder Pensions were not 
implemented and was it truly `Thinking the Unthinkable? ' 
7. While you were Minister, which groups or vested interests resisted your ideas 
the most and why? 
8. What is the main difference between the stakeholder model you advocated and 
the model in place now? 
9. If you could wave a magic wand, what parts of the Stakeholder pensions model 
would you change today and why? 
10. In `Making Welfare Work' you advocated universal private pension coverage. 
Why is it, do you think, that the government has preferred the voluntary system 
of private pension coverage? What in your view motivates the voluntary 
preference and will it last? 
Brown - different approach to welfare completely. Believes that paying out to the 
poor and maintaining means testing is ok, especially under pension credit. 
Compares Brown to Lloyd George. I think what Field suggests is that the Treasury 
is important here in maintaining a simple and short-termist view of how to deal with 
pensions and welfare. Not thinking long-term. Questions remains as to whether this 
is about issues of cost. The point was also made that efforts on pensions were made 
in the last 12 weeks of Mr Fields position from where Stakeholders began to take 
shape. This kind of raises questions of priority. Field thinks that Brown looks upon 
Welfare with a one-dimensional view. This view seems to be one of paying out to the 
poor, providing short-term poor relief, as opposed to an approach that encourages 
distribution, providing incentives for the rich that also maintain the needs of the 
poor. Brown was determined that the original stakeholding idea was not going to 
happen. On this issue, Field argued that one of the problems was that it was hard to 
get across to people how to argue for a greater role and participation of the private 
sector, without placing an emphasis too much on privatisation. Here, it would seem 
that there is still a problem with the public/private dichotomy and how arguing for a 
particular relationship between them can face particular difficulties. It can't be 
stressed enough how the Treasury has an influence here in organising the pensions 
according to Field. See article he wrote on his website. Another aspect that was 
concerning to Field was the extent to which Blair encouraged good ideas, but did 
not follow them through. 
Theme Three: Relationship with the financial sector 
11. During your time as Minister of State in the Department of Social Security, what 
kind of relationship did you have with the financial community at the time? 
12. How did the financial community perceive your ideas for reform and how much 
time did you spend working with the financial community on your ideas? 
13. What are your thoughts on the financial sector and how influential is the 
financial sector in shaping regulatory and social policies towards pensions? 
14. To what extent do you think that current Government policy towards 
Stakeholder Pensions is influenced by the interests of the financial sector? 
15. If it is influenced, how does it influence and why does the Government trail the 
wishes of the financial sector? 
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Thought that financial sector played a role. He thought that he had a good relationship 
with financial sector. On this issue, Stakeholders would bring in business. But Field also 
pointed to something on the relationship between the stakeholding minimum and the 
pension credit. 
Theme Four: Private Pensions and Social Inclusion 
Context for questions 17 to 20: 
William Beverage made an interesting comment with regard to the commodification of 
19th and 20th century insurance when he argued that `life assurance among people with 
limited means, is so different from most other commodities that it cannot be safely 
treated as an article of commerce' (quoted in O'Malley, 2002, p. 105). 
The Pensions Commission with regard to the contemporary situation said something 
similar, except with a different emphasis: 
`The issue which therefore needs to be debated... is whether this implies that 
there is a segment of the pension market, comprised of lower income savers and 
people working for small firms, to which a free market will never be able to sell 
pension products profitably except at RIYs [reduction in yields] which make 
saving unattractive' (PC, 2004: 224). 
Ron Sandler in a recent discussion (2004) with the HM Treasury Committee on `Long- 
term Saving' recently argued, highlighting the concerns of both Beverage and Turner 
that: 
`I come back to the fundamental point that a system which has weak consumers, 
conflicted advisers, inherently complex products and a commission-led incentive 
process for sales is almost certain to produce at the margins the sale of 
unsuitable products. The more the system is tightened up - which is in many 
respects a desirable thing - the more cost is added to the process and more 
saving is made uneconomic for the smaller saver' (Ron Sandler, 2004). 
16. The question I want to ask therefore is can a private Stakeholder model ever 
promote the interests of the socially excluded, without either mis-selling or 
inefficiencies? 
One of the things about depolarisation is that it will make the industry more 
competitive by forcing IFAs to be clear about their relationship to certain kinds 
of providers, creating clarity over fees and commission, while at the same time 
offering the most suitable products. As far as I know, depolarisation will cover 
the whole industry including Friendly Societies. One of the positive things about 
Friendly Societies is that they can offer low commission levels. But one of the 
implications of depolarisation is that marketing will come into play, much like it 
did before Prime Minister Gladstone (1865) set -up a state-run fully 
contributory life insurance system designed to drive industrial insurance 
companies from the market, which was linked to the post-ofce. 
17. I noted in `Making Welfare Work' that you were critical of William Beverage 
and his criticisms of Friendly Societies (despite as you noted his ironic sympathy 
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for them). But is their return in addition to de-polarisation a good thing in light 
of a fresh concern towards social inclusion and future cases of mis-selling? 
18. Or more specifically, can the voluntary system under the private model ever 
create social inclusion? 
As I understand it, the private model forecasts their level of revenue based on 
two things, the level of contributions and the level of persistency. In the initial 
stages, even if these two factors are accounted for, market institutions will only 
begin generating cash flow after a certain period. As institutions will have to use 
their own assets to cover costs. 
19. Lastly, why is it so difficult to create welfare alternatives that are based on 
accountability and altruism? 
Does not believe that private pensions on their current level can create social 
inclusion because of issues such as the pension credit, maintaining means 
testing, and increasing the cost of contributions for the poor. Stakeholders have 
turned into a safe haven for those looking for a safe haven for their money. 
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11. Notes 
1 Distancing himself from the Western rationalist tradition that has maintained truth as essence, Martin 
Heidegger reverted to the Ancient Greek concept of truth as 'unhiddenness' in order to debunk 
conventional wisdom (Heidegger, 1988/2002). 
2 Rainya Chume from West Africa visited England in 2006 while staying at friends and made this 
statement. 
3 `Far beyond' traditional history `with its concern for the short time span, for the individual and the 
event' we find a history `capable of traversing even greater distances, a history to be measured in 
centuries this time: the history of the long, even of the very long time span, of the long duree' (Braudel, 
1980: 27). 
4 Monetary expansion occurred between 1926 and 1929 and monetary contraction between 1931-33 
(Economist, September 21" 2002: 20). 
5 This is the title of Hobsbawm's third chapter in The Age of Extremes (1995). 
6 The Triffin Dilemma was named after Robert Triffm's observation made in 1947 that the Bretton Woods 
system would depend on the US balance of payments deficit, which would cause an excess growth of 
foreign dollar balances relative to US gold reserves, calling into the question the convertibility of US 
dollars. De Gaulle saw the Greenback's reserve currency status as an `exorbitant privilege'. 
7 In this research Pontusson (1995) compares the performance of Liberal Market Economies (US, UK, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada) with Continental Social Market Economies (Germany, Belgium, 
Austria, Netherlands, Switzerland) and Nordic Social Market Economies (Demark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden) in an effort to demystify the myth of `equality versus efficiency'. 
8 At the end of the 1950s, Britain's economy was worth £320 billion pounds annually (BBC, 2006). 
9 During my time at Newcastle University I worked as a part-time researcher at the Small Enterprise 
Research Unit that looked at the implementation of work-life balance policies and gender inequalities. On 
the whole, a lot of the research at the time provided a very dim view of self-employed forms of work 
arguing that it created problems for the individual in the areas of health and safety, social security and 
employment certainty. 
10 Go to, http_//www. statistics. jzov. uk. uk/pdfdir/msuk0507. pdf 
I heard this concept in a seminar discussion at one time led by Barry Gills, but I can't give the exact 
reference for it. It basically refers to the idea, similar to Germain's (1996), that hegemony is not state- 
centred in spatial terms. It is actually an amalgam of different economic institutions and ideas that have 
spun out at the end of the cold war, as a result of various state attempts, especially in the West i. e. US and 
UK, to benefit from transnational economic activities in order to reinvigorate domestic economic growth. 
From a critical point of view it is an ideology underpinned by free-market logic and assumptions, which 
continues to spin out the realist notion of `Liberal Democracy' as the final model of human freedom. 
From a post-colonial point of view, it is another example of Western standards of superiority and 
ethnocentricity re-imposing their will over other alternative forms of global governance. 
12 Unlike any other period in history that relied on one financial center (e. g. Amsterdam, London, New 
York) as the credit recycling city-mechanism for the world economy, the spatiality of contemporary world 
practices, according to Langley (2002), has followed a 'centralisation-decentralisation-(re)centralisation' 
dynamic, so that the World Financial Centers of London, Tokyo and New York act as a regional 'triad' 
that performs in concordance with off-shore financial centers with 'no single PFC' likely to 'dominate at 
31 
esent' (Langley, 2002: 94). 
ICTs have enabled firms to be much more flexible and global in their productive approaches to 
procurement, manufacturing, assembly, logistics, management and R&D. Companies are not only 
competing on the quality and design of the product, but issues such as delivery time and procurement, 
which have placed an emphasis on the running costs of administration and customer service. While ICTs 
have certainly made labour costs more efficient in manufacturing, especially in Western nations, ICTs 
have not necessarily reduced the costs of production overall because the amount of productive 
considerations has actually increased. But ICTs have certainly allowed for companies to spread their 
production structures or supply chains across cost efficient national economies, which have also embraced 
'informationalism' as part of the global state strategy to pursue. For example, as ICTs have hooked up 
rich nations in the West with emerging nations in the East, the 'combination of technology and 
management know-how' has encouraged firms to 'outsource' core productive functions, such as IT 
services or administration, to cheaper well qualified firms within the emerging economies. 
14 According to a recent report, for every dollar American firms spend on service work in India, the US 
economy receives $1.14 in return. It is important to remember that 'remote' work is underpinned by the 
economic principles of competitive advantage and flexible labour markets. It's no wonder then that 80-90 
percent of all remote service work in India comes from either Britain or America. 
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15 George Soros is now famous for his ethical writings on the global economy, an irony, because he 
became a household name, especially amongst academics, financiers and politicians, for his management 
of a hedge fund that profited $lbillion from a speculative attack against an overvalued pound sterling, 
when Britain was trying to align its currency to Europe's Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in its first 
steps to join the Euro currency. Losing £15 billion trying to prop up sterling and raising interest rates to 
15 percent, the Major Government was forced to pull out of ERM and devalue its currency. Politically, 
ERM had a devastating effect. 
16 Throughout my research and conversations with everyday folk, people have consistently made 
reference to the stock market as being solely constituted by companies and their share prices, or have 
reiterated the common perception that the stock market solely provides finance in return for public equity. 
This is true, but it misses the micro-political reasons for floating, re-issuing and buying back shares, but 
more importantly, it ignores all the other forms of debt securities, in addition to their derivative forms, 
that are raised and then traded on the stock market. There is a feeling that this perception could have 
something to do with the mass privatizations of national companies such as BP, British Gas or BT during 
the 1980s, where ordinary people were invited by the government to share in their policy of `popular 
capitalism' or `shareholder democracy'. The significance of this is that ordinary people remain oblivious 
to important financial trends that figure outside their range of perception and understanding, when they 
don't quite realize that the other forms of financing, the other securities listed on the stock market, are 
where their money is going. Perhaps if people cared less about how much their savings returned and more 
about where their savings were going, there would be more accountability between experts and people, 
between politicians and experts. 
17 Tables thirteen and fourteen are not specifically Stock Market listed firms. They are an aggregate of all 
manufacturing and non-financial service sector activity in the UK economy. Some will be listed, some 
will not. But this nevertheless gives us an understanding of the interrelation of activity between corporate 
profitability and investment in the real economy, and trading in the stock market. 
$ To be fair to the social accountants they argue that coupon pool capitalism is `not the secondary market 
in issued shares or the secondary and primary markets together because it includes all coupon investment 
opportunities, including bonds, venture capital and securitised paper. The size and composition of the 
coupon pool influences the behaviour of households or, at least, those households which save/invest on a 
significant scale' (Froud et al, 2002: 78). While the social accountants provide an explicit account of the 
relationships and effects of activity in the equity coupon pool, they do not explicitly look at how the other 
coupons and the institutions that trade them fit in with their analysis. It is a small point, but one worth 
looking into because there is a historical momentum to fmancialisation that is linked to the intensification 
of its core logics. 
19 In the traditional banking model, banks act as an intermediary between depositors and borrowers, so 
that savings are rewarded through a rate of interest on deposits that are then used to supply borrowers with 
credit at a higher rate of interest, allowing banks to pocket the difference. Given that borrowers are far 
more likely than depositors to fail this contract and given that lending is a scrupulous process, such a 
model is well justified. However, since the 1970s, this traditional banking model has been under attack 
and is now a marginal method of banking revenue and debt financing in comparison to other areas of 
financial growth and intermediation19. One of the key differences between bank lending and bond 
financing is that the former is based on much shorter time horizons than the latter. For example, money 
markets typically lend short-term loans with maturities of anything between a few hours or a few years, 
but because the transactions costs are high, the amount of lending involved tends to be high also. In other 
words, the benefits of lending have to outweigh the costs of doing so. This is an issue for bankers because 
lending is a risky business and requires a high degree of assessment, not only of creditworthiness, but in 
terms of liability safeguards and supervision. Under the Basel agreement on international banking 
regulations established in 1988, international banks have been obliged to put aside 8 percent of spare 
capital aside for every penny lent. The other difference is that the value of specific amounts of bank 
lending does not change over time or due to volatilities. Whatever is lent is returned at a specified date in 
addition to compound interest. In contrast, the price, yield and value of a security or bond changes in 
relation to the vagaries of capital market transactions. Bank lending is of course perfectly acceptable when 
there is an assured sense of diligence and monitoring of loans, but the integrity and robustness of this 
most basic method has succumbed time and again to periods of recession, competition and speculation. 
20 For example, the traditional method of banking, both domestically and internationally, received a 
hammering in the 1970s and 1980s when international banks in the West massively over-lent to third 
world nations and emerging markets creating a massive debt over-hang that became known as the 
international debt crisis (Aliber, 2002: 179-195). Over the long course of the 1970s and 1980s, the 
transition from geo-economic inclusion to exclusion (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997) and from financial 
compartmentalization to competition (Cerny, 1994) in the international financial system caused two 
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upsets in the UK that changed financial services and the monetary system forever. For example, in the 
1970s, `fringe' banks, a relatively new institution began a trend in the UK of property inspired over- 
lending. Such banks over-borrowed from short-term money markets, a form of unsecured lending, and 
over-lent to property developers and mortgage lenders in the 1970s, on the twin assumption that they 
could re-borrow at favourable rates and where property values would stay buoyant (Roberts, 2004). In the 
1970s, the UK faced their first biggest domestic banking crisis called the `secondary banking crisis' when 
the 1970s recession caused credit rates to tighten and property values to crash (Roberts, 2004). This 
episode was one half of a development that signaled the end of traditional banking and the case-by-case 
assessment of creditworthiness; and partly explains why unsecured lending was replaced with secured 
lending in competitive credit conditions, an `illusory' approach that secured loans against the value of the 
asset that was being financed (Warburton, 2000: 58). Global financial re-regulation in the 1980s, led by 
Thatcher, was motivated by an attempt to `integrate British financial institutions better with international 
financial markets' (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997: 209: Roberts, 2004), making Britain more competitive as a 
financial entrepot, and in doing so, forced clearing banks to compete with other financial institutions such 
as building societies in the area of personal finance, or merchant banks and securities brokers in the areas 
of corporate finance (Cerny, 1994). In the 1980s, the international debt crises was compounded by another 
domestic property crash, this time led by clearing banks and building societies, and as interest rates 
heightened through a general policy of monetarism in the 1980s and 1990s to control and minimize 
inflation, government's all over the world began to tap the bond markets for long-term financing 
(Warburton, 2000: 60). 'In essence', as Warburton argued, `government borrowing in the bond market 
replaced consumer borrowing from the banks' (ibid, 2000: 60). International banks and their lending 
practices, which had once dominated the international financial system, were forced to consolidate and 
strengthen their assets and re-think the new financial climate that had over-taken them (Warburton, 2000: 
53-69). Leyshon and Thrift described what happened in the aftermath as the financial sector's second 
'flight to quality' (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997: 200) as the financial sector as a whole transformed itself 
through disintermediation/securitisation; financial market integration or what Cerny (1994) called 'de- 
compartmentalisation'; financial capital centralization or monopolization; and financial re-regulation 
(ibid: 204-205). 
21 Please see 'national debt' at: www. dmo. og v_uk. 
22 For an understanding of monetisation please see the glossary of terms at the beginning of this thesis. In 
simple terms and reflecting the sentiments of Warburton (2000), had the government decided on a policy 
of monetisation, as opposed to bond market financing, the increasing supply of money would not have 
been matched with money demand as ordinary households and banks, after the 1980s property crash, 
would have been forced to repair their balance sheets. Or else, the increasing supply of money through 
monetisation would have been counter-balanced by high interest rates to control inflation and the need to 
increase the value of sterling. Like an episode of 'back to the future', Warburton (2000) argues that all in 
all, the economy would have been forced to re-find that typically British and reserved respect for money 
that was lost during the spending spree of the 1980s, a respect that was finally lost according to 
Warburton, when the UK government took the lead in taking the state's budget off the balance sheet, 
increasing its potential to borrow from the financial markets, at the very same time that it was fuelling its 
institutional growth through financial de-regulation. As a result, respect for money has dissolved at the 
same time that our avarice appetite for unsecured goods has increased, at the same time that the level of 
debt, both in the financial markets and closer to home has proliferated, necessitating for its careful private 
management and its dumbing down by the experts, reflecting the general level of attention and ignorance 
by ordinary people about the size and obscurity of global debt and the implications 'if it all comes 
crashing down. 
23 There is a certain hilarity to this notion of low inflation economic growth, because essentially economic 
growth, the expansion of gross domestic product and income, should invariably raise the distributional 
share of income per head, but today's economy as we have shown already, tends to place an emphasis on 
sectors that do not inspire wages to grow in proportion to profitability i. e. service sector growth, or else 
emphasis is placed on technology sectors that are too small to be effective in aggregate terms, and lastly, 
the financial sector has a great disparity in wage rates and is concentrated geo-economically. Where 
affordable necessities and commodities are lacking, especially in highly populated income areas, finance 
is used to fill in the gaps, which is a tenuous implication, because interest rate rises, used to control 
inflation hit low and mid income earners first. All in all, Britain's economy is built to draw in social 
terms, not to win, which means that the status quo is good and designed to constrain economic 
politicization and increase the suggestion of individual responsibility, even though it is structurally 
imposed; and this reflects the kind of bland politics and social naivete that is at the heart of British politics 
today, in addition to an implicit and contrived imperial superiority that pays no real attention to what 
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Britain's economy is founded upon or how Britain compares to other countries that will soon catch up in 
more than economic terms. 
24 There a number of reasons for this. Firstly and fundamentally speaking, imagine a fmancial system that 
continually issues new forms of debt in the form of securities, whether it be government debt or mortgage 
debt, which are then repackaged (folding in other obligations) or simply traded at different yield values 
reflecting their underlying reward for the price of risk. Bear in mind however that a government security, 
such as a UK Gilt or US Treasury bond pays less of a dividend than a corporate security, such as one 
issued by GM motors, because the likeliness of default is greatest for those without the resources of the 
state. The financial system is constantly competing on the cost or yield value of financial instruments that 
are sold in the global financial market place. There are always borrowers that require a low cost of interest 
and lenders (or investors) that require a high yield. But there are always borrowers ineligible for the 
lowest debt obligation and there are always lenders willing to take the risk of their capital being used in 
exchange for a higher return. Very much like Marx's discussion of commodities in the initial chapters of 
Capital, as long as debt issuance can create pricing differentials and as long as such debt can be traded to 
match appropriate demands, the enveloping of debt through the fmancial market and its secondary trading 
can constantly suppress and compete away what it costs to lend money. In essence then, the bond market 
is very much like a game musical chairs. As long as there are enough chairs or borrowers to sit on when 
the music is playing, then lenders are always secure in the knowledge that they can call in their loans for 
support. But if debt issuance and speculative trading begins to inflate the amount of people, investors and 
assets running around the chairs, things can get pensive and profoundly unstable if lenders can't find a 
chair when the music stops. 
25 Quote taken electronically from Part Three, Chapter 8, paragraph 41, at 
h": //www. econlib. orvAibrary/Kniizht/knRUP. htnil 
26 As Bum meticulously documents, even throughout the Bretton Woods era, private and public officials 
seemingly operated in a network of monetary governance and persistently favoured a sympathetic view of 
the City and its heritage as an international financial centre poised to take advantage of international 
capital movements. 
27 For example, America's pivotal industrial might after World War two ensured that massive public and 
commercial investment in Europe ignited European and East Asian trade and growth, solidifying trading 
links to the US and the dollar as the reserve currency, leading to De Gaulle's criticism of America's 
`exorbitant privilege'. As the US balance-of-payments deficit deepened, international reserves of US 
dollars increased relative to US gold reserves making convertibility increasingly tenuous. As European 
growth continued, the Eurodollar markets emerged on the back of surplus money created through 
American exports strengthening the off-shore role of US and European banks for funding balance of 
payment deficits. As America pursued its role as world policeman and as the US state increasingly tried to 
strengthen its payments deficits through various capital controls, this actually encouraged the privatisation 
of the monetary system and development of the Euromarkets, from where US banks had a competitive 
advantage. 
28 This point came out in a debate between de Goede (2003) and Laffey (2004). 
29 Bourdieu (1998: 92-109) argues that `practices are always double truths' in an economy of symbolic 
exchange, rendering 'a contradiction between subjective truth and objective reality', where individual 
`self-deception is sustained by a collective self-deception, a veritable collective misrecognition is 
inscribed in mental structures and in mental structures, excluding the possibility of thinking or acting 
otherwise'. 
30 I came across this concept years ago in a lecture by David Campbell of now Durham University. I did 
not understand it all then, and now I hope I can borrow it in order to denote my own usage. 
31 In his history of post-war Europe, Tony Judd described the 1970s as the decade of `diminished 
expectations' and the most `dispiriting decade of the twentieth century' (Judd, 2007: 477) 
32 I rely here on a document called `Monetary Policy in the UK since the Second World War' by Gavin 
Cameron, whom plots the different stages of monetary policy in the post-war period (e. g.: 1945-1947 = 
cheap money/1948-1951 = `Neutral' Policy/1951-1960 = The `New' Monetary Policy/1960-1971 = 
Special Deposits/1971-1973 = Competition and Credit Control. 
3 For example, Hobsbawm argued that over the course of the 19th century prices had continually fallen 
and were lower at any other period at the end of century, where `the mere word inflation was enough to 
describe what we now call `hyper-inflation" (Hobsbawm, 1995: 89). Increasing demands on the state by 
social forces meant that the state, during the early 20th century, now acted in ways haut finance did not 
understand (cf. Eichengreen, 1996: Cox, 1987). 
34 In May 2005, the target was an annual inflation rate of the Consumer Price Index of 2 percent (Bank of 
England, 2005) 
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In May 2005, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) based on the Consumer Price Index of 2 percent. 
35 In 1978 net investment in domestic equities by British institutional investors equalled £1.9 billion and 
£459 million in foreign shares. By 1982, this was £2.4 billion and £2.9 billion respectively (Roberts, 
2004: 41). 
36 The monetary target shifted from M3 to MO which meant that monetary targeting no longer existed 
despite the intention (Cameron, 2004). 
37 In 2005, this was measured by the Consumer Price Index (Bank of England, 2005). 
38 Post-war unemployment averaged 2 percent (Guardian, 2002). 
39 Source: Office for National Statistics, at http: //www. statistics. gov. uk/statbase/TSDdownload2asp 
40Source: Office for National Statistics. In 2006, Government deficit was 2.7 percent of GDP or £35.4 
billion. Go to, http: //www. statistics. gov. uk/cci/nug eg t_asp? id=27 
41 1 have taken these figures from Blake (2000) who does not see it the way I do, because he argues that 
his 'figures indicate that 72 percent of supplementary pension scheme members in 1996 were SERPS or 
an occupational scheme and 28 percent were in personal pension schemes' (ibid.: 225). Upon a closer 
inspection, the private sector is larger than the state sector. 
42 The spouse's member's pension entitlement was also cut in half (Blake, 2000: 226). 
43 Correspondence with Michael Nassirr, a private investigator in the case against Equitable Life. 
44 This was surely the case in the 18"' century where individuals speculated on the lives of (sometimes 
random) others, whose lives were identified as posing a risk and an opportunity of return (Clarke, 1999: 
2002). As Clarke's (2002) study of 18`h century insurance demonstrates, moral reflection was the outcome 
of speculative failures and provoked the creation of a more collective and ethical approach to insurance 
that developed in the spirit of scientific advance and political freedom. While insurance is constituted by 
its potential to manage the uncertain, the uncertain is also built into insurance so that potential dangers can 
be managed if they are realised. Given that risk is also 'collective', Ewald's implicitly saying that 
insurance also manages the uncertain as well as calculating risks (Ewald, 1991: 202). 
45 In 1984, a good 27 years after Equitable Life had been selling conventional with profit policies (CWPs) 
the government abolished the Life Assurance Premium Relief (HM Treasury, 2002b: 153-157). However, 
the 'qualifying regime', which had been introduced alongside the tax break remained in place and has so 
far given unfair advantages to high-income earners who have been able to pay more into their fund and 
guarantee a fixed period of saving (HM Treasury, 2002b: 153-157). The effect recognised by the Sandier 
report (ibid. ) has been to make the life assurance tax regime 'regressive' (ibid.: 2002: 155). 
46 Shelly, M (2002) 'Regulation of UK Life Insurers by appointed actuaries monitoring Policyholder's 
Reasonable Expectations', attained from web in 2001. See Shelly et. al., where the authors make the same 
4point 
(2002). 
7 Correspondence with member of EMAG and retired solicitor. 
48 Interview with leading public investigator into Equitable Life. Name Anonymous. 
49 Interview with leading public investigator into Equitable Life. Name Anonymous. 
50 Interview with investigator and verified by questionnaire responses. 
51 Interview with leading public official investigating Equitable Life. 
52 As the Penrose report stated, 'the change of practice introduced in 1990 released £557 of surplus in a 
year when the society had suffered negative investment returns. The society was enabled to allocate a 
substantial rate of return to policyholders for 1990 and 1991' (Penrose, 2004: 140-170). 
53 Office for National Statistics 2007, 'Pension Trends', www. ons. co. uk. 
54 Office for National Statistics 2007, 'Pension Trends', www. ons. co. uk. 
55 See Erza (1980), Lillevold and Eyland (2004) and Booth (1999) for excellent and simple descriptions. 
56 The 'aggregate method' and 'discontinuance target method' have been popularly used in the funding 
approaches to UK pension funds. The former takes the full value of the benefits due on their remaining 
service and discounts their value minus the assets to produce the extent of the liabilities in a closed 
pension fund model. The later fixes the time of the benefits, commonly 20 years and makes assumptions 
on new entrants, so as to smooth fund solvency in attempt to 'equalise the generations'. The latter is more 
of an American usage and treats each year as a separate entity. It 'takes the benefit each year, based on 
current salary, valuing that and paying the result as normal contribution' (Colbran, 1982: p. 363). It is 
interesting to note that the US approach is more likely to meet the interests of the accountants accrual 
concept, unlike the UK approaches, which would suggest the US approaches are more in touch with 
accounting principles. 
57 I have lost the reference for this quote. I believe it is in Puckridge (1948). 
58 Correspondence to the Editors of the Journal of the Institute of Actuaries 1958 by S. M. Thompson on 
'Equity Linked Products' (1958: 141). 
59 Lost reference. Please see Scholey (1969). 
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60 Booth et al (1999) argued that the `The purpose of using a stochastic investment model is to enable 
more complex problems to be analysed by simulation than can be analysed mathematically: the stochastic 
investment model can be used to simulate probability distributions of future investment returns, where is 
it not possible to find an analytical distribution. It is therefore possible to obtain measures of variability 
using stochastic models, which is not possible using a deterministic approach' (Booth et al, 1999: p. 113). 
61 The Myners (2001) review surveyed 226 trustees and 75 scheme administrators. As the report made 
clear, 'many trustees currently bring very limited time and expertise to their investment responsibilities'. 
The reports finding are summarised: 62% had no investment qualifications; 26% received less than one 
days training when first appointed; 69% received less than two days; 54% had no investment committee 
or in-house professionals to help them on investment matters; 44% did not attend any training courses; 
49% spent less than three hours on preparing investment matters. 
62 Discussion with consulting actuary, July 2005. 
63 Interview with Frank Field, July 2005. 
' Interview with Frank Field, July 2005. 
65 Frank Field (interview) argued that the private model could decentralise away from government, 
making things more cost-competitive. Instead of being cajoled by commission-led agencies, which would 
have a monopoly on prices, the private sector could be brought into make things work more efficient. This 
did not mean that governance would be privatised. This relates to the second important factor here. State 
bureaucracy could contribute towards treating welfare as a means of giving out money to the poor, which 
is something that Mr Field has tried resist. Instead, people need to be able to fend for themselves in a 
collective way. In this way, the private sector could be brought in to create a much more efficient delivery 
system on a collective basis, that would limit the state, while holding or maintaining the democratic 
emphasis. In other words, Mr Field takes a much more nuanced view of how to combine the private and 
public sector in to a collective sense of the world, which is being knocked down by the current 
privatisation scheme. Trying to create collective values in the tradition of Friendly Societies. 
66 Storey does not come from a transhistorical point of view. His view follows Hall's that identities are 
sutured through discursive practices. 
67 Initial figures from Abbey National support this view although it is not known how sustainable this is as 
a development. As Abbey's figures suggest, 'new business premiums for investments' has fallen from 
£866m in 2002 to £476m in 2004. This is contrasted against 'new business premiums for pensions' which 
have fallen from £1,342m in 2002 to £292m in 1004. This shows in both cases a dramatic loss of business 
in both investments and pensions. But it shows that the business of investment has overtaken pensions by 
nearly £200m. 
68 I attended a financial planning seminar by a well known pension provider where the expert openly said 
that there was no money in selling the Stakeholder product to me. He then told me I would receive a 
follow up call. I didn't receive one. 
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